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ABSTRACT
The thesis applies a political economy approach to the study of how institutions 
and geography explain the development of a commodity chain. Focusing on the Brazilian 
Amazon from 1870 to 1910, the analysis develops a new theoretical framework 
constructed by combining standard trade models with institutions and economic 
geography. There are two levels of analysis: interactions among, and within, different 
nodes of the commodity chain. A quantitative-driven analysis from macroeconomic data 
supports inferences from microeconomic behaviour. The thesis provides new information 
on rubber prices and exports, trader ledgers, estate accounts, newspapers, travellers 
accounts, and official documents.
The research develops a demand- and supply-side analysis of the history of 
rubber, from tappers to manufacturers. It features the main rubber manufacturing 
countries, Britain and the USA, and shows how competition prevailed along the chain, 
translating into a struggle for rubber supply. Rubber was not a homogeneous product. 
Due to a combination of quantity and quality, the Brazilian Amazon possessed significant 
market power, market power that shaped the rubber chain. In this light, the thesis 
investigates how the Brazilian rubber supply chain was organised and how agents profited 
from its monopolistic position. It also shows that taxation increased the regional welfare 
and allowed the government to support two related activities: telegraphs and shipping.
The thesis proves that violence and coercion were not necessary features of 
rubber production, as argued by much of the literature. Through a game-theoretic 
approach, the thesis demonstrates conditions under which production could have 
occurred without exploitation. In a context of high price-inelasticity of demand and rising 
prices, production was driven by market forces. Inelasticity of demand was indeed one of 
the main features of the rubber boom. It shaped production, bargaining power between 
different nodes of the chain and competition within them, defining the distribution of profits 
along the rubber chain.
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NOTE ON CURRENCY
From 1822 to 1942, Brazilian currency was denominated in milreis (or mil-reis), expressed 
as 1$000. One thousand milreis were known as conto de reis (or simply conto), expressed 
as 1:000$000. Therefore, the currency was not subdivided centesimally as most of other 
international currencies at the time but rather into millesimals.1
NOTE ON SPELLING
Because of changes in orthography, there were several different spellings for the same 
word in Portuguese. I maintained the original spellings in citations and names and used 
modern spellings in the text.
NOTE ON AMAZONIAN POLITICAL ORGANISATION
For the purposes of the thesis, the Brazilian Amazon is roughly comprised of the current 
Brazilian states of Para, Amapa, Amazonas, Roraima and Acre. During the rubber boom 
(1870-1910) these administrative units were organised into two larger ones: Amazonas 
(including Roraima) and Para (including Amapa). These two administrative units were 
called Provinces under the Empire (1822-1889) and States afterwards. Acre was not part 
of Brazil until 1903 when it was incorporated as a Federal Territory. See map below for 
current political organization of the Brazilian Republic where shaded areas represent the 
Amazon Region.
Amazonas CearaMaranhao
Rio\Grande do N orte 
Par a ib a 
Pernambuco
X ^A lagoas
,Sergipe
Piaui
Acre
Tocantins
Rondoma
Bahia
M ato-Grosso
Goias
M inas Gerais
Mato-Grosso 
do Sul ,
Esp lrito  Santo
Legend Sao Paulo
R io de Janeiro
Am azon Region
Parana
Santa Catarina
R io Grande 
Do Sul
Source: elaborated by me.
1 See Abreu and Lago (2001). I would like to thank Marcelo Abreu and Luiz Aranha Correa do Lago 
for revising this paragraph.
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INTRODUCTION
In the eighteenth century, the so-called Industrial Revolution began to change the 
Western World: beginning in England, it engendered an unprecedented social and 
economic transformation. At the heart of this transformation was the increase in 
productivity generated by the substitution of machines for human labour. It is difficult to 
summarise the several technical improvements that jointly explain the Industrial 
Revolution. However, the steam engine is undoubtedly paradigmatic. The usage of steam 
engines pushed the demand for coal whose supply, in turn, was increased by the 
(atmospheric) steam engine. More and cheaper coal further created a spur to the iron 
industry, another raw material of steam engines. Therefore, a virtuous cycle crystallised 
and, with it, the possibilities for application of steam engines seemed endless. This was 
particularly true in the textile industry where subsequent improvements in machinery 
pointed to an ever increasing productivity. The processing of textiles (as well as of several 
other manufactures) demanded a greater amount of chemical substances and, at the 
same time, the increasing in productivity meant that the market had to expand accordingly. 
Again, steam engines were instrumental: transport improvements (notably railways and 
steamships) caused a decline in transportation costs and consequently the market 
potential increased. An expansion of trade ensued connecting more and more areas 
around the globe, a process that was strengthened by declining tariffs, gold standard, 
higher capital mobility, migration and improvements in communication. However, only 
after Britain’s move towards free trade with the repeal of the Corn Laws (1846) and the 
Navigation Acts (1849) and the laying of submarine telegraphic cables across the English 
Channel (1851) did this cycle generated a true and enduring global trade boom: economic 
interconnectedness created a virtuous cycle in which falling transport costs, by shrinking 
economic distances, opened new areas to trade and to movement of people and, 
conversely, the increase in trade (and in migration) provided economies of scale that 
pushed transportation costs down. Conversely, the trade boom meant that industrial 
techniques were spreading from England to Continental Europe and a few other overseas 
areas.
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Rubber encapsulates this globalisation process brought about by the Industrial 
Revolution. This raw material is the cause and consequence of the Industrial Revolution. 
On the one hand, rubber partly explains the Industrial Revolution insofar as more efficient 
steam engines would hardly have been devised without rubber seals. Improved long­
distance communication would not have developed without rubber being applied for wire 
cladding, especially in submarine telegraphy. Some areas would have never thrived as 
markets for manufactures without the economic development and wealth brought about by 
rubber production. On the other hand, rubber is definitely a consequence of the Industrial 
Revolution as it is the result of developments in chemistry: only after a solution had been 
found to chemically stabilise this raw material, crude rubber became impervious to the 
weather, greatly expanding its industrial applications. Improvements in communication 
and shipping connected the producing areas with the main markets and the influx of 
people and capital boosted rubber production.
Developments in rubber trade have certainly mimicked the evolution of trade 
worldwide. Initially, the main rubber producing region, the Brazilian Amazon, was as far 
from Europe and the USA as it was from the Brazilian capital, Rio de Janeiro. This meant 
trade was a very costly, if not prohibitive, enterprise. However, due to developments in 
transportation, especially after the advent of steamships, distances (measured in terms of 
travel time) shrank by one-third and freight prices fell significantly as a proportion of the 
price of rubber. Communication between the Amazon and the rest of the world became 
more reliable and faster after the submarine telegraphic network was expanded up to 
Manaus city, located some 1,000 miles upriver, in the middle of the Amazon forest.
For the Brazilian Amazon, rubber production was fostered by forces that pushed 
the region towards integration into a wider economic domain. Initial demographic, 
geographic and economic conditions suggested that it was very unlikely that the region 
would have developed on its own, without an external impulse. Despite occupying over a 
third of South America its population amounted to only some 200,000 souls in 1850, less 
than 3% of Brazilian population (See Appendix). This population was completely isolated 
as their only connection with the rest of the country was by coastal shipping. Institutionally,
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the region stood closed to navigation of foreign flags and there was no regular steamship 
line connecting the port of Belem to other major ports in Brazil. Moreover, initially the 
region had very little to offer and thus no economic dynamism.
Rubber changed this state of affairs. From the 1860s onwards, rubber exports 
from Para rapidly exploded and this raw material became the second most important 
article of trade for Brazil, ranking just below coffee. According to official statistics (see 
Appendix), rubber exports were more than 16% of total Brazilian exports at the turn of the 
century and a quarter of total exports in 1910. Due to this rubber trade, despite high 
mortality rates, population increased six-fold from 1850 to 1910 whereas real income per 
capita increased 4-fold in the same period (see Appendix). As will be shown in this thesis, 
steam navigation and telegraphs gave rise to the rubber boom which, in turn, supported 
even further the development of (steam) navigation and the telegraphic system. 
Communication and steam navigation generated some integration, and the consequent 
movement of people (and other factors of production) and flow of information, created the 
conditions for further development of the rubber boom by supporting a virtuous cycle that 
completely changed the economic, political and social structures of the Brazilian Amazon.
These transformations were shaped by the pre-existing, but ever-evolving, 
institutional setting: even though the rubber economy can be seen as an inter-dependent 
microcosm in the world economy, its evolution was peculiar in several ways due to 
institutions. Societies have different technological (e.g. geographical location, useful 
knowledge, capital stock, etc.) and non-technological (law and enforcement methods, 
ways of allocating property rights, levels of corruption, and trust) features.2 These non- 
technological features are generally called institutions which are understood here as the 
rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction. They reduce uncertainty by providing structure to everyday life, 
defining and limiting the set of choices of individuals. Macroeconomically, they affect 
decisions about work, saving, investment, innovation, production and exchange and as
2 Greif (2006, p. 5).
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such have a significant impact on economic outcomes.3 This is especially true when the 
social and economic structures experience a sudden change due to exogenous and 
endogenous factors as it was the case of the Brazilian Amazon. Indeed, the decline in 
rubber production was even faster than its meteoric rise: from 1910 onwards Southeast 
Asian rubber plantations displaced Brazilian wild producers from the market. The Brazilian 
Amazon lost its near monopolistic position that it had held since the 1870s.
Geography was another important aspect of the rubber boom in the Brazilian 
Amazon. Rubber production was originally confined to the region around Belem. Due to 
the density of the Amazon Forest and the sheer size of the territory, rivers were the main 
arteries for transportation. The development of rubber production thus followed the 
contours of the Amazon River and its main tributaries. It spread westwards in the direction 
of Manaus located some 1,000 miles upriver. In 1870, Manaus was only a small village 
whose growth would depend entirely on rubber production. The city eventually became 
the second most important rubber hub, rivalling Belem’s long-established position in the 
rubber trade. Even though the rivers provided access to nearly all areas of the Brazilian 
Amazon (See Figure 1.1 below)4, production expanded mostly southwards due to the 
availability of hevea brasiliensis trees. As Chapter 3 will show, this tree provided the best 
rubber grade and tappers were continuously looking for hevea growing areas. In this 
search, Brazilian production would eventually cross national borders towards the Acre 
region which, until 1903, was de jure part of Bolivia. The region would be ultimately 
annexed into the Brazilian Federation as a consequence of the rubber boom.
3 North (1990).
4 Not all rivers were entirely navigable though. Sometimes they were too shallow for large vessels 
or they just had downfalls and rapids. However, even still, most of them were accessible by canoes.
12
Figure 1.1: Main Occurrence of Hevea Brasiliensis Trees in the Brazilian Amazon
Venezuela
Colom bia
Ecuador
M anaus
B o liv ia
B raz il
Source: Elaborated by me. Shade areas indicate main areas of occurrence of hevea brasiliensis trees within the Brazilian 
Amazon. The map is indicative only and do not intend to show precise areas of hevea concentration.
Rubber trees were seldom found in large concentrations, and ‘rubber estates’ 
generally spanned a large area.5 The area was usually accessible by a river and 
production was extremely labour-intensive. Rubber extraction technique varied according 
to the type of tree. In the case of trees from the hevea genus, predominantly found in the 
Brazilian Amazon (in the shaded area in Figure 1.1 above), the rubber tapper normally 
worked in two trails, each one on an alternate day to allow the trees to recover. The 
tapper would normally make two rounds. During the first, in the very early morning 
(around 3-4 am), he made some wounds in the tree with a small machete, fixing a cup to 
the tree an inch below the incision for the milky juice to flow into it. Then in the second
5 Over time large rubber estates became more and more common. However, especially in the older 
producing areas closer to Belem, several small rubber estates continued to produce rubber 
throughout the rubber boom. See Weinstein (1983, pp. 170-180).
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round, the latex was collected from the cups, poured into a bucket and carried back to his 
hut. He then ignited a buyon with a fire fuelled by palm nuts from whose top opening the 
smoke would normally come through. When the buyon attained a certain specific degree 
of heat, the tapper took up the bucket with the milk and removed it to the defumador which 
was a small room used for smoking the rubber, completely closed so that the wind could 
not interfere with the operation of curing. Curing, in turn, consisted in pouring the milk into 
a mould and then turning it round over the opening at the top of the buyon until the milk 
dried. The same operation was repeated until the milk was exhausted or the ball of solid 
rubber attained the desired size (normally not exceeding 50 lb.).6
H. Brasiliensis was the type of hevea mostly sought. It registered three varieties, 
namely: black, white and red. From the black hevea the finest rubber was prepared and its 
best quality was classified as ‘Fina Hard Para’ whilst its lower grade was denominated as 
‘Entre Fina’. The rubber produced from the white hevea was designated locally as weak, 
of which the best grades were called ‘Fraca Fina’. Crude rubber production methods 
hardly changed over the period 1870-1910.7 The production entailed a very harsh life, and 
the death toll was very high indeed. According to Woodroffe,
“(...) the seringueiro [rubber tapper] can only work during the summer or 
dry months, and this is precisely when the forests are unhealthy, and 
during this period the mortality among the seringueiros is enormous, 
due, among others, to the following causes:
(1) Paludic fevers and other diseases which have their origin in the 
damp heat and rotting vegetation.
(2) Beri-Beri, consumption, and diseases caused by chills acquired 
while working in the swampy seringals, through eating unhealthy food, 
the lack of hygienic air, and the insanitary surroundings generally.
6 Woodroffe (1916, pp. 41-44).
7 Akers (1912, pp. 3-4).
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(3) Chest diseases owing to the damp and aggravated by the 
inhalation of the dense smoke by which the rubber is cured.
(4) The presence of decaying vegetable and animal matter in the 
water which the seringueiro uses for his cooking and drinking purposes.
(5) The weakened and impoverished state o f his system owing to 
bad food and want of attention to even the most elementary laws of 
hygiene, and a variety of diseases peculiar to individuals. ”8
This development of the rubber boom in the Amazon is shrouded by myths and 
legends that reflect the high profits accrued in a region that was considered by most, a 
pre-capitalist society. In this context, Manaus Opera House is paradigmatic: the building is 
a monument to rubber bonanza. Inaugurated in December 1896, it is still preserved in its 
original style: eclectic and neo-classic architecture built with materials and a labour force 
brought from Europe. In Belem, the main rubber hub, another sumptuous theatre had 
been built from rubber proceeds some years earlier, the Theatro da Paz (Theatre of 
Peace). During the rubber boom, it was said that Manaus diamond consumption per 
capita was the largest in the world, men walked with canes topped in gold and silver, 
children went to school in Paris or Lausanne and almost 2,500 inhabitants took first-class 
tickets to Europe every year. Houses were decorated in Parisien style where “pre-dinner 
drinks were usually sipped from silver champagne goblets set on Carrara marble-topped 
tables with bases of solid gold”.9 In addition, it was also said that Havana cigars were lit 
with bank notes of 500 milreis (equivalent to 20 pounds at the 1900 exchange rate) and 
that every toothache was treated in Europe.10 Exaggeration or not, these descriptions of 
the rubber boom reflect the rapid wealth that flowed to the region from 1870 to 1910, 
capturing the imagination of many people around the world and fuelling immigration. 
Droughts in northeast Brazil contributed for the push of immigrants, especially cearenses
8 Woodroffe (1916, pp. 99-100).
9 Collier (1968, p. 22).
10 Prado and Capelato (1975, p. 300).
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(from Ceara State), who worked as rubber tappers but stories about the Amazon black 
gold, as rubber was nicknamed, also attracted foreign fortune seekers.
The whole story was not so bright though as there were several accusations of 
labour exploitation in Brazil and elsewhere. The most infamous case of labour exploitation 
was unveiled by Sir Roger Casement who brought to light the atrocities commited by the 
Abir Co. in the Belgium Congo. According to Casement,
“A careful investigation of the conditions of native life around the Lake 
[Mantumba] confirmed the truth of the statements made to me -  that the 
great decrease in population, the dirty and ill-kept towns, and the 
complete absence of goats, sheeps or fowls -  once very plentiful in this 
country -  were to be attributed above all else to the continued effort 
made during many years to compel the natives to work india-rubber.
Large bodies of native troops have been quartered in the district, and 
the punitive measures undertaken to this end had endured a 
considerable period. During the course of these operations there had 
been much loss of life, accompanied, I fear, by a somewhat mutilation of 
the dead, as proof that the soldiers had done their duty’’. 11
The Abir Co. had been incorporated in 1892, being granted exclusive rights to 
exploit all the products in a given area of the Belgium Congo for thirty years. Rubber was 
the chief product exported by the company and the people of the area were to collect wild 
rubber for the company in lieu of paying taxes to the State. Collection was enforced by 
giving the company rights of police. In return, Abir Co. gave the State half the shares and 
agreed to recruit soldiers and workers for the State.12 The company was very successful 
in exploiting its concession and by 1900, Abir dividends, duties and taxes accounted for
11 Correspondence and Report from His Majesty's Consul at Boma respecting the Administration of 
the Independent State of the Congo. No. 1 (Africa: Congo: Correspondence, pp. 247-248).
12 Harms (1975, p. 78).
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10% of overall Belgium State revenues and three years later, the company alone exported 
nearly a thousand tons of rubber.13
Congo’s atrocities would haunt rubber companies ever since. Casement himself 
would be at the centre of another furry of scandals relating to abuses in crude rubber 
production, this time in the Putumayo region. The Putumayo region is located at the 
borders of Colombia, Peru and Brazil, where the institutional frontier remained in dispute. 
Although atrocities against Putumayan Indians had been denounced by Colombian, 
Ecuadorian, Peruvian and US officials14, the case only aroused public attention thanks to
E. Hardenburg, who gathered evidence while in Peru. The ‘civilised’ public was then told 
that Indians were constantly beaten, enslaved, mutilated, tortured and slaughtered in 
order to placate Julio Cezar Arana’s greed for rubber.15 Arana was one of the largest 
rubber producers in the world who had reorganised his company in London as the 
Peruvian Amazon Co. (PAC) in 190716. His alleged control of the Putumayo region was 
the result of the closure of entire rivers to navigation that created de facto private police 
control over large traces of land. Since the company was a British concern and involved 
crimes committed by and against colonial nationals (mainly Barbadians), the British 
Foreign Office decided to verify the claims. Due to his previous work on the Congo, 
Casement, who was by then Consul-General in Rio de Janeiro, was summoned to 
proceed to the Putumayo region and gather evidence on these supposed atrocities. His 
conclusions were mainly based on the direct testimony of Barbados men in the PAC’s 
service. Casement claimed that,
“There was, moreover, the evidence of our own eyes and senses, for 
the Indians almost everywhere bore evidence of being flogged, in many
13 Harms (1975, p. 81).
14 Stanfield (1998, pp. 133-138).
15 Hardenburg (1913). His tales were actually published in a series of articles at the Tmth in 1909 
and only some years later transformed into a book. The cited book contains an account of the 
Putumayo region as well as translations from Peruvian newspapers at Iquitos and statements of 
Peruvians that allegedly confirm the atrocities. Additionally, in order to provide further evidence to 
his allegations, the book reprints Casement’s report.
16 Chapter 3 provides more detail on Arana’s businesses. Furthermore, the Appendix shows some 
data for his English concern, the Peruvian Amazon Co.
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cases of being brutally flogged, and the marks of the lash were not 
confined to men nor adults. Women, and even little children, were more 
than once found, their limbs scarred with weals left by the thong of 
twisted tapir-hide, which is the chief implement used for coercing and 
terrorising the native population of the region traversed.
The crimes charged against many men now in the employ o f the 
Peruvian Amazon Company are of the most atrocious kind, including 
murder, violation, and constant flogging.
The condition of things revealed is entirely disgraceful, and fully 
warrants the worst charges brought against the agents of the Peruvian 
Amazon Company and its methods of administration in the 
Putumayo. ”17
There are indications that Casement’s Report may have been somewhat biased18 
and the report neglects Indian traditions.19 The full analysis of the Putumayo scandal is 
outside the scope of this thesis though and there is an extensive literature dealing with it.20 
What is more relevant for the thesis is to understand how violence in the Putumayo was 
assumed to apply to rubber production everywhere, including Brazil. For instance, the 
idea that the violence perpetrated in the Putumayo was necessarily found in other areas 
of the Amazon was indeed stated in another report of the British Foreign Office:
17 Correspondence relating to the treatment of British Colonial subjects and native Indians 
employed in the collection of rubber in the Putumayo District, including Sir Roger Casement's 
Report. (Miscellaneous Papers n. 8, 1912: Putumayo, p. 2).
18 Despite the fact that Joseph Froude Woodroffe had been employed by the PAC during the period 
in which these crimes were supposedly committed, he made no mention to them in his 1914 book. 
The most ‘outrage’ violence that appeared in his book relates to an account of a rubber tapper who 
told him he had been eunuchised by Indians. See Woodroffe (1914, p. 58). See also Stanfield 
(1998, pp. 131-178).
According to Stanfield (1998), Some of the abuses Casement portrays are just a reflection of 
customary behave of native peoples there. Also, Casement takes Barbadian’s reports at face value 
as if he had pre-decided the source of wrongdoing. As usual by then, he shows prejudice against 
Peruvians (and other South American nationalities there).
20 For instance, see Hardenburg (1913), Collier (1968), Stanfield (1998), Serier (2000), and Lagos 
(2005). See also Peruvian Rubber and International Politics, American Review of Reviews, 1912.
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“But in the course of Inquiry your Committee have been impressed with 
the fact that ill-treatment of the Indians is not confined to the Putumayo. It 
appears, rather, that the Putumayo case is but a shockingly bad instance 
of conditions of treatment that are liable to be found over a wide area in 
South America. No doubt there are special features peculiar to the 
Putumayo problem, such as the dispute over the territorial sovereignty, 
which would not occur elsewhere. But the spirit of the ‘conquistador’ 
appears to be at work on other rivers. (...) It may be hoped that these 
depths of brutality are unparalleled elsewhere. But your Committee regret 
that they are unable to regard the ill-treatment of the Indians, of which the 
Putumayo case is an abominable instance, as an isolated 
phenomenon. ”21
Although the report makes no direct mention to Brazil, it speculates that similar 
violence may have been practiced there. British Diplomatic and Consular Reports do not 
show any evidence that violence was widespread in Brazil though. True, British diplomats 
had complained about mortality rates among rubber tappers, but the blame was invariably 
imposed on the Nature. For instance, in 1908 Roger Casement had decried about the lack 
of education and sanitary conditions in the Brazilian Amazon making him to ask himself: 
“( ..) it may be questioned whether the universal subjection of this population to the spell 
of rubber production is altogether good for the people or the future of their country”22. 
Some criticism surfaced later on as expressed by Consul G.B. Mitchell in 1914:
“Travellers arriving from the Acre report the acutest distress among the 
seringueiros [rubber tappers] of the territory. Many of those in the 
remoter parts are described as absolutely starving, and deaths from
21 Report and Special Report from the Committee on Putumayo, together with the Proceedings of 
the Committee, Minutes of Evidence and Appendices. Ordered by the House of Commons, 5th 
June 1913.
22 Brazil. Report for the Year 1907 and previous years on the trade of the consular district of Para. 
N. 4111 (Annual Series), p. 22.
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starvation have already been denounced. This is largely due to the 
impoverished condition of the rubber merchants, estate owners, and 
aviadors [intermediaries], who have been unable to furnish the usual 
supplies”.23
When this report was written, a final blow to Brazilian Amazon rubber production 
had long been laid as its production had been displaced by East-Asian plantation rubber 
after 1910. As rubber prices had plummeted and the region was facing an unprecedented 
crisis, Consul Mitchell’s criticisms were directed to starvation, apparently caused by the 
general state of crisis. If such event were common during the boom years, these reports 
from the Acre region might not have captured his attention in 1913 only. British Consular 
Reports for the Brazilian Amazon have never claimed that violence was the typical way of 
enforcing rubber production. Nonetheless, the literature on the Brazilian rubber boom 
evolved around the topic of exploitation. A very recent work summarises this idea:
“Those considered lazy were corrected, first through debt and diplomacy, 
later, as huge sums of money flowed unchecked, through intimidation, 
beatings, enslavement, and torture” 24
However, physical punishment seldom appears in contemporary descriptions. For 
instance, Yungjohann’s accounts of his experience as a rubber tapper do not contain a 
single episode in which he suffered physical punishment. Perhaps this is due to the fact 
that he was a successful tapper otherwise his accounts would have never reached us. 
The only instance in which he refers to physical punishment in the area refers to Indians 
being enslaved by Peruvians25 and punishment for theft26. Furthermore, when he decided 
to leave the area, he did not face any physical threat even though in the end he was
23 Brazil. Report for the Years 1910-12 and part of 1913 on the trade Para. N. 5262 (Annual Series), 
p. 15.
24 Jackson (2008, p. 114).
25 Yungjohann (1989, p. 50).
26 Yungjohann (1989, p. 73).
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amicably persuaded to stay for another season.27 In one occasion, rubber agents 
unsuccessfully tried to cheat him but, according to his accounts, he relied on other tappers 
to prevent it from happening.28
Therefore, despite some claims of cruelty, contemporary accounts only stressed 
the extreme economic exploitation of rubber tappers and denounced the credit channel as 
exploitative. For instance, in 1854 Sebastiao do Rego Barros, president of Para Province, 
stated that
“(...)
this difference [he referred to the trade balance surplus, highlighting that 
imports had doubled whereas exports had quadrupled from 1851-52 to 
1853-54] is the result of higher consumption of imported goods, the 
extremely high price of rubber and, consequently, the employment of 
almost every men into rubber extraction and production which impels us to 
buy first necessity goods, which we had produced once, from other 
Provinces. This is certainly bad since the high profits of rubber industry, 
which absorbs and annihilates every other industry, do not lead to wealth 
distribution and establishment of small properties with their advantages and 
stability but rather to wealth accumulation in the hands of a few, mainly 
foreigners. This scenario results in poverty for the mass population who 
abandoned their homes, small stores and mavbe families in order to devote 
themselves to an uncertain and harsh life in which profits evaporates 
rapidly.”29
Another president of Para Province, Francisco Carlos de Araujo Brusque, echoed 
Barros’s view in 1862:
27 Yungjohann (1989, pp. 74-75).
28 Yungjohann (1989, pp. 77-78).
29 Barros, S. R. "Falla que o exm. snr. conselheiro Sebastiao do Rego Barros, prezidente desta 
provincia, dirigiu a Assembles Legislativa provincial na abertura da mesma Assemblea no dia 15 
de agosto de 1854." edited by Para: Typ. da Aurora Paraense, 1854, pp. 9-10 (underlined by me).
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“[Rubber industry] is the most important element o f our actual wealth, but 
this should not be mistaken, it is wealth for a few since it pours misfortune 
and poverty into the heart of those employed in its extraction and 
production.
(...)
On these remote areas, and over marshy terrains, where hevea grows, 
rubber tappers will construct their huts where they will live many months 
under deadly influences, without the necessary resources for a proper 
subsistence and generally fatigued.
(...)
The men who work [in the rubber industry] are represented as inert 
quantities, or figures at the end of a column that can be summed up, as if 
the mankind were a company where the worker plays the role of a machine 
where everything can be represented as profits or losses, forgetting that 
those quantities are persons and the arithmetic figures are lives; morality of 
human beings guided by God to the same destiny to which we aspire."30
Rego Barros’ and Araujo Brusque’s complaints were made very early in the 
Rubber boom and they most certainly voiced the fear and opposition against rubber 
production stemming from part of the old Amazonian elite who based their wealth in 
agriculture, cattle or other traditional activity of the region. The opposition eventually fade 
as most of the old elite were integrated into rubber production or profited indirectly from it. 
However, the organisation of crude rubber production in the Brazilian Amazon continued 
to be denounced. For instance, Euclides da Cunha stated that
30 Brusque, F. C. A. "Relatorio apresentado a Assemblea Legislativa da provincia do Para na 
primeira sessao da XIII legislatura pelo exm.o senr. presidente da provincia, dr. Francisco Carlos 
de Araujo Brusque em 1.0 de setembro de 1862." edited by Para: Typ. de Frederico Carlos 
Rhossard, 1862, pp. 47-48 (underlined by me).
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the men, once having walked through the two doors that lead to the 
diabolic paradise of rubber estates, give away their best inherent qualities 
and kill themselves instantaneously. They laugh with that formidable irony.
It is indeed at the exuberant landscapes of heveas and catilloas where the 
most criminal labour organisation that could be imagined by the most 
revolting selfishness awaits him. In fact, the rubber tapper (...) performs an 
abnormal task: he is a man who works for enslaving himself.”31
Euclides da Cunha certainly wanted to capture the attention of his readers and he 
may then have exaggerated what he actually witnessed in the Brazilian Amazon. 
Nonetheless, whatever agenda these contemporaries may have had, it is very unlikely 
that they all made up their stories. Economic exploitation did happen but violence was not 
as typical as it is sometimes claimed. For instance Akers stated that,
“( . . . )
For the many thousands of labourers annually brought to the rubber 
properties, a certain percentage remain permanently on the estates, partly 
because they find themselves heavily in debt to their employer, and 
frequently for the lack of funds to pay for a return passage to their homes. As 
a general rule the men are well treated so far as personal relations between 
master and man are concerned, and the fact that they are charged 
abnormally high prices for the provisions and merchandise they purchase 
from the estate store carries very little weight with them, provided they are 
allowed to obtain what they desire without any restriction of credit.”32
31 Santos (1980, p. 167), originally from Euclides da Cunha.
32 Akers (1912, pp. 54-55), underlined by me.
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Price differential between goods in the rubber estate and in the main cities were 
the main instruments used by the literature to show economic exploitation.33 Moreover, 
the debate about the economic exploitation of rubber tappers was extended to other links 
in the rubber chain, creating the view of an exploitative channel in which the export 
houses, sitting at the top of the chain, were absorbing most of the profits from rubber 
production. The credit channel (called aviamento) was criticised by contemporaries such 
as Woodroffe. For him, the aviamento credit system entailed exploitation at each layer of 
the rubber chain,
“(. ..)
nearly the whole of the Amazon seringals [rubber estates] are mortgaged to 
commercial houses in Manaos, Pari, and the smaller towns, the proprietor 
relying upon the mortgages for his merchandise and, as a rule, binding them 
down to deliver to him alone. The whole organisation reminds me one of the 
saying that the biggest fishes eat the bigger ones, who in their turn, prey on 
the little ones, whilst these, the little fish, eat mud. ”34
British Consuls also denounced the aviamento credit chain, as Mr. Cheetham did 
in 1909:
“(...)
The whole of this valuable trade is gathered in the first place by a handful of 
illiterate, untrained men who, taking their lives in their hands, enter the vast 
uncultivated wilderness of the upper Amazon and on behalf of distant 
aviadores [intermediaries] and nominal forest owners, tap the trees and
33 See for instance Santos (1980, pp. 166-171).
34 Woodroffe (1916, p. 48).
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smoke the rubber that later figures as the second asset in Brazilian 
commercial and financial prosperity.
Deprived of her rubber, Brazil would lose one-third of her purchasing 
capacity.
Yet, although the source of so large a part of her national income, Brazil as a 
whole does nothing for her rubber producers, and these, in equal disregard 
of great responsibilities, do little or nothing for their rubber trees. ”35
Contemporary descriptions such as these could be tediously repeated. What is 
important is to understand how these descriptions shaped the way researchers later 
perceived the rubber boom. Some authors indeed followed this exploitative line of 
argument to construct a Marxist/Dependentist view of the rubber boom in the Brazilian 
Amazon.36 Their views can be summarised in the following way. Debt-peonage, bondage, 
semi-serfdom or indenture system was at the heart of rubber production in the Brazilian 
Amazon since it developed as the commonest outcome of migration to the Amazon. The 
underlying idea was that in order to move, the labourer indebt himself and, once having 
arrived at the rubber estate, was exploited. In a Marxist perspective, rubber labourers 
were generally described as comprised of a mass of dehumanised and defenceless men 
who were exploited by cruel and greedy capitalists due to the latter’s monopoly over the 
means of production (rubber fields and tools). In turn, rubber estate owners were also 
usually taken as having power to enforce the so-called ‘Rules of the Rubber Fields’ which 
dictated that fugitive labourers would be returned to their original rubber fields. Since the 
labourer was inside the forest and worked alone, escape was normally a difficult 
enterprise since there were not many alternatives left. If the conditions prevailing in the 
forest were not sufficient to entice labourers to work, rubber estate owners could resort to 
physical punishment, or so the literature argued.
35 Brazil. Report for the Year 1908 on the Trade of Brazil. N. 4358 (Annual Series), pp. 24-25.
36 Ferreira Reis (1953), Prado and Capelato (1975), Santos (1980) and Bunker (1985).
25
Violence was at least assumed as a latent threat that shaped labour relations 
during the Brazilian rubber boom, creating a Marxist account of the rubber boom. Because 
land was supposedly free, labour had to be controlled or coerced. This Marxist account of 
the rubber boom was extended to the other links of the rubber chain providing the basis of 
a dependentist view of rubber production in the Brazilian Amazon. The credit channel was 
organised in a vertical way, in which every node was exploiting the node immediately 
beneath it. In this view, rubber production was the outcome of several successive 
exploitative relations along the rubber chain in which most of the surplus was drained by 
[foreign] export houses. Monopoly of capital was the mechanism that provided the 
rationale for such exploitative system.
Weinstein offers probably the first revisionist account of the debt-peonage 
system.37 She argued that rubber tapper’s resistance rather than coercion conditioned the 
nature and durability of social relations.38 Weinstein argued that at least in downriver 
rubber estates ‘the Rules of the Rubber Fields’ were a dead letter. First, the extracted 
rubber was, by law and all practically, the property of the rubber tapper and not of the 
estate owner who held the land and the trees and then there was no monopoly over the 
means of production.39 Secondly, the high cost of monitoring the rubber tapper strictly 
limited the degree to which the rubber estate owner could effectively control their workers 
and curb illicit rubber sales. A durable alliance was thereby formed between rubber 
tappers and rubber estate owners, based on interlocking self-interest -  the rubber estate 
owner’s need to control the exchange and the tapper’s preference for autonomy -  that
37 Weinstein (1983) and (1986).
38 Weinstein’s revision is in line with the literature on slave economic rationality which argues that 
even slaves had some room for manoeuvre and used resistance as a means of enforcing their 
bargain power. In this regard, amongst others, see Genovese (1976) and Barzel (1977) for analysis 
on US slaves, Blanchard (1992) for Peru and Toplin (1969) for an analysis of slavery in Sao Paulo 
(Brazil). Moreover, Engerman (1992) provides a very broad view of the implications of differing 
forms of property rights in people.
39 Weinstein seemed to be very influenced by Akers (1912) account of the rubber boom. In regard 
to Weinstein’s assumption of relatively labour freedom, Akers (1912, p. 55) says that
“So long as a collector delivers a fair weight of rubber during the month, there is
practically no interference with his mode of life, and he can and does, take
holidays whenever he is so inclined, without asking the consent of the employer.
Such depiction of the freedom of the rubber tapper is confirmed by Yungjohann (1989) accounts.
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effectively frustrated local and foreign pressures for rationalising rubber extraction and 
trade.40
Bentes, in turn, advances that the rubber estate owners commanded the process 
of rubber production and owned the best and most profitable rubber fields but work 
relations were not defined by indebtedness. From the accounts of a rubber estate located 
in the Acre region, she shows that the estate owners used several different incentives 
such as bonuses, discounts and gratifications to ensure production and not necessarily 
violence.41
Another revisionist approach is that of Barham and Coomes who aimed at 
conforming labour relation system into the Institutional framework. Even though they deny 
Weinstein’s assumption that rubber tappers necessarily preferred autonomy, they support 
her main findings while offering some new evidence. Their main contribution lies upon the 
role of risk42 by arguing that labour arrangements depended upon the following factors: 
endowments, motivations and alternative opportunities open to rubber workers (which will 
ultimately define opportunity costs), the property relations under which they worked, and 
the type of rubber collected. Distinct labour arrangements were associated particularly 
with the type of rubber extracted and on hevea estates, the scarcity of labour and market 
features of risk and transaction costs provided strong incentives for rubber tappers and
40 Such opinion had actually been voiced by Akers (1912). Indeed, Weinstein work seem to be too 
much influenced by Akers’ accounts of the rubber boom. Several of her main qualifications of the 
literature can be found in Akers. For instance, Akers (1912, p. 76) states that rubber tappers prized 
their independence. At page 56, Akers discusses the idea similar to Weinstein’s assumption of 
durable alliance:
“Once the allotment of estradas [trails connecting several rubber trees inside the 
forest] is made, the collector becomes a temporary partner with the owners; for 
he is paid by a percentage of the mbber collected, and this is fixed in most 
districts at one-half the rubber collected. ”
On page 57, he discusses monitoring:
“Supervision of the work of collectors in the estradas and in the preparation of 
the rubber is delegated to fiscales, or foremen. As a general rule these men 
perform their duties in a most incompetent and perfunctory manner, and it is the 
exception to find a man who is willing to make any real effort to protect the 
interests of his employerJ’ (p. 57)
41 Bentes (1999, pp. 143-180).
42 It is true that Weinstein (1983) also highlighted the role of risk, but this was of a secondary 
importance to explain the durable alliance between tappers and estate owners.
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rubber estate owners to develop a durable relationship. For rubber estate owners, stable 
tappers would tap heveas with greater care (increasing future productivity of hevea trees) 
and would be a source of diminishing transaction costs (monitoring and recruitment costs 
would fall)43. Tappers, in turn, would also seek a stable relationship in order to guarantee 
access to more productive trails and as a way of obtaining some form of insurance against 
the risk of the environment.
Therefore, Barham and Coomes rely on transaction costs to account for the 
establishment of a durable relationship between tappers and rubber estate owners in lieu 
of Weinstein’s assumption of tappers’ preference for autonomy. Moreover, for Barham 
and Coomes, high premia over foodstuffs (see Chapter 6) could be explained by the high 
risk involved in the enterprise and should be regarded as normal remuneration of capital 
due to high risks entailed by rubber gathering.
The aim of the thesis is exactly to further deconstruct these Marxist/Dependentist 
views about the rubber boom in the Brazilian Amazon (as well as analyse some of the few 
revisionist ones) through an analysis that encompasses the whole rubber chain: from 
producers to consumers. The thesis analyses the conditions under which production could 
have been enforced without violence. It will also show that these conditions were more 
prevalent than previously assumed by the literature, as it is argued here that the role of 
inelasticity of demand had been so far completely neglected. Yet it is central to 
understand the rubber chain. Under high inelasticity of demand, all factors could have 
been properly remunerated and production could be enforced via market institutions. 
Moreover, high inelasticity of demand is in itself a reflection that the Marxist/Dependentist 
view was wrong: developments in crude rubber production were actually driving and 
shaping the manufacturing node, rather than the other way around. Finally, inelastic 
demand allowed the government to heavily tax rubber exports, increasing the Amazonian 
welfare without causing immiserising growth. A significant surplus was being retained by 
the government who redistributed it back to the region in form of subsidies and public
43 Barham and Coomes (1996, p. 62) also accounted for less moral hazard problems and higher 
personal security for the rubber estate owner.
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goods. The thesis combines qualitative and quantitative evidence under a new theoretical 
framework that asks whether a better explanation can be provided by examining how 
institutions and geography influenced the development of the rubber chain in the Brazilian 
Amazon from 1870 to 1910. By doing so, some theoretical contributions will additionally 
be made, especially in regard to the comodity chain framework.
Even though the thesis analyses the entire rubber chain, it does not follow the so- 
called Global Commodity Chain approach (GCC). Thus, Chapter 1 explains that the GCC 
approach is an extension of Wallerstein’s word-system theory and as such it assumes that 
trade is embedded in, instead of being determined by the optimising behaviour of rational 
economic agents. Under the GCC, the global market is an uneven playing field, 
underscored by the existing hierarchy between core and periphery areas that translates 
into a pre-defined relation of power between nodes of the chain located in these two areas. 
As some subsequent works had done, the thesis rejects the centre-periphery assumption 
of the GCC and by consequence it also rejects the world-system theory altogether: here, 
the historical context shapes and influences the evolution of the commodity chain. 
Furthermore, the thesis uses an innovative game theoretical framework to analyse power 
relations between nodes of the chain which are further constrained by institutions. Finally, 
quantitative exercises complement the theoretical and historical aspects of the analysis.
The next chapters follow the organisation of the rubber chain and the methodology 
developed in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 deals with the manufacturing side, emphasising how 
production of rubber manufactures took place in an environment of great scarcity of crude 
rubber. Chapter 3 analyses the rubber trade, spanning the largest crude rubber producing 
areas in the world from 1870 to 1910: the idea is to survey the rubber trade in conjunction 
with investment and finance. Chapter 4 looks in more depth at the main crude rubber 
supplier, the Brazilian Amazon, which was responsible for around 60% of world supply in 
this period. The chapter provides a game theoretical framework that improves the 
understanding of the interactions between the main nodes of the rubber chain by 
highlighting the role of agents’ horizon of planning, reward from cheating, expected 
income from an alternative employment and the implicit and explicit prices paid for rubber
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produced. This chapter thus shows that production could have been enforced without 
necessarily resorting to punishment or debt-peonage, a clear contradiction to the 
Marxist/Dependentist literature. However, in order to fully understand crude rubber 
production in the Brazilian Amazon, it is imperative to understand the role of the 
government. Chapter 5 then analyses the impact of government intervention in the market, 
showing that, contrary to contemporaries and to the subsequent literature, government 
intervention was positive for the Amazon region although not positive for everyone 
involved in the rubber trade. However, domestic losers could have been compensated 
and the government would still have generated a welfare gain for the region and a profit 
for itself. Actually, it could have even doubled the actual welfare gain it generated from 
1870 to 1910, had it increased the export tariff up to the optimum level. True, part of the 
rubber proceedings were already being reinvested back into the Amazonian economy in 
the form of subsides to strategic sectors. The main recipients of state aid were probably 
the shipping companies which performed an important task in the Amazonian economy: 
given the natural environment and the size of the region, production had to be channelled 
through the Amazon River. Speed and reliability were fundamental to ensure production 
and profits: backed by the government, steamships rapidly displaced canoes from the 
rubber trade. Information was also crucial providing incentives for the development of a 
telegraphic network. These two communication systems and their relationship are 
analysed in Chapter 6, showing how important they were for the development of the 
rubber boom in the Brazilian Amazon. Finally, conclusions are provided and some 
speculations advanced. The idea is not only to point to future research on the Amazonian 
rubber boom but also to understand how this case study helps us understand a broader 
picture: globalisation and trade in the belle-epoque.
Since the thesis spans a long period (1870-1910) and several different places, it 
required comprehensive and extensive sources of qualitative and quantitative materials 
that were gathered in several libraries: London School of Economics Library, British 
Library, University of London Library, Guildhall Library, Bank of England Library, Public 
Record Office at Kew and UCL library, Porthcurno Telegraph Museum, Brazilian National
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Library, Ministerio da Fazenda Library (in Rio de Janeiro), PUC-Rio Library, Para Public 
Archives and Arthur Vianna Library. Qualitatively, there are several manuscripts that 
referred mostly to companies that operated in the Amazon region. From these data it was 
possible to obtain valuable information about their businesses in Para, Amazonas 
(States/Provinces) and Acre Territory. From their activities, it was also possible to validate 
(or not) any inferences about the state of affairs in the rubber trade as their operations 
were invariably connected with rubber or at least indirectly influenced by it. Electoral 
registers are also a very useful resource as they generally recorded the name of the voter, 
his address, occupation and annual income. With this information in hand it would have 
been possible to track changes in income and in the wage level. However, it was not 
possible to find a comprehensive set of voting lists (only two lists for Braganga city) and 
thus they were only used in a qualitatively way. Real income of a rubber tapper was then 
compared to the income declared by a urban worker in these voting lists.
Official publications were another important source of information. Speeches, 
Communications, Annual State and Provincial Reports as well as Extraordinary Reports 
are all available online at the ‘Brazilian Government Document Digitalization Project’. 
There are reports for both Amazonas and Para (States/Provinces) as well as for the 
Federal government and its several ministries. These reports were complemented with 
several others found in Belem and Rio de Janeiro, produced by the myriad of secretariats 
of the Governments of Para and Amazonas. Altogether they give a sense of the state of 
affairs of the government besides possessing valuable information on social conditions, 
the organisation of the rubber trade, companies operating in the area, relationship with 
foreign companies and individuals, relationship with the Central Government, and etc. 
British Consular reports (for Para, Amazonas, Maranhao and Rio de Janeiro) were also 
instrumental as, on top of statistics for the region, they further provided to a certain extent 
a view from the outside.
Pictures of the region during the rubber boom were also found in several albums 
that were published by the government, firms or individuals from 1870 to 1910. They show 
boats and their description, rubber estates and their labourers, Belem, Manaus and
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several other smaller cities, commercial establishments, etc. This iconographic set is 
extremely important for historians of the region but it also provides the economic historian 
a more concrete sense of the economic and social transformations embodied in the 
rubber boom. This sense is either validated or qualified by travellers’ accounts too. Indeed, 
numerous books were published as a consequence of travels to the region. True, most of 
these accounts envisaged self-promotion and thus researchers need be very cautious in 
using them. Finally, it is important to mention the most recent literature on the history of 
the Amazon and on the economic history of rubber manufacturing in the USA and Europe. 
They often offer the starting point for the researcher and a sense of what still needs to be 
improved or complemented.
Quantitatively, it was necessary to estimate crude rubber demand and supply 
equations as well as welfare effects of tariffs which required data for prices and quantities 
of several crude rubber suppliers and the taxation levied upon the rubber trade in the 
Brazilian Amazon. Regional data on population, fiscal revenues, GDP, exports, imports, 
etc. was also required. Entirely new series for several of these variables were constructed, 
reconstructed or completed. Official regional statistical publications, annuaires44 as well as 
national statistics and some databases compiled by other researchers or institutions were 
the starting point. Their figures were reviewed and checked against foreign statistics on 
rubber trade, travellers’ accounts information and against the Annual Reports of the 
States/Provinces and data from the central government. For the purpose of this thesis, the 
rubber trade was actually reconstructed from scratch, out of data from the main importing 
countries (USA and Britain but also France) which are deemed more reliable than 
statistics generated by the Brazilian government. The thesis contains an Appendix that 
makes available most of the data produced or organised for the thesis. It also presents the 
econometric model used in Chapters 2 and 5.
Putting all these materials together and making sense of them represented the 
very first challenge of the thesis. From these materials and from the theoretical framework
44 Actually only a few of them were produced during the rubber boom. In spite of the fact that they 
were called serial publications, only one or two statistical publications were in the end produced.
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presented in Chapter 1, it will be possible to build a coherent and accurate account for the 
question of how institutions and geography influenced the development of the rubber 
chain in the Brazilian Amazon from 1870 to 1910. The thesis thus turns to this question in 
the following chapters.
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1. Commodities and Trade
1.1 - Introduction
Standard trade theory gives two complementary explanations for patterns of trade 
whose predictions are based on general equilibrium analysis. Whereas the Ricardian 
model suggests that technological differences account for trade specialisation (and hence 
to a specific trade pattern), the Hecksher-Ohlin model focuses on endowments. However, 
these two models neglect other important features of trade. They did not formally model 
intertemporal decisions, tastes are assumed equal across countries, the size of the 
economies do not matter and geography only enters indirectly into the models. Some of 
these features need be relaxed and incorporated into a partial equilibrium framework that 
would be more suitable for the analysis of commodity chains. In this regard, the present 
chapter builds a theoretical framework to analyse rubber production and trade and its 
impacts on the demand and supply side. The departure point is the Ricardian and 
Hecksher-Ohlin models. The new framework will incorporate into these models investment, 
finance, or other relations between parties to trade. While some of the features of this new 
theoretical framework are derived from Wallerstein’s world-system theory and Gereffi’s 
Global Commodity Chain (GCC) approach, the thesis rejects their methodological 
foundations. Neoclassical economic reasoning and modern standard trade theory models 
are assumed throughout and the thesis follows what is called here ‘the commodity chain 
approach’ (in contrast with the GCC approach). It adds a more detailed discussion of the 
role of institutions and geography in the organisation and development of the chain 
combining it all with a more quantitative-driven analysis (that gives macroeconomic 
support to the analysis at the micro level). Based on this modified commodity chain 
approach, the thesis is organised according to interactions among the main nodes of the 
rubber chain and its ultimate goal is to investigate how institutions and geography can 
explain the development of the rubber chain in the Brazilian Amazon from 1870 to 1910 
and, by so doing, some contributions to Institutional Economics are additionally made.
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The chapter is organised in seven sections, including this introduction. Section 1.2 
briefly describes some very basic trade models that highlight the main determinants of 
patterns of trade. It also shows the conditions for immiserising growth: even in simple 
trade models, growth might generate a worsening of national welfare. Section 1.3, in turn, 
shows how the Global Commodity Chain (GCC) approach departs from general trade 
theories to establish that patterns of trade are defined by political-economy forces based 
on the World-Systems theory, an extension of the dependency theory. Under this context, 
the GCC approach is shown to be a-historical and polarised, implying a specific power 
relation between core and peripheral areas. Section 1.4 examines how the GCC 
framework had been adapted to study commodities within a more detailed historical 
context, giving rise to the commodity chain approach. However, it is argued that this 
approach still lacks a more thorough grounding in Institutional Economics as well as a 
more quantitative background. As it is shown in Section 1.5, this is exactly what the 
present thesis does: it provides a general framework in which institutions, geography and 
econometrics are integrated into the analysis, generating new and powerful insights about 
the rubber chain. It further shows how the thesis is organised and how this approach 
generates a thread along the whole dissertation: the thesis organisation follows the 
interactions between nodes of the chain. Section 1.6 gives an inside look into one of the 
main contributions of the thesis, namely, institutions theory and geography. The section 
explains how this theory is applied into the specific context of the Brazilian Amazon. 
Finally, Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 -  Standard Trade Theory, Immiserising Growth and Geography45
In the most basic Ricardian trade model, the world is comprised of two countries, 
Home and Foreign. In autarky these countries produce two goods (wine and cloth) using a 
single factor of production (labour measured in hours of work). Since resources are limited, 
there are limits to what can be produced and the production trade-off may be summarised
45 Unless otherwise specified this section is based on Krugman and Obstfeld (2006), Dixit and 
Norman (1980) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).
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by a production possibility frontier. The opportunity cost of, say, producing 1 additional unit 
of wine in terms of units of cloth is equal to the absolute value of the slope of the 
production possibility frontier. The production possibility frontier, however, only defines the 
different mixes of goods the economy can produce but in order to determine what the 
economy will actually produce it is necessary to look at prices, more specifically at relative 
prices. Let Pc and Pw be the prices of cloth and wine, respectively. If it takes aLC person- 
hours to produce one unit of cloth (constant returns in the production), the value of what a
Pcworker can produce in an hour is equal to ——. Wages in the cloth sector will then be
a LC
P a
higher X ± c _ > ^ic_ , and since everyone will prefer to work in the industry that offers the
P fV  a LW
P a
highest wage rate, the economy will specialise in cloth if and in wine if
Pw a LW
Pr a ,r  Pr a ,r—— < . Only when —1— = —— will both goods be produced.
P w  a LW  P w  a LW
Therefore, in general terms, even under autarky, countries should specialise in the 
production of a certain good if the relative price of this good is higher than its opportunity 
cost: in the absence of trade, the relative price of one unit of cloth to one unit of wine
a, rwould be determined by the relative unit labour requirements:—^ .  Countries would then
a LW
tend to specialise in the production of the good they have a comparative advantage,
measured as productivity of one good over the other in the two countries. Nonetheless, if
trade is allowed, countries would specialise in the production of goods for which they
possess relative comparative advantage. For instance, if due to technology differences 
*
Q <2
—— > — (where the superscript asterisk defines that they were measured to Foreign),
& i w  ^L y v  LW
the ratio of the labour required to produce one unit of cloth to that required to produce one 
unit of wine is higher in Home than in Foreign, Home is relatively more productive in the
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production of wine. Note that this conclusion was reached from comparative advantage 
that was measured not in absolute terms but in relative terms.
Remember that in the absence of trade, the relative price of one unit of cloth to
one unit of wine would be determined by the relative unit labour requirements:^^- for
a LW
*a
Home and for Foreign. If trade is allowed, the price will no longer be determined by
a
LW
domestic considerations only but rather by the interaction of domestic and foreign markets 
(under a general equilibrium framework): the relative price of goods after trade would be 
located between the pre-trade levels of Home and Foreign. In this context, the gains from 
trade are quite obvious since trade will allow the countries to specialise in the good they 
are relatively more productive thereby increasing the total amount of goods produced. 
Consequently, a higher consumption (ensuring a higher utility level if there is no satiation) 
is attained. According to Ricardo,
"It is quite important to the happiness of mankind, that our enjoyments 
should be increased by the better distribution of labour, by each country 
producing those commodities for which by its situation, its climate, and 
its other natural or artificial advantages, it is adapted, and by their 
exchanging them for the commodities of other countries, as that they 
should be augmented by a rise in the rate of profits.”46
Therefore, trade is carried out due to the existence of different costs in autarky and, 
in the Ricardian framework, such differences are explained by technology. The results are 
quite intuitive but hard to generalise: once we leave the two-good case, it is not possible 
to establish a detailed predictive relationship stating that if the relative price of a traded 
good exceeds the relative price of that good in autarky, then that good will be exported by 
the country in question. All one can hope is to find a correlation between the pattern of
46 Ricardo (1951, p. 132).
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trade and differences in autarky prices. The model is also very simple and several of its 
assumptions can be relaxed, leading to more interesting results. However, even the 
simplest Ricardian trade model provides an explanation for patterns of trade and since 
technology is certainly a possible determinant of it, the thesis will explore further the 
implications of technology to trade.
Another possible explanation for patterns of trade relates to difference in 
endowments, such as the model known as Hecksher-Ohlin. In order to see how different 
endowments lead to certain patterns of trade, it is assumed now that Home and Foreign 
possess the same technology and that consumers in both countries have equal tastes 
(formally, identical homothetic preferences are assumed). In sum, both countries are 
identical but in their endowments. In order to generate such endowment differences, it is 
necessary to assume that countries still produce two goods (cloth and wine) for which 
they now use two inputs: land (measured in acres) and labour (measured in hours). We 
further assume that the ratio of labour to land used in the production of cloth is higher than
the ratio of labour to land in the production of wine, or simply: > —— => —— > ,
a TC a TW a LW  a TW
where aLC still indicates how many hours are necessary to produce one unit of cloth, and 
now arc, Qlw and ajw represent acres of land used in the production of one unit of cloth, 
hours of labour used to produce one unit of wine and acres of land used to produce one 
unit of wine, respectively. What this expression tells is that cloth is labour intensive 
whereas wine is land intensive. Since resources continue to be limited, the production 
possibility frontier still summarises the limits of production. Ruling out corner outcomes, 
the economy will now produce at the point that maximises the value of production given 
the price it faces (or, formally, the point on the production possibility frontier that is tangent 
to the isovalue line whose slope is defined by the relative prices).
This simple Hecksher-Ohlin model is capable of establishing a relationship 
between relative factor abundance and pre-trade relative output prices, which will shape 
the pattern of commerce once trade is allowed. Remember that trade arise as a 
consequence of differences in autarky prices. This relationship is verified in three steps.
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First, it is possible to show that from the specification of the model, the country with the 
highest relative price of labour will also have the highest relative price of cloth (because 
cloth is labour intensive). The same holds for land: the country with the highest relative 
price of land will also have the highest relative price of wine (which is land-intensive). 
There is then a one-to-one relationship between product prices and factor prices. 
Secondly, it is also possible to show that there is a one-to-one relationship between factor 
supplies (quantities) and output quantities: countries will tend to produce more goods that 
are more relatively intensive in the factor that is relatively more abundant domestically. 
These first two steps validate the factor abundance hypothesis: the factor which is 
relatively more abundant will be relatively cheaper, and then the good which uses this 
factor relatively more intensively in its production will be relatively cheaper as well. The 
factor abundance hypothesis is particularly important for the thesis and its implications for 
the pattern of rubber trade will be explored in detail. Finally, if aggregate demand can be 
derived from homothetic tastes, an increased relative factor supply ratio will therefore 
result in lower relative price of output. For instance, it follows that as cloth is labour 
intensive, an increased supply of labour would lead to increased production of cloth, and 
reduced production of wine (Rybczynski Theorem).
One interesting feature of the Hecksher-Ohlin model is the possibility of 
immiserising growth47. Let’s assume an increase in the endowment of the abundant factor. 
This would have two effects: 1) since the national income rises, demand for both goods 
will increase (if both goods are normal); 2) domestic production of the good intensive in 
the abundant factor increases, whilst domestic production of the other goods goes down 
(Rybczynski Theorem). Therefore, production of the exported good increases and 
production of the imported good decreases. Increased supply of exports combined with 
increased demand for imports should normally result in less favourable terms of trade and 
there is no reason to expect a priori that the utility loss caused by less favourable trading 
terms to be smaller then the direct utility gain of a more abundant factor endowment.
471 need to thank prof. Jeffrey Williamson for suggesting me to look at immiserising growth in the 
Brazilian Amazon context.
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Consequently, immiserising growth is a theoretical possibility which is more likely to 
happen in overspecialised, monoproducing countries (or regions) as it was the case of the 
Brazilian Amazon from 1870 to 1910. This follows from the fact that the region was a big 
player in the world rubber market: increases in the Amazonian rubber production could 
negatively affect the price of its exports which, ceteris paribus, may worsen its terms of 
trade. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse if there were signs of immiserising growth in 
the Brazilian Amazon during the rubber boom.
Immiserising growth may be generated from other sources as well. For instance, 
immiserising growth might occur in the traditional two-country and two-good trade model 
due to the worsening of terms of trade even in the presence of elastic foreign-offer 
curve.48 Additionally, if neutral technical progress occurs in a protected industry, 
immiserising growth is also a possibility. Technical progress increases the efficiency and 
therefore potential output per head, but it also shifts resources towards the industry in 
which progress occurs. Thus, if the additional cost of excess protection outweights the 
increase in production per head, growth might generate a loss in national welfare.49 
According to Bhagwati, the possibility of immiserising growth is increased if: 1) the ratio of 
domestic production of the imported good to imports of this very same commodity is small; 
2) the constant-utility demand-elasticity for the importable good with respect to its own 
price, is small; 3) the elasticity in supply of the importable good when production shifts 
along the production possibility curve in response to a change in its price, is small. Note 
that neither of these conditions nor any combination of them is a sufficient condition for 
immiserising growth and the possibility of immiserising growth arises when, with all these 
conditions fulfilled, either or both of the conditions below are satisfied:
1. the offer of the rest-of-the-world is inelastic (in the extreme, it would imply that 
growing country’s exports are giffen goods abroad)
48 Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan (1998, p. 369).
49 Johnson (1967, p. 153).
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2. growth actually reduces the domestic production of importable good at constant 
relative commodity prices.50
As in the Ricardian Model, it is difficult to generalise the results of this simple two- 
good x two-country x two-factor Hecksher-Ohlin Model. First, it is possible that the number 
of goods and factors may differ requiring sometimes information from the demand side as 
the supply side of the economy is insufficient to determine the quantities actually 
produced. Secondly, if countries can choose their best input-mix (or if technology allows 
different coefficients of use of resources), a factor intensity reversal may occur: for 
instance, for a certain relative price of land and labour it is possible that the technology 
used by the country will turn cloth into a land intensive good.
Factor intensity reversals may change the pattern of trade but they are usually 
unlikely to happen. Theoretically then, in the two-good x two-country x two-factor 
Hecksher-Ohlin model, patterns of trade will hardly change, engendering a geographical 
dimension for trade as endowments are often geographically specific. Yet, in the 
Ricardian model, specialisation leads to a certain geographical pattern of trade too but, in 
the case of the Hecksher-Ohlin model, one of the inputs may be immobile, making the 
consequent pattern of trade more inflexible. Therefore, for the purposes of the thesis, the 
[Brazilian] rubber supply resembles more a Hecksher-Ohlin model insofar as crude rubber 
depends on the quantity and quality of the existent rubber trees [in the Amazon forest]. 
These rubber trees, in turn, were geographically specific: as the thesis will show, although 
they could be found in nearly all continents, crude rubber quality differed significantly, 
depending on the tree from which it was produced and the dexterity of the rubber tapper. 
Moreover, initial attempts to transplant rubber trees failed and thus until 1910 (when 
rubber supply from Asian plantations inundated the market), rubber trees were, for all 
purposes, an immobile factor.
Therefore, physical geography [of the Amazon Forest] underlies [Brazilian] rubber 
supply. The location of the trees, measured by their distance to a river and/or a village and
50 Bhagwati (1958, p. 205).
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their density in a given area, invariably played a decisive role in determining the location 
of crude rubber production. First-nature geographical factors (the physical terrain) will thus 
influence production not only because they may represent natural impediments to 
production but also because they influence its costs. Therefore, the spatial distribution of 
crude rubber production is also shaped by second-nature geography, i.e., the spatial 
interaction between economic agents.51 The thesis analyses in depth the impact of first- 
and second-nature geographical factors on the rubber chain, and it is important to note 
that second-nature geographical effects are more flexible than first-nature ones. In this 
context, economic distance and remoteness are a recurrent theme in the thesis, 
determining the spatial organisation of the rubber supply chain. Moreover, economic 
distances and costs of production shape the interaction between supply and demand.
In order to analyse the demand side, an additional feature needs be included in 
the model: economies of scale. The possibility of increasing returns to scale turn the first- 
nature geographical effects less important and issues such as the size of industrial plants 
and proximity to markets arise. There may also be agglomeration effects: manufacturing 
firms will locate their activities based on proximity to markets. This was true for the rubber 
shoe and boots industry which agglomerated around Boston (close to the main US cities), 
but also for the tyre manufacturers which agglomerated in Akron (close to Detroit where 
the carmaker companies were). The consequent agglomeration effects will generate 
spillovers and external economies of scale that will further reinforce the spatial 
agglomeration of rubber manufacturing firms on these sites.52 Yet, access to inputs will 
still be important as cheap clean water and energy will be instrumental to manufacturing.
In sum, the Ricardian and Hecksher-Ohlin models presented here give two 
complementary explanations for patterns of trade and their predictions are always based 
on general equilibrium analysis. Whereas the Ricardian model suggests that technological 
differences account for trade specialisation (and hence to a particular trade pattern), the 
Hecksher-Ohlin model focuses on endowments. Even though only weak correlations
51 Overman, Redding and Venables (2001) and Crafts and Venables (2003).
52 Krugman (1991) and Krugman and Venables (1995) and Overman, Redding and Venables 
(2001).
42
between autarky prices and the pattern of trade can be sketched from less parsimonious 
and hence more realistic versions of these models, they both summarise the main 
mechanisms that drive trade: differences in technologies and in endowments. In terms of 
gains from trade, the Ricardian model offers a very positive view as trade benefits 
everyone in the economy. In the Hecksher-Ohlin model, in turn, there are typically losers 
and winners from trade: owners of a country’s abundant factors gain from trade whereas 
those owners of scarce factors lose. Nonetheless, after trade it is possible to find an 
equilibrium that is Pareto-superior so long as the winners compensate the losers: there is 
thus a one-to-one relationship between relative prices and national welfare as an 
improvement in a country’s terms of trade increases its welfare. Both models for trade 
pattern will be analysed in the thesis and, additionally, the possibility of immiserising 
growth will be explored as well.
However, these two models neglect other important features of trade. They did not 
formally model intertemporal decisions, even though different goods consumed in different 
periods of time may be regarded as different goods. Furthermore, these models assume 
that tastes did not differ in the two countries, a very unrealistic assumption in some cases. 
The truth is that difference in tastes does not generate any interesting result in terms of 
economic modelling as the observation that, ceteris paribus, a country will import goods 
for which domestic consumers have stronger preferences than foreign ones is rather trivial. 
With imperfect competition and product diversity, however, consumer tastes may have an 
important effect on trade. Incorporating into the models the size of the economies also 
generates interesting results as the possibility of immiserising growth reveals. Moreover, 
even though both models generate a certain geographical pattern of trade, geography 
only enters indirectly via costs to trade. Even though the rubber supply may still fit well 
into these models, the rubber demand requires a more detailed specification of spatial 
economics. Due to internal and external economies of scale, there are agglomeration 
effects that shape the organisation of the rubber demand. Therefore, the analysis of the 
rubber chain still needs a more suitable model that incorporates some of these features 
not dealt with by neoclassical trade models.
1.3 -  Global Commodity Chain Approach
Standard trade theories usually consider trade in isolation from investment, finance, 
or other relations between parties to trade. In turn, the Global Commodity Chain (GCC) 
approach has a different departure point and does not explain trade patterns as derived 
from different technology or endowments. The GCC addresses questions about what 
products countries do (and should) import and export in relation to complex institutions. 
Moreover, instead of deriving trade patterns from optimizing behaviour of rational 
economic agents, for GCC, trade is taken as embedded in, and to a considerable extent 
as determined by, specific (but changing) institutional structures.53 GCC is ultimately the 
development of the world-system theory at the micro level. It is thus imperative to discuss 
the main features of this theory before analysing the Global Commodity Chain approach. 
Even though the GCC approach will be in the end rejected, some of its features will still be 
present in the thesis, making it necessary to analyse GCC’s theoretical foundations in 
detail before a more suitable framework can be constructed.
A social-system is a self-contained unit of analysis as the dynamics of its 
development is mainly internal. Only small autonomous subsistence economies and 
world-systems can be considered as actual social systems. According to Wallerstein, a 
world-system is thus “a social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member 
groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence”. 54 In history, there have only existed two 
types of world-systems: world-empires, in which there is a single political system over the 
whole area, and world-economies in which such political system does not exist. According 
to Wallerstein, it is exactly the absence of a single political system that allows capitalism 
to operate within an arena larger than any political entity can actually control, giving 
capitalists room for manoeuvre that is structurally based.
Geographical factors such as transport and communication define the borders of 
this world-system, inside which an extensive division of labour develops. This division of
53 Raikes, Jensen and Ponte (2000, p. 394).
54 Wallerstein (1976, p. 347).
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labour is geographical and arises not only from ecological factors as it is also a function of 
the social organisation of work: following a Marxist framework, it magnifies and legitimises 
the ability of some groups within the system to exploit others. As a consequence, a clear- 
cut division between core-states and peripheral areas arises. Whereas core-states are 
those where a strong state machinery and a national culture are created to ensure the 
coherence of the world-system and to justify disparities that have arisen within the world- 
system, peripheral areas are those where the indigenous states are weak, ranging from 
non-existence (e.g. colonial situation) to one with a low degree of autonomy (such as neo­
colonial situation). Core-states are thus understood as those that possessed sovereignty 
vis-a-vis other states which additionally are strong before any particular social group 
within the state. There are also semiperipheral areas which are in between the core and 
the periphery: some of those areas had been either a core-state of a given world-economy 
or a peripheral area that was promoted as a result of changing geopolitics of an 
expanding world-economy. It is possible to infer then that for Wallerstein, state structures 
are relatively strong in the core-areas and relatively weak in the periphery.55
The aforementioned division of labour entails a hierarchy of occupational tasks in 
which core-states concentrate higher levels of skill and capital. Since a capitalist world- 
economy essentially rewards accumulated capital (including human capital) at a higher 
rate than raw labour, the system is prone to self-maintenance and to increasing disparity. 
Moreover, the absence of a central political entity makes it very difficult to employ 
counteracting measures to remedy this maldistribution of rewards. This maldistribution of 
rewards, in turn, does not necessarily generate the seeds of internal discontentment and 
dissolution since with the expansion of the system (especially through technological 
developments) ever new areas are being absorbed. This process of development in the 
periphery (and in the semiperiphery) then masks the inequality of rewards.56
Wallerstein’s framework is based essentially on the nation-state and consequently 
individual workers, entrepreneurs, industries and firms are either neglected in his analysis
55 Wallerstein (1976).
56 Wallerstein (1976).
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or assigned a secondary role. As these players influence the functioning of the world- 
system, it was necessary to integrate them into the Wallersteinian framework. That is 
exactly one of the initial objectives of the global commodity chain (GCC) literature: 
according to its proponents, by tracing the network of commodity chains, it is possible to 
track the underlying division and integration of labour processes and thus monitor the 
constant development and transformation of the world-economy’s production system.57 In 
this context, a commodity chain is understood as a “network of labour and production 
processes whose end result is a finished commodity”58. For analytical purposes, the chain 
is assumed to be comprised of several nodes or “boxes” that correspond to quite specific 
production processes. The boundaries of a given box are taken as socially constructed 
and locally integrated, highlighting the social embeddedness of economic organisation. 
Therefore, a box may be redefined, reconstructed, consolidated or subdivided based on 
technical or social organisational changes.
In short, a “GCC consists of a set of interorganisational networks clustered around 
one commodity or product, linking households, enterprises, and states to one another 
within the world-economy”59. At the macro level, all these networks are constituents of the 
world-system in which an extensive division of labour exists along geographic lines. This 
division of labour is understood as being usually triggered by a globalisation process of 
production and trade.60 For analytical purposes, such globalisation process may be 
subdivided into three different phases: a) investment-based globalisation (1950-1970) 
when the multinational spread of transnational corporations accelerated in a growing 
number of manufacturing and raw material industries; b) trade-based globalisation (1970- 
1995) was based on the rapid and diversified industrialisation of a wide range of 
developing nations, changing the centre of gravity for many manufacturing industries; c) 
digital globalisation (1995 to date) when an information revolution developed as a 
consequence of the rapid spread of connectivity, impacting on business strategies.
57 Hopkins and Wallerstein (1994, p. 17).
58 Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986, p. 159).
59 Gereffi, Korzeniewicz and Korzeniewicz (1994, p. 2).
60 Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005, pp. 78-79).
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The result of this ongoing globalisation process is the emergence of a worldwide 
manufacturing system in which production capacity is dispersed to an unprecedented 
number of developing as well as industrialised countries. This globalisation pattern implies 
a degree of functional integration between and control over internationally dispersed 
activities that span over core, semiperipheral and peripheral areas61. This international 
dispersion of activities, in turn, follows a hierarchy whose rationale is given by the world- 
system theory: a relatively greater share of wealth accrues to core-like nodes than to 
peripheral ones, underscoring the fact that, by construction, the periphery produces raw 
materials whereas the core produces industrial products. Even though this is too simple 
and might not be true for all commodity chains, it should be true for the world-economy as 
a whole.
Therefore, hierarchy among countries at the macro-level (periphery versus core 
areas in the world-system theory) translates into a relation of power among nodes along a 
commodity chain at the micro level (GCC). Power here is defined as the ability to 
coordinate and control transnational production systems, which can be structured and 
categorised in two different ways: as producer-driven or buyer-driven. On the one hand, 
“producer-driven commodity chains are those industries in which transnational 
corporations or other large integrated industrial enterprises play the central role in 
controlling the production system (including its backward and forward linkages)”62. The 
distinctive feature of the producer-driven commodity chain is the degree of control 
exercised by the headquarters of transnational corporations. On the other hand, “buyer- 
driven commodity chains refer to those industries in which large retailers, brand-name 
merchandisers, and trading companies play the pivotal role in setting up decentralised 
production networks in a variety of exporting countries, typically located in the Third 
World”63.
Ultimately, under the GCC framework, power assures that the most profitable 
nodes will be located in the core areas. According to Hopkins and Wallerstein, monopoly
61 Gereffi (1994, pp. 95-96).
62 Gereffi (1994, p. 97).
63 Gereffi (1994, p. 97).
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and competition are key to understand the distribution of wealth among the nodes in a 
commodity chain (and in aggregate, for the world-system as a whole). Competitive 
pressures are less pronounced in core nodes as enterprises and states in core areas gain 
competitive edge through innovations that transfer competitive pressures to peripheral 
areas of the world economy64. As it will become clear later, the degree of competition will 
continue to be useful in the new approach of this thesis, being examined in detail for each 
and every node of the rubber chain.
Even though commodity chain analyses are usually a-historic, competitive 
pressures change over time following a Shumpeterian notion of competition. For Hopkins 
and Wallerstein, concentration and decentralisation (or shifts in the zonal location of 
nodes) are associated with cyclical rhythms of the world economy: during A-periods 
(upswings) vertical integration and geographical concentration of boxes of a chain are 
induced as a consequence of reduction of transaction costs, whereas during B-periods 
(downswings) a geographical dispersal of chain’s boxes happens in order to ensure 
reduction in labour costs by subcontracting.65
In sum, the underlying idea of the Global Commodity Chain framework is that by 
describing and analysing a commodity chain, it is possible to show how social relations 
shape production, distribution, and consumption in a given industry or sector. Even though 
theoretically it could be applied to all commodity chains (maybe requiring sometimes 
some adaptations), GCC has mainly been applied to industrial chains such as apparel66, 
semi-conductors67, automobiles68 and footwear69 despite some attempts to apply it to 
other areas such as services70, fresh fruit and vegetables71 and illegal commodities72. 
Therefore, the rubber chain has been so far left out. However, it will be argued here that 
the GCC approach does not provide a suitable framework to analyse the rubber chain and
64 Hopkins and Wallerstein (1994, p. 18).
65 Hopkins and Wallerstein (1994, pp. 19-20).
66 Gereffi (1999).
67 Henderson (1989).
68 Doner (1991).
69 Schmitz (1999).
70 Rabach and Kim (1994).
71 Reynolds (1994).
72 Wilson and Zambrano (1994).
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thus an alternative theory/model needs to be found or developed. That is exactly the goal 
of the following sections.
1.4 -  Global Commodity Chains: a Critique
As shown above, standard trade models are based on optimising behaviour of 
rational agents. In these models, the possibility of trade usually increases the total welfare 
but it is impossible to generalise this result. It is certainly true for the basic two-country x 
one-factor Ricardian model. However, even in the most basic formulation of the Hecksher- 
Ohlin model, trade does not benefit everyone: there are losers and winners. It is usually 
possible to achieve a Pareto-superior equilibrium but it was shown that immiserising 
growth remained a theoretical possibility.
The Global Commodity Chain approach is a development of the world-system 
theory at the micro level. As such, it is an extension of the dependency theory. Instead of 
the Prebischian notion of dependency being created from increasingly unequal terms of 
trade73, in the world-system the global market is a uneven playing field, underscored by 
the existing hierarchy between core and periphery areas that translates into a relation of 
power between nodes of the commodity chain located in these two areas. Proponents of 
the GCC approach have seldom appropriately defined the concept of ‘power’. It is 
certainly the equivalent of the hierarchy existent at the macro level but its underlying 
rationale is usually lacking. For Hopkins and Wallerstein, core areas derive power over 
peripheral (and semiperipheral) areas out of the development and possession of more 
advanced technologies and consequently by high degrees of market power whereas, for 
Gereffi, power involves the ability to out-source lower value-added activities and to retain 
or incorporate those with higher value-added.74 As noted by Raikes at a!., under the GCC 
approach, power is usually regarded in an ‘all or nothing’ terms: it usually disregards 
degrees of power along the chain and assumes a polar structure in which one node of the
73 See for instance Love (1980). See also Prebisch (1959).
74 Hopkins and Wallerstein (1994) and Gereffi (1994).
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chain is taken as dominant.75 This is a critical and important point that the thesis will 
develop further.
As mentioned above, the GCC approach was usually applied to industrial chains 
and largely ignored the historical/cyclical context. Both the historical and cyclical contexts 
are embedded. On the one hand, the historical context is actually provided by the world- 
system theory that describes how capitalism evolved within the world-system. On the 
other hand, cycles are explained by a Schumpeterian notion of development. There have 
been some efforts to construct the global commodity chain analysis with a more detailed 
historical context. The most concerted effort in this direction is certainly the book edited by 
Topik, Marichal and Frank.76 The editors criticised the global commodity chain approach, 
adapting it to the analysis of (non-industrial) commodities in a long-run historical 
perspective. The central idea is still to focus on commodity chains rather than on countries 
or continents even though the commodities were chosen on a geographical basis, namely 
Latin America. Since economic activity transcends national borders, it cannot be 
adequately analysed within the limits of political administrations and borders. As in the 
case of GCC, waves of globalisation provides the rationale for the commodity chain 
approach as countries cannot be understood in isolation or autarky. The contribution of 
Topik et al. to the commodity chain literature is that the historical context is not embedded 
in but rather analysed in conjunction with the development of the commodity chain. Here 
the term commodity chain will be used to make a distinction from the Global Commodity 
Chain approach. In short, production decisions are assumed to be based on the 
international dynamics of a commodity chain, not simply on the autonomous plans of a 
national government. As will be discussed in the next section, these assumptions seem 
more valid for the analysis of the rubber chain as well.
Topik et al. also depart from the GCC approach by not assuming a necessary 
centre-periphery relationship. In the GCC approach, the location of production and the 
distribution of returns in the commodity trade are usually defined by the centre-periphery
75 Raikes, Jensen and Ponte (2000, p. 402).
76 Topik, Marichal and Frank (2006).
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relationship. In a commodity chain, the notion that European players constituted the 
metropolis while Latin American countries/regions were peripheral or semiperipheral is 
explicitly rejected. Each commodity is assumed to follow its own logic following a much 
wider set of conditions: core economies sometimes export primary commodities to one 
another; peripheral economies sometimes import primary commodities from the core; 
depending on the complexity of the chain, there may be several steps in the production, 
warehousing, shipping, and marketing of a commodity -  all of which make it necessary to 
pay attention to what happens to commodities at each stage in the chain.77
Commodities are evaluated and analysed on a case-by-case basis with no 
relationship or power structure imposed ad hoc. In the GCC approach, power is loosely 
defined and usually lacks the establishment of degrees of power between nodes of the 
chain. Topik et al. does not formally model the concept of power either even though they 
see the analysis of the interactions and relative power of different positions on a 
commodity chain as one of their main contributions. Global trade is taken as 
heterogeneous and the international markets as far from uniform or consistent.78 Markets 
are not assumed to be natural laws that impose themselves onto humans but rather as 
human constructs that are determined by social and political values and institutions.
Due to the different historical context and to the rejection of the centre-periphery 
approach, the analysis of strategies of global firms, which is the cornerstone of the GCC 
approach, is no longer so useful and Topik et al. develop a more integrated approach in 
which the role of other participants is analysed in production, processing, and marketing of 
commodities. In sum, their edited book examines, from the commodity chain’s viewpoint, 
the interaction of supply and demand which determines the development and cycles of the 
major export commodities without disregarding the social and political consequences on 
both ends of the chain.
Topik et al. examine the chains in raw materials (silver, henequen, and rubber), in 
intermediary inputs (cochineal, indigo, and fertilisers) and in stimulants that were
77 Topik, Marichal and Frank (2006, p. 14).
78 Topik, Marichal and Frank (2006, p. 11).
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consumed in social events (cocoa, cocaine, coffee, sugar and tobacco). For the purpose 
of this thesis, the most interesting commodity chain is certainly that of rubber, where 
Frank and Musacchio analyse for the first time the entire rubber chain, “from trees to 
tires”79. These authors reject the centre-periphery approach as their analysis is more 
centred at standard trade theory. They explicitly assume that factor shares and 
geographical conditions largely determined the location of production and additionally that 
risks and rewards tended to be distributed in competitive markets. Moreover, States and 
pressure groups played an important role in deciding the location and relations of 
production. For Frank and Musacchio, actors were rational but operated within limited 
information and uncertainty. From their analysis, several points can be raised. Brazil was 
not a usual peripheral or semiperipheral country insofar as developments in the Brazilian 
supply chain influenced and limited the room for manoeuvre in the rubber manufacturing 
sector. One indication that this was the case is the fact that the rates of profit along the 
chain moved in synchronisation due to competition forces (that were present in every link 
of chain). Brazilian producers, in turn, adapted to circumstances and acted optimally given 
their limited access to labour and capital.
Clarence-Smith had analysed one of the commodity chains included in Topik et al.: 
cocoa. He was interested in examining, from the commodity chain’s viewpoint, why cocoa 
cultivation seems to have failed to generate economic take-off80. On the supply side, he 
highlights that cocoa provided few backward linkages and limited forward linkages but the 
actual economic impact of cocoa was very disappointing. Even though there were more 
chocolate factories in tropical countries before 1914 than it is usually appreciated, forward 
linkages remained quite limited. Yet, exports of cocoa still provided the producing 
countries with an important source of foreign revenues which was nonetheless usually 
squandered by governments. Governments indeed seem to have played a pivotal 
negative role in the development of cocoa cultivation by restricting immigration, 
discouraging savings, failing to protect the forest, allowing cartels, etc. Moreover, cocoa
79 Frank and Musacchio (2006).
80 Clarence-Smith (2000).
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cultivation engendered a voracious appetite for virgin forest whose destruction 
undermined the long-run viability of the enterprise. Even planting cocoa in lands 
previously used for other crops usually proved unsuccessful.
On the demand side, Clarence-Smith analyses the history of consumption of 
cocoa (and chocolate). Western markets rapidly became the main consumers of the 
product that was usually processed by small workshops that produced finished chocolate, 
cocoa butter and cocoa powder. Large Western companies became more prevalent only 
after 1850s but before 1914, despite some cartelisation and collusion attempts, the market 
remained quite competitive due to low barriers to entry. On the intermediaries side 
(traders and shippers), Clarence-Smith acknowledges that information is still poor, 
requiring some further research. In sum, this author analyses all the links of the cocoa 
chain in an integrated way, unveiling the facts that jointly explained why cocoa failed to 
produce economic take-off in the producing regions that span Latin America, initially, and 
Africa and Asia after 1880s.
Another interesting application of the concept of commodity chain is the paper by 
Ian Hunter81 who analyses the meat and dairy (butter and cheese) industries in New 
Zealand, having the meat and dairy industries in Latin America as counterpoints. His 
analysis is complemented by the application of the concept of networks. For Hunter, 
whereas chains are characteristically linear, network relations that hold the chain together 
may be better understood as multidimensional or multilayered. He departs then from the 
dichotomy of producer-driven and buyer-driven chains which assumes a central role for 
big and internationalised firms that organised and control a vertical chain: in different 
cultures and societies, institutional arrangements and societal norms engender different 
forms of commercial activity, support different labour processes, and inspire different 
managerial responses. In Hunter’s variant of the commodity chain, control or power over 
the chain is not a critical factor: the pursuit of economic opportunity is. In some contexts, 
this pursuit is more easily accomplished by the formation of networks built around an 
entrepreneur (or groups of entrepreneurs). In conclusion, Hunter states that innovation
81 Hunter (2005).
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fostered by entrepreneurial networks had a direct impact on the size and structure of New 
Zealand’s economy, particularly in the case of two export staples: frozen meat and dairy 
industries.
In short, even though there are just a few contributions in the commodity chain 
approach, its proponents tend to reject the centre-periphery assumption of GCC. By doing 
so, they typically reject the world-system theory altogether replacing it with more 
neoclassical economic reasoning and modern standard trade theory models. A 
construction of a more detailed and integrated historical context becomes thus a 
requirement as it ceases to be embedded in and becomes commodity-specific. In this 
context, the evolution of the commodity chain over time now interacts with this more 
general and specific historical background. In the commodity chain approach, institutions 
are sometimes used in the analysis to limit the agent’s room for manoeuvre but a more 
detailed and thorough discussion of institutional theory and spatial economics within the 
commodity chain approach is still lacking. Moreover, as in the GCC approach, very few 
quantitative studies have emerged within the commodity chain literature.
1.5 -  Thesis Approach: Bringing Institutions and Geography to the Fore
The thesis follows the commodity chain approach as described above. However, it 
adds a more detailed discussion of the role of institutions and spatial economics in the 
organisation and development of the chain. This new framework further embodies a more 
quantitative-driven analysis that gives macroeconomic support to the analysis at the micro 
level. Thus the thesis innovates on theoretical grounds: it builds a new theoretical 
framework to investigate how institutions and geography can explain the development of 
the rubber chain in the Brazilian Amazon from 1870 to 1910.
But what is exactly the rubber chain? The rubber chain is the outcome of several 
interconnected activities that result in final products that are made primarily of crude 
rubber. These final products could be of several kinds: rubber shoes, machine belts, tyres, 
hoses, waterproofed clothes, railwagon buffers, submarine [telegraphic] cables, steam 
engine seals, surgical products, and so forth. The rubber manufacturing industry is very
54
diversified, a sheer consequence of how versatile this raw product really was. One of the 
main characteristics of rubber was its tensile elasticity, a characteristic that very few other 
products could match, making for a very low degree of substitutability. Crude rubber was 
in this sense a unique material.
Crude rubber was itself a product of human ingenuity too. As the thesis will show, 
crude rubber was the result of a very rudimentary process first developed by Native 
Americans who transformed the latex (sap) of some specific trees into waterproofed 
clothes and bouncing balls for leisure games. The process was hardly perfected from 
1870 to 1910 and consequently crude rubber experienced no significant technological 
change in its production. In contrast, rubber manufacturing did so. The development of the 
‘vulcanisation’ process was certainly a watershed for the rubber industry insofar as it 
allowed the mechanisation of production and created two geographically separate nodes 
of the rubber chain: 1) crude rubber supply where the latex of rubber trees was processed 
and transformed into crude rubber and; 2) crude rubber demand where crude rubber was 
being processed and transformed into manufactured rubber products. Between these two 
nodes, several other ones developed as there was very little vertical integration in the 
chain, even in the final years of the rubber boom period (1870-1910).
Figure 1.1 shows the main nodes of the chain, which is depicted in the horizontal 
format in order to avoid imposing any ad hoc relation of power or hierarchy between them. 
On the left side, there are rubber manufacturers (such as Macintosh, Dunlop and 
Firestone, to name a few) and rubber traders (agents who imported crude rubber from the 
producing countries). Sometimes a rubber agent (or broker) made the bridge between 
these two agents, either by advising the rubber manufacturer about the best rubber 
grades to buy or by finding possible buyers to a certain rubber trader. The rubber trader 
relied on information coming from producing areas and on a close relationship with the 
shipping companies.
55
In the crude rubber producing country/region there were several nodes, each 
responsible for a different stage of rubber production or transportation.82 As the thesis will 
show, the rubber export house was the commercial establishment that sold crude rubber 
to buyers located in the main consuming regions, usually United States, Britain, France, 
Belgium and Germany. The rubber trade was their main business but these trading 
houses invariably exported other Amazonian products too (e.g. Brazil nuts). They were 
often foreign owned and their economic position depended on connections with the 
consuming countries and a close relationship with shipping companies. In the Brazilian 
Amazon, there were also import houses who imported products to be sold in the local 
markets and to rubber intermediaries. Rubber intermediaries, in turn, bought several 
products from import houses and sold them to the myriad of rubber estates located miles 
away from the main cities in exchange for their crude rubber. They either possessed their 
own ships or relied on a close relationship with a domestic shipping company. Finally, the 
rubber estate owner bought goods from the intermediary that were either consumed in the 
rubber estate or advanced to rubber labourers in exchange for the crude rubber they 
produced. Crude rubber was produced by rubber tappers and channelled through the 
rubber chain to the export houses from which it would reach the rubber traders and finally 
the rubber manufacturing companies.
The distinction of the activities of these nodes was sometimes blurred but Figure
1.1 provides a stylised overview of the rubber chain. The thesis follows this stylised 
organisation. Chapter 2 discusses the demand side, i.e., the US and British rubber 
manufacturing industries. Chapter 3 deals with the interactions between demand and 
supply. It analyses the rubber trade, spanning all major crude rubber producing areas and 
its two main buyers: the USA and Britain. Chapter 4 examines the Brazilian Amazon crude 
rubber supply chain. Chapter 5 analyses the role of the government and its impact on the 
rubber chain whereas Chapter 6 finally examines domestic and overseas transport and 
communication networks (shaded nodes in Figure 1.1). However, the analysis is not linear
82 A stylised configuration of the rubber chain in the Brazilian Amazon is presented here. Other 
producing regions possessed quite different organisation, usually following their own institutions 
and geography.
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as it investigates two different dimensions altogether. In the first dimension, the thesis 
analyses the interaction among agents within a certain node of the chain whereas in the 
second one the interactions between nodes of chain are explored.83 The section briefly 
explains the main content of both the within- and between-analyses found in the next 
chapters.
83 It is not intended to cover fully every node of the rubber chain but rather to give an illustration of 
the complexity of the several processes and stages involved in the chain and which were 
considered of particular importance.
57
Figure 1.1 -  Rubber Chain
Consuming Country (UK/USA)
Rubber Agent
River Shipping 
Company
Overseas Shipping 
Company
Rubber Intermediary
Rubber Export House
Rubber Manufacturer Rubber Labourer
Import House
Rubber Trader 
(London, Liverpool or NY) Rubber Estate Owner
Supplying Country (Brazil)
Source: Elaborated by me, following a stylised version of the rubber chain.
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In the ‘within-analvsis’. the thesis deals mainly with competition issues. In this 
regard, Chapter 2 analyses the location of rubber manufacturing companies and their 
interaction. Initially, proximity to crude rubber production was essential for the viability of 
the enterprise but a technological breakthrough (the ‘vulcanisation’ process) made it 
possible to concentrate rubber manufacturing in factories closer to consuming markets. 
Ricardian and Heckcher-Ohlin models determine why production of finished rubber 
products moved geographically from, say, the Brazilian Amazon to the USA and Britain. A 
technological development allowed the exploitation of economies of scale in rubber 
manufacturing due to specialisation based on endowments. Since the Brazilian Amazon 
possessed a huge concentration of rubber trees whereas the USA and Britain possessed 
none, it was rational for the Brazilian Amazon to specialise in the production of the good 
(crude rubber) that was intensive in the abundant factor (rubber trees). Yet, Ricardian and 
Hecksher-Ohlin models do not help understand the subsequent evolution of the rubber 
manufacturing industry and why manufacturing companies located where they did. 
Especially in the USA, economies of scale increased the optimal size of the rubber 
manufacturing plants that tended to concentrate now closer to consuming markets. Spatial 
economies started to matter: external economies of scale and spillover effects created 
agglomeration economies that ultimately shaped the organisation of the rubber 
manufacturing industry and explained their expansion to Akron, Ohio. Formal institutions, 
notably patent legislation, further influenced and shaped the market structure of the rubber 
manufacturing industry: indeed, patents enforced a process of amalgamations in the USA 
and Britain even though the rubber manufacturing industry remained quite competitive on 
both sides of the Atlantic (in contrast with the GCC approach).
Chapter 3 complements this analysis by exploring competition between several 
crude rubber sources. It is shown that investments in crude rubber production before 1910 
(focusing on sources other than plantations) defined production and quality of the raw 
product Britain and the USA were acquiring. The chapter further explains that Brazilian 
leading position was established due to a combination of quantity and quality of the 
product (endowments). Therefore, first-nature geographical factors played a decisive role
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but institutions such as cultural and political ties created a path-dependence structure of 
the trade with all other crude rubber sources apart from Brazil. There was limited 
competition between Brazilian crude rubber and other sources. Brazilian crude rubber 
exporters may be regarded as market leaders to a certain extent. Moreover, the chapter 
shows that among the crude rubber exporters, there was a high degree of concentration 
leading to oligopolisation of the business: competition was limited but cartelisation 
attempts failed.
Chapter 4 further examines the economic relations on the Brazilian crude rubber 
supply chain. The chapter shows the degree of concentration among the rubber 
intermediaries. It is shown that the intermediary market was less concentrated than that of 
the rubber exporters, meaning that competition was definitely fiercer in this node of the 
chain. Among rubber estate owners, competition was also prevalent but they enjoyed a 
certain amount of market power due to the monopoly of land rights: indeed, according to 
Bentes, at the end of the rubber boom there were no good lands available to rubber 
exploitation any longer.84 As will be shown here, labour was also a scarce factor of 
production meaning that despite the constant and increasing influx of people to the region, 
labourers theoretically enjoyed a good bargain position (at least initially).
Lastly, Chapter 6 shows the degree of concentration in transport and 
communication. In this chapter, second-nature geographical aspects are analysed in 
depth showing how much closer the Brazilian Amazon got from 1870 to 1910 in terms of 
travel time, travel cost, speed of news and cost of sending messages (mail and 
telegraphs). The conclusion is that all of these markets were oligopolised. Whereas in the 
internal navigation, the Amazon Steam Navigation Co. dominated the market, in the 
overseas business, the Booth Line exercised a high degree of oligopoly control. In 
communication, there was initially only one (submarine) telegraph company that at the 
end of the period had to compete against the government land telegraph. Mails were 
usually a prerogative of the State.
84 Bentes (1999, pp. 143-180).
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In sum, within all nodes of the rubber chain, there were clear signs of oligopolisation. 
However, the thesis shows that the leading companies at each node of the chain were not 
always able to fully exercise their oligopoly power over another node. It is possible to 
show it by examining the second dimension of the rubber chain: the relationship between 
nodes of the rubber chain. This analysis is carried out through a simple game that 
highlights the main incentives of the players involved at each node of the rubber chain. 
Moreover, institutions are examined too as they provided limits to agents’ interactions.
In the ‘between-analvsis’. the thesis is mainly concerned with relationship between 
agents located in different nodes of the rubber chain. In this regard, Chapter 2 presents a 
quantitative exercise that shows how hungry for crude rubber traders located in the 
consuming countries (USA and Britain) were. Competition at the manufacturing level 
resounded along the rubber chain, translating into a struggle for securing a steady and 
reliable source of crude rubber, the main input in the industry. Due to its scarcity, crude 
rubber was very expensive and access to resources thus became strategic to determine 
(or influence) profitability at the manufacturing level, turning the manufacturing node very 
different from the ideal GCC/‘Wallersteinian’ core-node type.
Chapter 3 shows that, differently from standard trade theory, crude rubber trade 
needs to be examined in conjunction with investment and finance. The chapter surveys 
investments made in crude rubber production on a regional basis. It also explains the links 
between crude rubber importers in the USA and Britain and crude rubber exporters in the 
supplying countries, focusing on the main supplier: Brazil. Since the literature has argued 
that the bulk of the British and American investment in rubber production was channelled 
through (foreign) rubber export houses, the Chapter also provides a case study of the 
relationship between one Brazilian/Portuguese rubber export house and one British 
rubber buyer. Even though results are difficult to generalise, the case study provides new 
insights that challenge long accepted facts about the international trade on rubber.
Chapter 4 complements the previous two chapters by examining the economic 
relationship within the Brazilian crude rubber supply chain. Unlike the GCC approach, no 
pre-defined power relationship is assumed between the nodes of the rubber chain and
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bargain power becomes not only defined by its fundamentals but also constrained by 
Institutions. This chapter develops one of the main theoretical contributions of the thesis, 
notably, an explicit evaluation of power between nodes of the commodity chain. It does so 
by defining a game that summarises the main incentives of agents involved in the 
transactions between any two nodes of the chain. The chapter partly refutes the existent 
literature on the rubber boom: the rubber chain is much more intricate and the relations of 
power do not necessarily follow a vertical one in which every forward node is able to 
exploit the node immediately beneath it (as the GCC approach usually assumes). True, 
rubber exporters might still have been better positioned to extract monopoly rents due to 
their knowledge of the rubber market and the degree of oligopolisation of their activities. 
Yet, looking at the whole chain together, it is possible to conclude that rubber production 
is even easily self-enforced under a scenario of constant production expansion and of 
high inelasticity of demand, like the one that prevailed from 1870 to 1910 in the Brazilian 
Amazon. Under this scenario, all factors of production could have been properly 
remunerated.
Chapter 5 examines the impact of government interventions in the crude rubber 
market. States (and thus governments) create, mould or destroy institutions. Governments 
are not taken as central or pivotal, being just another agent that influences the 
developments along the rubber chain. However, in the rubber chain the government was 
able to extract monopoly profits through taxation even under a perfect competition market. 
The departure point of the present chapter is the fact that rubber exporters in Brazil faced 
an inelastic demand (as is shown in Chapter 2) which allowed the government to capture 
monopoly profits even under a perfect competitive market. Chapter 5 thus supports Frank 
and Musacchio’s view that there was no economic imperialism in the Amazon as the 
rubber chain does not fit into the model of peripherality of raw material and centrality of 
manufacture. This traditional formulation is at the heart of the GCC approach and it 
suggests that production in the periphery (Brazil) should have developed in tandem with 
impulses emanating from the industrial core (USA and Europe). That pattern would 
ensure that profits in the periphery would either be held down (so as to maximise profits at
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the industrial core) or be high in order to ensure profitability from investments flowing from 
the industrial core. It is not surprising that for a quite long period, given the high inelasticity 
of demand for Brazilian rubber, manufacturers in the core economies were tied to 
developments occurring within the Brazilian Amazon, diametrically contrary to the 
traditional assumption of economic imperialism and to that embedded in the GCC 
approach.
From taxation, the Amazonian governments accumulated considerable wealth that 
was partly redistributed back in form of public goods. These funds were instrumental to 
develop two supporting activities, telegraphs and steamships, whose impacts onto the 
rubber chain are analysed in Chapter 6. Interestingly, rubber had fostered the 
development of submarine telegraphs for gutta-percha (a kind of low quality rubber, 
extracted from a tree that grows in Southeast Asia) was used to insulate submarine 
copper cables. On the other hand, rubber was also important in the improvement of the 
efficiency of steam engines insofar as this raw material was sometimes used as seals. 
Steam navigation and telegraphs gave rise to the rubber boom which, in turn, supported 
even further the development of (steam) navigation and the telegraph. The rubber boom 
demanded better communication and transport systems and the consequent increased 
intensity in the flow of people and merchandises provided these systems with economies 
of scale that ensured their ulterior development. The spread of news and the improvement 
in the transport system also provided the region with the scarcest factor of production, 
labour85. Furthermore, the advent of steamship navigation in the Amazon region displaced 
the canoes, releasing even more labourers to work in the rubber industry. Thus 
communication and (steam) navigation overcame first-nature geographical hurdles and 
generated some integration. The consequent move of people (and other factors of 
production) and flow of information, in turn, created the conditions for further development 
of the rubber boom by supporting a virtuous cycle. In sum, without rubber, steamships 
might have been even more costly to operate, and the submarine telegraphic system may
85 As shown in Chapter 4, the Brazilian rubber supply was very inelastic to this factor of production.
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have never developed. Analogously, without steamships and telegraphic communication, 
the rubber boom might have never taken place.
Therefore, the analysis of the rubber chain proceeds in a non-linear way. There 
are two dimensions of analysis that are both explored in every chapter. In the ‘within- 
analysis’ the thesis examines the relationship among agents located in the same node of 
the rubber chain. The main instrument of analysis is competition. However, institutions 
and geography shape the way competition evolves. In the ‘between-analysis’, the thesis 
explores interactions between agents located at different nodes of the rubber chain. This 
dimension of analysis relies on game theory, institutions and geography. Institution 
Economics and geography are indeed the main features of the thesis. It is then necessary 
to understand how it is incorporated into the analysis. The next section provides an inside 
look on how they are incorporated into the thesis.
1.6 -  Inside Look at Institutions and Geography
Like in the GCC framework, the departure point of the analysis of the thesis is the 
focus on a product (rubber) but with special attention to its development in the main 
producer region: the Brazilian Amazon. Therefore, the thesis is geographically specific. 
According to standard trade theory though, this focus on a single commodity is not 
unwarranted as the theory proclaims that trade should be analysed under a general 
equilibrium framework. By focusing on one sector (or one commodity), there might be a 
chance of missing the connections and interactions with other sectors of the world 
economy that might be crucial in understanding the commodity chain in certain contexts. 
However, abstracting from the real world and reducing the reality are key procedures to 
understand economic phenomena and it is exactly the researcher’s task to simplify the 
reality to its most basic components that help explain economic phenomena without losing 
the connection with that same reality.
The theoretical framework here looks at two different dimensions: between nodes 
of the chain and within nodes of the chain. As in standard trade models, patterns of trade 
are initially explained by technology and endowments. However, even though technology
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and endowments explain the likely pattern of trade, Institution Economics and Economic 
Geography are applied to examine the actual pattern of trade that emerged. Therefore, 
trade is not considered in isolation from geography, investment, finance, or other relations 
between parties to trade and thus it is not assumed to be carried out in a free environment 
but rather in an environment that is constrained by institutions: cheating, asymmetry of 
information, enforcement of contracts are all analysed in conjunction with market forces. A 
careful and detailed analysis of institutions within the commodity chain framework is 
exactly one of the main contributions of the thesis. These institutions permeate the whole 
chain from one end to another and are usually applied to analyse the environment in 
which agents take decisions about production, consumption, etc.: institutions constrain the 
interactions among agents, ultimately defining the market structure in a given 
geographical space. As in the Wallersteinian framework, competition and monopolistic 
forces are key to analyse the interactions between nodes of the chain but the thesis 
further examines the interactions within the nodes of the chain in which economic costs 
and geography are important factors as well. Like the Wallersteinian notion of the limits of 
his world-system being determined by the transport costs, the scope of the rubber chain 
here is also influenced by economic costs and geography.
In this context, agents are assumed to behave as rational individuals that pursue 
their own individualistic goals summarised by their utility functions. However, agents act 
under incomplete information and uncertainty even though the assumed model of 
economic behaviour continues to be more connected to the formalist view. On the one 
hand, the proponents of the formalist view claim that embeddedness was not greater than 
the low level found in modern societies, allowing the use of neoclassical economic 
concepts and tools for the analysis of pre-capitalist societies86. On the other hand, the 
proponents of the ‘substantivist school’ argue that economic behaviour was heavily 
embedded in social relations in pre-capitalist societies but became much more
86 Granovetter (1992). This author’s approach suggests that the level of embeddedness of 
economic behaviour is lower in non capitalist societies than is claimed by sustantivists and it has 
changed less with modernisation than they believe. Granovetter (1992) also argues that this level 
has always been and continues to be more substantial than is allowed for by formalists.
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autonomous with modernisation. It is thus argued here that since actors in the Brazilian 
Amazon registered profit motivation it does justify a more formalist approach in which 
decisions can be atomised: the majority of the agents here was comprised by foreigners 
who went to the region in a quest for profit. Furthermore, even if this region is taken as a 
pre-capitalist society, there seems to be evidence that economic concepts can be applied 
to explain individual behaviour in pre-capitalist societies.87
The adoption of the formalist approach does not mean that economic theory will be 
used upon the assumption of purely neoclassical economics. There were many market- 
failures88 that were partially overcome by the creation of certain institutions (not 
necessarily efficient ones) opening room for some extra-economic behaviour. Therefore, 
these atomised individual decisions are constrained by institutions (formal or informal 
ones) that are understood as the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. They reduce uncertainty by 
providing structure to everyday life, defining and limiting the set of choices of individuals.89
These institutions are not ad hoc but rather the result of an historical evolution of 
interactions among agents. Therefore, the thesis also rejects the historical context of the 
world-system theory, assuming instead that each commodity has its own history, its own 
evolution and its own geography. As in the commodity chain literature, by rejecting the 
historical context of the world-system theory, the thesis needs also to reject the necessary 
centre-periphery relationship: the Brazilian Amazon is not assumed to be peripheral. 
However, unlike the commodity chain approach, the notion of power is formally defined 
and analysed by applying game theory. This game theoretical framework has the 
additional advantage of providing a myriad of possible outcomes for market interactions 
instead of simplifying it to one single homogeneous solution (chains are not necessarily 
polarised anymore).
87 See Law (1992) and Ogilvie (2001).
88 For a summary of new institutionalism see Bates (1995). This author discusses market failures 
and how they are sometimes overcome by institutions.
89 North (1990, pp. 3-4).
66
Power between nodes of the chain is understood as bargaining power between 
transacting agents in a world constrained by formal and informal institutions. The 
formalisation and modelling of power structure is certainly one of the most innovative 
theoretical developments of the thesis. In the several games analysed here, individual 
maximisation of utility does not necessarily generate the best possible social outcome, 
meaning that bad Nash-equilibria are usually present. True, cooperation among players 
may lead to a Pareto-superior equilibrium which is nevertheless seldom a self-enforcing 
solution. Cooperation may only arise naturally if there are a small number of players, the 
play is repeated and players possess complete information about the other players’ past 
performances.90
First, some forms of exchange involve and require the interactions among several 
players. Secondly, since the game is never repeated ad infinitum (as agents do not 
survive forever), a cooperative solution (like the ‘tit-for-tat’) is seldom a stable equilibrium. 
Thirdly, actors frequently must act on incomplete information and process the information 
that they receive through mental constructs that can result in persistently inefficient paths. 
Preferences are not stable, actors do not possess true models and the information 
feedback is insufficient91: when information is incomplete, principal and agent will not form 
equal expectations, opening room for deceit.
Deceit may be avoided through second-party or third-party punishment/retaliation. 
One obvious way to do it is through collective action, i.e., by forming an alliance among 
players to punish any deviant behaviour. According to Greif contract enforcement can also 
be achieved through a variety of other instruments: morality, personal trust and the legal 
system92. First, if there is any preference for being honest (which overcomes profit 
motives) the agent would live up with the terms of the agreement even in the case where 
cheating could be profitable, provided that the agent could signal to the principal that they 
would not cheat under any circumstances. Secondly, in a repeated game, playing some
90 North (1990).
91 North (1990).
92 Lovejoy and Richardson (1997) show an example of how culture/region-specific institutions can 
enforce contracts, strengthening Bates (1995) assertion that there are limits to policy prescription 
from new institutionalism analysis. Lovejoy and Richardson (1997) show how important was the 
pawn institution as a way of enforcement.
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tit-for-tat strategy, agents might form personal trust diminishing the costs of monitoring. 
However, it does not seem economically rational for the agents to do so since they would 
be giving up bargain power in exchange for nothing (unless the minimisation of monitoring 
cost93 allowed production and everyone was thus better off). Lastly, although the legal 
system is not strictly necessary for enforcing informal contracts94, it may be used to punish 
and/or ostracise deviant players.
The proposed methodology is thus based on the commodity chain literature and 
analyses the rubber chain under a partial equilibrium approach. Even though the focus is 
on a commodity (rubber), the thesis unveils the economic and social impacts on a specific 
region, the Brazilian Amazon that from 1870 to 1910 accounted for around 60% of the 
overall supply of that commodity (see Appendix). Neoclassical analysis provides the basic 
framework that points out the likely outcomes of the forces at play that, once combined 
with Institutional Economics and Economic Geography, explains the actual outcomes of 
the interactions among atomised agents who maximise their own utility function 
independently. The resultant effect on the macro level is further quantified and 
investigated by econometric analysis. This interaction between qualitative and quantitative 
evidences represents one step further in the analysis of commodities in general, and 
commodity chains in particular.
1.7 -  Final Remarks
Basic trade models suggest at least two determinants for patterns of trade: 
technology and endowments. In terms of gains from trade, the Ricardian model offered a 
very positive view as trade benefits everyone in the economy. In the Hecksher-Ohlin 
model, in turn, there are typically losers and winners from trade: owners of a country’s 
abundant factors gain from trade whereas those owners of scarce factors lose. Even
93 According to North (1990), because it is costly to measure the valued attributes fully, the 
opportunity for wealth capture by devoting resources to acquiring more information is ever present. 
It is measurement plus the costliness of enforcement that together determine the costs of 
transacting.
94 See Greif (1996).
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though it is still possible to find a Pareto-superior equilibrium, this basic model shows the 
theoretical possibility of immiserising growth.
These standard trade theories usually consider trade in isolation from investment, 
finance, or other relations between parties to trade. The Global Commodity Chain (GCC) 
approach, in turn, has a different departure point and instead of explaining trade patterns 
as derived from different technology or endowments, the approach addresses questions 
about what products countries do (and should) import and export in relation to complex 
institutions. Moreover, instead of deriving trade patterns from optimizing behaviour of 
rational economic agents, for GCC, trade is taken as embedded in, and to a considerable 
extent as determined by specific (but changing) institutional structures. The Global 
Commodity Chain approach is a development of the world-system theory at the micro 
level and, as such, it is an extension of the dependency theory. Instead of the Prebischian 
notion of dependency being created from increasingly unequal terms of trade, in the 
world-system theory, the global market is a uneven playing field, underscored by the 
existing hierarchy between core and periphery areas that translates into a relation of 
power between nodes of the commodity chain located in these two areas.
The proponents of the commodity chain approach, in turn, reject the centre- 
periphery assumption of GCC. By doing so, they typically reject the world-system theory 
altogether replacing it with more neoclassical economic reasoning and modern standard 
trade theory models. A construction of a more detailed and integrated historical context 
becomes thus a requirement as it ceases to be embedded in and becomes commodity- 
specific. In this context, the evolution of the commodity chain over time now interacts with 
this more general and specific historical background. In the commodity chain approach, 
institutions are sometimes used in the analysis to limit the agent’s room for manoeuvre but 
a more detailed and thorough discussion of institutional theory within the commodity chain 
approach is still lacking. Moreover, as in the GCC approach, very few quantitative studies 
have so far emerged.
The thesis follows the commodity chain approach but adds a more detailed 
discussion of the role of institutions and geography in the organisation and development
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of the chain combining it all with a more quantitative-driven analysis (that gives 
macroeconomic support to the analysis at the micro level). The analysis becomes two- 
dimensional and hence non-linear: it analyses the interactions between nodes of the 
rubber chain as well as interactions within the nodes of the chain. Based on this modified 
commodity chain approach, the thesis is organised according to the main nodes of the 
rubber chain and its ultimate goal is to investigate how institutions can explain the birth 
and development of the rubber chain in the Brazilian Amazon from 1870 to 1910 and, by 
so doing, some contributions to Institutional Economics are additionally made. 
Neoclassical analysis provides the basic framework that points out the likely outcomes of 
the forces at play that, once combined with Institutional Economics and Economic 
Geography, explains the actual outcomes of the interactions among atomised agents who 
maximise their own utility function independently. The resultant effect on the macro level 
is further quantified and investigated by econometric analysis.
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2. Demand for Crude Rubber: from early history to 1910
2.1 -  Introduction
As explained in Chapter 1, the thesis follows a modified commodity chain 
approach in which institutions and geography are brought to the fore. Institutions are 
assumed to permeate the whole chain, shaping and influencing interactions among and 
within the nodes of the rubber chain. Under this perspective, the present chapter aims to 
analyse the first node of the chain, namely the rubber manufacturing industry. It then 
provides a succinct history of the industrialisation of rubber, focusing on two countries: the 
United States and Britain. It is shown that formal and informal institutions defined the 
degree of competition (within-analysis) that prevailed in rubber manufacturing, making the 
industry somewhat different from the GCC/Wallersteinian model. Secondly, the chapter 
shows that competition emanated along the rubber chain translating into a struggle for 
crude rubber supplies (between-analysis). Therefore, institutions in the form of relations 
between parties to trade and the role of finance and investment enhance the 
understanding of the actual pattern of rubber trade that emerged, complementing the 
prescriptions of standard trade models. Quantitatively, it is further shown here that this 
struggle for rubber supplies, in turn, would have allowed the main crude rubber supplier, 
the Brazilian Amazon, to extract monopoly rents from consumers, moving the rubber 
chain further away from the Wallersteinian model. This quantitative exercise is entirely 
based on new data on US and British rubber trade, combined with information obtained 
from Brazilian sources.
The chapter is organised into 7 sections, including this introduction. Section 2.2 
presents the history of the rubber industry until the discovery of the vulcanisation process 
and its consequent application in rubber manufacturing. Section 2.3 and 2.4 then surveys 
the evolution of the rubber industry in Britain and in the USA, respectively, showing that 
despite some cartelisation attempts, competition prevailed on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Section 2.5 explains how this competition at the manufacturing level resounded along the 
rubber chain, translating into competition for crude rubber sources whereas Section 2.6
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computes elasticities of demand that validates this assumption. Finally, Section 2.7 
concludes the chapter.
2.2 -  Early Rubber History until 1850s
Even though pieces of rubber containing 1.92% of sulphur were found in the lignite 
deposits of Germany dating from the Eocene period (B.C. 58.8 to 33.7 million of years), 
the modern history of this raw material is more intrinsically connected with the discovery of 
the Americas. The presence of latex-yielding trees in Mexico, Central America and notably 
in the Amazon basin led to the application of this milky-fluid by American civilisations, as 
noted by early European explorers including Columbus (on his second voyage in 1493-6), 
Pietro Martire d’Anguiera (1530), Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo (1535), Antonio Herrera 
Tordesillas (1601) and F. J. de Torquemada (1615). Most of these accounts portrayed a 
(rubber) ball game similar to today’s football, but also religious ceremonies in which 
rubber was used as tribute. The utilisation of rubber for waterproofing was early 
recognised, but the product still remained as a simple curiosity.95 Charles Marie de la 
Condamine96 and Frangois Fresnau’s97 accounts directed more attention to rubber but no 
immediate industrial development followed. In the eighteenth century they described the 
process of crude rubber production, the types of trees from which latex was obtained and 
some possible applications of the material. They nonetheless inspired two other
95 Jones (1952, pp. 1-2) and Rogers (1952, pp. 40-41).
96 According to Charles Marie de la Condamine (1778, pp. 76-77):
*
"The wax so-called cahuchu (pronounced cahout-chou) in the surroundings of Quito, 
close to the sea, is also very common on the banks of the Maragnon river and has 
the same usages. If fresh, one can mould it to any shape; it is impervious to the rain; 
above all, it is its elasticity that is most remarkable. One can make it into strong 
bottles, boots or hollow bowls that become flat if pressed and regain its original form 
as soon as the pressure is released. The Portuguese from Para were taught by the 
Omaguas how to transform it into pumps or syringes that do not require piston: they 
look like hollow pears with a cavity on one end where a cannula is introduced. If filled 
with water, and pressing until full, they will function as ordinary syringes. This device 
is very common amongst (the) Omaguas." (my translation from French)
97 Moreover, Fresnau’s memorandum of 1747 (transcribed in Jones, 1952, pp. 21) states:
“Uses of the Different milky saps of which I have spoken: With these spread on linen 
one could make tarpaulins, sleeves for pumps, divers’ suits, waterbottles, bags for 
biscuits, etc., without fear that this material would impart a bad smell, but all these 
things can only be made on the spot where the trees grow, as the saps lose their 
fluidity very soon, especially the Sereingue (sic) sap”.
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Frenchmen, Frangois Herrissent and Pierre Macquer to make the first attempts to employ 
rubber in Europe by chemically dissolving the product. From their work, and of other 
French scientists, the first breakthrough was reached: the utilisation of turpentine and pure 
ether as solvents for rubber.98 On the other side of the Channel, experiments were also 
being carried out by Winch, Samuel Peal, Henry Johnson and J. Clark among others, all 
of whom devised a different chemical mixture for dissolving rubber. In parallel, a patent for 
preparation of rubber varnish was registered in the United States by J. F. Hummel.99
The dissolution of rubber and its consequent industrial manipulation led to several 
rubber factories being founded in the USA and in Europe (see Figure 2.1 below). Probably 
the first rubber company was founded in St. Denis, near Paris in 1803. Eight years later, J. 
N. Reithoffer opened a rubber factory in Vienna for the manufacture of elastic goods. In 
England, the first rubber concern was founded by Thomas Hancock in 1820 for working 
rubber and cutting strips to insert into garters and waistbands. Three years later, his future 
partner, Charles Macintosh founded Chas. Macintosh & Co. in Manchester whose main 
initial production was waterproofed fabric. In 1828, the first German rubber manufacture 
was founded at Finsterwalde near Berlin for the production of rubber thread and woven 
elastic. In the same year, Jan van Geuns started a company in Haarlem, Netherlands, for 
the confection of surgical specialities of soft rubber. In 1830, a rubber manufacturing 
company named H. Kirkstein was established in St. Petersburg, Russia, to make footwear 
whereas three years later the first American rubber manufacture was founded: Roxbury 
India Rubber Factory for the manufacture of rubber cloth and leather.100 As can be seen 
from Figure 2.1, some other rubber concerns were founded in the 1830s in the USA, 
Britain and France.
98 Woodruff (1958, p. 2).
99 Jones (1952, pp.10-11).
100 Rogers (1952, pp.40-48).
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Figure 2.1: Early Rubber Manufacturing Concerns, 1800-1840
Company Name or Entrepreneur's Name City Country
Year of 
Incorporation
n.a. St. Denis France 1803
J. N. Reithoffer Vienna Austria 1811
Thomas Hancock London Britain 1820
Chas. Machintosh & Co. Manchester Britain 1823
Rattier and Guibal n.a. France 1828
Francois Fonrobert Finsterwalde Germany 1828
Jan Van Geuns Haarlem Netherlands 1828
H. Kirkstein St. Petersburg Russia 1830
Barbier & Daubree Clermont Ferrand France 1832
Roxbury India Rubber Factory (later Goodyear 
Manufacturing Co. and thence Boston Belting Co.) Roxbury USA 1833
David Moseley & Sons, Ltd. Chorlton-on-Medlock Britain 1833
Eagle Rubber Co. Easton USA 1835
P. B. Cow & Co., Ltd. London Britain 1836
London Caoutchouc Co. (later Wm. Warne & Co., Ltd.) London Britain 1837
Source: elaborated from Rogers (1952, pp. 40-48). Note: n.a. = not available.
Rubber manufacturing companies appeared in several countries, but by 1830s, 
they started to be more and more concentrated in Britain and in the USA (even though 
France was also an important early rubber manufacturer). However, despite the 
establishment of these various manufacturing concerns there still remained technological 
hurdles for rubber manufacturing. The main issue hampering further industrialisation and 
commercialisation of rubber was not only its industrial manipulation but especially the fact 
that the product became rigid and inflexible in cold weather and it softened and 
decomposed under the sun or in hot weather. This problem was particularly important in a 
place like Northeast USA where extreme variations in temperature are recorded during 
the year and where customers were probably more deeply dissatisfied with rubber 
manufactures.
In parallel to this process of rubber industrialisation in Europe and in the USA, 
North-American interests started to establish themselves at the future centre of worldwide 
crude rubber supply: Belem city at the mouth of the Amazon River in Para region, Brazil. 
However, their initial commercial interest referred more to indigenous rubber shoe trade, 
set by New England traders who worked a shipping route linking Northeast US to the 
Brazilian coast, and Buenos Aires, in Argentina. That trade emerged after a ship captain
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named Benjamin Upton brought a pair of shoes to Salem, Massachusetts. Thomas Crane 
Wales somehow took notice of this new product and by 1825 he imported 500 pairs of 
rubber shoes from Belem, which were readily sold in the local market. Other traders 
followed suit and rubber shoe imports quickly rose, fostered by the transfer of some 
technical knowledge to native producers in Brazil. US traders indeed established 
commercial entrepots (usually run by family members of New England traders) in Belem 
which allowed them to instruct local rubber tappers on what they wanted and how to 
imprint a certain brand on the footwear. Proximity to production (geography) also 
permitted a more readily perception of supply variables, rendering responses to demand 
changes easier.101
Brazilian rubber shoes were praised for their quality and durability: the indigenous 
rubber men were taken as experts at their business.102 Belem producers possessed 
‘Ricardian’ comparative advantage in rubber shoe production. Their comparative 
advantage in rubber shoe production was strengthened by technological impediments 
(long time of travel, faulty preparation of the raw material, etc.) to crude rubber trade: it 
usually got damaged during the travel becoming useless for industrial purposes or 
requiring higher costs of manipulation. Higher quality and commercial ties should thus 
explain the increase in rubber shoe trade until mid 1840s (see Figure 2.2 below), even in 
the context of a civil war that disrupted trade in Belem from 1835 to 1840.103 Indeed, in 
1837-8 (in the middle of the civil uprising) 212,500 pairs of shoes were exported from Para 
and from 1841 to 1846 420,000 pairs of shoes were exported on average per year. 
However, from 1846 onwards the rubber shoe trade from Para started to wither away until 
1854, when orders ceased to come through.
101 Coslovsky (2005, pp. 11-29).
102 Coslovsky (2005, pp. 12-13).
103 It must also be noted that there was some technological impediments (long time of travel, 
preparation of the material, etc.) to crude rubber trade: the material usually got damaged during the 
travel becoming useless for industrial purposes.
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Figure 2.2: Exports of Rubber Shoes from Para to Selected Countries (in pairs) 
1836-1856
1836-1841 1841-1846 1846-1851 1851-1856
n. of pairs % n. of pairs % n. of pairs % n. of pairs %
USA 894,320 87.4% 1,722,918 82.1% 1,187,893 82.7% 81,400 44.6%
Germany 50,224 4.9% 151,359 7.2% 82,447 5.7% 37,135 20.4%
France 25,229 2.5% 114,455 5.5% 66,330 4.6% 600 0.3%
Britain 18,877 1.8% 61,188 2.9% 39,639 2.8% 8,354 4.6%
Portugal 16,096 1.6% 25,000 1.2% 56,565 3.9% 51,904 28.4%
Others 18,651 1.8% 24,843 1.2% 2,770 0.2% 3,078 1.7%
Total 1,023,397 100.0% 2,099,763 100.0% 1,435,644 100.0% 182,471 100.0%
Source: computed from Hancock (1857, pp. 158-165).
As it can be further inferred from Figure 2.2 above, US traders clearly dominated 
the rubber shoe trade with Para, accounting for more than 80% of total Para rubber shoe 
exports until the 1850s (note that England was never a large consumer of native rubber 
shoes even compared to countries such as Germany and France). However, by 1850s, 
two things were undermining the native rubber shoe trade. First, the boot and shoe 
industry in Massachusetts was experiencing an organisational change from the ‘Domestic 
Stage’ to the ‘Factory Stage’. In the 1850s, there was a sharp increase in demand for 
boots and shoes following the Californian and Australian gold discoveries which brought 
about immense orders with big profits, pushing to its very limits of production the boot and 
shoe organisation.104 Large economies of scale rendered mechanisation profitable, 
especially after 1860 with the introduction of the McKay sole sewing machine and the 
Goodyear Welt machine in 1875.105 Secondly, the discovery of the vulcanisation process 
by Charles Goodyear in 1839 improved the quality of US and European rubber products 
which became impervious to the weather, making the centralisation of production viable 
through the exploitation of large economies of scale. There was then a structural break in 
the rubber industry that shifted relative comparative advantage in manufactured rubber 
towards the USA and Britain. By increasing the quality of rubber products, the 
vulcanisation process undermined the quality advantage Brazilian shoes had had, 
explaining the sharp decrease in rubber shoe imports in the 1850s. This specialisation of
104 Hazard (1913, pp. 244-262).
105 Roe (1913, pp. 938-940). See also Coslovsky (2005, pp. 36-45).
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rubber manufacturing closer to consuming markets shaped the rubber chain: 
manufacturing ceased to be concentrated geographically closer to rubber trees in the 
Brazilian Amazon. The Brazilian Amazon then became a producer of crude rubber 
whereas the USA and Britain specialised in rubber manufacturing. In order to understand 
this transition and its consequences, it is important to examine this technological 
breakthrough first and then consider if technology was country-specific. Once the rubber 
market strucuture in the USA and Britain is analysed, it will be possible to evaluate the 
demand for crude rubber, i.e., the relationship between rubber manufacturing and the 
other nodes of the rubber chain.
What is the vulcanisation process and how was it achieved? The perfection of 
industrial manipulation of rubber relates to technological breakthroughs in the USA and in 
Britain. Whereas in Britain rubber developments are associated with Thomas Hancock 
and Charles Macintosh’s experiments, in the United States, the name of Charles 
Goodyear stands out. Hancock began his experiments with rubber as early as 1819 which 
led to the registration of several patents connected to mechanical apparatuses to treat the 
product. The most famous of these machines was the ‘masticator’ or ‘pickle’, comprised of 
two hollow wooden cylinders armed with teeth in which initially a hand-driven spiked roll 
was turned. The pickle welded together scraps of rubber into a homogeneous dough 
which could be applied to manufacture. Macintosh, in turn, (re-)discovered about 1820 the 
use of coal tar oil as a cheap solvent for rubber.106 Therefore, the process of dissolving 
rubber by the Macintosh process was perfected by treating the material mechanically 
through Hancock’s pickle machine, making cheap and financially viable the manipulation 
of rubber. By the end of the 1830s, there had been a consolidation of the Hancock- 
Macintosh forces with certain textile interests around Manchester, trading under the name 
of Chas. Macintosh & Co.
US industrial developments went along other lines. US industries did not adopt 
Hancock’s pickle machine, the method chosen was to compress crude rubber between 
wooden or iron cylinders. For instance, in 1836 Edwin Marcus Chaffee (original member
106 Woodruff (1958, pp. 1-5).
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of Roxbury India Rubber Company) developed a ‘calender’ or coating machine, comprised 
of steam heated rolls that allowed for the grinding and mixing of the rubber either without 
the use of solvents or with their limited use. Even though the absence of solvents would 
diminish the odour, it did not solve the primary problem that rubber hardened under cold 
temperatures and softened/melted in hot weather. This would be solved three years later 
with the discovery of the vulcanisation process by Charles Goodyear. Goodyear became 
interested in rubber in 1832 and his experiments continued until his death in 1860. His first 
patent was registered in 1837 for an ‘acid gas process’ which he believed had solved the 
basic problem of rubber industrialisation and manipulation. However, its commercialisation 
was a failure and only after he started to apply sulphur to rubber in his experiments 
(following suggestion by Nathaniel Hayward, from Eagle Rubber Co., who sold rights of 
his ‘solarisation process’ to Goodyear), would Goodyear make the final breakthrough: 
applying high temperature to a compound of sulphur, lead and rubber. Rubber would then 
achieve a new (vulcanised) state whereby it would be impervious to weather conditions.107
From then on, rubber manufacture technology was defined by a six-step industrial 
process: cleansing, grinding, softening, mixing, calendering and lastly vulcanising. First, 
rubber balls were cut into pieces and any foreign matter was extracted. The rubber pieces 
were then inserted into a water-filled barrel fitted with rotating and fixed knives that would 
tear apart the rubber and separate it out from impurities. Secondly, the cleansed material 
was plasticised by grinding and compressing it against two rolling heated cylinders. Next, 
softeners (such as camphene) were added and the rubber was placed into the mixer 
where the chemicals (vulcanising agents) were incorporated. For articles built from sheets 
of rubber the next step would then be the calendering: rubber would be compressed 
against rotating cylinders so close to each other that the crude rubber would be 
transformed into rubber sheets. Lastly, rubber was placed into a steam-heated chamber 
until it achieved its vulcanised state -  a state that could only be determined by an 
experienced worker.108 Crude rubber manufacturing became much more capital and
107 Woodruff (1958, pp. 6-10), Lunn (1952, pp. 31-37) and Goodyear (1855).
108 Woodruff (1958, pp. 21-23).
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technology intensive and the skills necessary for production were not the same as the 
ones American Natives possessed, partly explaining why rubber manufacturing moved 
geographically. Economies of scale increased the benefits of larger industrial plants that, 
due to costs, needed be located closer to consuming markets.
However, even though technically rubber could now be industrialised, the USA 
was still suffering from the crisis of 1837. Heavily in debt, Goodyear looked to England 
and in 1842 empowered Stephen Moulton to dispose of his formula for £50,000. Stephen 
Moulton carried with him the first samples of vulcanised rubber which were presented to 
Hancock and Brockedon (Hancock’s partner). However, the negotiation came to naught 
and Moulton went back without the money Goodyear needed so much. Moreover, from 
the vulcanised rubber pieces shown to Hancock, it was possible to discover the 
vulcanisation process and indeed Hancock registered his formula in Britain in November 
1843, two months before Goodyear belatedly applied for his English patent.109 Therefore, 
in the mid-1840s, the consolidation of the vulcanisation process started and with it the 
applications of rubber greatly expanded.
Figure 2.3: Exports of Crude Rubber from Para to Selected Countries (in lbs.)
1836-1856
1836-1841 1841-1846 1846-1851 1851-1856
in pounds % in pounds % in pounds % in pounds %
USA 235,476 14.0% 974,765 47.5% 4,956,447 59.6% 11,683,325 52.9%
Germany 87,322 5.2% 136,428 6.6% 192,688 2.3% 418,069 1.9%
France 303,776 18.1% 314,836 15.3% 740,777 8.9% 795,860 3.6%
Britain 650,793 38.7% 485,847 23.7% 2,364,348 28.4% 8,195,542 37.1%
Portugal 326,308 19.4% 51,226 2.5% 21,344 0.3% 36,055 0.2%
Others 77,757 4.6% 90,547 4.4% 41,952 0.5% 951,690 4.3%
Total 1,681,432 100.0% 2,053,649 100.0% 8,317,556 100.0% 22,080,541 100.0%
Source: computed from Hancock (1857, pp. 158-165).
From Figure 2.3 above, it can be seen that exports of crude rubber from Para 
increased steadily throughout the period and that the US and Britain clearly took a lead as 
main importers: altogether they accounted for 90% of total Para rubber exports in the
109 Woodruff (1958, pp. 10-14) and Hancock (1857).
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early 1850s. Note that the growth of crude rubber trade increased even faster when 
rubber shoe exports started to wither away.
In sum, proximity to latex-yielding trees and the dexterity of indigenous inhabitants 
of Para combined with technical expertise and capital advanced by New England shoe­
makers gave rise to a thriving rubber shoe trade which from 1836 to 1856 entailed the 
export of nearly 5,000,000 pairs of rubber shoes (of which nearly 4,000,000 exported to 
the USA alone) from one of the least developed regions of Brazil. However, the general 
demand for boots and shoes increased markedly due to Californian and Australian gold 
discoveries in the 1850s, generating more economies of scale that could only be explored 
through mechanisation. The discovery of the vulcanisation process in 1839 undermined 
the superior quality of Brazilian rubber shoes and made possible centralisation of 
production in factories. Moreover, with the vulcanisation process, the applications of 
rubber greatly expanded giving rise to a thriving flow of crude rubber from non­
industrialised countries to industrial ones, with the US and Britain taking the lead.
At first glance, the vulcanisation process then allowed rubber production to behave 
along the lines of the GCC/Wallersteinian framework. Core-states (here USA and Britain) 
concentrated higher levels of skill and capital. However, as explained in Chapter 1, the 
thesis does not assign any pre-defined notion of power among different nodes of the 
rubber chain and there is no assumption that any node was necessarily regarded as core. 
Furthermore, the development of the rubber trade also follows the Hecksher-Ohlin trade 
model as Brazil became an exporter of crude rubber and importer of rubber manufactures: 
indeed Brazil was relatively abundant in crude rubber but relatively scarce in capital for 
rubber manufacturing concerns (especially because the dexterity of native producers 
ceased to be too relevant after the discovery of the vulcanisation process). Conversely, 
the USA and Britain deepened their industrial position in rubber manufacturing110, a 
process that was influenced and shaped by formal (especially patents) and informal 
institutions that developed in relatively the same way in both countries. As in the GCC
110 Tariffs might have also played a role in withering rubber shoes trade from Para. See Coslovsky 
(2005).
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approach, it is important to understand the resultant market structure as monopoly and 
competition are considered key to understand the distribution of wealth among the nodes 
of a chain. Hence the next sections explore the evolution of the British manufacturing 
industry and later contrast it with its US counterpart. Once the resulting market structure in 
both countries is understood, it will be possible to analyse the demand for crude rubber, 
i.e., the relationship between rubber manufacturing and the other nodes of the rubber 
chain.
2.3 -  British Rubber Manufacturing Industry, 1860s-1910
As can be seen in Figure 2.4, several rubber companies were incorporated in 
Britain from the late 1840s to the 1860s, evincing the technical success of the 
vulcanisation process with more and more applications being developed for crude rubber 
(the list is not intended to be extensive though). The most important companies founded in 
this period were probably G. Spencer, Moulton & Co. (1848), The India Gutta Percha, and 
Telegraph Co. Ltd. (1852) and the North British Rubber Co., Ltd. (1855). Even though 
Moulton never became a large company in the rubber industry, remaining very much 
specialised, there are quite a lot of academic works about the company that shed light into 
the rubber manufacturing industry as a whole.111 The India Gutta Percha and Telegraph 
Co.112 remained very specialised too but its ramifications into submarine telegraphic 
communication turned this company into an important player in the rubber industry.113 
Finally, as will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, the North British Rubber 
Co. was an important competitor of both Chas. Macintosh & Co. and Dunlop (after the turn 
of the century). However, the viability of most of these early rubber companies was 
attached to patented vulcanisation rights owned by Chas. Macintosh & Co. Formal
111 See, for instance, Woodruff (1951), Woodruff (1953), Woodruff (1958) and Payne (1961).
112 The Company was merged in 1865 with Glass, Elliot & Co. (see Figure 2.4) to form the 
Telegraph and Construction Maintenance Co., or simply Telcon. This was the first company to be 
involved in every stage of cable making, from insulating the core to laying it. See Lawford and 
Nicholson (1950, pp. 9-64).
113 It is the same group (especially John Pender) behind the Eastern Telegraph Co. See Chapter 6 
for details on submarine telegraphic communication.
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institutions became then key to understand the evolution of British rubber manufacturing 
and how competition developed among the main firms.
Figure 2.4: British Rubber Concerns, 1840s-1870
Company Name Year of Incorporation
J. G. Ingram, Ltd. 1847
G. Spencer, Moulton & Co., Ltd. 1848
J. Mandleberg & Co., Ltd. 1850
C. E. Heinke & Co., Ltd. 1852
The India Rubber, Gutta Percha, and Telegraph Works Co., Ltd. 1852
Glass, Elliot & Co. 1854
North British Rubber Co., Ltd. 1855
The Leyland and Birmingham Rubber Co., Ltd. 1862
J. Frankenstein & Sons 1868
J. G. Franklin & Sons, Ltd. 1870
Northern Rubber Co. Ltd. 1870
Source: elaborated from Rogers (1952, p. 42) and Lawford and Nicholson (1950).
Due to patents, by the 1860s, Chas. Macintosh & Co. enjoyed a competitive edge 
(and rents) in the British market but its leading position and property rights did not remain 
uncontested for long. In 1849, Stephen Moulton began to manufacture rubber under his 
own patent that prescribed lead sulphate instead of sulphur as the vulcanising agent.114 
Moulton’s patent was a result of his early association with the brothers William, John and 
Emory Rider, manufacturers of rubber goods in Harlem, NY. Their vulcanisation formula 
was discovered in Rider’s factory by an American chemist, James Thomas, and registered 
in England where they initially intended to sell it. This is another example of how 
technology was spread from one side of the Atlantic to the other. However, Stephen 
Moulton had other plans and decided to set production in Bradford-on-Avon for which he 
counted on technical knowledge from the Americans.115
Once Chas. Macintosh & Co. had enforced Hancock’s patent in England (and 
Wales) through litigation against Goodyear, the Manchester company channelled its
114 Woodruff (1953, pp. 41-42).
115 Woodruff (1958).
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energies against Moulton & Co. under the plea that Moulton’s patent was also an 
infringement of Hancock’s. The court decided in Macintosh & Co.’s favour but its victory 
was only partial: Moulton & Co. was granted a restrictive license under which to continue 
operations the company had to pay £600 per year. Nonetheless, even though Macintosh 
was henceforth forced to share the market with Moulton & Co., Moulton’s venture did not 
challenge Macintosh’s market position. The Bradford company specialised in high quality 
rubber mechanicals116 instead of producing a wide range of rubber products as Macintosh 
did. In fact, more important competitors arose from Scotland and overseas instead.
Despite its victory against Goodyear (and, by consequence, against all American 
licensed rubber manufacture companies) in the English courts, Macintosh was never able 
to keep American products (produced under Goodyear license) at bay. Moreover, the 
English monopoly of the vulcanisation process was not fully secured as a group of 
American investors used a breach of the law to establish a rubber factory in Scotland. 
Hancock’s patent was registered in England before the Patent Law Amendment Act of 
1852, and it was not automatically extended to the rest of Britain. In Scotland, it was 
Hancock (Chas. Macintosh & Co.) who belatedly applied to a patent as Goodyear’s patent 
preceded Hancock’s by 3 months.117
In 1856, Norris & Co., a footwear concern, was established in Edinburgh as a 
Goodyear licensee. A year later the venture was reincorporated as North British Rubber 
Co. with an authorised capital of US$491,000 (or £100,000) increased to US$1.9 million 
(or £350,000) in 1888116. Like Chas. Macintosh & Co., British Rubber Co. also diversified 
into a wide range of rubber products such as belting, hose and other mechanical goods, 
giving a spurt to sales. The move to tyre production proved later even more profitable and 
in 1898, tyres accounted for 38% of sales.119
Chas. Macintosh & Co. responded to the entry of North British Rubber Co. and to 
foreign competition by cutting prices below costs, causing lower standards and profits in
116 The company was very specialised in rubber mechanicals such as rubber buffers or springs for 
train wagons which led to its later association with the House of Spencer. See Payne (1961).
117 Woodruff (1958, p. 143).
118 Figures were converted from sterling pounds into US dollars using exchange rate series 
provided in the Appendix.
1^9 French (1988, pp. 396-403).
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the British rubber manufacturing. Paradoxically though, increased competition and general 
uncertainty about the supply of crude rubber coupled with price warfare compelled the 
British rubber industry towards collusion. Yet the problem with issuing uniform price lists 
was that the quality of rubber goods differed immensely. Additionally, cartelisation could 
not control foreign competition. With overt support of the India Rubber Journal120, the first 
Rubber Manufacturers Association of Great Britain was created, based in Manchester but 
the Association was handicapped as some important firms decided not to join: for 
example, Wm Warne & Co., North British Rubber Co., Spencer Moulton & Co., and The 
Silvertown Co.121
Macintosh would not continue indefinitely as the main rubber manufacturer in 
Britain, being surpassed by Dunlop which would become in 1930 the eighth largest British 
company in terms of estimated market value. This firm’s initial growth rested on John 
Boyd Dunlop’s 1889 patent of the pneumatic tyre principle. This patent was nonetheless 
invalidated three years later after the re-discovery of Robert William Thompson’s much 
earlier patent of the pneumatic tyre in 1845. Were it not for the purchase of other 
important patents, such as the Welch and Bartlett ones (the last one bought from North 
British Rubber Co. for £200,000) concerned with methods of attaching pneumatic tyres to 
bicycle rims, Dunlop’s company might not have survived. Indeed, the company’s 
expansion was laid upon possession of patented technology that the company tried to 
protect abroad through international ventures in France, Germany, Russia, Canada, 
United States, Japan and Australia.122
As with Macintosh some years earlier, formal institutions (namely, patent rights) 
explain Dunlop success. However, whereas Macintosh’s patents related to an industrial 
process for rubber manipulation, Dunlop’s referred to a specific product, the pneumatic 
tyre, and methods of applying it to cars and bicycles. Apart from Dunlop and Moulton & 
Co., British rubber companies were usually highly diversified, producing a wide range of
120 India Rubber Journal, 13th May 1898.
121 India Rubber World, 1st May 1900.
122 Tariffs were also decisive in defining Dunlop’s international strategy. See Jones (1984, pp.35- 
41).
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rubber products as North British Rubber Co. and Chas. Macintosh & Co. did. However, 
with the re-discovery of the pneumatic principle, these companies lost market share to 
Dunlop which specialised in the most rapidly increasing niche of the industry, rubber tyres. 
According to the UK Census of Production, in 1907 rubber tyres accounted for 31.8% of 
overall sales in the industry that stood at US$43.3 million (equivalent to £8.9 million) in 
1907 and US$62.3 million (or £12.8 million) in 1912.123 Dunlop was the company that 
benefited the most from this structural change, becoming the biggest rubber concern in 
Britain employing around 4,000 people in 1913124 out of a total employment in the rubber 
industry of 31,900 in 1912125. In turn, North British Rubber Co. had around 3,500 
employees in 1908126 against a total employment in the rubber industry of 24,039 in 
1907.127 In capitalisation terms, in 1905 Dunlop ranked 16th among British industrial 
companies with a total capital of US$21.4 million (or £4.4 million), dwarfing North British 
which was capitalised at US$1.8 million (or £360,000).
In sum, a formal institution, patent legislation, was at the heart of the development 
of the British rubber industry. Initially, Macintosh used patents to enforce a domestic 
monopoly, with some success. The company was able to prevent American competition 
for a while, at the same time that it cashed in with its licensees. However, North British 
Rubber Co. and Moulton & Co. were a thorn in the side of Macintosh in a context of 
increasing foreign competition with ever new players in the market. On top of that, 
following the re-discovery of the pneumatic principle, rubber tyres were applied to bicycles 
and later to motorcars, changing completely the composition of rubber manufactures.
Remember that, apart from Dunlop and Moulton & Co., British rubber companies 
were usually highly diversified, producing a wide range of products. Thus due to more 
specialisation in the most rapidly growing niche of the rubber industry, Dunlop profited 
from the change in the demand for rubber manufactures that became more and more
123 UK Censuses of Production (1907) and (1912).
124 Shaw (1983, p. 53).
125 UK Census of Production (1912).
126 Shaw (1983, p. 53).
127 UK Census of Production (1907). For the sake of comparison, according to Censuses for 
England and Wales (1861) and Scotland (1861), in that year there were only 1,840 rubber workers 
in Britain.
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concentrated on tyres. Despite Dunlop’s leadership, the rubber manufacture market 
remained quite competitive, though not as much as it was during the price war of the 
1860s. In that sense, the British rubber industry does not follow so closely the 
characteristics of a Wallersteinian core-node as initially thought. Even though patents 
(formal institution) enforced monopoly/oligopoly, competition continued to be prevalent: 
despite the existence of big players (such as Dunlop, Macintosh and North British Rubber 
Co.) cartelisation was always unsuccessful as it was not possible either to curtail foreign 
competition or to assure a price list in such a heterogeneous market.
2.4 -  US Rubber Manufacturing Industry, 1860s-1910
As in Britain, amalgamation and collusion in the rubber industry was shaped by 
formal institutions, right from the start. As mentioned before, Goodyear was responsible 
for the emergence of the US rubber industry as new industries appeared as Goodyear’s 
licensees. In late 1840s, the first voluntary association of rubber industries was born as 
Goodyear Associates and Licensees when six firms (Goodyear’s Metallic Rubber Shoe 
Co., L. Candee & Co., Newark India Rubber Co., Ford and Company, Hayward Rubber 
Co. and Oderdonk and Letson) agreed to pay into a common fund -  to be used for 
prosecution of infringers of the patent -  a royalty of three US cents a pair on all sellable 
footwear manufactured under Goodyear license. This sum was additional to the royalty of 
one-half cent a pair paid directly to Goodyear. These firms also agreed on minimum and 
maximum discounts, and further agreed to meet annually to decide on prices. From 1852, 
a tighter control was established with production quotas being assigned to members of the 
agreement.128
Between 1865 and 1892 several other agreements were pursued in order to 
increase profits by maintaining high prices through production limits (or the consolidation 
of companies). In 1882, B.F.Goodrich proposed to several rubber companies the 
formation of a single central company which would absorb sixty-makers of rubber goods, 
including B.F.Goodrich. The idea did not last long, but was revived in 1886 when a pool
128 Babcock (1966, pp. 21-22).
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for mechanical goods (including industrial belting) was formed 129, resulting in the 
incorporation of the Central Rubber Co., a Rhode Island Corporation. However, dissent 
among stockholders led to court actions and the dissolution of the company in 1892. In 
parallel to this agreement in the mechanical goods, other collusion was attempted among 
boot and shoe companies which nonetheless did not materialise until 1889 when 10 out of 
14 rubber boot and shoe companies formed the Rubber Boot and Shoe Manufacturers’ 
Association aiming at securing high prices.130
Apart from protection of property rights, the driving forces behind collusion and 
amalgamation were usually competition and the swings in the price of crude rubber. After 
the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890) the US Federal Government started to intervene in 
those overt collusion agreements, but further concerted action in the rubber industry still 
ensued, notably as consequence of the efforts of Charles R. Flint who organised and 
prepared the incorporation of the United States Rubber Co. (USRC) on March 29th, 1892. 
By the end of that year nine companies merged (see Figure 2.5 below). In 1893, USRC 
gained control of Goodyear’s India Rubber Glove Manufacturing Co., Woonsocket Rubber 
Co. (and its subsidiary Marvel Rubber Co.), the Lawrence Felting Plant and Colchester 
Rubber Co. The next major purchase was that of the Boston Rubber Shoe Co. in 1898 
which means that by mid-1890s there were only two rubber footwear companies outside 
USRC’s control. Yet, by the end of the decade, competitors were emerging to challenge 
USRC market dominance. These companies were all incorporated by former managers, 
directors or presidents of some of the companies amalgamated into the USRC.131
129 Blackford and Kerr (1996, p. 26).
130 Babcock (1966, p. 24).
131 Babcock (1966, pp. 26-40).
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Figure 2.5: Rubber Footwear Concerns Amalgamated into USRC before 1900
Year of 
Incorporation
Name of the Company Year of Amalgamation into USRC
1845 Goodyear M etallic Rubber Shoe Co. 1892
1847 Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Manufacturing Co. 1893
1850 New Brunswick Rubber Co. 1892
1852 The L. Candee and Co. 1892
1853 Boston Rubber Shoe Co. 1898
1861 M eyer Rubber Co. 1892
1864 National India Rubber Co. 1892
1867 W oonsocket Rubber Co. 1893
1877 New Jersey Rubber Shoe Co. 1892
1878 American Rubber Co. 1892
1878 Boston Rubber Co. 1892
1881 Para Rubber Shoe Co. 1892
1888 Colchester Rubber Co. 1893
1888 Brookhaven Rubber Co. 1892
1890 Lycoming Rubber Co. 1892
1896 Hood Rubber Co. 1898
Source: elaborated from Babcock (1966, pp. 26-50).
In 1898, Charles R. Flint was again active in amalgamations in the rubber industry, 
orchestrating the incorporation of the Rubber Goods Manufacturing Co. (RGMC) on 
January 26th, 1899. Members of the syndicate subscribed US$ 5 million (of which US$ 3 
million in cash)132 to be invested in properties of manufacturers of rubber goods and allied 
products other than boots and shoes. By February 1893, the RGMC had acquired 99.8% 
the capital stock of the Mechanical Rubber Co., 75% of the stock of Morgan and Wright 
and the entire stock of the following companies: Peerless Rubber Manufacturing Co., 
Akron India Rubber Co., Sawyer Belting Co., Hartford Rubber Works Co., Indianapolis 
Rubber Co., Sandy Hook Reclaiming Works, Mechanical Fabric Co., American Dunlop 
Tire Co., Single Tube A and B Co. and Peoria Rubber and Manufacturing Co.133
In 1905, the most important agglomeration in the rubber industry took place when 
the United States Rubber Co. bought the Rubber Goods Manufacturing Company, thereby 
becoming the largest firm in the industry as of 1907 (see Figure 2.6 below) its net sales 
reached nearly US$ 40 million (£8.2 million). USRC sales dwarfed all other major rubber
132 £1,028,000 and £616,780, respectively. See appendix for data on exchange rates.
133 Babcock (1966, pp. 44-47).
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companies and its profits were twice as large as B.F.Goodrich’s and twenty times that of 
Firestone.
Figure 2.6: Financial Performance of Major US Rubber Manufacturers, 1907 
(in £)
Net Sales Net Profits Net Income as a Percentage of Net Sales
U.S. Rubber 8,172,016 944,444 11.6%
B.F.Goodrich 2,660,503 478,166 18.0%
Goodyear 450,617 n.a. n.a.
Firestone 345,885 44,092 12.7%
Source: elaborated from Blackford and Kerr (1996, p. 43). Converted into pounds sterling using series 
presented in the Appendix.
The second major company in the industry by 1907 was B.F.Goodrich with net 
sales of US$ 13 million (£2.7 million) or just 32.6% of U.S. Rubber Co.’s. B.F. Goodrich 
was the first rubber company west of the Appalachians, beginning operations in February 
1871 in Akron, Ohio. Numerous factors accounted for the establishment of the company in 
that site, which would later become the rubber capital of the United States: for example, 
availability of clean water (essential in the cleansing process), good transportation 
facilities (not only by canal but also by rail), cheap fuel from Ohio’s coal mines and a 
relatively inexpensive labour supply.134 B.F. Goodrich initial success also accounted for 
the spurt in rubber production in Ohio as other companies moved to the region. By 1904, 
there were another twenty-six rubber companies in Ohio; in 1909, 41. In 1905, Ohio had 
already established itself as the main rubber manufacturer in the USA and in 1914, the 
State accounted for 36.4% of overall US rubber manufacture production.135 Even though 
Dunlop and North British also possessed large scale plants, there is no comparable 
agglomeration of rubber plants in Britain as the Akron rubber cluster in the USA.
Moreover, the relationship with car makers (that were agglomerating in the nearby 
Detroit area) granted the US tyre manufacturers advantage in the development of the new
134 Blackford and Kerr (1996, p. 37).
135 Barker (1940, pp. 17-21).
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designs necessary for car tyres136 and, for instance, by 1907, Goodyear dismissed British 
Dunlop’s car tyre as unsatisfactory: standardisation of demand (and quality and 
technological improvements) emerged as a response to the needs of the motorcar 
industry.137 As a consequence, whilst in Britain a wide variety of types and sizes for tyres 
would become the rule, in the United States motor manufacturers at any one time 
restricted their demands for tyres to a limited number of sizes and types.138
It must be mentioned that economies of agglomeration might have been present 
long before the motorcar industry. The rubber shoe and boot production had clustered in 
New England, especially around Boston, as an extension of the traditional shoe and boot 
industry.139 This might have accounted for the early high productivity of the US rubber 
industry. With the tyre making industry, these economies of scale and agglomeration 
simply intensified, facilitating the formation of cartels or any other restrictive agreements.
Like the USRC, B.F.Goodrich was involved in several agreements to restrict 
competition. As mentioned earlier, the company was at the heart of consolidations of the 
mechanical rubber goods, even though it did not join the Rubber Goods Manufacturing Co. 
agreement until later. By mid-1890s, B.F.Goodrich tried another arrangement, this time to 
limit competition in the bicycle tyre market, and form a pool to control the price of crude 
rubber. These efforts were not successful, though they resulted in the formation of the 
Rubber Tyre Association which lasted two years only because one third of the companies 
in the market decided not to join.
In the late 1890s and early 1900s,
1,3b French (1987, p. 70).
137 French (1987, p. 70, footnote 21).
138 Donnithorne (1958, p. 53).
139 The Appendix shows my own computation of productivity in the US and British rubber industries. 
Due to data availability it is only possible to compare productivity in the 1900s. The data shows a 
significant productivity gap of 2:1 favouring the USA. Since early productivity was relatively high in 
the USA, it is possible to speculate that this gap may have existed as early as 1860s, contradicting 
Woodruffs (1955) claims. His computation is quite misleading as he proxies productivity by crude 
rubber consumption divided by the number of workers. The data shown in the Appendix relates 
more to the idea of productivity as being defined by quantity of production divided by the number of 
people employed in the industry. Woodruffs productivity is measuring technology differences rather 
than productivity.
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“(...) the company [B.F.Goodrich] joined with others, including Goodyear, in 
an effort to limit competition by purchasing from the Single Tube Automobile 
and Tire Company the right to manufacture automobile tires under the 
Tillighast patents. Companies not so licensed were excluded from making 
certain types of tires. Similarly, in 1903 Goodrich joined the Rubber Goods 
Manufacturing Company and several others in setting up the Clincher Tire 
Association. This body tried to limit competition by acquiring patents that 
gave its members the sole right to make clincher automobile tires. It also set 
production quotas and prices. Goodyear was given a very small allocation 
and Firestone was excluded altogether”.140
As the quote above shows, B.F.Goodrich was indeed involved with various 
agreements that tried to curtail competition but, as several previous ones, these efforts 
failed or were at best short lived. It was very difficult to cartelise such a heterogeneous 
market. Moreover, these agreements invariably gave incentives for outside firms to 
innovate thereby overcoming the limits of the cartel. This indeed happened in the case of 
the Clincher Tire Association mentioned above. The cartel backfired as the outsiders, 
Goodyear and Firestone, developed a “straight-side” tyre that was much easier for 
motorists to replace. Because of this development, Firestone was granted its first orders 
from Ford and emerged as one of the biggest companies in the rubber industry.141 
Goodyear and Firestone companies were very much specialised in tyre production, and 
because of the increasing demand for rubber tyres, as a consequence of the development 
of the motorcar industry, they rapidly increased their market shares in detriment of 
B.F.Goodrich and The United States Rubber Co. that remained very much diversified. 
Both companies were latecomers: the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. was founded in 
1898 by F. A. Seiberling (former financier of B.F.Goodrich), H. Manton, and D. E. Hill142 
whereas the Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. was only established in 1900, by H. S.
140 Blackford and Kerr (1996, p. 34).
141 Blackford and Kerr (1996, p. 34).
142 Rogers (1952, p. 45).
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Firestone and other investors, initially based on an invention by James A. Sweinhart of a 
tyre that could be easily fastened to the rim.143 By 1907, these two rubber concerns were 
still small compared to US Rubber Co. and B.F.Goodrich, but with further development of 
the motorcar industry they would soon catch up. Goodyear would eventually become the 
biggest rubber company in the USA.
Even though in the USA cartelisation of the industry seems to have been more 
successful (a bit closer to the Wallersteinian core-node ideal type if compared to its British 
counterpart), the four giant rubber corporations were not able completely to control the 
marked. Even the USRC, the largest company, accounted for less than 15% of the market 
by 1910. Therefore, competition was curtailed somewhat along the process of 
amalgamations in the industry but the market remained quite competitive. Competition 
indeed continued, despite agglomeration forces. Agglomeration economies in Akron were 
created by proximity to markets (especially, Detroit where the motorcar industry was also 
agglomerating) and to inputs (clean water, coal and labour). Spillover effects and the 
geographical proximity to carmakers gave a competitive edge to US rubber manufacturers, 
creating even more external economies of scale.
Even though the geographical proximity between several firms pertaining to a 
same segment of the rubber market facilitated cartelisation, as in Britain, patents were the 
main formal instrument used to limit competition.144 However, this amalgamation process 
cannot be viewed solely as attempts to limit competition by greedy capitalists as it was 
also a natural adjustment of the industry in a period of rapid growth in a context of scarcity 
of the main input of the industry: crude rubber.
143 Firestone (1926, pp.46-55).
144 Patents were also used to keep some foreign competitors out of the market. For instance, 
British Dunlop had trouble to re-enter the US market after having given in the rights to trade in the 
United States in tyres “for use on cycles and other vehicles”, when they sold its American venture 
to its Canadian manager. After the Rubber Goods Manufacturing Co. secured a controlling interest 
in the (American) Dunlop Tyre Co. in 1899, British Dunlop was forbidden to trade under its own 
brand up to 1916 after a payment of US$95,320 (or £20,000) in royalties for the United States 
Rubber Co. (which by then owned the Rubber Goods Manufacturing Co.). See Jones (1984, pp.35- 
41).
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2.5 -  Impulses of Demand
As argued in the previous sections, despite cartelisation efforts, competition 
prevailed on both sides of the Atlantic and as shown by international ventures (epitomised 
by Dunlop’s attempts to establish itself in the USA), British and American rubber 
companies were definitely rivals. British and American exports of rubber manufactures 
soared with clear advantage to Britain since most of US rubber manufacture production 
was absorbed by the domestic market as a consequence of the deeper development of 
the motorcar industry in that country.
This rivalry among rubber companies (and between British and American rubber 
industries) emanated along the rubber chain, notably after the demand for bicycles and 
motorcars caused the demand for crude rubber to take an explosive trend. As explained in 
the previous section, the British and American rubber industries do not appear to have 
followed the Wallersteinian core node ideal type as competition continued to be prevalent 
and this section further shows that profitability does not follow the GCC prescriptions as 
swings in crude rubber price influenced profitability at the manufacturing level rather than 
the reverse. In order to understand why the rubber chain departs so much from the GCC, 
it is important to analyse the rubber trade in conjunction with investment and finance. 
Even though this will be carried out in more depth in the next chapter, it is shown here that 
access to a steady and reliable supply of rubber was the key to success in a context of 
rising crude rubber prices.
As can be inferred from Figure 2.7 below, the price of crude rubber showed an 
upward trend, especially from 1902 to 1910, despite an interruption in mid-1906, result of 
an attempt by a Brazilian export house to corner the rubber market in Belem, which 
nonetheless failed due to a recession in the USA. The price of crude rubber in 1910 
simply reflected the fact that wild sources were inadequate to support an increasing 
demand for rubber, pushed by motorcars sales in the USA and abroad.
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Figure 2.7: Monthly Price of two Varieties of Brazilian Crude Rubber in New York
(November 1894- December 1910)
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Source: computed from several issues of the India Rubber World. The plotted line was computed as the average between 
minimum and maximum prices for ‘Para Upriver’ and ‘Island Fine’ rubber grades as quoted in the New York market. ‘Upriver 
Coarse’, Island Coarse’ and ‘C am eta’ grades (lower quality grades from the Brazilian Am azon) all showed the sam e basic 
trend in prices. See Appendix for further data on prices for different rubber grades.
As can be seen, the average price for ‘upriver fine Para’ in 1905-1910 period was 
1.54 times higher than in 1895-1899 and 2.35 times higher than 1875-1879. Hence, 
rubber manufacturers became increasingly concerned about crude rubber supply. The 
analysis of costs in the industry does suggest that rubber was the main cost component 
that could account for as much as 30% of the price of the final product.145 Moreover, some 
industries set their prices based on the cost of rubber rather than on the scale of its 
activities:
“(...) for Moulton [from Moulton Co., later Spencer, Moulton & Co.] price 
was determined not so much by movement to and from a point of 
equilibrium in the scale of operations as by changes in the cost of raw
145 This can be observed by dividing the value of crude rubber consumption (proxied by imports 
minus exports) over the value of rubber manufacture production in a given year (taken from the 
Census of Manufactures or Census of Production).
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materials; particularly movements in the crude rubber market that 
affected a great part of his total manufacturing costs. Over a period, and 
this point needs to be stressed, no other factor could so easily spell 
prosperity or disaster for the producer than changes in the value of his 
rubber stocks”146
As the quote above shows, changes in the price of crude rubber usually drove 
prices of rubber manufactures as it can be inferred from several letters exchanged by 
Moulton and Spencer regarding price adjustments. Moreover, Stephen Moulton always 
showed confidence that his price adjustments would be followed by the whole industry.147
Further evidence of how important crude rubber prices were in influencing the 
price for the whole chain derives from the fact that the profit levels along the rubber chain 
were strongly correlated and profits for tyre companies usually had a positive correlation 
with crude rubber prices.148 The explanation for this counterintuitive result reinforces 
Moulton’s perception in the quote above: rubber stocks held could cause disaster or could 
be a blessing for a rubber manufacturing company. Crude rubber was so scarce that a 
good position in this market could determine profits at the rubber manufacturing industry. 
This explains the US and British struggle for crude rubber supply. There was little 
horizontal integration along the rubber chain and then British and American rubber 
manufacturers would usually place orders to crude rubber traders at the beginning of the 
rubber tapping season. Therefore, there was usually a stable and long relationship 
between traders and rubber manufacturers and once the orders were placed, rubber 
traders would often directly advance funds to crude rubber producers (or buying in the 
spot market) in order to meet the demand. They would also speculate by buying more
146 Woodruff (1953, p. 61), underlined by me.
147 Woodruff (1953, p. 54).
148 Frank and Musacchio (2006, pp. 288-289). B.F. Goodrich (1881-1910) and Firestone (1903- 
1910) do show a strong correlation between their profits and crude rubber price. So does Spencer 
& Co. from 1861 to 1890. However, the North British Rubber Co. (1857-1910) and Moulton & Co. 
(1855-1860) showed a negative correlation, suggesting that these two companies might have had 
more trouble passing through increases in the crude rubber price to the final consumer. Sources: a) 
for profits: French (1988), Woodruff (1958), Payne (1961), Blackford & Kerr (1996) and Lief (1951); 
b) for crude rubber prices: US Trade and Navigation Reports (several issues) and UK 
Parliamentary Papers (several issues).
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rubber than that required by the forward contracts. In this context it was difficult for
American rubber manufacturers to bypass British buyers (and vice-versa) even if they
offered a higher price as most of the market was hidden under forward contracts and only 
a small proportion of trade occurred on spot markets: for example, according to a British 
crude rubber trader,
“(...) [tjotal imports (into Liverpool) for the last three months are 2,265 tons 
while the total sales only represent 562 tons, it is thus perfectly evident
that large quantities of Rubber, especially Para, must find its way to the
manufacturers without coming on the open market, the result no doubt of 
forward contracts so that considerable quantities must have been 
forwarded from the store”.149
However, as England (London and Liverpool) established itself as the main rubber 
spot market, it is not surprising that, even still, American rubber manufacturers (and crude 
rubber traders) tried to bypass importers on several occasions under the assumption that 
they were suffering from speculation. For instance, in 1910, Bertram G. Work, president of 
B.F.Goodrich decried the “work of speculators in London in raising crude rubber prices”150.
For a rubber trader, a good position in the crude rubber market was crucial to meet 
the forward contracts, whereas from the viewpoint of rubber manufacturers, it was crucial 
to ally themselves with an (or a pool of) influential (rubber) trade house(s). It was also 
important to forecast accurately the demand for rubber manufactures as additional 
marginal production would require going to spot markets where prices were usually very 
high due to the scarcity of the product. Since the American industry was the one 
expanding the most, US rubber manufacturers ended up resorting more to the spot 
markets, meaning that American rubber companies paid higher prices (especially at the 
margin) for a same quality of crude rubber. Moreover, in general the US rubber traders
W. Wright & Co./SM, 20 March 1875, cited by Woodruff (1958, p. 52, footnote 4).
150 Blackford and Kerr (1996, p. 56). See also Frank and Musacchio (2006).
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were acquiring a lower average quality of crude rubber. Indeed, according to a British 
crude rubber trader:
“[\]t is a noticeable fact that the average price of crude rubber imported 
into the U.K. was higher than the average price of that exported (1889 for 
example 231s. cwt. against 209s.) which suggests that the British 
manufacturer normally retained the superior and exported inferior kinds’’151
Nonetheless, this was also a consequence of the fact that most of the trade 
entering Britain was actually under forward contracts that usually embodied a lower value 
for rubber trade in exchange for a steady, long-term relationship between the parties. If 
most of the British re-exports were spot sales against forward contract purchases in the 
importing market, it would be expected that prices should be higher in the re-export 
market regardless the quality of the product. If this was really the case, to account for 
lower prices in British re-exports of rubber, the quality of the product must have been very 
low indeed.152
As mentioned earlier, rubber traders sometimes made direct investments in rubber 
production, usually by advancing money to producers, shaping the connection between 
manufacturers and the other nodes of the rubber chain. Before 1910 the supply of crude 
rubber came mainly from wild sources, and British and American investments were mostly 
carried out through export houses, which provided capital for native rubber producers in 
exchange for their future production of rubber. Sometimes the export houses were simply
151 Wright, Roberts & Co.’s Circular, 20 January 1871. Cited by Woodruff (1958, p. 49, footnote 1).
152 According to the Appendix though, implicit prices for Brazilian crude rubber imported into the 
USA were considerably lower than reported for Britain (and France). Even though it could be 
argued that American buyers were more successfull in lowering prices due to market power, the 
text shows evidence in contrary. Moreover, as the thesis will further show, US buyers were more 
dependent on rubber (higher inelasticity of demand), they paid higher freights, and qualitative 
information from rubber manufacturers suggest that they were getting more low quality rubber. 
Another explanation for lower prices in the US data refers to the different role of US and British 
rubber exporters placed in Brazil. On the one hand, the former were mainly agents of US importing 
firms and then were probably exporting rubber at its cost price (with the profits being accrued by 
the headquarters). On the other hand, the latter had more freedom of manoeuvre and were 
exporting rubber at the highest possible price.
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representatives of British and American rubber traders.153 However, funds were also 
channelled through stock markets even before plantations came into place: there are 
examples of native wild rubber companies that were directly incorporated abroad, such as 
the Liberian Rubber Corporation, the Peruvian Rubber Co. and De Mello Brazilian Rubber 
Co., among others. These wild rubber producers went to London in search of capital, and 
the London Stock Exchange was preferred to its New York counterpart. By 1910, London 
had established itself as an international financial centre, trading securities from the whole 
world whereas New York traded almost exclusively in American stocks and bonds.154 In 
regard to rubber, it is true that after several scandals due to speculation and fraud155, 
rubber securities were banned from the London Stock Exchange in 1909 but investors 
continued to trade in rubber shares in an alternative market set up in Mincing Lane, 
London. In the USA, plantation companies seldom met
“(...) the strict requirements for listing on the New York Stock Exchange 
and promoters usually employed paid journalists and bold advertising to 
peddle their securities directly to unsophisticated investors -  physicians, 
school teachers, clerks, waiters, laborers, widows and other susceptible 
women, and others with money to invest.’*56
153 See, for instance, Weinstein (1983).
154 Michie (1986, pp.184-185).
155 There is ample evidence of speculation on rubber shares. First, the sheer amount of money 
channelled to rubber production in the 1900s is indicative of this process. The Appendix shows the 
paid-up capital of crude rubber producing companies in Africa, Americas and Asia. Secondly, the 
number of firms involved in the rubber trade also provides further evidence (see Appendix). Thirdly, 
there are several stories of frauds with rubber shares making Munro (1981, p. 267, underlined by 
me) affirm that in African rubber investments,
“ftjhere were often uncertainties surrounding the assets of the business -  for example, 
over the actual amount of tappable rubber available in the forest concession, or 
whether the company’s monopoly rights could be defended, de facto as well as de 
jure, against competing elements. Against these operational risks were set the 
possibility of quicker and higher returns on capital than from plantations which might 
require several years of expensive development work. Consequently, companies to 
exploit natural rubber concessions were more susceptible to speculative financial 
pressures”.
Michie (1986, p. 184), Schell Jr. (1990, p. 225), Drabble (1973) and Drabble and Drake (1974) 
provide further information on rubber investments. See also The Rubber Producing Companies 
(1911) and The Rubber Share Handbook (1910).
156 Schell Jr. (1990, p. 223).
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Thus in the first decade of the 20th Century, there was speculation with rubber 
shares, fuelled by the increasing demand for crude rubber in the industrialised countries, 
notably in Britain and America, that drove prices upward. Several companies were formed 
or funds channelled directly to investments in crude rubber production all over the globe 
and indeed rubber was a globalised commodity par excellence: rubber yielding trees were 
found in all continents. However, as can be inferred from Figure 3.1 (further below), Brazil 
supplied around 60% and the rest of the Americas another c.10% of the market to both, 
the USA and Britain. The remaining 30% was supplied by Africa and ‘Asia & Oceania’ for 
Britain and by European re-exporters to the USA. This geography of the rubber trade will 
be explored in more detail in Chapter 3 and what is important to note here is just that 
competition for rubber sources was pushing prices up, forcing production to continue to 
expand to ever new areas too. Consequently, the investment in crude rubber production 
was soaring.
The geographical struggle for crude rubber supply meant that Britain and the USA 
had different access in terms of the quality of rubber they imported insofar as crude rubber 
was not a homogeneous commodity at all, registering huge differences in terms of quality 
and physical properties of the material (notably in terms of tensile elasticity). For instance, 
gutta-percha, a native tree from Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, was a non-elastic 
variety of rubber and owed its commercial use for insulation of (submarine) cables and for 
outer casing of golf balls. In turn, African rubber produced a decent quality of crude rubber, 
registering a good cost advantage in the production of buffers of railway carriages: buffers 
made out of lower quality rubber would seldom return to their original size once 
compressed. Finally, hevea trees, native of the Amazon forest, produced the best quality 
of rubber (the best tensile elasticity) and thus Amazonian crude rubber (especially from 
Brazil and Bolivia) were usually either applied to high value added products or mixed to 
lower grades in the confection of medium value added products. Therefore, the higher the 
quality of the crude rubber, the more applications it would have and of course, the higher
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the price: prices indeed reflected quality and there were several different grades of rubber 
in the market whose prices could vary by more than 3 tim es.157
During 40 years of rubber trade, from 1870 to 1910, at a first glance total rubber 
import figures suggest a draw in the struggle for crude rubber supply: whereas Britain 
imported on average 16,690,980 kilograms of crude rubber per year, the USA imported on 
average 16,504,344 kilograms of rubber per year.158 However, the geography of trade 
differed significantly: most of the primary sources of US crude rubber imports were located 
in the Americas whereas Britain relied heavily on its colonies and on Brazil. But since US 
primary sources of crude rubber were insufficient to meet demand, it was very dependent 
on re-exporters, especially on Britain. From 1870 to 1910, British colonies supplied 20% of 
total crude rubber imports into the UK whereas Britain and its colonies supplied 18% of 
overall US crude rubber imports. Moreover, since most of the crude rubber trade was 
carried by British vessels, the role of British capital was even more decisive. In that regard, 
resource endowments suggest that Britain was in a better position. Not only did this 
country have more access to rubber sources but it might also have been able to influence 
price and quality in US rubber manufacturing industry (at least marginally).
Therefore, competition among British and American firms emanated along the 
rubber chain, translating into a battle for crude rubber resources. Investments were 
normally channelled through the London Stock Exchange to several different rubber 
producing countries (or colonies) all over the globe in order to create a flow of crude 
rubber to meet the demands of the American and British rubber industries. The 
dependence of these two industries to supplies of crude rubber might have been so great 
that the control of capital might not have been able to offset the control of crude rubber 
reserves by indigenous crude rubber producers before the advent of plantation in 1910, 
contradicting GCC’s prescriptions: a high inelasticity of demand for crude rubber might 
have then ensued. However, the British rubber industry might have faced a lower 
inelasticity of demand in view of the fact that this country was importing more rubber than
157 See Appendix for details on prices for different rubber grades.
158 Computed from several issues (1870-1910) of UK Parliamentary Papers and US Trade and 
Navigation Reports of the Secretary of the Treasury. See Appendix for data on the rubber trade.
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its industry needed and moreover part of the rubber was coming from its own colonies, 
over which London rubber traders might have possessed a higher degree of control. Here, 
the relations between parties in trade and the role of investment and finance (these roles 
will be explored further in the next chapter) help understand the actual trade pattern that 
defined the geography of trade vis-a-vis the likely trade pattern as predicted by standard 
trade theories.
Access to crude rubber sources was important but not sufficient to meet the needs 
of rubber manufaturing industries insofar as the quality of the rubber imported mattered. 
Depending on the industrial use, a higher or less quality was required and to achieve that 
desired quality level sometimes different grades of rubber were mixed.
2.6 -  Elasticities of Demand
From previous sections, it is possible to infer that the rubber manufacturing 
industry in Britain and in the USA evolved in a relatively competitive environment and that 
its activities and profitability were directly dependent upon establishing a stable and 
reliable supply of crude rubber of some minimum quality. This competition at the 
manufacturing level emanated along the rubber chain and resulted in fierce competition 
for raw material. Given the nature of production until 1910, which was almost exclusively 
dependent on wild sources, this section investigates, from British and American trade 
balance data, how hungry for rubber these industrial centres were and what their 
strategies were to save on rubber. The data is all new and original, collected by the author 
from primary sources. British data was obtained from Parliamentary Papers whereas USA 
data came from the Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States.159 It is 
shown that the USA was much more in need of a steady crude rubber supply than Britain, 
which might even have been able to extract monopoly rents from the USA due to its
159 Import value and quantity was collected by country of origin from 1870 to 1910 for both the USA 
and Britain. Apart from Brazil, no other single country possessed significant market share 
throughout the period and only seldom a country exceeded 10% mark. Therefore, countries had to 
be aggregated in groups, notably in view that their territory often changed as consequence of 
colonial policies or simply independence or incorporation by another.
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position in the market: Britain imported more than it needed and re-exported a sizeable 
fraction of its rubber stock, notably to the USA.
The methodology is based on estimations of elasticities of demand from the two 
main sources of rubber: Brazil and British Colonies (for the USA, the last category 
includes Britain). Together, they accounted for 76.2% of total crude rubber imports into the 
UK and 74.4% of total crude rubber imports into the USA between 1870 and 1910. It is 
very likely that Brazilian figures (BRZ) include some crude rubber produced in 
neighbouring countries such as Bolivia, Venezuela and Colombia since Belem city in 
Brazil developed as the main rubber hub in the region.160 In the British dataset, ‘British 
Colonies’ (BRC) comprise ‘Channel Islands’, ‘New South Wales’, ‘British West Indies’, 
‘British East Indies’, ‘British India’, ‘Madras’, ‘Bombay & Scinde’, ‘India Singapore & 
Ceylon’, Singapore & Eastern Straits’, ‘Ceylon’, ‘Federated Malay States’, ‘Borneo’, 
‘Mauritius’, ‘Aden’, ‘Australasia’, ‘British West Coast Africa’, ‘British East Coast Africa’, 
‘British South Africa’, ‘Natal’, ‘Zanzibar & Pemba’, ‘Gold Coast’, ‘Lagos’, ‘Nigeria’, ‘Sierra 
Leone’, ‘Gambia’, ‘Niger Protectorate’ and finally ‘Other British Possessions’. For the US 
data, BRC includes ‘United Kingdom’, ‘British Honduras’, ‘Dominion of Canada’, ‘New 
Foundland’, ‘Labrador’, ‘Canada’, ‘British West Indies’, ‘British Guiana’, ‘British East 
Indies’, ‘British Australasia’, ‘British Africa’ and ‘Other British Possessions’.
There are several ways of computing these elasticities. One possible way would 
be to estimate demand and supply equations for the whole market jointly. However, in 
order to add up crude rubber supplies from several different parts of the world, that 
procedure would require the assumption that rubber was a homogenous commodity. In 
view of large quality differentials, this procedure does not seem to be satisfactory; 
especially in view that quality is an important feature of our story here. Moreover, the 
interaction between American and British demands would be lost. Another estimation
160 Import data refer to Brazil as a whole. As Figure 3.4 shows, lower rubber grades were produced 
in other Brazilian regions as well. It was not possible to decompose British and US rubber imports 
by region of origin within Brazil. Even though the thesis is only concerned with the Amazon region, 
the aggregated results can and must be understood as being representative for the Amazon region 
as the other Brazilian regions produced very little in comparative terms. Moreover, since these 
regions produced lower quality rubber, in value, its proportion was even smaller. See Appendix for 
details.
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procedure would be to calculate a separate demand and supply system for each crude 
rubber source but this procedure would treat each rubber source as a totally different 
commodity, leaving no room for complementarity or substitutability among the sources: it 
is true that crude rubber was not a homogenous product but, as argued earlier, different 
grades of crude rubber were substitutes to some extent and sometimes they could also be 
mixed to achieve some desired minimum quality.
The estimation procedure proposed here is based on an Almost Ideal Demand 
System (AIDS)161 which provides a framework that is general enough to be used as a first- 
order approximation to any demand system (a more comprehensive discussion of the 
model is presented in the Appendix). Although it assumes that the supply for all rubber 
sources are perfectly elastic (which might be a strong assumption in some cases and will 
be relaxed along the rest of the thesis), this procedure provides a measure of the 
relationship between any given pair of crude rubber sources. From the estimation output, 
it is possible to see if rubber sources were complementary or substitute, or if they were 
normal or inferior goods, for example. Under this setting, equation 2.1 below is the 
specification to be estimated here, using data on import of rubber from Britain and the 
USA balance of trade statistics:
Y  1 n  1 x  (2-1)w, = a,+2_ r„ log Pj + p, log—
j  *
where log P = J ]  wk log p k (2.2)
k
where w, is the budget share of country /', cr, is the intercept, pv is the implicit price for 
rubber from all sources j  and x is the amount of money spent on rubber by country /. 
Lastly, P is the Stone’s Price Index as defined in Equation 2.2, which is used because
161 For a discussion about Almost Ideal Demand System, refer to the seminal article by Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980). For applications of the model see Alston et al. (1990) and Alston et al. (1994). 
Finally, for economic historians, Irwin (2003) article is a good example of application of the model 
to the analysis of an historical case: cotton during the Antebellum USA.
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implicit prices for rubber are collinear162: correlation between Brazilian and British Colonial 
rubber is 0.92 in the US sample and 0.95 in the British sample. Theoretically, 
homotheticity, homogeneity and symmetry should be imposed in the estimation to assure 
that the microeconomics behind the model will hold. Homotheticity would require that all j8, 
coefficients summed to zero whereas under homogeneity (of degree zero in prices) all y..
summed up should equal zero for each equation. Finally, homogeneity requires that Yij = 
Yji for all / and j.
For instance, in Equation 2.1 for Brazilian rubber, we will be estimating the 
Brazilian market share (dependent variable) against the price of Brazilian rubber, the price 
of British Colonial rubber and a variable that capture overall physical demand of the 
market as it is defined as the total expenditure on crude rubber (total imports of crude 
rubber) divided by an average price of the raw product. Analogously, for British colonial 
rubber, the British Colonial share (dependent variable) will be estimated against the price 
of Brazilian rubber, the price of British Colonial rubber and a variable that capture overall 
physical demand of the market as it is defined as the total expenditure on crude rubber 
(total imports of crude rubber) divided by an average price of the raw product.
In fact, both equations (for Brazilian and British Colonial rubber) were estimated
jointly by iterative SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) techniques with only symmetry
imposed and the results for the US and British data are presented in the Appendix.
Symmetry was rejected only for US data (statistical tests for symmetry are presented in
the Appendix), but it was still imposed to the system to avoid double elasticity of
substitution between Brazil’ and British Colonies’ crude rubber sources. Tests for
homogeneity in both systems suggested that it should be rejected under symmetry and
162 Under high collinearity, small changes in data might produce wide swings in the parameter 
estimates which may have very high standard errors and low significance levels even in the case 
when they are jointly significant and the R2 of regression is quite high. Furthermore, coefficients 
may present the “wrong” sign or implausible magnitudes. However, this does not seem to be the 
case here, as it will be clear later on, coefficients do show plausible magnitudes, expected sign and 
are quite robust. Moreover, collinearity increases the likelihood of Type II error, i.e, the likelihood of 
accepting the null hypothesis that a certain parameter is equal to zero increases. And, since this 
does not work in favour of the results here rather the contrary, it is possible in this case to simply 
disregard collinearity, especially because its correction would entail either dropping a variable or 
making the coefficients biased. Neither would help in the analysis: dropping a variable would 
embody losing information whilst biasing estimators would turn inferences from point estimators 
useless.
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non-symmetry. Moreover, homotheticity was not imposed since the system here is 
equivalent to the one in which an extra equation for “all remaining countries” had been 
deleted whose j8 coefficient would be given by the adding-up restriction.163
For Britain, Adjusted-R2 indicates a reasonably good fit in both equations: 0.45 in 
the equation for the Brazilian rubber demand and 0.30 in the equation for British Colonial 
rubber demand. For the USA, Adjusted-R2 is lower in the Brazilian equation (0.20) but 
higher in the British Colonial equation (0.38). Durbin-Watson statistic suggests positive 
serial correlation in all equations from both systems possibly due to omission of price 
expectations or inflexibility in the short run, as a result of long run contracts between 
buyers and sellers. Even though the estimated coefficients remain unbiased and 
consistent, they are not efficient anymore. For both systems, Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
tests on residuals in level for each equation (not reported here) indicated that the null 
hypothesis that the residuals follow a unit root is always rejected.
Under AIDS, changes in real expenditure operate through the /3; coefficients: it is 
positive for a luxury good and negative for necessities. According to the estimates 
presented in the Appendix, Brazilian rubber is a luxury good for both the USA and Britain 
whereas British Colonial rubber is always a necessity (although not significant in the USA 
demand system). Yet, since their magnitudes are very close to zero, changes in the 
quantity of crude rubber consumed do not cause a significant change in terms of market 
share: for instance, whenever British consumption of rubber increased (income increased) 
there was only a more than proportional increase in Brazilian market share and a 
decrease in its Colonies’ market share.
From the parameters of the AIDS equation is possible to retrieve the implied price- 
elasticities of demand as well as the elasticity of substitution among all rubber suppliers.
163 In fact, to be strictly correct, the estimated equation should have included a price variable for “all 
remaining countries”. However, the micro properties do not change and the system is equivalent to 
impose that the coefficients of these prices were equal to zero. All qualitative results are robust to 
specification changes and it was just chosen here the minimal specification required to support the 
hypothesis put forward here, i.e., that Britain could, at least partly, pass-through the price of rubber 
scarcity. Furthermore, it must be stressed that estimates are invariant to the equation deleted. See 
Barten (1969).
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According to Alston et. al.164, the compensated elasticity of demand for the /th good with 
respect to the yth price is defined as below:
A  (2 -3)V„ = - $ , + —  -w ,w. w.
where 8ij is the Kronecker delta that is equal to one if i  = j  and zero otherwise. The 
standard error of the elasticity is given by ^.divided by w,-. The elasticity of substitution is 
also implicit in the AIDS estimated parameters and is defined as:
7 (2-4)
( w . w . )
where i  ^  j , with an associated standard error calculated as the standard error of y 
divided by w,w7-.
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 below show the implied price elasticities (on the diagonal, 
shaded cells) of US and British demand for Brazilian (BRZ) and British Colonies (BRC) 
rubber as well as their elasticity of substitution. Their associated t-ratios are shown below 
each estimate.
Figure 2.8: Implied Price Elasticities and Elasticity of Substitution of British demand
for Rubber, 1870-1910
Mkt Share Beta BRZ BRC
BRZ 59.46% 0.07 -1.54 1.85
3.99 -12.37 3.23
BRC 16.68% -0.03
-1.77 -2.51 .J
Source: computed from data presented in the Appendix.
164Alston etal. (1994).
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From Figure 2.9 above, it can be seen that British demand for Colonial rubber was 
more inelastic than for Brazilian rubber: -1.54 for BRZ against -0.92 for BRC. Even though 
both demands were relatively inelastic, Colonial rubber was more inelastic due to the 
prevalence of colonial interests over purely market forces. Thus a 1% increase in the price 
of Brazilian rubber would lead to a decrease of 1.59% of the British demand for Brazilian 
rubber. Analogously, a 1% increase in the price of Colonial rubber would cause a less 
than proportional decrease (0.92%) in the British demand for rubber from its own Colonies. 
Lastly, for British crude rubber buyers and traders, Brazilian and Colonial rubber were 
substitutes (elasticity of substitution was positive: +1.85).
Looking at all elasticities together, it can be inferred that in a context of rising 
prices of rubber (and in which prices are very collinear), British buyers decreased their 
demand from both sources but decreased Brazilian sources more than proportionally. 
Since Britain was importing more rubber than they needed, they could do it without 
affecting their manufacturing sector. The only change would be in terms of the quality of 
crude rubber they were consuming: they were importing less Brazilian rubber 
proportionally, which was considered on average as the best quality of crude rubber in the 
market (see Chapter 3).
Figure 2.9: Implied Price Elasticities and Elasticity of Substitution of US Demand for
Rubber, 1870-1910
Beta BRZ BRC
BRZ 57.64% 0.08 -1.11 S -°-80
5.06 -0.26 -2.26
BRC 17.52% -0.02 0.32
-144 146
Source: computed from data presented in the Appendix.
From Figure 2.9 above, it can be seen that US demand for Brazilian rubber was 
very inelastic: -1.11. Thus, an increase in the price of Brazilian rubber would cause a just 
proportional decrease in the quantity demanded by US crude rubber importers. Note that
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US demand for Brazilian rubber was more inelastic than British demand for Brazilian 
rubber, -1.11 against -1.54, suggesting that US rubber manufacturers were in more need 
of Brazilian rubber than the British rubber manufacturers. As can be seen from Figure 2.9, 
US demand for Colonial rubber (which here includes Britain) is inelastic but positive 
suggesting that it was an inferior good: Americans would buy more British Colonial rubber 
if the price increased, probably because that would suggest that the quality would have 
improved. Thus, a 1% increase in the price of Colonial rubber would lead to a 0.32% 
increase in the demand for Colonial rubber. Lastly, for the US crude rubber importers, 
Brazilian and Colonial rubber were taken as complementary goods (elasticity of 
substitution was negative: -0.80).
Analysing all elasticities together it is possible to understand the US rubber 
industry strategy in a context of rising prices of crude rubber. Whenever crude rubber 
prices increased (remember: prices are highly collinear), the USA would decrease imports 
of that raw material from Brazil more than proportionally and increase the imports from 
British Colonial sources less than proportionally. Therefore, in a context of rising prices of 
crude rubber, both the USA and Britain would save on rubber to some extent, but Britain 
was in a better position: since that country was importing more rubber than its domestic 
market needed, if crude rubber prices increased, they could simply save on all rubber 
sources and sell even more (at higher price) to the USA. For the USA, there were clearly 
limits to save on rubber and the alternative was just to mix more low quality rubber from 
British Colonies with better quality rubber from Brazil, impacting over the overall level of 
quality of the raw product. In this context, it is easy to understand why the USA was more 
reliant on reclaimed rubber than Britain: reclaimed rubber was a compounding ingredient 
and would only compete with crude rubber at times of high crude rubber prices.165 Thus, 
at the turn of the nineteenth century, the United States was the only country where 
reclaiming was of real importance, although small quantities were manufactured in Great 
Britain and on the Continent.166
165 Barker (1940, p. 39).
166 Essex (1952, pp.83-88).
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In sum, the American and British rubber industries evolved in a relatively 
competitive environment. Given its scarcity, crude rubber supply proved to be the key 
variable to define profitability at the manufacturing level. Competition between rubber 
manufacturers translated into a struggle for crude rubber suppliers. Funds were 
channeled through the London Stock Exchange to several different parts of the globe but 
even though these investments registered a high correlation with trade flows, the control 
of the capital was not enough to alleviate the shortage of the main input in the industry, 
resulting in a high inelasticity of demand for crude rubber. However, since the British 
rubber industry was better positioned in the crude rubber market, its demand for crude 
rubber was more elastic compared to the USA. Furthermore, the quantitative results 
suggest that there was room for extraction of monopoly rents by Brazil, the main rubber 
producer.
2.7 -  Final Remarks
The present chapter shows that at first proximity to rubber sources and the 
dexterity in the manipulation of rubber initially provided a ‘Ricardian’ comparative 
advantage to indigenous rubber manufacture. However, the discovery of the vulcanisation 
process (coped with the increase in the demand for rubber manufactures) undermined the 
superior quality of indigenous production and made possible the centralisation of rubber 
manufacture in factories: vulcanisation shifted comparative advantage in rubber 
manufacturing towards Britain and the USA. Therefore, from then on, the pattern of trade 
can mainly be understood as a result of Hecksher-Ohlin forces: Brazil specialised in the 
production of crude rubber due to the relative abundance of rubber trees in the Brazilian 
Amazon whereas Britain and the USA specialised in the production of rubber 
manufactures due to the relative abundance of capital, that became a requisite for larger 
rubber concerns. Therefore, from the 1860s onwards, Britain and the USA deepened their 
industrial position in rubber manufacturing with a similar technology being used on both 
sides of the Atlantic.
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Even though standard trade theories help explain the geography of rubber trade 
(and by consequence the first node of the rubber chain, namely, the rubber manufacturing 
industry) there were other forces at play. For instance, economic geography forces 
explain agglomeration and location, notably in the US rubber manufacturing industry. In 
the within-analysis, the chapter shows that formal institutions, especially patent legislation, 
influenced and shaped the market structure of the rubber manufacturing industry: indeed, 
patents enforced a process of amalgamations in both countries even though the rubber 
industry remained quite competitive on both sides of the Atlantic. In the between-analysis, 
this competition at the manufacturing level resounded along the rubber chain, translating 
into a struggle for securing a steady and reliable source of crude rubber, the main input in 
the industry: competition within the manufacturing node influenced the interactions of 
agents located in different nodes. Here, the analysis of the rubber chain is enhanced by 
acknowledging that trade is not carried out under neoclassical assumptions: the 
relationship between parties to trade and the role of investment and finance is 
instrumental to understand the actual pattern of the rubber trade that emerged. Given its 
scarcity, that crude rubber was very expensive and access to resources thus became 
strategic to determine (or influence) profitability at the manufacturing level, turning the 
manufacturing node of the rubber chain very different from the ideal GCC/‘Wallersteinian’ 
core-node type. Yet, the British rubber industry was better positioned compared to its 
American counterpart: since British traders were importing more crude rubber than the 
British industry needed, they were able to pass through the burden of crude rubber 
scarcity to American buyers since the latter were unable to meet all their demand from 
primary sources. Furthermore, there was also scope for Brazilian crude rubber traders to 
extract monopoly rents especially from US buyers who registered a more inelastic 
demand for their product when compared to British demand for Brazilian crude rubber (- 
1.11 for the USA against -1.54 for the Britain). It is important then to analyse the 
organization of crude rubber supply in Brazil in order to understand how (if any) monopoly 
rents were generated. This would bring the rubber chain even further away from the 
GCC/Wallersteinian ideal chain type. That is exactly the objective of the next chapters.
3. World Rubber Supply: the US and British Struggle for Rubber
3.1 -  Introduction
Before the Brazilian supply side can be fully analysed, it is important to investigate 
the main competing rubber producing regions in the world. Rubber could be found in 
nearly all Continents as the tensile elasticity of the material could be obtained from several 
types of trees, some of even different genus. However, the quality of the material 
(measured by its tensile elasticity) varied according to the type of tree which, in turn, 
demanded a different production technique. In the end, crude rubber quality depended on 
the rubber tree, the associated production method and the dexterity of the rubber tapper. 
Whereas the dexterity of the rubber tapper could be improved (at least to a certain extent), 
before the successful domestication of rubber trees in large scale (plantation), little could 
be done about geography and natural endowments: they were a given.
This geographical pattern of production was generated and/or supported by 
investment flows. Even though it is not possible to draw any causal relationship, 
investment and finance shaped the rubber trade in a way that it is not explored by simple 
standard trade models and, as shown in Chapter 2, the scarcity of crude rubber led to a 
struggle along the rubber chain to secure regular supply of the raw product: indeed, the 
rubber manufacturing industry needed to break the dependence upon an unreliable raw 
product that defined its prices and the ultimate level of manufacture. With this aim, this 
chapter shows that British and American investments, fuelled by their rubber 
manufacturing needs, poured into several different parts of the globe. The analysis is 
based on the same new trade data discussed in Chapter 2167 but also on investment data 
from primary and secondary sources, that is, completely new dataset on rubber concerns 
organised in London and presented in the Appendix.
167 Imports and re-exports of crude rubber into the USA and Britain by country of origin, covering 
the period 1870-1910. The sources for Britain came from the Parliamentary Papers (Annual 
Statements of Trade) which provide a full dataset on crude rubber trade broken down by country of 
origin from 1854 onwards. For the USA, a complete series on crude rubber trade was obtained 
from the Trade and Navigation Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for the years 1861-3 and 
1869 onwards.
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The underlying idea is to show all the main competing rubber producing regions 
around the world, underscoring the fact that their competition was somewhat limited by 
differences in the quality of the crude rubber produced which, in turn, depended on the 
type of tree available in the region. Here, economic geography plays a smaller role as 
second-nature geographical effects are of secondary importance: production is defined 
mainly by first-nature geographical aspects, i.e., endowments. In this vein, this chapter 
surveys the quality of production by analysing the trees available in every major rubber 
producing region and the technique employed to extract raw rubber. The Chapter thus 
shows that a combination of quantity and quality rendered the Brazilian Amazon a unique 
position as the major crude rubber producer, accounting for nearly 60% of the world 
supply.168 This high market power in rubber (as computed and explained in Chapter 2), if 
exercised, would have generated monopolist (oligopolist) profits to rubber exporters 
placed in Brazil. Therefore, the Chapter also investigates if those conditions were really in 
force by analysing a case study: the relationship between a Brazilian/Portuguese export 
house (J.H.Andresen & Co.) and a British buyer (Schluter & Co.). Schluter’s accounts are 
very rich, offering new insights on the rubber trade. It is really the first time that archival 
data (collected in London and in Brazil) is available to analyse the relationship between 
these two nodes of the rubber chain. If the relation of power really leaned towards 
independent rubber exporters in Brazil, the rubber chain would be even further from the 
ideal Wallersteinian chain type, requiring a more detailed investigation of the conditions of 
supply within the Brazilian Amazon, i.e., the relationship among the several nodes of the 
rubber chain located in the Brazilian Amazon. In sum, the chapter investigates competition 
within the rubber trade but also between players located in different nodes of the rubber 
chain.
Besides this introduction, the Chapter is organised into other 6 sections. Section
3.2 briefly shows the role of re-exporters as suppliers of rubber to the USA and Britain. 
Section 3.3 analyses the quality, quantity and organisation of rubber production in Asia 
and Africa (Oceania is included as well), stressing the role of colonies (especially to
168 This figure actually refers to Brazil as a whole. See the Appendix for a discussion on the dataset.
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Britain). British and American investments in rubber production are also surveyed and 
their returns analysed. Section 3.4 examines the struggle for American supplies, notably 
from Mexico, Central America and the Amazon region (excluding Brazil), emphasising the 
varying quality of rubber produced in each region. The main rubber producer is then finally 
analysed in Section 3.5, highlighting the superior quality and the sheer quantity of rubber 
produced in the Brazilian Amazon. Investments in rubber production and in adjacent 
sectors of the economy are also surveyed and analysed. The main conclusion is that 
capital was channelled mainly through (foreign) export houses placed in Belem and 
Manaus. The role of these export houses and their relationship with American and British 
buyers is thus finally examined in Section 3.6 through a case study: the relationship 
between the Brazilian/Portuguese export house J.H.Andresen & Co. and the British buyer, 
Edmund Schluter & Co. Even though this case cannot be directly generalised to the other 
players in the Brazilian Amazon, it sheds new light on the role of export houses in Brazil 
and their market power on world rubber market. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes the 
Chapter.
3.2 -  Re-Exporters (mainly Europe)
The European Continent possessed no reserves of rubber trees169 yet some 
countries played an important role in the market as re-exporters of crude rubber that came 
mainly from their colonies in Africa and Asia. From 1870 to 1910, re-exporters supplied 
14.2% of the total crude rubber imported into Britain (see Figure 3.1 below), meaning an 
average annual value of 2,367,855 kilograms of crude rubber.170 The USA was even more 
reliant on re-exporters of crude rubber: 27.6% of its crude rubber imports came from re­
exporters of which more than a half was from Britain (see Figure 3.1 below).171 Despite
169 Actually, Turkey and Russia sometimes appear as crude rubber producers or re-exporters and it 
is not at all clear where their product is coming from. It is possible that they may have possessed 
some small reserves of crude rubber in their territory.
170 For Britain, the list of re-exporters that appear in any one year in the UK Annual Statements of 
Trade (1870-1910) is the following: Hanse Towns, Russia, Holland, ‘Channel Islands’, Belgium, 
Turkey, United States, France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Hamburg, Bremen and Germany.
171 For the United States the list of re-exports in the US Trade and Navigation Reports to the 
Secretary of the Treasury (1870-190) is the following: Austria-Hungary, Spain, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
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the fact that Britain was competing for primary sources of crude rubber, as in the case of 
other commodities, a sizeable portion of its trade was carried out to be simply re-exported 
to other countries in Continental Europe and the USA. Therefore, even though the USA 
had a lead on rubber manufacturing (as seen in the Chapter 2), Britain secured more 
crude rubber supplies than the country actually needed, and with soaring prices, reflected 
by the expansion of US rubber manufacturing industry, British rubber traders could profit 
substantially. This position in the crude rubber market was probably achieved thanks to its 
colonies in Africa and Asia and its naval supremacy.172 Although the USA was emerging 
as a naval power, port statistics in the main crude rubber producer, Brazil, suggest that 
most of the trade continued to be carried by British vessels, especially by the Booth Line, 
an English company that ran a regular service connecting the Brazilian and Peruvian 
Amazon to New York and Liverpool (see Chapter 6).
Figure 3.1 -  Breakdown of Value of Crude Rubber Imported into Britain and the USA,
1850-1910
Brazil Americas Africa Asia + Oceania Europe
Britain USA Britain USA Britain USA Britain USA Britain USA
1850-1859 73.39%  n.a. 8.82% n.a. 1.21% n.a. 10.80% n.a. 3.81% n.a.
1860-1869 51.78%  n.a. 17.27% n.a. 3.23% n.a. 19.01% n.a. 5.12% n.a.
1870-1879 58.72%  51.56% 11.90% 33.05% 12.36% 0.85% 10.95% 3.02% 4.09% 11.28%
1880-1889 58.66%  58.00% 4.51% 19.20% 18.87% 1.38% 11.58% 1.68% 5.35% 19.69%
1890-1899 57.66%  63.92% 5.38% 6.47% 22.67%  0.30% 4.81% 0.94% 8.63% 28.37%
1900-1910 60.43%  54.30% 7.98% 8.82% 11.73% 0.01% 10.04% 1.52% 8.37% 35.36%
Source: computed from several issues of UK Parliamentary Papers and US Trade and Navigation Reports of the Secretary 
of the Treasury. Note: ‘Americas’ excludes Brazil.
3.3 -  The Role of Colonies: Oceania, Asia and Africa
From 1870 to 1910, Oceania accounted for nearly zero percent of both British and 
American rubber supplies173 whereas Asia accounted for almost 10% of overall crude
172 It is important to note that, contrary to what Prado and Capelato (1975, p. 300) stated, the USA 
were the main importers of Brazilian rubber. They were right though when they said that Britain 
was an important centre for re-exports of rubber. As was clear from the previous chapter, the USA 
was consuming much more rubber than any other country in the world, including Britain.
173 In the UK Annual Statements of Trade (Parliamentary Papers), I could only find two exporters of 
crude rubber into Britain located in Oceania: Australasia and ‘New South Wales’. In turn, in the US 
Trade and Navigation Reports of the Secretary of the Treasury for the years 1870 to 1910 the only 
place in Oceania that ever appeared in the data was ‘British Australasia’.
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rubber imports into Britain174 and 2.5% into the USA175. This can be seen in Figure 3.1 
above, which shows a decade by decade breakdown of Asian market share in crude 
rubber imports into the USA and Britain. In absolute terms, the British leading position in 
the South-East Asian crude rubber market was even clearer: between 1870 and 1910, 
Britain imported on average 1,503,174 kilograms of crude rubber per year from the region 
against an equivalent amount of only 360,626 kilograms for the USA.176
In regard to Africa, the situation was not different: the region was responsible for a 
significant portion of the supply of rubber to Britain: 20.0% of its total crude imports.177 In 
absolute terms, Africa generated an average annual influx of 3,345,954 kilograms of 
rubber from 1870 to 1910 into Britain. In contrast, the region accounted for only 0.5% of 
total rubber imported into the USA, with an average annual influx of only 88,198 kilograms 
of crude rubber on average. It is even more striking that, from 1900 to 1904, when 
consumption of crude rubber was skyrocketing, the USA did not import a single kilogram 
of rubber from that entire Continent.178
There are geographical and institutional aspects that explain the geography of 
crude rubber trade in Asia and Africa. As will be shown here, first-nature geography 
explain the location of crude rubber endowments: latex yielding trees were mainly found in 
tropical rain forests such as the Congo basin and in today’s Indonesia. However, the types
174 In the UK Annual Statements of Trade (1870-1910) there are several entries relating to Asian 
crude rubber imports into Britain: ‘British East Indies’, ‘British India’, Java, China, ‘India, Singapore 
& Ceylon’, ‘Singapore & Eastern Straits Settlements’, ‘Federated Malay States’, Borneo, St. 
Thomas, Aden, ‘Bombay & Scinde’, Ceylon and Madras. See Figure 3.2 for the geographical 
location of these places.
175 According to US Trade and Navigation Reports of the Secretary of the Treasury (1870-1910), 
there are few less places located in Asia that exported crude rubber directly into the USA: China, 
‘British East Indies’, ‘Dutch East Indies’, Hong Kong, Japan, Siam, Philippines and ‘All Other Asia’.
176 Computed from several issues (1870-1910) of the Annual Statements of Trade of the United 
Kingdom (Parliamentary Papers) and US Trade and Navigation Reports of the Secretary of the 
Treasury.
177 There are several places in Africa that exported crude rubber in any one year to Britain: 
‘Western Coast Africa’, ‘German West Africa’, ‘German East Africa’, ‘British West Coast Africa’, 
‘British East Coast Africa’, ‘East Coast Africa’, Madagascar, China, ‘British South Africa’, Natal, 
Mauritius, ‘Zanzibar & Pemba’, ‘Gold Coast (incl. Lagos)’, Nigeria, ‘Sierra Leone’, Gambia, ‘Niger 
Protectorate’, ‘French West Africa’, ‘French Somaliland’, ‘Portuguese West Africa’ and ‘Fernando 
Po’. See the Annual Statements of Trade of the United Kingdom (1870-1910) and Figure 3.3 for 
geographical location of these places.
US Trade and Navigation Reports of the Secretary of the Treasury (1870-1910). There were a 
few less places exporting crude rubber from Africa into the USA, reflecting exactly the British (and 
other European powers) jurisdiction over the region. According to the data, there are only six 
different entries for African crude rubber imports: ‘British Africa’, ‘Portuguese Africa’, ‘French Africa’, 
Liberia, Madagascar and ‘All Other Africa’.
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(or genus) of trees found in these forests differed from one another, influencing the quality 
and defining the method of extraction of the crude rubber ultimately produced. Institutions 
(Colonial Power) further explain why Britain was much more successful in generating a 
crude rubber inflow from these three continents (Oceania, Asia and Africa) compared with 
the USA. British trade statistics show that, in Asia, the majority of rubber came from India 
and the Straits Settlements whereas, in Africa, the British Gold Coast was the main 
supplier: indeed, for about fifteen years, from 1890 to 1905, that colony was the forth 
biggest exporter of crude rubber in the world, ranking behind Brazil, the Congo Free State 
and Angola.179 Regarding the USA, the country’s limited rubber imports from these 
regions came mainly from the British East Indies and to a lesser extent from the Dutch 
East Indies.
Figure 3.2 -  Map Showing Proximate Area of Crude Rubber Production in Asia
Federated Malay 
States
I M alaya
Ceylon
•Borneo
Sumatra
Dutch East IndiesJava
Source, elaborated by me. The map does not intend to show precise places where rubber production took place, but rather 
to give a proximate idea of the geography of production. I used modern day borders to reconstruct an approximate area of 
these colonies, protectorates or countries.
179 Annual Statements of Trade, UK Parliamentary Papers (1870-1910).
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In Asia, there were two main indigenous species of latex yielding trees: Ficus 
elastica and gutta-percha. F. elastica is native to Burma and Assam and even though 
most of the supply came from wild sources, the tree was also cultivated in small scale in 
India, Assam, the Malay Peninsula, Java and Sumatra (see Figure 3.2 above). Indeed, 
probably the oldest rubber plantation experiment in the world consists of F. elastica and 
was situated in West Java, set up by British Capital (Anglo-Java Plantation Co.) in 
1872.180 This plantation experiment was not extended but continued to produce into the 
interwar period. In turn, gutta-percha trees were found in the wild state in Malaya and in 
the Dutch East Indies. Since it was a non-elastic variety of rubber, it owed its commercial 
value to the use for insulation of submarine telegraphic cables and for outer casing of golf 
balls. Unlike F. elastica, gutta-percha trees cannot be tapped regularly and they were 
usually cut down with the latex being extracted after the felling (this also represents a very 
different method of latex extraction from Amazonian trees, as will be discussed later on in 
this chapter). Therefore, most of the indigenous trees were destroyed over time. Early 
plantation experiments with gutta-percha were abandoned for more remunerative crops 
and only a plantation set up by the Dutch government in 1885 lingered on, accounting for 
a sizeable percentage of the overall supply of gutta-percha.181
180 Eaton (1952, p. 52).
181 Eaton (1952, pp. 57-61).
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Figure 3.3 -  Map Showing Proximate Area of Crude Rubber Production in Africa
Fernando Po
Za n z ib  ar &  
Pem ba (Is lands)
A fr ic a
A n g o la
B r it is h  S o u th  
A fr ic a
Source: elaborated by me. The map does not intend to show precise places where rubber production took place, but rather 
to give a proximate idea of the geography of production.
In Africa, the two main indigenous sources of crude rubber were the Funtumia 
elastica tree and the Landolphia vines. Funtumia was widely distributed in tropical Africa 
from Sierra Leone (west) to East Africa and in Belgium Congo, Liberia, Nigeria, Dahomey, 
Cameroons, French Congo, Uganda and French Ivory Coast (See Figure 3.3 above). 
Landolphia vines were mostly concentrated in tropical Africa and unlike Funtumia, they 
were not suitable for regular tapping, and the method of extraction invariably embodied 
the killing of the plant. There were also a number of shrubs or bushy plants of the genus
118
Landolphia, Clitandra, Carpodinus and Cryptostegia that were found mainly in tropical 
Africa, from which rubber was also extracted.182 Therefore, as in Asia, rubber extraction 
techniques were exhausting the natural reserves of the region and plantation soon 
became the key issue.
Plantations were tried early in both Asia and Africa, usually set up by English 
capital, though some German and Dutch finance was also important. The most successful 
plantation experiments in Southeast Asia happened to be with hevea brasiliensis tree and 
they relied heavily upon capital raised in London. Indigenous to the Amazon region, the 
tree was not only the most resilient one, enduring three tapping seasons a year, but also 
the tree that produced the best rubber quality. The history of hevea plantations in Asia 
began in 1876, when Henry Wickham collected some 70,000 seeds in Para region that 
were planted (only 2,600 germinated) in Kew Gardens, London, from where they were 
transplanted to Ceylon in 1876 to be distributed to other moist and hot regions around.183 
Even though plantation trees in the region seldom yielded as much latex as they did in 
wild state in Brazil, the organisation of production proved to be decisive. In 1877, the first 
trees were planted in Singapore and in the Federated Malay States, and during the 1890s 
and 1900s plantation took an explosive trend forcing all wild rubber producers out of the 
market, including Brazil (the main crude rubber producer) after 1910.184 However, since 
rubber trees took at least 6 years to produce rubber (sometimes more than 10 years), 
before 1910 production from hevea plantations was still negligible and most rubber 
produced in Asia still came from wild sources instead.
In Africa, British investment and entrepreneurship was also instrumental for the 
development of the rubber trade, albeit plantations were less important. African merchants 
played an important role in the crude rubber trade at first but long-established British 
trading firms, mainly Alexander Miller Brothers and F. and A. Swanzy, came to dominate 
the market by the turn of the century: some price-fixing eventually occurred but coastal 
trading firms usually competed with each other for crude rubber supplies from the interior.
182 Eaton (1952, p. 51).
183 Wickham (1908), Drabble (1973), Dean (1987) and Jackson (2008).
184 Eaton (1952, pp. 52-55).
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Since production usually damaged the rubber tree or vine, production moved 
geographically towards the thick forests in the Agni kingdoms of Sanwi and Indenie along 
the middle reaches of the Komoe River in the hinterland of the French Ivory Coast, by­
passing French ports. Then the closure of this trade from French territories pushed rubber 
more into new supply sources in Asante. Usually, villagers collected rubber on credit 
advanced by British coastal traders or by middlemen.185
In West Coast of Africa, British colonial administrations were not willing to alienate 
forest blocs on the scale required by the companies and the three largest British African 
rubber concerns ended up operating outside British jurisdiction. In that region, the most 
ambitious rubber concern was the Liberian Rubber Corporation organised in 1905 whose 
board even included a nominee from the Dunlop Rubber Co. Although Dunlop had a 
contract with this African concern to purchase the entire output of the corporation for 10 
years at market price less brokerage, the Liberian Rubber Corporation was a fiasco and 
went into bankruptcy already in 1910.186 This failed attempt into crude rubber production 
by Dunlop made even more evident the lack of vertical integration in the rubber chain in 
the period from 1870 to 1910.
In East Africa, British investments also spread outside British jurisdiction with 
British capital ending up owning between one quarter and one third of the total rubber 
acreage of German East Africa, totalling £1.26 million.187 In contrast to West Africa, British 
investments in East Africa were concentrated on plantation ventures of ceara (manihot) 
rubber trees that were initially set up by the Germans.188 This tree was indigenous to 
north-east Brazil and was suitable to regular tapping, even though its quality and 
productivity did not match that of hevea brasiliensis tree and its main advantage lay in the 
fact that it could be tapped earlier than hevea: 2.5 years after planting instead of 5.0 years 
for hevea.
188 Dumett (1971, pp.79-101).
186 Munro (1981, p. 268-270).
187 Munro (1983, p. 369).
188 Monson (1993).
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British capital also participated in concession areas in Congo. The infamous Abir 
Co. was initially incorporated as the Anglo-Belgian India Rubber and Exploration 
Company in 1892 although 6 years later, British capital was withdrawn following a 
reorganisation of the company that ultimately led to its increasing pressure over villagers 
to collect rubber. In 1900, Abir dividends, duties and taxes accounted for 10% of the total 
revenue of the Belgium State and three years later, the company alone exported nearly a 
thousand tons of rubber.189 However, in the following year, the depletion of rubber was 
becoming apparent due to the destruction of rubber trees. Moreover, following a furry of 
scandals in Europe, led by Sir Roger Casement, unveiling the atrocities committed by Abir 
officials in the search for rubber190, the company was reorganised again into the hands of 
King Leopold but the move proved to be a disaster for the State and a blessing for the
191company.
From 1905 to 1910, 53 African rubber companies were incorporated in London, 
and in 1910 alone £4.4 million new capital was raised, a figure almost identical to the 
nominal British investment in rubber in the Dutch East Indies, or equivalent to 55% of 
nominal capital invested in plantations in Malaya in that same year. Although very 
significant, British investments in the region provided extremely poor commercial returns, 
with little dividends being paid and several failures being registered from 1910 onwards as 
a result of competition with Malayan rubber plantations.192 Other reasons for failures 
stemmed from deficient managerial expertise and fraud, perpetrated by promoters who 
invariably published misleading reports exaggerating rubber production and future 
profits.193
Although direct investment in African rubber plantations proved to be a failure for 
entrepreneurs, they actually provided the expertise for the later successful development of 
Asian plantations. In the 1900s, crude rubber from Southeast Asian plantations achieved 
high prices almost at par with Brazilian wild hevea prices, generating high profitability for
189 Harms (1975, pp. 73-81).
190 Anstey (1971).
191 Harms (1975, p. 87).
192 Munro (1981, p. 266).
193 Munro (1981, pp. 273-274).
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plantation ventures in the region. In contrast with African ventures, Asian plantation 
companies paid huge dividends in the first years as, for instance, the Pataling Rubber 
Estates Syndicate, which paid 45% in 1908 and 325% in 1910. Interest quickly arouse for 
Malayan rubber shares in London, leading to the incorporation of 271 Malayan rubber 
concerns in London from 1904 to 1910, with a total authorised capital of £18.3 million and 
521,000 acres planted.194 The seeds for the demise of Brazilian rubber boom were 
already in place, and it was then just a matter of time until the Brazilian wild rubber 
production would be forced out of the market.
In sum, first-nature geographical aspects explain the location of latex yielding trees 
and consequently the location of crude rubber production which was concentrated in 
tropical areas, especially in the Congo Basin and in today’s Indonesia. The pattern of 
trade was very much impacted by institutions as colonial power and jurisdiction played an 
important role in rubber trade flows. Foreign capital and entrepreneurship were also 
instrumental for rubber production. Moreover, the types and genus of latex yielding trees 
differed geographically, impacting the quality of crude rubber ultimately produced. 
Different trees, in turn, implied different methods of extraction as latex collection 
sometimes required the felling of trees forcing rubber reserves into exhaustion. Indeed, as 
several trees started to disappear, production initially moved geographically but there 
were obvious limits to increase production over time and soon plantation became an issue. 
There followed several attempts to domesticate different latex yielding trees that explain 
the later success of hevea plantations in South East Asia. Institutions fostered rubber 
plantations as governments were sometimes involved directly into plantation ventures (or 
just in distributing seeds).
3.4 -  Americas (excluding Brazil)
As in Asia and Africa, first-nature geography and institutions also explained the 
pattern of crude rubber trade that emerged. First, rubber came mainly from the tropical
194 Stillson (1971, pp. 589-594). Authorised capital cannot be translated into investments, since 
sometimes only part of it was actually issued. Moreover, debentures and loans should account for 
British investment in plantations as well. See also Drabble and Drake (1974).
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parts of the Continent, especially the Amazon basin, Central America and parts of Mexico. 
The types of trees found in these three main areas differed among them as well as in 
comparison with Asian and African rubber trees. Therefore, the quality of rubber produced 
and the methods of latex extraction differed too. Proximity to the USA (second-nature 
geography) and political aspects (institutions) will turn the United States the main market 
for crude rubber from the Americas.
In Mexico and Central America, US interests clearly prevailed over British. While 
from 1870 to 1910 the region accounted for less than 1% of total imports of crude rubber 
into Britain195, 6% (in terms of quantity) of American total crude rubber imports came from 
there.196 In absolute terms, from 1870 to 1910 Britain imported on average 93,637 
kilograms of crude rubber every year from Mexico and Central America compared to US 
imports of 1,292,561 kilograms p.a., or almost 14 times the British figure. In the Amazon 
region (excluding Brazil), the USA also held a leading position: the region accounted for 
6.3% of all crude rubber imported into the USA, averaging 1,032,730 kilograms per year 
from 1870 to 1910. Britain imported just over a half of it, or an average of 553,895 
kilograms of crude rubber per year during the same period (3.3% of its total crude rubber 
imports).197
In Mexico and Central America, the main US rubber source was the Central 
American States, with an increasing participation of Mexico though: from 1900 to 1910, 
Mexico accounted for 81.2% of total quantity of crude rubber imported by the USA from
195 Reflecting the small significance of crude rubber imports from this region, only a few places in 
the Americas were ever reported in British trade statistics from 1870 to 1910: ‘Central America’, 
Ecuador, Chile, ‘Nueva Granada’, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Haiti and 
Mexico.
196 US crude rubber imports from the Americas came from everywhere in the Continent: ‘British 
Honduras’, Canada, ‘Costa Rica’, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Salvador, Mexico, 
‘British West Indies’, Cuba, ‘Puerto Rico’, ‘Dutch West Indies’, Haiti, ‘Santo Domingo’, ‘Central 
American States’, ‘New Granada’, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, ‘British Guiana’, ‘Dutch Guiana’, 
‘French Guiana’, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, ‘Spanish West Indies’, ‘French West Indies’ and ‘All 
Other America’.
197 Computed from several issues (1870-1910) of the Annual Statements of Trade of the United 
Kingdom (Parliamentary Papers) and US Trade and Navigation Reports of the Secretary of the 
Treasury.
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that region. In the Amazon (excluding Brazil) the main rubber producing regions were the 
Putumayo and Acre, areas subject to territorial disputes.198
Proximity, and perhaps lower freight rates (second-nature geography), explains 
the US leading position in the region vis-a-vis Britain. This economic geography aspect 
was especially true for Mexico, which shared borders with the USA and whose dictator, 
Porfirio Diaz, courted US investments he believed would provide “all the fruits of 
annexation without any of the dangers”. 199 Therefore, US investments in rubber 
plantations in Mexico were part of a broader wave of American investments in Mexico 
which usually led to land speculation. Most of the plantations were comprised of Castiiloa 
elastica trees, a rubber yielding tree that is indigenous to Central America but that can 
also be found in the Andes and Amazon regions.200 For the quality of the rubber produced 
from those trees, Castiiloa plantation was a very promising investment notably in the 
context of the ‘rubber famine’ in the 1900s. However, although these trees could produce 
abundant latex per tapping201, the tree could only be tapped once a year (twice if the tree 
was eight or more years old) against three times for the hevea brasiliensis tree (see 
Section 3.5 further below).202 Moreover, native methods normally killed the tree, 
preventing a steady and enduring increase of production from wild sources.
US investments in Castiiloa plantations in Mexico might have amounted to US$ 50 
million (£10.3 million) by 1908 and US$ 75 million (£15.4 million) by 1913203 while, as 
shown in the Appendix, in 1911 British investments in Mexican rubber ventures amounted 
to a mere £1.3 million (nominal capital). However, most of the investment was speculative 
or redirected for other uses than plantation, contributing for the general discredit of rubber 
ventures that prevented their floating into the London Stock Exchange from 1909 onwards. 
Moreover, in spite of these massive investments in Castiiloa plantations, wild guayule 
sources (a low-growing shrub) accounted for the bulk of rubber exported from Mexico
198 Computed from several issues (1870-1910) of the Annual Statements of Trade of the United 
Kingdom (Parliamentary Papers) and US Trade and Navigation Reports of the Secretary of the 
Treasury.
199 Schell Jr. (1990, p. 219).
200 Schell Jr. (1990, pp. 217-222).
201 Cook (1937, p. 406).
202 Schell Jr. (1990, p. 234).
203 Schell Jr. (1990, p. 238). Figures converted into £, using series presented in the Appendix.
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throughout the period: for instance, in the 1908-09 fiscal year total Mexican rubber exports 
totalled US$ 11,393,807 (£2.3 million) of which US$ 10,702,839 (£2.2 million) referred to 
wild Guayule sources, or 94%.204 Therefore, even though the USA were able to secure a 
very important flow of rubber from Mexico and Central America, the country seemed to 
have paid dearly since most of the investments made rarely bore fruits.
In turn, in the Amazon region (excluding Brazil), the rubber boom was certainly an 
extension of what was happening in the main rubber producing country, Brazil, even 
though it possessed a dynamism of its own: declining rents from traditional exports helped 
the development of the boom. Most of the Amazonian rubber reserves came from castiiloa 
trees (with the exception of Bolivian sources that were predominantly comprised of hevea 
trees) and their rubber showed relatively good quality and was well regarded in the rubber 
market. Figure 3.4 below gives an overview of the area where latex yielding trees could be 
found in the region: it overlapped with the Amazon rainforest, consequently spanning 
several countries or colonies.
204 Schell Jr. (1990, p. 235).
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Figure 3 .4 - Map Showing Proximate Area of Crude Rubber Production in South
America
Venezuela
Colombia
Ceara
Brazilian Amazon
Brazil
Bahia
Bolivia
Source, elaborated by me. The map does not intend to show precise places where rubber production took place, but rather 
to give a proximate idea of the geography of production. The Figure shows modern day territories but during the rubber 
boom period (1870-1910) borders were not at all settled, changing for instance significantly in the Acre region (between  
Brazil and Bolivia). Borders are here merely indicative as they were extremely fragile and permeable.
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In Bolivia, rubber collection gained commercial viability after the exploration of the 
Lower Beni River by the American Edwin R. Heath who confirmed that the Beni flowed 
into the Madeira in 1880. Even though there were several falls on the Madeira river, 
merchandises (notably rubber) could henceforth flow from the Bolivian Oriente to Manaus, 
Belem and thence to Europe and the USA. The Oriente was abundant in heveas, 
especially in the section adjacent to the unsettled borders with Brazil, precisely where the 
two largest Bolivian rubber producers would arise: Antonio Vacas Diez and Nicolas 
Suarez. Antonio Vacas Diez had established a number of rubber producing units in the 
region as early as 1876 and could then take profit from his strategic position in the main 
waterway to the Atlantic. However, by 1890s Vacas Diez was seriously undercapitalised 
and went to Europe in search of funds, meeting success in both Paris and London. On 1st 
February 1897 the Orton (Bolivia) Rubber Co., Ltd was officially registered in London. 
Vacas Diez died just 4 months afterwards and, due to high indebtedness, the company 
was passed in its entirety to Casa Suarez, which happened to be its chief creditor. Nicolas 
Suarez established himself in the Bolivian Oriente in 1881 and soon founded a strategic 
position in the area as well. Like Vacas Diez, Nicolas Suarez also turned to England in 
order to capitalise and with the help of his eldest brother, who was the Bolivian-Council 
General in London, they launched F. Suarez & Co. This close connection with Britain 
would mean that the entirety of the production of Suarez House would be shipped to this 
country throughout the period under analysis here.205 As shown in the Appendix, by 1911 
there were four Bolivian ventures registered in London: the Anglo-Bolivian Rubber Estates 
Ltd., the Galvez Rubber Estates Ltd., La Martona Rubber Estates Ltd. and the Zongo 
Rubber Estate, Ltd. Altogether, they had an authorised capital of £650,000 of which only 
£343,188 were issued.
However, American capital had also been pervasive in the region but at first it 
concentrated in colonisation and transport enterprises and thus American capital was only 
indirectly connected to rubber production in the Amazon. The National Bolivian Navigation 
Company was chartered and granted to the American Colonel Church on 27th August
205 Fifer (1970, pp. 120-133).
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1868 but since it met immediate Brazilian opposition, the colonel would not find too much 
success in his enterprise even though he would later be a prominent figure in other 
ventures in the region, especially on the Brazilian side of the border. Another American 
venture was the Colonisation and Commercial Company of Bolivia, founded on 25th 
January 1870 in California aiming at attracting settlers to upper Acre region. That venture 
did not meet success and was later dispersed with the change in the Bolivian presidency.
Even in colonisation enterprises, British capital was rivalling American investments 
in the region. Francisco Javier Brabo organised an enterprise in London that proposed to 
introduce one hundred thousand colonialists into the Bolivian East within ten years, 
construct railroads across the Chaco, establish arsenals in the Beni River and maintain 
armed steamers on the Mamore River. Another colonisation enterprise, known as the 
Bolivian Syndicate, was also organised in London in 1901 but counted with American 
directors (including a cousin of the US president Theodore Roosevelt) and capital: it had 
an authorised capital of £5 million and was granted a thirty-year lease of the Acre territory. 
The Syndicate was authorised to administer Upper Acre, to collect taxes, to establish 
police, sanitation, and other public services, and to construct railways, wharves and other 
communication facilities. The incorporation of this company arose fierce Brazilian 
opposition who feared the region could become a new Africa in which chartered 
companies opened the way for future foreign power control. The disputed region ended up 
in Brazilian hands after occupation by Brazilian forces, payment of indenisation to Bolivia 
(£2 million) and the buy-out of the Syndicate by the Brazilian government for £110.000.206
Rubber exploitation in Peru, Colombia and Ecuador also took place in a region 
where borders were unsettled and the jurisdiction of the territory was under dispute. 
Fuelled by the development of the crude rubber trade, aggressive westward expansion by 
Brazil reached the Putumayo region which was claimed by Peru, Colombia and Ecuador. 
The region offered both liabilities and opportunities but the development of the rubber 
trade heightened the economic value of the region. Counting initially with guano resources 
(1840s-1870s), Peru pushed forward its jurisdiction over the disputed territory and
206 Tambs (1966, pp. 254-273).
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transformed Iquitos into a thriving crude rubber hub in Northwest Amazon through 
infrastructure investments: the government was an ‘institutional builder* by its role in 
supporting the construction of docks, trade regulation, definition of property rights, private 
steamboat navigation and subvention of a shipping line connecting Iquitos to Liverpool, 
managed by Booth Co., an English concern (see Chapter 6 for details). Political will and 
the geographic and strategic position of Iquitos would be decisive to curb Colombian and 
Ecuadorian interests in the region. The Colombians were more diligent, establishing a 
colonisation policy in the region but they lacked political stability and resources to beat the 
Peruvians, even though they would in the end secure the upper reaches of the Putumayo 
and Caqueta. Ecuador lacked both financial resources and political will to succeed, insofar 
as the economy was more directed to the Pacific coast where a thriving cocoa trade was 
developing. Ecuadorians looked with pride to their Amazonian region but they failed to 
assure their de facto possession against their neighbours.207
Rubber production in the Putumayo region came chiefly from castiiloa trees which, 
even though they could be exploited throughout the year (castiiloa trees were not confined 
to flooded areas as heveas were), the tree was usually damaged during the tapping due 
to a lethal fungi. Therefore, rubber collectors usually cut down the tree and extracted the 
whole latex which could amount to 90 kilograms compared to just some 3 kilos a tapped 
hevea could produce in one year. It is true that hevea rubber commanded a higher price 
but rubber collectors in the Putumayo area could profit immensely from the sheer quantity 
of caucho they produced.208 Even though caucho production, as rubber produced from 
castiiloa was known, was more itinerant than hevea rubber production, some companies 
or rubber producing units developed in the region. In fact, the Putumayo became mostly 
known for the large rubber producing units which not unusually entailed the closure of an 
entire river to navigation and where Indians (which supplied most of the labour force in the 
region) were enticed to work. It is true that sometimes they were lured for axes, machetes, 
firearms, etc. and they freely set themselves to work for rubber producers, but the
207 Stanfield (1998, pp. 63-87).
208 Stanfield (1998, pp.23-25).
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relationship led to abuses and violence in order to subject them to a regime of work that 
they were not willing to, just to placate the greed of rubber producers. The Putumayo 
scandal, unveiled in 1910 by Sir Roger Casement (the same person who unveiled the 
Congo atrocities) following a series of articles based on W. E. Hardenburg’s accounts, 
would bring Julio Cezar Arana’s name to the fore. Some years before, in 1907 at the 
height of the rubber boom, Arana registered his company in London as The Peruvian 
Amazon Company (PAC), with an authorised capital of £1,000,0002°9 and a claimed area 
of 12,000 square miles (see Appendix). Julio Cezar Arana became infamous because of 
the Putumayo scandal, but he was not the only one and the region saw the emergence of 
other rubber barons such as Rafael Reyes, Benjamin Larraniaga, Crisostomo Hernandez 
and Isaiah Fermin Fitzcarrald. Despite the size of Arana’s venture, there were only a 
handful of rubber companies registered in London that operated in the Putumayo area 
and most of the foreign capital was channelled to production through several foreign 
trading houses placed in Iquitos, such as Wesche and Co. which transacted business and 
financial deals with firms in New York city to the tune of US$10,000 (around £2,050) by 
mid-1890s.210
In sum, in the Americas (excluding Brazil) first-nature geography explained the 
location of crude rubber production which concentrated close to reserves of latex yielding 
trees that, in turn, happened to be located in the tropical areas of the American Continent, 
notably in the Amazon region, Central America and parts of Mexico. Castiiloa trees were 
abundantly found in both Central America and in the Amazon region whereas guayule 
trees were found primarily in Central America and Mexico. Hevea trees, in turn, were only 
found in the Brazilian and Bolivian Amazon. As in Asia and Africa, different trees required 
different production techniques: guayule production invariably entailed the felling of the 
tree but castilloas and heveas could be tapped regularly. However, production from 
castiiloa trees often involved the killing of the tree due to lethal fungi.
209 See Collier (1968), Serier (2000) and Lagos (2005).
210 Stanfield (1998, p. 92). Value converted in £ using series presented in the Appendix.
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Second-nature geography and institutions shaped crude rubber production and 
trade. Given the rubber endowments, production was either defined by domestic 
jurisdiction which fostered, protected or corrupted production or by foreign relations as the 
political attachment between Mexico and the USA demonstrates. Proximity (and freights) 
may have helped determine the pattern of crude rubber trade that emerged, possibly 
biasing it towards the USA.
3.5 -  The Brazilian Rubber Supply
The hevea tree underlies the rubber boom in the Brazilian Amazon. As explained 
in the introduction, the tree is indigenous to the region south of the Amazon River. As 
explained in the Introduction, historically, production started in the region around Belem 
(located at the mouth of the Amazon River) and followed the course of the Amazon River 
towards the city of Manaus located at the confluence between Amazon and Negro rivers. 
Production also spread along the main tributaries of the Amazon, especially south and 
westwards towards Acre region in search for hevea trees. These trees were seldom found 
in large concentrations, usually being spread over a large territory. The Amazon region 
comprises around half the Brazilian territory but the rainforest is even larger surpassing 
the Brazilian jurisdiction further into Bolivian, Colombian, Venezuelan, Peruvian, 
Ecuadorian, English, French and Dutch territories in South America. However, despite the 
rubber trees being geographically spread out, the difficulty in accessing the hinterland 
caused production to remain mainly confined to the areas close to the major river 
gateways. Production was then shaped by first-nature geography.
Figure 3.5 below shows exactly how crude rubber production became 
concentrated along the Amazon river and its main tributaries.211 The Figure shows the 
geographic dispersion of crude rubber production by cities/municipalities in the State of 
Para in 1897-1898212. It is possible to see that there was very little production in the
211 I am indebted with Leonardo Monasterio for helping me producing this map.
212 British Diplomatic and Consular Reports, n. 2140 [Annual Series], Brazil: Report for the Year 
1897 on the Trade of Para and District, 1898.
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hinterlands213 and that the majority of crude rubber production was still taking place 
around the city of Belem and in Marajo Island.
Figure 3.5: Geography of Crude Rubber Production in the Brazilian States of Para
and Amapa, 1897-1898
L eg e n d
(k g  o f crude  ru b b e r)
0
1 -  29,980
29,981 -  111,722
111,723 -  214,990
214,991 -  347,051
347,052-  668,551 
668,551 - 1,497,304
Island Belem
Source: Rubber Production by Cities, British Diplomatic and Consular Reports, n. 2140 [Annual Series], Brazil: Report for 
the Year 1897 on the Trade o f Para and District, 1898. Note: I first found the geographical coordinates (latitudes and 
longitudes) of the cities or villages where production took place in 1897-8. Luckily, the cities/villages retained their old 
names and thus I was able to find their geographical coordinates from data gathered at the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia  
e Estatistica (IBGE) website (http://www.ibge.gov.br). I then matched their actual location with the political-administrative 
organisation of Para State into municipalities as of 1998.
213 However, it is possible that production was taking place further inland and just being channelled 
through the cities listed in the Report above.
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Compared to other trees, with the right technique, heveas could endure tapping for 
several years without losing much productivity. Hevea trees were the basis of Brazilian 
influence in the rubber trade: due to a combination of quantity and quality, the Brazilian 
Amazon assumed a leading position in the world crude rubber trade. From 1870 to 1910, 
Brazil supplied on average 7,600,995 kilograms of crude rubber per year to Britain and 
9,095,951 kilograms per year to the USA, accounting then for 45.5% of total crude rubber 
imports into Britain and 55.1% into the USA. Brazil was then the biggest producer of 
rubber throughout the period, until plantations in Southeast Asia forced its crude rubber 
production out of the market. In terms of value, Brazilian market share was even higher, 
due to the presence of the hevea brasiliensis tree which, as argued above, provided the 
best quality of the product, especially in terms of tensile elasticity.214
As elsewhere, American and British capital was instrumental for the development 
of the rubber boom in the Brazilian Amazon. Some rubber concerns were incorporated in 
Britain such as The Amazonas Rubber Estates Ltd. (1895, £300,000 of authorised capital), 
The Para Island Rubber Estates Ltd (1910, £125,000 of authorised capital), De Mello 
Brazilian Rubber Co., Ltd (1906, £495,000 of authorised capital), Brazilian Rubber Trust, 
Ltd (reorganised as Islands Rubber Estates Ltd. in 1907 with an authorized capital of 
£37,500), Amazonia Rubber and Trading Co., Ltd. (£25,000 of authorized capital) and The 
Rubber Estates of Para Ltd. (1898, £350,000 of authorized capital).215 As shown in the 
Appendix, in 1911 there were still 12 ‘Brazilian’ rubber concerns registered in London of 
which half were operating in the Brazilian Amazon. These six Amazonian companies had 
a total claimed area of 401,228 acres and authorized capital of £860,000 (the paid-up 
capital, in turn, amounted to £797,466).
Furthermore, British and American capital had interests in several utility 
companies in the Brazilian Amazon, supporting the rubber boom indirectly. In Britain, the 
following concerns (among others) were incorporated: Cia. de Gas do Para (1866,
214 Computed from several issues (1870-1910) of the Annual Statements of Trade of the United 
Kingdom (Parliamentary Papers) and US Trade and Navigation Reports of the Secretary of the 
Treasury. Again, note that figures refer to Brazil as a whole. Rubber was also produced in Ceara, 
Bahia and Mato-Grosso Provinces/States. See Appendix for details.
215 The list is not intended to be extensive yet and it was compiled from London Stock Exchange -  
Tea, Coffee & Rubber- Commercial Report -  several years.
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£250,000 of authorised capital), The Amazon Steam Navigation Co., Ltd (1872, £850,000 
of authorised capital in 1876), The Para Central Sugar Factory (1885), The Manaos 
Trading Co. (1885), The Amazon Telegraph Co., Ltd (1895, £250,000 of authorised 
capital), Manaos Harbour Ltd (1902, £500,000 of authorised capital), Para Electric, 
Railways and Lighting Co. (1905, £700,000 of authorised capital), Para Telephone Co. 
(1909, £62,000 of authorised capital), The Manaos Tramways and Light Co Ltd (1909, 
£300,000 of authorised capital) and Municipality of Para Improvement Ltd (1910, 
£400,000 of authorised capital). Additionally, some Amazonian companies were also 
incorporated in the USA, among others: Madeira and Mamore Railway Co. (1870 but 
reincorporated in 1907 with an authorised capital of US$11 million or £2.3 million), The 
Para Transportation and Trading Co. (1888, US$7 million of authorised capital equivalent 
to £1.4 million) and Port of Para Co. (1906, US$32.5 million or £6.7 million).216
The City of London played a more important role as intermediary of funds to the 
Brazilian Amazon than Wall Street even though the Americans imported slightly more 
crude rubber from Brazil than the British. As the world financial centre, London was able 
to counterbalance the leading position the Americans had enjoyed during the rubber shoe 
trade (see Chapter 2). American interests clearly established themselves in the region first 
and that is why the USA led the international pressure over the free navigation of the 
Amazon in the 1850s, notably after their attempts to establish a steamship line between 
Para and the USA was barred by the Brazilian authorities.217 However, in the end, even 
shipping lines came to be dominated by English capital (as will be shown in Chapter 6).
Another form of direct investment refers to loans contracted abroad.218 After the 
proclamation of the Republic in 1889, states and municipalities were entitled to contract 
loans abroad and thus at the beginning of the twentieth century six major loans were
216 Santos (1980, pp.134-135) and London Stock Exchange -  Tea, Coffee & Rubber -  Commercial 
Report -  several years. Values were converted from US dollars to British pounds using exchange 
rate series presented in the Appendix. There were additionally some Belgium and French 
investments such as La Bresilienne (Brussels, 1898), Cie. d’Enterprises Electriques de Para 
(Brussels, 1899), Compagnie General des Caoutchoucs (Paris, 1905) and Compagnie Agricole et 
Commercial du Bas Amazone (Paris, 1907). See Santos (1980, pp. 135-136) and Coelho (1982, p. 
25, Table 1).
217 See Ferreira Reis (1965, pp.60-85).
2181 need to thank prof. Marcelo de Paiva Abreu for giving me valuable information about the loans.
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negotiated in England and one in France (see Figure 3.6 below). As it can be seen from 
Figure 3.6 below, the State of Para contracted three loans with Seligman Brothers 
(London) totalling £2,300,000. The interest rate paid was around 5% but the initial face 
value discount decreased over time indicating a higher credit rating as a consequence of 
the improvement in the revenues of the State which in turn depended on the booming 
rubber trade.219 The same improvement in the credit rating can be observed from the 
loans contracted by the Municipality of Belem: the interest rate was usually the same as 
for the State of Para, i.e. 5%, with the initial face value discount decreasing over time.220 
In total, the loans contracted by the Municipality of Belem totalled £1,600,000. Despite the 
more modest amount, the Municipality of Manaus also contracted a loan in the City, with 
the Bank of London and South America, amounting £350,000. The interest rate was also 
5% and the initial discount over face value was 9%.
Figure 3.6 -  Amazonian Loans Contracted Abroad
Issued in Year Nominal Value (£) Interest (%) Type Maturity (years)
State of Part London 1901 1,450,000 5.0% 69 50
Municipality of Bel6m London 1905 1,000,000 5.0% 86 n/a
Municipality of Bel6m London 1906 600,000 5.0% 95 50
Manaus City London 1906 350,000 5.5% 91 29
State of Amazonas Paris 1906 3,327,249 5.0% n/a n/a
State of Part London 1907 650,000 5.0% 87 37
State of Part London 1910 200,000 6.0% 90 6
Source: computed from Bou?as (1955) and Santos (1980).
As the main crude rubber producer and due to the quality of its production, 
international capital flowed into the region in several different ways: direct investments in 
rubber production, investments in public works and in companies operating in the region 
and loans to the Amazonian states and municipalities. However, the bulk of direct 
investment in rubber production was probably channelled through the export houses 
which very early secured a foothold in the rubber trade: the literature has indeed
219 It may also reflect path dependence: after each successive loan, the underwriter and the 
lenders possessed more information about the track record of the borrower.
220 Note that the interest rate and the initial discount over the face value also depended on the 
guarantees given. For a description of guarantees given, see Santos (1980).
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advanced that most of the capital employed in the production of rubber in the Brazilian 
Amazon was ultimately supplied by these foreign export houses.221
Active foreign participation in the Amazonian trade can probably be dated from the 
1850s when two foreign export houses appeared in Belem (and would both later become 
among of the largest in the region): Denis Crouan & Co., French cocoa traders, and 
Singlehurst, Brocklehurst & Co., a British concern that later would also organise the 
transatlantic Red Cross Line (see Chapter 6 for details about shipping).222 With the 
development of the rubber boom, some other export houses fought for a position in the 
trade but throughout most of the rubber boom, a few export houses dominated the rubber 
export trade in both Manaus and Belem. For instance, as in Figure 3.7 below, during the 
1899-1900 fiscal year, the top three export houses in Para accounted for 72.9% of all 
rubber exported from Belem and 53.0% from Manaus. Concentration was in fact even 
higher since several Manaus export houses were simply agents or branches of Belem 
export houses which moved part of their operations upriver as a consequence of taxation 
incentives: in 1878 the State of Amazonas (where Manaus lays) decided to divert part of 
the trade towards its jurisdiction by levying a lower duty for rubber exported directly from 
Manaus in comparison with rubber channelled through Belem. When in 1885 the tax gap 
widened to 5 percentage points, most export houses and intermediary (aviador) houses 
were forced to move part of their operations to Manaus in order to profit from the lower 
tariff.223
221 See Santos (1980) and Weinstein (1983). From 1870 to 1910, despite Brazilian leadership in 
the crude rubber market, there were only a few Brazilian rubber companies incorporated in London 
compared to many more operating in other regions (see Appendix). This seems indicative that 
money was channelled to the region in different ways, possibly, through export houses as 
suggested by the literature.
222 Weinstein (1983, p. 62).
223 Weinstein (1983, pp. 195-196).
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Figure 3.7 -  List of Exporters of Rubber from Para and Manaus during the Year
1899-1900
From Belem (in kg) USA % Europe % Total %
Cmok, Prusse & Co. 2,081 20.7% 3,367 39.1% 5,448 29.2%
Adelbert H. Alden 3,032 30.1% 1,182 13.7% 4,214 22.6%
Frank da Costa & Co. 2,302 22.9% 1,651 19.2% 3,953 21.2%
The Sears Para Rubber Co. 1,908 19.0% - 0.0% 1,908 10.2%
Rud. Zeitz 250 2.5% 895 10.4% 1,145 6.1%
Denis Crouan & Co. 107 1.1% 349 4.1% 456 2.4%
R. Suarez & Co. - 0.0% 334 3.9% 334 1.8%
Mello & Co. - 0.0% 227 2.6% 227 1.2%
H. A. Astlett 187 1.9% 16 0.2% 203 1.1%
Henry Airlie & Co. 105 1.0% 71 0.8% 176 0.9%
Kanthack & Co. 32 0.3% 101 1.2% 133 0.7%
Comptoir Colonial Frangais - 0.0% 132 1.5% 132 0.7%
B. A. An tunes & Co. - 0.0% 101 1.2% 101 0.5%
Sundry Exporters 61 0.6% 184 2.1% 245 1.3%
Total 10,065 100.0% 8,610 100.0% 18,676 100.0%
From Manaus (in kg) USA % Europe % Total %
Prusse, Dusendschon & Co. 773 32.1% 1,090 18.8% 1,863 22.7%
Witt & Co. 825 34.2% 506 8.7% 1,331 16.2%
Marius & Levy 11 0.5% 1,144 19.7% 1,155 14.1%
Rud. Zeitz 89 3.7% 400 6.9% 489 6.0%
Adelbert Alden 356 14.8% 49 0.8% 405 4.9%
Comptoir Colonial Frangais 4 0.2% 337 5.8% 341 4.2%
J.H.Andresen 22 0.9% 276 4.8% 298 3.6%
Brocklehurst & Co. 112 4.6% 138 2.4% 250 3.0%
Kahn Pollack & Co. - 0.0% 193 3.3% 193 2.4%
Luiz Schill & Co. - 0.0% 144 2.5% 144 1.8%
Mello & Co. 4 0.2% 125 2.2% 129 1.6%
J.A. de Freitas & Co. 26 1.1% 77 1.3% 103 1.3%
Moray and Aguiar - 0.0% 119 2.1% 119 1.4%
Sundry Exporters 187 7.8% 255 4.4% 442 5.4%
Iquitos Merchants - 0.0% 944 16.3% 944 11.5%
Total 2,409 100.0% 5,797 100.0% 8,207 100.0%
Grand Total 12,474 14,407 26,883
Source: Adapted from UK Diplomatic and Consular Reports, n. 2580, Annual Series, Brazil, Report for the Year 1900 on the 
trade of Para and District, p. 23.
Looking at the names of the companies in Figure 3.7 above, it is clear that some 
export houses operated in both cities. That was obviously the case of the German 
exporter, Rudolph Zeitz; the French Company, Comptoir Colonial Frangais; the American 
export house, Adelbert H. Alden; and etc. However, some other branches were more 
difficult to identify as, for instance, Witt & Co. (Manaus) was related to Frank da Costa & 
Co. (Belem) and Prusse Dusendschon & Co. (Manaus) to Cmok, Prusse & Co. (Belem). 
The rubber export trade was indeed concentrated in the hands of a few firms, indicating a 
low degree of competition within the rubber trade node of the chain.
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Following the Global Commodity Chain approach, it is useful to see the degree of 
competition in every link of the chain. It is very difficult though to analyse how competitive 
the rubber export trade was, as it is hard to follow a given company’s track record over 
time because export houses frequently changed their names. For instance, until 1910, the 
house of Ernesto Schramm became Pusinelli, Prusse & Co., then Cmok, Schrader & Co., 
and finally Schrader Gruner & Co. Therefore, even though the names of the leading 
export houses changed over time and even though several restructuring of these 
companies occurred, the control of the export trade remained mostly in the same hands 
during the rubber boom. Indeed, looking at the ranking of top exporters of rubber from 
Manaus in 1910 it can be inferred that they were basically the same as in 1899-1900: 1st) 
Dusendschon, Zarges & Co. (the reminiscent of Prusse, Dusendschon & Co.): 6,536,080 
kilograms of rubber exported; 2nd) Adelbert H. Alden: 2,880,490 kilograms and; 3rd) Scholz 
& Co. (which seems to the successor of Marius & Levy224): 2,715,130 kilograms. In total, 
these three companies handled 77.2% of the total quantity of rubber exported from 
Manaus. Therefore, Barham and Coomes’ claim that “(...) frequent entry and exit of export 
houses during the rubber boom are consistent with an actively competitive industry” 225 
does not find support from the data. It is true that some firms disappeared, as happened 
to the Comptoir Colonial Frangais, but at the top the companies were usually only 
changing their names, with the rubber trade remaining in the same hands throughout most 
of the period. Moreover, different export houses have different goals, as some acted as 
agents for rubber manufacturers whereas others were simply brokers.226 The degree of 
competition in the rubber trade seems then to be much smaller than in rubber 
manufacturing but does it necessarily mean that the rubber traders were actually the core 
node in the rubber chain?
224 This assumption is mostly speculative and based on accounts from Schluter & Co., importers of 
rubber in London. See next section for details.
225 Barham and Coomes (1996, pp. 32-35).
226 Accodring to the Confidential Letter of Hulne Cheeltham to Sir Edward Grey (Petropolis, 14th 
March 1909),
“The American Export houses are in more direct relations with the manufacturers, 
and act rather as agents, while the German and French houses are in the position 
of brokers, who, by withholding supply and other manipulations, produce artificial 
prices and otherwise disturb the market. ”
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Export houses provided most of the capital for rubber production in the Amazon 
Valley. However, a handful of companies managed to possess a high market share of the 
rubber export trade that remained virtually unchanged over time. The nature of their 
business was simply to buy rubber at the lowest prices possible from the intermediaries, 
called aviadores (even though some export houses were also aviadores in their own right), 
and sell at the highest prices possible to importers mostly in Britain and in the United 
States. In general, these export houses acted as agents for rubber buying firms placed in 
New York and Liverpool, although a few functioned independently (such as J. Marques). 
For instance, Ernesto Schramm represented Heilbut, Symons & Co. of Liverpool whereas 
La-Roque da Costa & Co. (and Frank da Costa & Co.) represented another American 
buyer.227 Moreover, Sears & Co. was founded in 1882 as a subsidiary of the renown and 
ubiquitous W. R. Grace & Co. besides having also initially represented Charles R. Flint & 
Co., the architect of mergers in the US rubber manufacturing industry (see Chapter 2 for 
details). His plans were to devise a pool of rubber buyers to increase their bargain position 
in the rubber trade. Finally, Adelbert H. Alden represented the homonymous American 
firm.
What was the degree of freedom these export houses had? Were they merely 
agents of rubber importing firms placed in New York and Liverpool for which they received 
a fee for their services? Were they able to speculate? What was the bargain position they 
had in their interactions with the rubber buyers? Those are very difficult questions to 
address in a definitive way but, based on new accounting data collected by the author 
from British and Brazilian sources, next section tries to shed some light on some of these 
issues by analysing a case study: the relationship between J.H. Andresen, a Portuguese 
rubber export house of Manaus and Schluter & Co. traders of rubber coffee and tea, 
placed in London but with branches in Liverpool, New York, Hamburg and in several other 
cities in Europe. If some light can be shed on these issues, it will be possible to draw the
227 Although partly Brazilian funded, the behaviour of that company differed in no significant way 
from foreign export houses. See Weinstein (1983).
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power relation between rubber traders in rubber consuming countries versus rubber 
traders in rubber producing countries.
3.6 -  Case Study: Edmund Schluter & Co. versus J. H. Andresen & Co.
Edmund Schluter & Co. were general merchants (particularly in coffee, rubber and 
tea) with trading links in France, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Italy, Austria, the United 
States and Brazil. The business was founded in 1858 and was initially based at 35 
Mincing Lane (1858-1859). In 1860, they moved to 24 Mark Lane where they remained 
throughout the rubber boom.228 The company collection is comprised of ledgers, account 
sales, bills receivable, cash books, coffee purchase book, expenditure daybook, invoice 
book, and journals. However, only the ledgers and the cash books overlap with the rubber 
boom (1870-1910). The ledgers are divided into three handwritten notebooks: 1873-1886, 
1887-1900, and 1901-1910.229 They show more detailed information on the companies 
Balance Sheets than what was ultimately published and submitted to the London Stock 
Exchange. Whereas the publish Balance Sheets only showed consolidated accounts, the 
handwritten ledgers provide all information related to that account at the end of the year. 
The cash book only refer to the period 1904-1910 but provides even more detailed 
information. In every account, it is possible to see all operations credited/debited, even if it 
is the same operation repeated several times during the year. It further shows the date 
when these operations took place. Therefore, whilst the ledgers provide a snapshot of the 
financial situation of the company at the end of the year, the cash books provide 
information on all operations that happened within that same year.230
228 Records of the company were donated to the Guildhall Library in 2005, catalogued and given 
free access to the public at the Manuscript Section. The surviving records used here refer to 
Ledgers/Balance Sheets (1873-1910) and Cash Books (1904-1910).
229 They show information on Office Furniture, Reserve Account, Share Account, Sundry Charges 
Account, Insurance Account, Commission Account, Debtors, Cash Account, Interest Account, 
Exchange Account, Bills Payable, Merchandise Account, Rubber Account, Tea Account, Coffee 
Account, Account Sales, Loan Account, Creditors, Bills Receivable, Trade Expenses, Dockcharges 
Account, Freight Account, Postage and Telegrams, Billbrockerage, Coupons Account, Shipping 
Charges, Fire Insurance and Sundry Creditors.
230 Edmund Schluter & Co. Accounts. Ledgers/Balance Sheets (1873-1910) and Cash Book (1904- 
1910), Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, catalogue reference: MS 35975-91.
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From the company’s balance sheets, it is not possible to know where funding 
came from, but they provided some clues. Dividends were rarely paid (or at least they 
were not explicitly stated in the balance sheets) and when they did, they usually referred 
to someone from the Schluter’s family or some other German investor231. The company 
seldom borrowed money and when it did, very small amounts were involved. It is possible 
that members of the Schluter family might have individually borrowed money and invested 
it in the company but, unfortunately, if those transactions ever existed, it was not possible 
to trace them. Small loans were sometimes given to individuals and companies but they 
were never significant either.
A significant amount of money was invested in stock shares of several companies. 
The composition of the company’s portfolio changed substantially over time. In the 1870s, 
investments in shares were very limited and indicated a tendency to invest in Central 
Europe, notably in Hungary. In the 1880s, investment in English concerns started to 
abound in parallel with a shift of investments towards Asia and the River Plate.232 
Argentina would indeed become the biggest recipient of investments from the Company, 
especially after 1885 when Schluter & Co. started to buy Argentine government bonds. 
Figure 3.8 above shows a sample page of Schluter & Co.’s ledger in 1888. On the left 
hand side, it is possible to see some of the Argentine shares and bonds the company 
invested in: ‘River Plate and General Investment’, ‘Argentine Drawn Bonds & Coupons’ 
and ‘Argentine Ced. Nacional B’. Indeed, from 1888, investments in Argentina became 
more diversified with the company holding shares in a railway, a water supply & drainage 
company and an investment trust. Investments elsewhere also became more diversified 
with an important stake on 2 copper companies besides investments in aluminium 
production, an ammunition company and banks.233
231 The surnames suggest that they were usually of German origin.
232 Edmund Schluter & Co. Accounts. Ledgers/Balance Sheets (1873-1886), Manuscript Section at 
Guildhall Library, catalogue reference: MS 35975.
233 Edmund Schluter & Co. Accounts. Ledgers/Balance Sheets (1888), Manuscript Section at 
Guildhall Library, catalogue reference: MS 35976.
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Figure 3.8 -  Sample Page of Schluter & Co.’s Ledger, 31st December 1888
Source: Edmund Schluter & Co. Accounts. Ledgers/Balance Sheets (1888), Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, catalogue reference: MS 35976.
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In the 1890s, investments in Argentina continued to dominate in a context in which 
the portfolio of the Company substantially increased, comprising investments in several 
different sectors: tobacco, cotton, petroleum, railway, trading, sugar refining, sugar, banks, 
waterworks, etc. The portfolio further showed a broader geographical coverage: Portugal, 
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Cuba, North America, Borneo, England, Germany, etc. After 
the turn of the century, the portfolio diminished in size and in composition with an 
increasing participation of government loans: besides Argentine bonds, Japanese and 
Brazilian bonds also appeared in the portfolio.234 From the records of the company, it is 
difficult though to assess the profitability of these investments but it is possible to 
speculate that the reduction of the company’s investments in the 1900s were a 
consequence of losses incurred in the 1890s when several holdings were written off 
(possibly due to the economic and credit crisis in Argentina).
From 1870s to 1910, in contrast to its investments, the company became more 
and more concentrated in the market of a very few products: coffee, rubber, tea and to a 
much lesser extent cocoa. Even though coffee was the main product traded by the 
company, this product will not be analysed here as the interest rests solely on the rubber 
trade (more specifically on the Brazilian rubber trade). Schluter & Co. distributed rubber to 
the European Continent and to the USA (sometimes rubber was also shipped directly to 
the final destination) and several rubber manufacturers figured among the clients of the 
company: Dunlop Rubber Co., Northern Rubber Co., Rubber Co. of Scotland, Russian- 
American India-Rubber Co., Spencer & Co., Clyde Rubber Co., Prager Gummi W. Fabr., 
Unity Rubber Co. Ltd., among others.235
Among the Brazilian suppliers of rubber to Schluter and Co. some were identified: 
Marius & Levy (after 1907, Scholz & Co), J. H. Andresen, S. Brocklehurst & Co., Mesquita 
& Co., Para/Marajo Rubber Estates Co. and Araujo Rozas & Co. As mentioned elsewhere 
before, S. Brocklehurst & Co. organised one of the main shipping lines (Red Cross Line)
234 Edmund Schluter & Co. Accounts. Ledgers, Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, catalogue 
reference: MS 35976.
235 Edmund Schluter & Co. Accounts. Ledgers, Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, catalogue 
reference: MS 35975-7.
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connecting Liverpool to the Brazilian Amazon besides being an exporter in its own right. 
Therefore, due to its two different operations, from the records of the company it is difficult 
to separate what was purely rubber trade and what was shipping236. Since Marius and 
Levy changed the name and their operations virtually vanished after the turn of the 
century and most of the other companies sold rubber to Schluter & Co. only sporadically, I 
decided to limit the analysis to the relationship between J. H. Andresen & Co. and the 
Schluter & Co.
As will be shown in Chapter 4, J. H. Andresen & Co. (or S/A Armazens Andresen) 
was a Portuguese trade house placed in Manaus that handled several Amazonian 
commodities amongst which, of course, crude rubber. According to Figure 3.3 above, 
Andresen ranked in 7th among the top exporters of rubber from Manaus, a position 
established by its prominent role as a rubber intermediary (see Chapter 4). Andresen 
operations were usually channelled via Oporto that was connected to Manaus through its 
own transatlantic vessels.237 Since there is no evidence that Schluter & Co. ever 
transacted any other commodity with J.H.Andresen & Co., it is likely that most the of the 
transactions between this company and Andresen referred to rubber despite the fact that 
Andresen was a big player in the market of Brazil nuts. Conversely, even though it is not 
possible to infer the amount of rubber traded between them, it seems that Schluter & Co. 
was only buying a portion of Andresen’s trade and thus the relationship was not a 
monopsony.
Looking at the financial and commercial transactions between Schluter & Co. and 
J.H. Andresen & Co., it is possible to identify three major periods. First, during the 1890s, 
there are no surviving cash books of Schluter & Co. and thus the analysis was carried out 
only from ledgers (balance sheets). The problem with balance sheets is that they only 
show a snapshot of financial and commercial transactions of Schluter & Co. at the end of 
the year and, by consequence, all transactions that were initiated and completed within
236 It is true that Schluter & Co. specified a separate account for shipping charges but it is not at all 
clear if the outstanding bills and debts of the S. Brocklehurst & Co. would refer to the rubber trade 
or to shipping charges. Anyway, only a few transactions with S. Brocklehurst & Co. were identified 
which would not be enough to make a full picture of the rubber trade as intended here.
237 LeCointe (1922, p. 249).
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the calendar year would not be registered in any way there. Before the 1890s, 
J.H.Andresen & Co. was rarely recorded making any inferences about this period very 
uncertain. In the 1890s, J.H.Andresen & Co. name consistently appeared in the balance 
sheets in form of Schluter’s creditor or debtor or whenever there were any outstanding 
bills to be paid by Schluter.238 In this period, Andresen was usually a net creditor of the 
company as it can be seen in the Figure 3.9 below.
Secondly, in the first five years of the twentieth century (1900-1904), Andresen’s 
net position turned into a huge debt with Schluter & Co. that was nonetheless offset by 
outstanding bills. Therefore, the data does not suggest in any way that J.H.Andresen & Co. 
ever became heavily indebted with Schluter & Co. Therefore, Andresen’s net debtor 
position in these years only reflected the nature of the trade: rubber was sent, say, from 
Manaus to Liverpool and invoiced against Schluter & Co. in form of short term payable 
bills. If no other transactions were made, Andresen’s debtor position would be cleared out 
after just a few months.239
In 1905 there is evidence of the only interest payment earned from J.H.Andresen 
amounting to £26 11s. Since there was no outstanding loan to Andresen in the Balance 
Sheet in 1905, I believe that the interest payment referred to a short term loan that was 
probably paid back during the same fiscal year. However, from that year onward, Schluter 
& Co.’s cash books suggest a change in the nature of the trade with Andresen: 
Andresen’s net debtor position was henceforth always close to zero, payable bills virtually 
vanished from the balance sheets and the financial transactions between these two firms 
decreased drastically, especially after 1906.240 This might have been the effect of the 
rubber valorisation attempt by a Brazilian export house.
238 Schluter & Co. Ledgers/Balance Sheets (1887-1900), Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, 
catalogue reference: MS 35976.
239 Schluter & Co. Ledgers/Balance Sheets (1900-1904), Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, 
catalogue reference: MS 35977.
240 Schluter & Co. Cash Book (1904-1910), Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, catalogue 
reference: MS 35978.
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Figure 3.9 -  J.H. Andresen’s net debtor position against Schluter & Co., 1891-1910
(in current £)
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Source: Schluter & Co. Ledgers/Balance Sheets (1891- 1910) and Cash Book ( 1904- 1910), Manuscript Section at Guildhall 
Library, catalogue reference: M S 35976-8 . Note: positive figures refer to net debt of J.H .Andresen & Co. with Schluter & Co., 
whereas negative figures indicate that Schluter was in net debt with J.H.Andresen.
Why did Schluter & Co. substantially decrease the trade with Andresen after 
1906? Did any other Amazonian firm take over Andresen’s position? Schluter & Co.’s 
rubber account indicate that the Company continued to expand its rubber trade so that 
some other firm took indeed Andresen’s position as the main supplier of rubber to 
Schluter. However, no other firm in the Amazon replaced Andresen as the trade was in 
fact shifted elsewhere, especially to Asia where rubber plantations were starting to invade 
the market. Therefore it seems that Schluter & Co. made a relatively early shift towards 
Asia241, consistently diminishing the volume traded with J.H.Andresen & Co. In turn, the 
latter firm did not diminish its overseas trade and probably found another buyer for its 
exports. This change in the strategy can also be inferred from Schluter’s investment 
portfolio. Despite the importance of the rubber trade for the company, until 1907 there was
241 If this was a conscious decision it is impossible to know. It might very well be the case that 
J.H.Andresen & Co. decided to change its trade partner in Europe and not the opposite.
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no direct investment in any rubber producing venture. As can be seen from Figure 3.10 
below, from that year onwards, the company started to invest in several plantation 
companies usually located in South East Asia despite the large sum invested in guayule 
production in 1910.242 According to the Appendix, Guayule Rubber Co. Ltd. was a 
company operating in Mexico from wild guayule rubber sources whose total authorised 
capital amounted to £400,000 (which was fully paid-up). Therefore, despite the huge 
investment in this company, Schluter & Co. had just over 1% of the venture. Additionally, 
there is no evidence that the company ever invested in any of its partners in the Brazilian 
rubber trade even though it is possible that a certain member of the Schluter family might 
have personally invested in, say, Andresen.
Figure 3.10 -  Rubber Shares in Schluter & Co.’s Portfolio, 1873-1910
(in current £)
Year N. of Shares Name of the Company £ s. d.
1907 100 Bantong Selangor Rubber Estates 50 - -
1908 100 Bantong Selangor Rubber Estates 87 10 -
250 Ledbury Rubber Estates 93 15 -
1909 1,000 Anglo Malay Rubber Co. Ltd 800 -
500 Chersoncor Estates Ltd. 125 - -
1,645 Batong Malaka Rubber Estates Ltd. 2 3 2
1910 1,000 Guayule Rubber Co. Ltd. 1,000 - _
3,000 Guayule Rubber Co. Ltd. (ordinary shares) 1,735 - -
3,080 Guayule Rubber Co. Ltd. (ordinary shares) 2,000 - -
200 Rubber Plantation Investment Trust 333 14 -
200 Anglo Malay Rubber Co. Ltd 226 9 -
500 Highlands Lowlands Para Rubber Co. 1,326 2 -
Source: Schluter & Co. Ledger/Balance Sheets (1907-1910), Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, catalogue reference: 
MS 35977.
What does the analysis of Schluter & Co. accounts tell us? First, the relationship 
between Schluter and Andresen resembles a usual trade relationship in which both 
companies benefited. The accounts suggest indeed that no firm possessed any specific
242 Schluter & Co. Ledger/Balance Sheets (1901-1910), Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, 
catalogue reference: MS 35977.
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market power over another: J.H.Andresen had probably other clients and Schluter & Co. 
had other suppliers. It is true that before 1905, J.H.Andresen was a major supplier of 
rubber to Schluter & Co., but this relationship changed over time following different market 
conditions. The advent of plantations (and maybe the 1906 crisis following the 
unsuccessful valorisation attempt by the Vianna trading house) caused Schluter’s rubber 
trade to divert elsewhere but J.H.Andresen still found buyers for its exports. Secondly, the 
trade between Schluter and Andresen was not based on commissions: Schluter actually 
seemed to have bought the rubber from Andresen and sold it either directly to rubber 
manufacturers or to its own agents placed in several cities in Europe and in the USA. 
Thirdly, even though the relationship between Schluter and Andresen seemed to have 
followed market conditions, we should expect that the former firm might have enjoyed a 
privileged position due to its knowledge of supply of and demand for rubber. However, 
looking at its own accounts, Schluter & Co. generated very small margins in the rubber 
trade243, which would indicate that if any of these two firms was benefiting at the expense 
of the other, that firm would be Andresen and not Schluter. Without Andresen’s accounts it 
is impossible though to make any definitive conclusion about which link of the rubber 
chain profited the most in the rubber trade and to define, incontestably, the relations of 
power between rubber traders placed in rubber consuming and rubber producing 
countries.
Accounts of De Mello & Co.244, a similar albeit a bit smaller aviador-cum-exporter, 
suggest that this firm was profiting quite a lot from the rubber trade. The balance sheet at 
30th June 1907 shows that the firm earned £60,138 in profits. According to the report of 
directors, the company received 521 tons of rubber that were sold for £251,561 2s. 10d., 
or on average by 9s. 8d. per kg. The average price of rubber imported from Brazil into the 
UK (which includes freight rate and docking expenses) was 8s. 11d. (1906-1907) much 
lower than the price earned by De Mello & Co. That can either simply indicate that this
243 From the records of the company, however, it is difficult to know exactly how the profit and loss 
on the rubber trade was calculated. The results suggest the perception of the company towards the 
rubber trade though.
244 Guildhall Library, Tea, Coffee & Rubber- 1906-1907, commercial report, catalogue number 978.
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company was selling higher quality rubber or that it possessed some market power, 
especially because the company was not exporting all its production as part of its rubber 
was sold to other exporters in Manaus: therefore, the average price earned by the 
company was higher than the average price paid by buyers in the UK even though the 
company was selling a significant part of its production in the domestic market. So, I do 
not think we should expect anything too dissimilar for J.H.Andresen and the company was 
probably very good positioned in the rubber market, being able to exploit its market power 
to a certain extent.
Generalisations from this case study are hard to draw as it is difficult to know how 
typical this relationship was. There is no other case study to compare and the results here 
should be regarded then as a first step towards a full understanding of the nature and 
conditions of the transatlantic rubber trade. Yet, J.H.Andresen might have enjoyed a quite 
substantial room for manoeuvre in the rubber market, contradicting, at first glance, the fact 
that export houses in Brazil were generally solely operating on behalf of buyers placed in 
Europe and in the USA. In order words, there is no evidence that rubber exporters placed 
in Brazil were not exploiting their market power or that they were facing monopsony power. 
Rubber manufacturers were to some extent in the hands of rubber traders, be they 
Brazilian, Portuguese, German, French or English. It is not at all clear which of them 
benefited the most, even though the analysis here suggests that were the ones placed in 
the rubber producing countries (especially in Brazil). This result certainly brings the rubber 
chain even further away from the ideal Wallersteinian chain type.
3.7 -  Final Remarks
The first chapter of the thesis built a theoretical framework that is more suitable for 
the analysis of commodity chains, in general, and of the rubber chain, in particular. The 
underlying idea is that the analysis needs be non-linear as it is necessary to examine two 
different dimensions: interactions that take place between agents located in the same 
node of the chain and interactions between agents located in different nodes. In this vein, 
Chapter 2 analysed the first node of the chain, i.e., rubber manufacturing. First,
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competition among manufacturing firms in Britain and the USA was examined. The main 
conclusion was that there were several attempts to cartelisation that nonetheless failed. 
Secondly, it was shown that this competition at the manufacturing level emanated along 
the chain as evinced by the high inelasticity of demand for crude rubber. Under this 
scenario, it was speculated that it was possible for traders, located at the crude rubber 
producing countries/regions, to extract oligopolistic profits.
In the present chapter, the analysis of the relationship between one 
Brazilian/Portuguese rubber exporter and one British rubber buyer indicates that the 
relationship between them resembled a usual trade relationship in which both companies 
benefited. However, if any company exercised market power, it was probably the 
Brazilian/Portuguese export house. Generalisations from this case study are hard to draw 
as it is difficult to know how typical this relationship was but the Brazilian/Portuguese 
export house might have enjoyed some market power at the British buyer’s expense, 
contradicting, at first glance, the fact that export houses in Brazil were generally solely 
operating on behalf of buyers placed in Europe and in the USA. There is no evidence that 
rubber exporters placed in Brazil were not exploiting their market power or that they were 
facing monopsony power. Rubber manufacturers were to some extent in the hands of 
rubber traders, be they Brazilian, Portuguese, Germans, French or English. This result 
certainly brings the rubber chain even further away from the ideal Wallersteinian chain 
type but it is still necessary to analyse the other nodes of the rubber chain to provide a full 
understanding of which nodes benefited the most from the rubber boom and that is 
exactly the aim of the next chapters in which the Brazilian rubber supply will be 
investigated in detail.
Competition between different sources of crude rubber was also examined here. It 
was argued that crude rubber production depended on endowments of latex yielding trees 
(first-nature geography) that happened to be located mostly in tropical areas. The main 
producing regions, however, possessed different types of rubber trees that required 
different methods of extraction and generated different qualities of crude rubber. 
Therefore, due to high heterogeneity, competition was somewhat limited as rubber grades
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were not at all completely substitutes to one another. In this context, the Brazilian Amazon 
emerged as the market leader due to a combination of quantity (thanks to the size of the 
Amazon forest) and quality (thanks to its hevea reserves).
Second-nature geographical factors and institutions also shaped the rubber chain. 
First, economic distance seems to explain why the USA was able to generate a higher 
crude rubber flow from the Americas compared to Britain. However, institutions played an 
important role too. Not only because of governments, jurisdiction and foreign relations 
(international politics and colonial power) as these factors were important on their own 
right but also because they determined economic distances by influencing freights and 
shipping (see Chapter 6 for an analysis of shipping and communication in the Brazilian 
Amazon). Thus, given its naval and colonial power, it is not surprising that Britain was able 
to generate a much higher crude rubber flow from Africa, Asia and Oceania, turning 
Britain into an important player in the crude rubber market as a re-exporter.
Furthermore, the Brazilian Amazon case suggests that Britain was indeed able to 
offset geographical distance with Brazil by creating several institutions. Brazil was not 
clearly within British or US sphere of influence. It was certainly on both, but neither of 
them succeeded in having a clear prominence over the other. The USA were the main 
consumer of Amazonian crude rubber but capital came chiefly from Britain. As will be 
shown in Chapter 6, shipping and communication were both organised by British (and 
Brazilian) interests, resulting that, despite geographical distances, economic distance was 
shorter between the Brazilian Amazon and London or Liverpool than between the 
Brazilian Amazon and New York. The Brazilian government was also instrumental in 
creating and/or supporting other institutions. The jurisdiction of the country (and the 
federal states) within the Amazon was instrumental to support rubber production. 
Subsidisation of shipping and communication also played a role (see Chapter 6). 
Government interventions in the crude rubber market, especially via taxation, changed 
incentives and shaped the actual pattern of production within the Brazilian Amazon (see 
Chapter 4 and 5). Therefore, in order to fully understand the rubber chain, it is necessary
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to move the analysis further into the supply chain of the main crude rubber producer, the 
Brazilian Amazon.
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4. Brazilian Production Chain: a Re-lnterepretation
4.1 -  Introduction
The present Chapter unveils the interactions among economic agents along the 
rubber production chain within the Brazilian Amazon. Chapter 2 analysed the demand for 
rubber, highlighting the main economic forces behind it whereas Chapter 3 described the 
link between supply and demand, notably the investment channel. This Chapter then 
complements the previous two chapters by examining the economic relations along the 
supply chain within the main producer region: the Brazilian Amazon. Unlike in the GCC 
approach, here no pre-defined power relationship is assumed between the nodes of the 
rubber chain and bargain power becomes not only defined by its fundamentals but also 
constrained by institutions.
This chapter develops one of the main theoretical contributions of the thesis, 
notably, an explicit evaluation of power between nodes of the commodity chain. It does so 
by defining a game that summarises the main incentives of the agents involved in the 
transactions between any two nodes of the chain. The chapter concludes that different 
from the existent literature on the rubber boom, the rubber chain is much more intricate 
and the relations of power does not necessarily follow a vertical one in which every 
forward node is able to exploit the node immediately beneath it (as the GCC approach 
usually assumes). Rubber exporters might still have bepn better positioned to extract 
monopoly rents due to their knowledge of the rubber market and the degree of 
oligopolisation of their activities. Moreover, looking at the whole chain together, it will be 
possible to conclude that rubber production is even easily self-enforced under a scenario 
of constant production expansion and of high inelasticity of demand, just like the one that 
prevailed from 1870 to 1910. Under this scenario, all factors of production could have 
been properly remunerated.
The Chapter is divided into 6 sections, including this introduction. Section 4.2 
presents the game theoretical framework that is used to explain the interactions between 
rubber tappers and estate owners. Section 4.3 shows how the Institutional theory changes
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the likely outcome of the game between tappers and estate owners. Section 4.4 then 
moves along the rubber chain and applies a similar game framework to analyse the other 
links in the production chain within the Brazilian Amazon. These interactions between the 
major players in the rubber supply chain shed new light on the Brazilian Rubber Boom, 
allowing, in Section 4.5, a re-interpretation and re-evaluation of previous works that were 
mainly concerned with the idea of labour exploitation. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes the 
Chapter.
4.2 -  Estate Owners & Tappers: a Game Theoretic Approach
Until mid-eighteenth century metallic currency was barely used in Para, and the 
bulk of transactions was carried out through exchanges of merchandises such as cotton. 
Only in 1749 was fiat money introduced, amounting ca. 55 contos de reis245, and a 
hundred years later it was still of scarce utilisation due to slavery (which meant that many 
labour arrangements did not evolve into payment of wages) and geographical conditions 
(in more remote places people still preferred to exchange merchandises than to make 
transactions based on fiat money). Since colonial times, however, an informal credit 
channel had been evolving. The first economic activity of the region, the collection of 
drogas do sertao246, relied heavily upon the exchange of merchandises: the gatherer 
received merchandises in exchange for the product collected in the Amazon Forest. This 
informal credit channel was called aviamento which means credit without money.247
Therefore, as explained in the introduction, according to the literature, aviamento 
turned to be the typical credit channel in the Amazon Region. During the rubber boom the 
aviamento was roughly organised into a horizontal channel (see Figure 4.1) in which the 
estate owner advanced the merchandises to the tapper in exchange for a promise to 
deliver a certain quantity of rubber. This merchandise was supposed to be the means of 
living that would allow him to concentrate solely on rubber extraction. The estate owner, in
245 See ‘Note on Currency’ at the front of the thesis.
246 ‘Drogas do sertao’ means, literally, drugs from the backlands and in the Amazonian context it 
meant commodities extracted from the Amazon Forest.
247 Santos (1980, p. 157).
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turn, was financed by an aviador, who was merely an intermediary who bought the 
merchandises from the export houses (or from importers with the money advanced by the 
export houses) which, as explained in Chapter 3, were the ultimate source of funding in 
that credit channel.
Figure 4.1 -  Aviamento Credit Channel in the Amazon Region
C xpurl
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Flow of Rubbor
Rubber
Tapper
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Source: Elaborated by me, based on the main nodes of the rubber chain located within the Brazilian Amazon. This is 
illustrative only as the definition of nodes is much more intricate with an agent sometimes acting in several nodes of chain at 
the same time.
The credit channel encompassed all nodes of the rubber chain located within the 
Brazilian Amazon and was much more complex than what this ‘Weberian’ ideal credit 
chain suggests. It hides several other relationships between the economic agents involved 
in the rubber chain as the degree of verticalisation increased quite substantially over time, 
especially during the last decade of the rubber boom (1900-1910). First, several 
intermediaries possessed their own ships (see Figure 6.3 in Chapter 6) to transport rubber 
from the jungle to warehouses in Belem or Manaus. Secondly, these intermediaries 
invariably ended up possessing some rubber estates, either following a business plan or 
as a consequence of foreclosure of rubber estates for collection of debts from their clients.
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Thirdly, some intermediaries also exported part of their rubber and could then be 
considered as export houses. Conversely, some export houses ventured into the 
intermediary market and also ended up renting or buying rubber estates.
As explained in the introduction, most of the literature on the Brazilian Rubber 
Boom adopted a Marxist approach as the authors invariably looked for evidences of 
exploitation. In this context, the rubber chain was generally drawn vertically, indicating a 
pre-existing and ad-hoc notion of power between nodes of the chain. The literature has 
thus assured some form of debt-peonage, bondage, semi-serfdom or indenture system as 
the outcome of migration to the Amazon. The underlying idea is that, in order to move, the 
labourer indebt himself and once having arrived at the rubber estate they were exploited. 
Rubber labourers were generally described as comprised of a mass of dehumanised and 
defenceless men who were exploited by cruel and greedy capitalists due to the latter’s 
monopoly over the means of production (rubber trees and tools).248 In turn, rubber estate 
owners were also usually taken as having power to enforce the so-called ‘Rules of the 
Rubber Fields’ which dictated that fugitive labourers should be returned to their original 
rubber fields. Since the labourer was inside the forest and worked alone, escape was 
normally a difficult enterprise since there were not many alternatives left. If the conditions 
prevailing in the forest were not sufficient to entice labourers to work, rubber estate 
owners could further resort to physical punishment.
In the particular case of the Brazilian Amazon, Weinstein offers probably the first 
revisionist literature on the debt-peonage system.249 She argued that rubber tapper 
resistance rather than coercion conditioned the nature and durability of social relations. 
Weinstein argued that at least in downriver rubber estates ‘the Rules of the Rubber Fields’ 
were a dead letter. First, the extracted rubber was, by law and for all practical purposes, 
the property of the rubber tapper and not of the estate owner who held the land and the 
trees. So there was no monopoly over the means of production. Secondly, the high cost of 
monitoring the rubber tapper strictly limited the degree to which the rubber estate owner
248 Barham and Coomes (1996, p. 16), Brusque (1862, pp. 47-48), Santos (1980, p. 167) and 
Barros (1854, pp. 9-10).
249 Weinstein (1983) and (1986).
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could effectively control their workers and curb illicit rubber sales. A durable alliance was 
thereby formed between rubber tappers and rubber estate owners, based on interlocking 
self-interest -  the rubber estate owner’s need to control the exchange and the tapper’s 
preference for autonomy -  that effectively frustrated local and foreign pressures for 
rationalising rubber extraction and trade.250
Bentes, in turn, advances that the rubber estate owners commanded the process 
of rubber production and owned the best and most profitable rubber fields but work 
relations were not defined by indebtedness. From the accounts of a rubber estate located 
in the Acre region, she shows that the estate owners used several different incentives 
such as bonuses, discounts and gratifications to ensure production and not necessarily 
violence.251
Another revisionist approach is that of Barham and Coomes who aimed at 
conforming the labour relation system into an Institutional framework. Even though they 
deny Weinstein’s assumption that rubber tappers necessarily preferred autonomy, they 
support her main critics over contemporary accounts with some new evidences. Their 
main contribution lies on their analysis of the role of risk252 by arguing that labour 
arrangements depended upon the following factors: endowments, motivations and 
alternative opportunities open to rubber workers (which will ultimately define opportunity 
costs), the property relations under which they worked, and the type of rubber collected. 
Distinct labour arrangements were associated particularly with the type of rubber 
extracted and on hevea estates, the scarcity of labour and market features of risk and 
transaction costs provided strong incentives for rubber tappers and rubber estate owners 
to develop a durable relationship. For rubber estate owners, stable tappers would tap 
heveas with greater care (increasing future productivity of hevea trees) and would be a
250 Weinstein’s revision is in line with the literature on slave economic rationality which argues that 
even slaves had some room for manoeuvre and used resistance as a means of enforcing their 
bargain power. In this regard, amongst others, see Genovese (1976) and Barzel (1977) for analysis 
on US slaves, Blanchard (1992) for Peru and Toplin (1969) for an analysis of slavery in Sao Paulo 
(Brazil). Moreover, Engerman (1992) provides a very broad view of the implications of differing 
forms of property rights in people.
251 Bentes (1999, pp. 143-180).
252 It is true that Weinstein (1983) also highlighted the role of risk, but this was of a secondary 
importance to explain the durable alliance between tappers and estate owners.
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source of diminishing transaction costs as monitoring and recruitment costs would fall253. 
Tappers, in turn, would also seek a stable relationship in order to guarantee access to 
more productive estradas (trails) and as a way of obtaining some form of insurance 
against the risk of the environment. Hence, Barham and Coomes rely on transaction costs 
to account for the establishment of a durable relationship between tappers and rubber 
estate owners in lieu of Weinstein’s assumption of tappers’ preference for autonomy. 
Moreover, for Barham and Coomes, high premia over foodstuffs (see Chapter 6) could be 
explained by the high risk involved in the enterprise and should be regarded as normal 
remuneration of capital due to high risks entailed by rubber gathering.
Since there are diverging revisionist theories, the objective here is to develop a 
game theoretic approach that unveils the bargain position of rubber tappers and rubber 
estate owners. Distinct from the Global Commodity Chain approach, there will be no pre­
defined power relation between nodes of the rubber chain: the bargain positions of 
transacting players located in different nodes define and shape the outcomes of the game. 
Once the game is specified and analysed, Institutions Theory will then be applied in order 
to see how the likely outcomes would change. Additionally, the revisionist literature will be 
analysed through this theoretical viewpoint which will ultimately improve the current 
knowledge of the aviamento credit chain during the rubber boom (that spam all the nodes 
of the rubber chain located within the Brazilian Amazon).
Northeasterners and, to a lesser extent, foreigners comprised the bulk of the 
immigrants who fostered the increase of the Brazilian Amazon population during the 
rubber boom and formed the workforce for the rubber industry, alongside Amerindians 
and caboclos. Nonetheless, the economic role that each one played was ultimately 
dependent upon their initial endowments. The most deprived workers were usually 
impelled to act as rubber tappers, normally renting a trail from the estate owner who was 
himself either a more affluent immigrant or a former rubber tapper who made profit from 
previous work in a rubber estate and then moved along the forest to establish a rubber
253 Barham and Coomes (1996, p. 62) also accounted for less moral hazard problems and higher 
personal security for the rubber estate owner.
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estate of his own.254 It is argued here that labour arrangements between the tapper and 
the estate owner depended primarily upon their respective bargain position at the time of 
the ‘contract agreement’ which implied no pre-defined power relation. Note, however, that 
no formal contract was required and indeed much of the transactions in the Amazon 
region took place informally.
According to Woodroffe a labour arrangement between the tapper and the estate 
owner would be based on one of the following systems:
1. The rubber was delivered to the estate owner at fixed prices, calculated at 
a discount from the prices ruling at Para or Manaus.
2. All rubber produced was sold to the estate owner, who made it a condition 
that he would pay in goods or cash, or send the rubber to the local market 
to be sold for account of the tapper, deducting from the net result of such 
sales the value of the rubber agreed upon as rent of the rubber trails.
3. The rubber was delivered to the estate owner, who sent it to the local 
market, having paid all freight and other charges, after having deducted for 
himself a percentage as commission and having paid the remaining of the 
net proceeds to the tapper.255
The basic problem of these contracts is to entice tappers to work at the minimum 
possible cost. In the first contract, there is risk-sharing, as the remuneration of both, estate 
owner and tapper, depend on the future price of rubber. They both suffer from lower 
market prices and profit from abnormally high ones. In the second contract, the risk is 
almost entirely borne by the tapper, as the estate owner’s remuneration is mostly fixed. In 
thesis, tapper would profit alone from a abnormally high production whereas bad 
production would spell disaster only to the tapper (as long as production is at least enough 
to pay for the rents of the trails or as long as the tapper possesses some additional capital 
to pay for the rent). Finally, in the third contract, the risk is still entirely borne by the tapper 
but now profits are shared: there is an assymetrical payoff, favouring the estate owner.
254 See Weisntein (1983).
255 Woodroffe (1916, pp. 56-57).
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What determines which contract would be adopted is exactly the bargaining power of 
each, estate owner and tapper, at the time of the agreement. It is possible to see this 
through a stylised game. Consider then an idealised typical chain of the aviamento credit 
system in which the Rubber Estate Owner (Principal) advanced D (usually in the form of 
merchandises) to the Rubber Tapper (Agent) in exchange for Q* kilograms of rubber256 
and promised to pay P per any additional kilogram of rubber. Those merchandises were in 
fact the means of living that would allow the tapper to concentrate solely on rubber 
extraction. The tapper was furnished with the implements necessary for tapping and 
curing rubber as well as firearms, ammunition, foodstuffs and supplies such as flour, 
sugar, coffee, rice, lard, dried meat, beans, tobacco, salt, kerosene, soap, spirits, 
medicine, clothes and a few oddments.257 The advance in kind was particularly important 
in the most remote regions since this should provide the tapper with means of living also 
during the off-season, which normally lasted more than 6 months (contingent to the rainy 
season)258. For purposes of simplification, it is assumed here that D is fully consumed by 
the rubber tapper during the year. It is also initially assumed that rubber tappers are 
homogeneous and if they play the game they make the maximum effort possible. These 
two assumptions will be relaxed later.
Assuming no difference in rubber quality259, the production of the rubber tapper 
must result in either of the two outcomes, according to the game specified above:
1. The actual production (Q) is below that required by the principal, or Q < Q *:
256 Note that from Q* and D it is possible to infer the implicit rubber price in the contract, i.e., 
P* = . Moreover, note that P* might also incorporate an implicit interest rate over the initial
Q*
capital advanced (D).
257 Woodroffe (1916, p. 52).
258 The rainy or flood season ranged from November to April or May. Depending upon the rain and 
the terrain, the working season would sometimes last from June to October, that is, only 4 months.
259 According to Akers (1912, p.3), and as explained in Chapter 3, crude rubber varied according to 
the type of tree as well as with the dexterity of the rubber tapper. Even though some areas 
contained more heveas than others (and different types of heveas), and the extraction technique 
was not uniform, it is possible and still valid for the purposes of this game to assume that crude 
rubber was homogeneous, at least across different rubber tappers operating in a given rubber 
estate. On average, they would produce very similar grades of rubber as the trees in the area 
would not differ too much and best techniques could be more easily transmitted. In order to avoid 
issues stemming from differences in quality, it is possible to assume that Q* and Q represent some 
weighted quantity of different rubber grades.
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• Principal receives Q and earns QPt , where P, is the price by which the
principal sells the rubber produced to the intermediary.
• Agent receives nothing and increases his indebtedness (I) by (Q* -  Q)P*
where P* = -^~ .
Q*
2. The actual production is equal to or higher than that required by the principal, or Q 
> Q*:
• Principal receives Q, earns QP. and pays to the Agent (Q -  Q*)P.260
• Agent receives (Q -  Q*)P or decreases his previous indebtedness (I) by
the same amount.
In the aforementioned game, if there is some degree of legal enforcement, the 
Agent will borrow from the Principal and produce rubber as long as their expectations over 
future production ( Q ) are higher than Q*, which is the threshold from which they start
profiting. Moreover, profits should be at least higher than the wage they could earn in an 
alternative occupation (outside option). In order words, the game will be played so long
as261:
D  + ( Q - Q * ) P > W  (4 -1)
where W stands for the wage from an alternative employment, P is the price the estate 
owner promised to pay for any additional kg of rubber the tapper produces in excess of Q*
260 Ideally, P* < P < P„ where P* is the price of rubber implicit in the contract, P is the price of 
rubber explicit in the contract for additional kg of rubber produced by the tapper and P, is the
“market” price for rubber, i.e., the price at which the estate owner sells its production to the
intermediary.
261 It is implicitly assumed that the agent is risk neutral. This assumption will be made for the other 
subsequent games later in this Chapter. If the agent is assumed risk averse the constraint would 
be given by:
U[D + { Q - Q * ) P ] > U \ W )
where U(.) is the utility function of the agent, and U’(.) > 0 and U”(.) < 0. If the agent decides to 
produce rubber, his utility needs be at least as high as if he had taken his outside option.
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and D refers to the initial consumption of the rubber tapper as a consequence of the 
advancement of merchandises at period zero.
This game is not played only once and then condition 4.1 above should be 
restated. Thus there would be production as long as the stream of expected income from 
rubber production discounted at the appropriate rate (r) is higher than the expected 
earnings from an alternative employment (also discounted by the appropriate rate). Or:
where all variables are defined as before. Just note that P became P j , i.e., now it refers
to the expected price the estate owner will promise to pay for future additional kg of rubber 
the tapper produces.
Nonetheless, in the context of a wealth-maximising world, where there is no form 
of enforcement, the gains from cheating might exceed the gains from cooperative 
behaviour262. Indeed, in a world where no legal enforcement is possible, the above profit 
condition may not hold because the Agent could always runaway with D and produce 
nothing instead of investing that amount of money (or ‘merchandises’) into the production 
of rubber.
In a repeated game, there will be production as long as the reward from cheating 
is less than the stream of expected income discounted at the appropriate rate (rj). Or:
262 Note that the game applies a narrow definition of cheating. Here cheating is understood as 
running away with D without producing any rubber. In practice, there were several other ways 
through which the rubber tapper could cheat such as selling part of his production to an itinerant 
trader (regatao), increasing the weight of the rubber ball produced by adding alien substances such 
as rocks and sand, etc.
(4.2)
(4.3)
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where all variables are defined as before and PC is the transport cost to run away from 
the rubber estate.
Notice that condition 4.3 is more stringent than condition 4.2. Now, the stream of 
expected profits from rubber production plus the current and future consumption of 
merchandises advanced by the estate owner must be higher than the stream of expected 
alternative income (ouside option) plus the net reward from cheating. That self-enforcing 
cooperative solution is then achieved when the game is repeated: if the game continues, it 
may be in the parties’ interest to live up to the terms of agreement, because the gain from 
successive interactions might exceed the once-and-for-all reward from cheating.263
Much has been said about the agent’s incentives in the aforementioned game, 
whereas little has been said about how the principal determines Q* as well as the price 
they promise to pay for the additional amount of rubber (P). These issues will be dealt with 
later on in this Chapter but it is important to discuss some aspects of them here. The 
principal is the contract designer. His basic goal is to produce rubber at the lowest feasible 
cost. As explained in Chapter 3, production costs depend on the type of tree and on the 
dexterity of the rubber tapper. However, it also depends on the effort the tapper puts into 
rubber production. The principal may know the type of trees available in their estates or at 
least, it is possible to assume that they can survey their lands and determine it with some 
accuracy. However, the principal does not know how skilled the agent is (or may become). 
Therefore, there are two important features of rubber production: moral hazard and 
adverse selection. Moral hazard appears because effort is a non-observable variable 
whereas adverse selection is the result of the heterogeneity of rubber tappers.264 It will be 
shown later, how these two features change the outcomes of the game.
In the contract, it is straightforward to see that Q* is the quantity that once sold to 
the intermediary (or directly to the export house at the price P,) provides the estate owner
263 It should be emphasized that it is implicit in the argument that cheating is costless. If there is 
cost of cheating (apart from transport cost of moving away from the rubber estate) the condition 
would be less binding.
There is an extensive literature on contracts that shed light on moral hazard and adverse 
selection. For moral hazard, see Malcomson and Spinnewyn (1988), Rey and Slanie (1990), 
Chiappori et al. (1994) and Mas-Colell et al. (1995, pp. 477-488). On adverse selection, see 
Milgrom (1981) and Mas-Colell et al. (1995, pp. 436-476).
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with the amount of money necessary for: a) covering the costs of production (including 
transport costs if applicable); b) cancelling their debts (due to the advancement of credit) 
and; c) remunerating their capital (especially the one invested in land) weighted by the risk 
involved in the enterprise. On top of moral hazard and adverse selection, there were at 
least three more sources of risk. First, product losses occurred due to rainy weather which 
spoiled the fine rubber latex, with shrinkage in transit of up to 16 percent,265 and due to 
impurities introduced by nature or by the sly tapper through the mixture of sand, flour or 
tabatinga in order to increase rubber weight266. Secondly, attrition rates due to death, 
illness, and desertion, especially in the Upper Amazon appear to have been very high 
indeed. For instance, a report from U.S. Consul Kenneday at Belem mentioned that of 100 
workers recruited and sent to the rubber fields, 75 would die, desert or leave because of 
illness.267 Thirdly, the price the estate owner promises to pay for the rubber (i.e., P*) would 
bear a directly link with the expected price of rubber: P* would be the today’s expected 
price of rubber for the day the rubber would be sold discounted by the risk of price 
variations. This risk cannot be neglected since the price of rubber registered wide 
variations which were magnified by exchange rate swings. Lastly, it should be 
emphasised that both Q* and P would also be a function of transaction costs: the more 
searching, negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing required to transact an exchange (e.g., 
rubber for credit), the higher the transaction cost and, by consequence, the higher Q* and
p 268
4.3 -  How does Institutions Change the Likely Outcomes of the Game?
The outcomes of the above mentioned game are summarised in Figure 4.2 below 
in the case condition 4.3 is satisfied (otherwise there would be no production). Note that 
this game is played in two steps: first the principal advances the merchandises to the
265 Barham and Coomes (1996, p. 42). Pearson (1911, pp. 216-217) shows more detailed statistics
for rubber shrinkage. According to his figures, certain rubber grades could lose as much as 35% of 
their weight. Shrinkage would occur by natural drying process en route or in store or by washing in 
the product to get rid of alien substances or carbon from the curing process.
266 Pearson (1911, pp. 38-42).
267 Barham and Coomes (1996, p. 46).
268 Barham and Coomes (1996, p. 46).
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agent (setting Q* out of their expected rubber sale price and risks) who in turn decides 
whether or not to produce rubber. Whenever the income from rubber production is lower 
than the reward from cheating plus the alternative wage, the rubber tapper will cheat by 
running away with D and producing nothing. However, since players have complete 
information and are rational, they can accurately infer the likely response of any other 
player and if there is any incentive to cheat, the principal will decide not to play the game 
at first and production will just not occur (and of course neither will cheating!). Furthermore, 
whenever the principal believes that an agent is productive enough, the former will decide 
not to cheat either in order to keep them producing next year. This is especially true here 
since shortage of labour prevents the principal from easily hiring other agent to replace 
him.269
Figure 4.2 -  Game Matrix under Neoclassical Assumptions
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Source: elaborated by me, based on the game specified in the text.
In the matrix above, it can be seen that, assuming rationality (which here is defined 
as profit maximising behaviour) and complete information, there are two possible 
outcomes: no production or production with no cheating. But are these two assumptions 
reasonable in the Brazilian Amazon context? As explained in Chapter 1, this question lies
269 This is a very important assumption of this game, i.e., there is no pool of unemployed agents at 
the equilibrium wage (as, for instance, in Greif, 1996), because of a high shortage of labour which 
implies that the equilibrium wage is so abnormally high that everyone is employed. This is possible 
due to the inelasticity of demand as computed in Chapter 2 that allows the rubber price to 
accommodate high costs of production.
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at the heart of the debate between substantivists and formalists. The proponents of the 
former argue that economic behaviour was heavily embedded in social relations in 
precapitalist societies but became much more autonomous with modernisation whilst the 
proponents of the latter claim that embeddedness was not greater than the low level found 
in modern societies, allowing the use of neoclassical economics concepts and tools for 
the analysis of precapitalist societies270. It is argued here that actors in the Brazilian 
Amazon registered profit motivation and then a more formalist approach shall be adopted.
Indeed, in the Brazilian Amazon context, the discussion about fundamental 
differences between capitalist and pre-capitalist societies and the underlying lack of profit 
maximisation motive is not applicable as shown by Bentes271. Moreover, the majority of 
the Brazilian Amazon labour force was comprised by foreigners who went to the region in 
a guest for profit. Even if this region is taken as a pre-capitalist society, there seems to be 
evidence pointing in the same direction of Law and Ogilvie, insofar as these studies 
highlight the importance of economic concepts in explaining individual behaviour in a pre­
capitalist society.272
However, the adoption of the formalist approach does not mean that economic 
theory will be used upon the assumption of purely neoclassical economics. There were 
many market-failures273 that were partially overcome by the creation of certain institutions 
(not necessarily efficient ones) opening room for some extra-economic behaviour274. As 
explained in Chapter 1, institutions (formal or informal ones) are the rules of the game in a 
society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. 
They reduce uncertainty by providing structure to everyday life, defining and limiting the 
set of choices of individuals. The self-enforcing condition 4.3 states that wealth 
maximising individuals will usually cooperate with other players when there are a small
270 Granovetter (1992). This author’s approach suggests that the level of embeddedness of 
economic behaviour is lower in non capitalist societies than is claimed by sustantivists and it has 
changed less with modernisation than they believe. Granovetter (1992) also argues that this level 
has always been and continues to be more substantial than is allowed for by formalists.
271 Bentes (1999).
272 See Law (1992) and Ogilvie (2001).
273 For a summary of new institutionalism see Bates (1995). This author discusses market failures 
and how they are sometimes overcome by institutions.
274 The credit channel discussed in this article bears some resemblance with marketing boards in 
Africa. See Bates (1989).
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number of players, the play is repeated and players possess complete information about 
the other players’ past performances. Let’s take a look at these three conditions.275
First, in terms of the game specified in the previous section, even though rubber 
estates normally covered a vast territory, rubber trees were scattered over the forest and 
thus a high concentration of rubber tappers in a given area was seldom required. 
Secondly, in the estate owner/tapper game it should be emphasised that the rubber 
tapper’s horizon of planning, J, was usually small due to the high attrition rates and then 
the profitability of the enterprise needed be very high to ensure production (and 
increasingly higher since the game is not repeated indefinitely).
“[t]he mortality of the rubber districts of Brazil has always been large. It was 
reported for example, when the census of Purus river district was taken, 
that enough immigrants had gone there to make a population of 40,000 yet 
the figures showed 16,000 remaining. It is not probable that all or one-half 
of the 24,000 missing perished. Still a great many were victims to disease, 
as a rule brought on by their own lack of care. ” 276
Mortality rates varied enormously depending on distance to medical facilities, 
animals in the jungle, mosquitoes (proximity to marsh or flooded lands), etc. Mortality 
rates in the main cities (especially in Belem and Manaus) were probably one of the lowest 
in the region.277 The Amazonian governments certainly tried to depict the region as very 
healthy.278 Propaganda served the purpose of attracting more labour to the region but 
indirectly it may have influenced the initial expected J\ if propaganda was effective, rubber 
labourers arrived in the region with an expectation of living conditions that was far better 
than what they actually found, meaning that their initial J was somewhat higher too.
North (1990).
276 Pearson (1911, p. 168). See also Akers (1912, p. 92) and Woodroffe (1914, pp. 99-100).
277 Annuario Estatlstico, Estado do Para 1902,, pp. 72-111.
278 See Caccavoni (1898, pp. 1; 108), Braga (1916, pp 21-22) and L’Etat du Para (1897, p. 23).
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Thirdly, actors frequently must act on incomplete information and process the 
information that they receive through mental constructs that can result in persistently 
inefficient paths. Preferences are not stable, actors do not possess true models and the 
information feedback is insufficient.279
But how can incomplete information alone change the outcome of the 
aforementioned game? First, when information is incomplete, principal and agent will not 
form equal expectations, opening room for deceit. Secondly, it is likely that many of the 
rubber tappers had no information about the alternative wages in the nearest 
villages/cities. It is true that labour was very scarce throughout the Amazon region and, 
consequently, wages were indeed very high especially on dry seasons when many people 
flooded from the cities into the forest to tap heveas. A document from Para sugar cane 
producers of 1901 argued that wages were quoted from 4 milreis to 5 milreis per day 
whereas in Pernambuco (a State located in the Northeast), it ranged from 800 reis to 1 
milreis, i.e., wages were roughly four to five times higher in Para than in Pernambuco.280 
Likewise, "[i]n the Brazilian Amazon, rural wage labourers would receive the equivalent of 
between US$ 24 (Lower Amazon) to US$ 40 (Upper Amazon) per month with rations. 
Such wages were competitive in the urban labor market (...)”.2B1 However, since tapper’s 
lives were confined into this narrow jungle environment, they might have been completely 
disconnected from urban centres and probably might have had no knowledge whatsoever 
about any alternative income: under these conditions, cheating (as defined in the game) 
may be ruled out as agents had no information about any available outside option.
In the case of incomplete information, there stands the issue of enforcement which 
can be achieved through second-party or third-party punishment/retaliation (note that 
when information is complete in the game above, there is no need for enforcement
279 North (1990).
280 Santos (1980, p. 113).
281 Akers (1912, p. 18). Actually, data from the Ministry of Agriculture (1922) show that wages may 
have been even higher than that reported by Akers. In Para State, the average daily wage (‘a seco’, 
i.e., without payment in kind) for an agricultural labourer in 1911 was 10$000 or US$ 3.26 whereas 
in Amazonas State it was 6$500 or simply US$ 2.12 a day. Assuming a 21 working day month 
(which is probably less than the usual agricultural weekly working load), the monthly wages in Para 
and in Amazonas were US$ 68.50 and US$ 44.53, respectively. I need to thank Eustaquio Reis for 
providing me data on wages in Amazonas and Para in 1911.
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because the outcome of the game will rule out any opportunity for cheating). Indeed, as 
airgued in the Introduction, punishment lies at the heart of the discussion about labour 
arrangements in the Brazilian Amazon and this explains the emergence of semi-serfdom 
labour arrangements in some areas. As mentioned earlier, the literature has tended to use 
a Marxist/Dependentist approach to argue that rubber tappers were exploited even 
through physical punishment: the control over the means of production meant that they 
could expropriate labour use-value, and rubber estate owners could resort to monitoring 
and physical punishment whenever there was room for deceit. However, according to the 
game developed here, if the tapper possessed some initial capital, there would be less 
room for exploitation and if the tapper knew about the prevailing wages elsewhere (which 
were high), no exploitation would ensue either.
Since one rubber estate would seldom transact with another, it is possible to set 
aside the discussion about segmentation of the labour market282: all transactions occurred 
within the rubber estate and the only transaction with the outside was that between the 
principal with the rubber buyer (which normally would exchange merchandises -  to be 
reinvested in rubber production -  and cash for rubber). The only instance in which 
segmentation might be important relates to the case when a cheating rubber tapper is 
hired in another rubber estate: since rubber estate owners desperately needed more 
labourers they would hire whoever wanted to tap rubber trees, provided that the incentives 
in the game made cheating irrational (or there was some other source of enforcement, as 
discussed below).
In fact, collective action between principals does not linger on here: shortage of 
labour would have made the incentives to break the agreement very high and, in order to 
work out, this collective action would have required the share of information among 
members (reputation then would have played a minor role in this game). Indeed, the so- 
called ‘Rules of the Rubber Fields’ which dictated that fugitive rubber tappers should be 
returned to their original rubber estate owner were usually a dead letter, just as claimed by
282 See Greif (1996) for a discussion about segmentation.
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Weinsttein283. This informal alliance284 amongst rubber estate owners to guarantee that no 
rubber tapper could leave the rubber estate before cancelling all his debts was difficult to 
sustaim in a context of shortage of labour. Likewise, the crystallisation of any collective 
action among agents was also unlikely: they were scattered over a large territory turning 
mobilisation into a difficult enterprise.
According to Greif, contract enforcement can also be achieved through a variety of 
other imstruments: morality, personal trust and the legal system285. The first instrument can 
changee the outcome of our game in a very straightforward way: if there is any preference 
for beiing honest (which overcomes profit motives) the agent would live up with the terms 
of the agreement even in the case where cheating could be profitable, provided that the 
agent (could signal to the principal that they would not cheat under any circumstances. In a 
repealed game, playing some tip-for-tat strategy, agents might form personal trust 
diminishing the costs of monitoring. However, it does not seem economically rational for 
the agtents to do so since they would be giving up bargain power in exchange for nothing 
(unless the minimisation of monitoring cost286 allowed production and everyone was thus 
better off). Lastly, the Brazilian Amazon case study points into the same direction of 
Institutiions Theory, insofar as it claims that the legal system is not necessary for enforcing 
informal contracts.287 Local, regional and federal government do not seem to be strong 
enouglti to be relied upon, and there is evidence that government jurisdiction was confined 
to the surroundings of the main cities/villages, not reaching most of the rubber estates 
inside ithe jungle and where most of production took place.288 However, even this weak
283 Weimstein (1983) and (1986).
284 Notes that this informal rule was passed into law: “One of the things the [Brazilian] Federal 
governrment did was to issue a proclamation forbidding laborers to leave the employ of their master 
if they \were in debt with them. They were usually heavily fined for so doing as were also the 
owners of seringaes [rubber estates] who hired them.” See Pearson (1911:165).
285 Lovesjoy and Richardson (1997) show an example of how culture/region-specific institutions can 
enforce' contracts, strengthening Bates (1995) assertion that there are limits to policy prescription 
from ne\w institutionalism analysis.
286 According to North (1990), because it is ‘Costly to measure the valued attributes fully, the 
opportuinity for wealth capture by devoting resources to acquiring more information is ever present. 
It is measurement plus the costliness of enforcement that together determine the costs of 
transactting.
287 See (Greif (1996).
288 Howcever, lawsuits were sometimes used to secure legal rights. See Bentes (1999, pp. 152; 
237) an(d Costa (2005).
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legal system provided the emergence of wage earners around the main cities (note that if 
a legal system is absent289 and if it is difficult to evaluate labourers’ efforts, rubber tappers 
would always choose to cheat whenever it pays off).
In sum, from the discussion carried out in this section, it is straightforward to see 
that the estate owner/tapper game might have had many more outcomes than the two 
suggested by neoclassical economic reasoning (no production v. production without 
cheating). Figure 4.3 below summarises the main outcomes of the game taking into 
consideration only two possible outcomes (t high or i  low) for each of the three main 
variables in condition 4.3: horizon of planning (J), reward from cheating (D) and expected
income from an alternative employment ( W ).
Figure 4.3 -  Outcomes o f the Game
Scenario Horizon of 
Planning
Reward
from
Cheating
Expected Income 
from an 
Alternative 
Employment
Conditions
for
Production
Bargain
Position
1. J T D 1 W i High Q* Tapper:
Low
Estate Owner:
High
2. J T 
J T 
J i
D j  
D i  
D i
W i
w \
W i
3. J i  
J i  
J T
D t 
D i  
D t
W i
w \
w \ r r
4. J i D T w \ Low Q* Tapper:
High
Estate Owner:
Low
Source: elaborated by me, based on the payoff of the game specified in the text.
289 It is not at all true that crude rubber in the Brazilian Amazon took place in the absence of a legal 
system even though in certain areas the jurisdiction of the State was somewhat limited due to the 
geography of the area or the cost of extending government control. However, as Costa (2005) has 
shown even in the remote Acre region from 1904-1918, there was a reasonable justice system in 
place and several disputes were indeed resolved in court.
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From the estate owner’s viewpoint the best scenario would be the one in which the 
horizon of planning was high (in other words, when the attrition rates were low) and both 
the reward from cheating and the expected income from an alternative employment were 
low. In this case, the estate owner could pay a very low price for the rubber produced 
which is equivalent to a very high Q* (in other words, the estate owner has a high 
bargaining power and appropriates most of the profits from the enterprise). Conversely, 
only paying a high price for the rubber produced would the estate owner be able to 
enforce production in the case where the horizon of planning was short and both the 
reward from cheating and the expected income from an alternative employment were high. 
Therefore, in order to enforce production, Q* must decrease from scenario 1 to 4 (and the 
price paid for additional rubber produced by the estate owner should increase from 
scenario 1 to 4).
In general, Institutions affect the bargain positions of the transacting players which 
ultimately define the appropriation of profits along the chain. Without understanding the 
institutional constraint, it is not possible to fully analyse the power relations between 
nodes of the rubber chain. For instance, regarding the game specified here, it is very likely 
that asymmetric information prevailed in the game insofar as the estate owner may have 
had better information about the true value of the variables of the game. First, they were 
able to best guess from past experience what the true value of J was in their rubber estate. 
Secondly, they knew exactly how much the goods they were advancing to the rubber 
tapper was really worth. Thirdly, they were dealing directly with intermediaries and were 
more assiduous in the nearby villages so that they may have known the wages prevailing 
elsewhere.
4.4 -  Moving Along the Rubber Production Chain
The next node in the rubber production chain is formed by the interaction between 
the rubber estate owner and the intermediary (trading house), locally known as aviador. 
Weinstein, for instance, defined the intermediaries as local merchants who informally 
controlled rubber production and trade in the district by marketing the tappers’ output and
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keeping them supplied with tools, food, and any luxuries they could afford. These 
intermediaries usually contracted with the importing houses for the goods that were 
distributed to the small merchant, the roving trader, the estate owner, and ultimately the 
rubber tapper. Some intermediaries possessed their own boats (see Chapter 6 for details 
on shipping) so that they could internalise the transport cost by sending steam vessels to 
the trading posts of their clients and collect the rubber to be sold in the major rubber 
centres: Belem and Manaus. These agents/firms might have been able then to define 
when and to whom to sell the rubber. Additionally, these commercial houses 
(intermediaries) were sometimes responsible for arranging extra credits or short-term 
loans from the local banks either to supplement advances from the importing firms, or to 
finance major purchases such as steamboats, docking facilities, or warehouses. They 
were always looking to establish new commercial relationship with incipient estate
290owners.
Remember that the degree of competition is instrumental to define the appropriation 
of profits along the chain and, as discussed in Chapter 3, the intermediary role was indeed 
disputed by several trading companies with no single one possessing any degree of 
market share similar to what some export houses achieved in the export trade (next link in 
the rubber production chain). According to Figure 4.4 below, in 1902/3 the top aviador 
house handled 7.2% of the all rubber channelled through Manaus and at the height of the 
rubber boom (1910) the top aviador house handled even less: 6.9%. Moreover, the top 25 
aviador houses handled just over 50% of the overall rubber trade in Manaus. Figure 4.4 
further suggests that the intermediary trade was much more competitive with huge 
changes in the ranking over less than 8 years. It is true that at the top these changes were 
less dramatic with the two Portuguese rubber traders, J.H.Andresen & Co. and 
B.A.Antunes & Co., remaining among the top commercial houses in Manaus. From 
1902/3 to 1910, J.G.Araujo consolidated its leading position climbing one position in the 
ranking: this Portuguese merchant built up a network of ships, trading posts and agents
290 Weinstein (1983, pp. 18-19).
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along several rivers that gave him a competitive edge in the rubber trade.291 Mello & Co., 
in turn, saw its rubber trade decrease by two-thirds. It is difficult to know what happened to 
the companies that disappeared from the ranking in 1910 because some of them might 
just have changed their names: as explained in Chapter 3, this was quite common in the 
Amazon and it is very difficult to have the full track record of all (or even the main) 
commercial houses in the Amazon. For instance, The Mello Brazilian Rubber Co. was the 
successor of S. F. de Mello whereas M. Corbacho & Co. was the successor of Fernandes 
& Co.
Figure 4.4 -  Top Aviador Houses (Intermediaries) in Manaus and Respective 
Amount of Rubber Handled, 1902/3-1910
Rank Aviador Houses
1902-03
Aviador Houses
1910
kg % kg %
1 B.A. Antunes & Co. 1,249,058 7.18% J H Andreses & Succs 1,219,900 6.94%
2 Mello &  C. 932,068 5.36% B.A. Antunes & Co. 1,172,524 6.67%
3 J H Andreses & S uccs 607,789 3.50% Tancredo Porto & C 837,839 4.77%
4 Montenegro & C . 562,977 3.24% E manuel Levy & C 809,480 4.60%
5 Leite & C . 476,117 2.74% J G Araujo 766,952 4.36%
6 J 6  Araujo 474,599 2.73% Gomes & C 755,507 4.30%
7 B. Santos & C 468,157 2.69% Mesquita & C 535,027 3.04%
8 Gomes e Pedreira 386,194 2.22% B Levy & C 522,542 2.97%
9 D. Nommensen & C 374,356 2.15% Wesche &. C 439,971 2.50%
10 Armindo R. da Fonseca 366,084 2.11% Antonio dos Santos Cardoso 434,868 2.47%
11 Alves Braga & C. 361,062 2.08% J oao Alves de F reitas 432,897 2.46%
12 B Levy & C 358,245 2.06% E. Kingdom &  C 365,459 2.08%
13 C erqueira Lima & C 326,990 1.88% G unzburger & Co. 363,187 2.07%
14 Oliveira Andrade & C 321,673 1.85% Mendes 81 Co. 349,136 1.99%
15 Ahlers & C 321,360 1.85% Barbosa & Tocantins 348,820 1.98%
16 Antonio C ruz & C 299,849 1.72% Mello & C. 343,225 1.95%
17 Carvalho & Barros 275,592 1.58% C osta S antos & C 338,894 1.93%
18 R ibas & C 270,163 1.55% M. Corbacho & C 313,765 1.78%
19 F. Guimaraes & C 258,012 1.48% Arruda & Irmaos 271,963 1.55%
20 S F de Mello 252,935 1.45% J C Arana & Hermanos 250,933 1.43%
21 Adalbert H Alden 252,187 1.45% The Mello Brazilian Rubber Co 234,385 1.33%
22 M. Corbacho & C 243,484 1.40% Bernardo Bockris & Co. 222,833 1.27%
23 Scholz & C 230,757 1.33% A. Miranda de Araujo 206,365 1.17%
24 Gaspar Almeida & C 214,909 1.24% Mendes, Filho & Co. 187,608 1.07%
25 Deffner & C 211,853 1.22% Carlos Montenegro 81 Co. 182,004 1.04%
Total Top-25 Aviador Houses 10,096,470 58.06% Total Top-25 Aviador Houses 11,906,084 67.73%
Total Manaus 17,388,225 100.00% Total Manaus 17,579,875 100.00%
Sources: a) 1902/3: du Pin e Almeida (1906, p. 44) and; b) 1910: Loureiro (1986, p. 223).
“Of the 100 firms listed in the 1869 almanac for Para, the vast majority 
seem to have been involved in import-export operations, whereas only 
eight could be identified as major aviador houses. But by 1880, the
291 Wolf and Wolf (1936, pp. 57-57).
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membership of Para’s Chamber of Commerce included eighteen aviador 
firms; and by 1890 that figure had risen to 42. ”292
Therefore, the rising of the intermediaries was also obvious in Belem with the 
economic power of the trading houses increasing in tandem with their political power. 
Several aviadores and estate owners began their commercial and productive activities by 
taking over the local municipality which allowed them political and police control over a 
certain area. Sometimes fraudulent means were used to acquire land rights which were 
later exercised to either sell the land to another trader/landowner or to control the rubber 
production and trade in the area. The amassed profits were further reinvested in docking 
facilities and shipping, strengthening their trade with neighbouring producers and 
reinforcing their economic position in a broader area.293 In sum, the intermediaries profited 
quite substantially from the rubber trade and their economic position was consolidated by 
their political leadership at the regional and/or local (coroneis) levels. But what determined 
their profits and what were the conditions for intermediating the rubber trade?
Intermediaries can certainly be analysed under a similar game framework to that 
applied to the estate owner and the tapper. Assuming that they had to rely on initial capital 
provided by the exporters, their game would be defined in the following way. The 
Intermediary (Principal) advanced d (usually in the form of merchandises) to the Rubber 
Estate Owner (Agent) in exchange for q* kilograms of rubber294 and promised to pay p 
per any additional kilogram of rubber (this constraint is unlikely to be binding if p + tc < p„ 
where tc stands for the transport cost of rubber, the estate owner will decide to sell their 
rubber surpluses to another intermediary/exporter295). Those merchandises, as explained 
earlier, were in fact used to ultimately furnish the rubber tappers during the season
292 Weinstein (1983, p. 72).
293 For an analysis of the political economy of aviadores, see Weinstein (1983).
294 Note that from q* and d it is possible to infer the implicit rubber price in the contract, i.e.,
* dp*  = — . Moreover, note that p* might also incorporate an implicit interest rate over the initial
q *
capital advanced (d).
295 Remember that the intermediary market seemed quite competitive so it is assumed here that it 
is always possible for the estate owners to change intermediaries, especially when it comes to 
selling the additional rubber produced.
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(sometimes also during the off-season). For simplicity, it is assumed here that D is fully 
passed through to rubber tappers during the year/season, i.e. d = D.296
The production of the estate owner must result in either of the two outcomes, 
according to the game specified above:
1. The actual production (Q)297 is below that required by the principal, or Q < q* :
• Principal receives Q and earns Qp„ where p, is the price by which the 
principal sells the rubber produced to the exporter (next agent in the rubber 
chain).
• Agent receives nothing and increases his indebtedness (i) by (q* -  Q)p*
where p* = — .
q *
2. The actual production is equal to or higher than that required by the principal, or Q
-  Q*:
• Principal receives Q, earns Qp, and pays to the Agent (Q -  q*)p.298
• Agent receives (Q -  q*)p or decreases his previous indebtedness (i) by the 
same amount.
In a repeated game, the estate owner will take D and set up production so long as 
the income from production is at least higher than the income of doing something else 
(outside option299). From the estate owner’s viewpoint, production will only occur if:300
y ( Q i ~ < I i ) P i  y ^ ( Q i ~ Q i ) P j  >  y  W l  | T  ^
r  (i+//) r  (i+o " / (i+o ra+o
296 It is implicitly assumed here that the intermediary and the estate owner do not consume any D.
297 Note that Q, the production level, is the same as in the previous game as rubber is not 
consumed in any node of the rubber supply chain.
298 Again, ideally, p* < p < ph where p* is the price of rubber implicit in the contract, p is the price of 
rubber explicit in the contract for additional kg of rubber produced by the tapper and p, is the 
“market” price for rubber, i.e., the price at which the estate owner sells their additional production in 
the market.
299 This should be understood as including the income from renting out the rubber estate to another 
entrepreneur.
300 It is implicitly assumed that rubber tappers, intermediaries and export houses, all possess the 
same discount rate r.
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where wi stands for the expected wage from an alternative occupation, Si is the 
opportunity cost of the capital invested in rubber production (especially land), p t is the
expected price of rubber (paid by the intermediary for additional rubber produced), P i is 
the expected price to be paid to the rubber tapper for any additional kg of rubber produced
in excess of Q * , Q * is the expected level asked by the estate owner to the rubber tapper
in exchange for D (which in this example is equal to the level of production required by
— *
the rubber estate owner to the rubber tapper to advance D), ql is the expected level
asked by the intermediary to the estate owner in exchange for D, Q, is the expected
actual level of production and n is the discount rate (note that r0 = 0), D the advancement 
of merchandises consumed by the rubber tapper. Note that the horizon of planning of this 
game is different from the game between the tapper and the estate owner and it is likely 
that L »  J as this interaction is not plagued by high mortality rates. Moreover, since 
transacting agents here may be firms rather than individuals, they may outlive their 
owners/workers.301
The first term on the left hand side indicates the earnings from any rubber 
produced in excess of q* whereas the second term refers to the amount of money paid to 
the rubber tapper for any rubber produced in excess of the contract between them. Note 
that it is easier to understand the distribution of profits along the rubber chain, and 
consequently market power if q* is assumed to be equal to Q*. In that case the equation
4.4 can be simplified to:
y ' (Qi ~<]i)(Pi ~Pi) wi l y  ^   ^ ^
/ 0 + '}) ~ / (1 + r,) / ( !  + */)
In this simpler case, the estate owner is passing through the minimum level of 
production from the intermediary to the rubber tapper. The estate owner here only profits
301 It is also assumed that estate owners cannot run away with D as intermediaries could collect the 
debt by foreclosure of the estate.
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from his relative market power within the rubber chain. The more he earns from the 
intermediary for the additional rubber produced (/?,) vis-a-vis how much he pays for this
very same rubber to the rubber tapper (Pi )  defines his profitability. This is equivalent to 
the contract in which the estate owner only receives commission (% of rubber prices) over 
any kg of rubber produced in their rubber estate. However in the more realistic case 
where q* *  Q* the market power is also embedded in the minimum required level of 
production each node of production demands and thus market power becomes more 
intricate and difficult to disentangle.
Moving further along the rubber production chain, it is easy to see that the 
interaction between exporters and intermediaries would result in a condition for production 
similar to 4.4. Intermediaries and exporters can thus also be analysed under a similar 
game framework. The Exporter (Principal) advances D (usually in the form of 
merchandises) to the Intermediary (Agent) in exchange for q*’ kilograms of rubber302 and 
promised to pay p, per any additional kilogram of rubber (i.e. market prices303). Those 
merchandises, as explained earlier, were in fact used to ultimately furnish the rubber 
tappers during the season (sometimes also during the off-season). For simplicity, it is 
assumed here that D is fully passed through to estate owners during the year/season.
The game must result in either of the two outcomes:
1. The actual production (Q) is below that required by the principal, or Q < q*’ :
• Principal receives Q and earns Qp„ where p, is the market price for rubber.
• Agent receives nothing and increases his indebtedness (i') by (q* -  Q)p*’
where d*'=  — .
q*'
302 Note that from q*’ and D it is possible to infer the implicit rubber price in the contract, i.e.,
p * '=  —  . Moreover, note that p*’ might also incorporate an implicit interest rate over the initial
q*'
capital advanced (D).
303 Note that for simplicity, it is assumed that the exporter pays market price for additional rubber. If 
he did not, the intermediary could have decided exporting his rubber himself or finding another 
export house to sell his rubber to. This assumption does not preclude cartelization among 
exporters though as the market price in this case would also be equal to that offered by the 
principal.
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2. The actual production is equal to or higher than that required by the principal, or Q
> q*’ :
• Principal receives Q, earns Qp, and pays to the Agent (Q -  q*’)p.
• Agent receives (Q -  q*’)p  or decreases his previous indebtedness (i’) by 
the same amount.
If Q > q*\ the intermediary will play the game (i.e., they will decide to produce) so long as:
( Q : ~ Cl z ) P z  y > V  | V   ^ ^
(1 + r.) 4  (1 + 0 “ 4(1 + 0 4(1 + 0
where w- stands for the expected wage from an alternative occupation, Sz is the 
opportunity cost of the capital invested in rubber production (especially boats, docking
facilities and warehouses), p . is  the expected price of rubber (paid by the intermediary), 
p _ is the expected price to be paid for any additional kg of rubber returned by the estate
owner in excess of Q *, Q * is the expected level asked by the intermediary to the estate
—*
owner in exchange for D, q} is the expected level asked by the exporter to the
intermediary in exchange for D, Qz is the expected actual level of production and rz is the
discount rate, D the advancement of merchandises ultimately consumed only by the
rubber tapper. Note that the horizon of planning of this game is different again and it is
likely that Z »  J but Z can be set equal to L.
On the right hand side, we have the opportunity cost of capital and labour,
whereas on the left hand side, we have the expect income from rubber intermediation: 
since in this simple game D is integrally passed through to the next link, the intermediary
earns from the difference between what he pays for the additional rubber produced and
—  *•  — *
what he earns from it. The difference is that q . *  Q. as these also reflect the bargaining 
position in each interaction along the rubber chain.
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4.5 -  Re-Interpreting the Literature
The present Chapter has unveiled the interactions among economic agents along 
the rubber supply chain and the first conclusion is that the traditional Marxist/Dependentist 
view of labour exploitation must be reviewed. As explained in the Introduction, this 
literature embodies three main features: exploitation, dependence and violence/coercion. 
In view of the game above, these three features need be revisited.
First, the literature claims that rubber tappers were economically exploited. The 
main evidences given to support this claim were the price differential between the same 
goods in the Amazon and in Rio de Janeiro, the initial indebtedness of tappers and the 
control of credit by the estate owner. There is evidence that a significant price gap existed 
(see Chapter 6 and Appendix) but the risk of bringing goods to the forest (translated as 
high freights) and the risks in advancing them to rubber tappers certainly explain part of 
this price differential as claimed by Barham and Coomes.304 In turn, tappers usually 
arrived at the rubber estate in debt and, even if they were luck and very productive, they 
still needed more than one season to clear their debts. Moreover, the monopoly of credit 
could have permitted the estate owner to extract all surplus from the rubber tapper. 
Monitored savings (through price control of the merchandises advanced to tappers) allow 
the estate owner to adjust the tapper’s reservation utility level (given by his outside option) 
along the optimal sequence of annual contracts. 305 In this context, the 
Marxist/Dependentist literature was mostly right. What this literature did not account for 
was the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection.306
As explained above, moral hazard appears when effort is non-observable. 
Typically, in a context of moral hazard (assuming that tappers are now risk averse), the 
estate owner needs to give rewards to those tappers who produce more rubber. 307 That is 
exactly the rule devised by the principals in the game discussed in this chapter. Therefore, 
the optimal contract may embody risk-sharing between the estate owner and the tapper,
304 Barham and Coomes (1996). Moreover, Chapter 6 shows that freights in the Brazilian Amazon 
were very high indeed.
305 Chiappori et al. (1994).
306 Barham and Coomes (1996) do discuss moral hazard but not adverse selection.
307 See Milgrom (1981) and Malcomson and Spinnewyn (1988).
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allowing the tapper to extract part of the chain surplus. Moreover, under adverse selection 
estate owners had to provide incentives for tappers to correctly signal their type (show 
how skilled they were or may be) avoiding the so-called ratchet effect. This effect appears 
when rubber tappers signal their type through their first production outcomes. If they are 
skilled and work hard, they will produce a large amount of rubber initially. The estate 
owner will perceive that a given tapper is skilled and will demand a higher Q* for the next 
season. However, since the tapper is rational and knows that if they work hard in the first 
season(s) the estate owner will demand a higher Q* in the future, it may be optimal from 
their viewpoint to mimick the production of a non-skilled tapper initially so that they do not 
jeopardise their future earnings. To induce the skilled tapper to reveal its efficiency, the 
estate owner finds it advantageous to initially offer a high reward.308 In this context, it is 
again very likely that rubber tappers retained part of the surplus. Another way of avoiding 
adverse selection is by commitment. By charging the tapper upfront a high price for their 
transport costs and tapping tools in the first season, the estate owner ensures that only 
the most productive tappers (or those who believe they can be productive enough) will 
accept the contract. That is why the rubber tapper needs to be in debt at the beginning of 
the contract. If this indebteness lasts for more than one period, high indebtedness also 
means that the estate owner, who invested their money, is committed with the tapper. 
This is especially true under labour scarcity as the estate owner does not have too many 
other options available apart from inducing their current tappers to continue producing.309
Secondly, rubber tappers exploitation translated into exploitation along all other 
nodes of the rubber chain. According to the literature, the [foreign] export houses were 
able to extract all surplus from the rubber supply chain. If the rubber chain was really 
characterised by a series of exploitative relations, it was possible for the export houses to 
develop a way of extracting the whole surplus. The rubber chain would then become as 
efficient as if the chain was vertically integrated by one single firm. However, as explained 
earlier, export houses were not always foreign owned and there are reasons to believe
308 Laffont and Tirole (1999, pp. 375-436).
309 Mas-Colell etal. (1995, pp. 436-476).
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that their market was to a certain extent contestable. Since competition prevailed in 
several links, part of the surplus was retained along the way.
Thirdly, violence and coercion was not as pervasive as the literature claimed. It 
was not necessary as a latent threat either. The main evidence the literature provides in 
that regard refers to poor working and living conditions of rubber tappers. However, it is 
not at all true that just because tappers were working under appalling conditions they were 
forced to do so. It is necessary to look at their expected outside option. Was it really much 
better? Moreover, there were conditions to enforce production via market mechanisms. As 
there is no reason a priori to believe that some combination of the variables in the game 
would not suffice to induce production.
The rubber production chain in the simple form depicted here can also reveal 
much more. First, whenever j  J, i.e., whenever the tapper’s horizon of planning 
approaches the end, the price of rubber must increase to enforce production. This price 
increase is revealed in the first interaction between the tapper and the estate owner: 
coeteris paribus, when j  J, Q* must decrease which causes P* to increase. This price 
increase at the rubber estate level reverberates along the rubber chain reaching the 
exporter who is the ultimate link on the domestic rubber market supply. Since the exporter 
possesses market power (as shown in Chapter 2 and 3), he was able to push the crude 
rubber price up to make sure that the optimal level of production would be induced in the 
rubber estate, given the market power and cost structure of all agents in the chain.
A similar but somewhat more complicated mechanism is in place when the frontier 
of rubber production is expanding, as it constantly was. At the first interaction (between 
the tapper and the estate owner), the expansion of frontier would probably increase the 
disinformation of the tapper about the expected alternative income at the same time that 
would make cheating more unlikely (because the transport cost to move away of the 
rubber estate was likely to increase), fostering production especially because the new 
areas under exploration were generally much more productive (Acre region in 
Brazil/Bolivia territory). Therefore, from the tapper’s viewpoint, the expansion of the 
frontier of production would naturally induce more production. However, mortality in these
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new areas was likely to be higher because they were even further away from any medical 
centre, but certainly more unknown to agents and principal altogether.
From the estate owner’s viewpoint though, the likely increase in the wages (given 
that the labour force did not increase in the short term) would raise the opportunity cost of 
their activity demanding a higher price to continue operating. Moreover, since the 
transport cost of the rubber from the production areas to the export trading posts 
increased (as production was moving further into the jungle), the remuneration of the 
intermediaries needed to increase as well. Therefore, the net result is that the price would 
have to rise in order to enforce more production at the margin, reverberating along the 
production chain reaching again the exporters.
In this context, it is important to investigate how the exporters operated. As 
analysed in the Chapter 3, rubber exporters in Brazil were not all tied to importers in the 
consuming countries. It was suggested there that they might have had considerable room 
for manoeuvre and speculation in the rubber market. It was further shown that a handful of 
export houses controlled the market and collusion agreements and cartels could have 
been feasible to organise. If that was really the case, and the export houses acted as 
monopolists/oligopolists in the rubber market, they certainly set Q* based on the 
maximisation of monopolist/oligopolist profits). If however the rubber export market in 
Brazil was contestable (low barriers to entry and exit) as suggested by Barham and 
Coomes310, the quantity produced was given by the market price and by the domestic cost 
structure. Whatever market structure is assumed, production was required to rise year 
after year because the demand for rubber was continuously shifting to the right from 1870 
to 1910. As Figure 4.5 below shows, the interaction between demand and supply was 
constantly moving up and to the right, meaning that production was increasing over time 
and so was the equilibrium price of rubber.
310 Barham and Coomes (1996).
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Figure 4.5 -  Market Equilibria (5-year moving average), 1870-1910
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Source: British Parliamentary Papers, several issues and US Trade and Navigation Statistics, several issues. The values 
and quantities of crude rubber from Brazil were summed up from both series and plotted against one another. Therefore, 
quantity of Brazilian crude rubber imported into the USA and Britain is shown (in tons) in the horizontal axis against the 
average price of Brazilian crude rubber (in £ per tons) in the vertical axis. As stated in the text, the figure shows that 
Brazilian production was constantly expanding but price continued to rise, meaning that demand was increasing faster than 
production.
There is no doubt then that the exporters were definitely very good positioned: 
they certainly knew the demand for rubber and they could form a very good guesstimate 
of the production costs (especially because some of the export houses were rubber 
producers themselves). They knew better the conditions of demand, in thesis they could 
enter into a cartelisation agreement to force prices down in the domestic market and up in 
the foreign market, and, finally, the intermediaries did not possess a counterbalancing 
market power.
Furthermore, the literature has neglected the role of the inelasticity o f demand for 
rubber in the definition of labour arrangements in the Brazilian Amazon. As shown in 
Chapter 2, the monopolistic position of Brazilian rubber exporters implied that whichever 
rise in costs could have been passed through to the world price of rubber with the extent 
of this effect being determined by the degree of their market power. Therefore, in the
184
context of inelasticity of demand for rubber and market power, rubber production costs 
would ultimately define its own world price: a high inelasticity of demand would allow 
production to take place even under high costs without necessarily having to resort to any 
kind of enforcement such as monitoring, punishment or collective action, for every factor 
of production could be properly remunerated. In this vein, the rising prices of rubber 
should not solely be regarded as a result of speculation but also as a movement of the 
physical frontier of production and its consequent increasing costs.
Supposedly, the inelasticity of demand was unimportant insofar as the supply of 
Brazilian rubber was also very inelastic due to shortage of labour. This assumption is in 
fact corroborated by equation 1 on Figure 4.6 below.311 The figure also presents the price 
and labour elasticity of supply under three other specifications: a simple time trend, a 
Koyck-transformation distributed lag (in which the long run supply elasticity is given by 
b/(1-c) where b is the price coefficient and c the lagged quantity coefficient), and a 
combination of the two.
311 The equations were estimated using data from the supply side. Quantities (in tons) and prices 
(in contos de reis) were obtained from Estatisticas Historicas do Brasil. In order to assure 
comparability with the other econometric results in the thesis, the equations were estimated from 
aggregated data for Brazil as a whole, not for the Amazon region. I nonetheless ran similar 
regressions using Amazonian data as well as British and US data. The results were much poorer 
than the ones presented in figure 4.6. Therefore, all quantitative results should be regarded with 
extreme caution.
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Figure 4.6 -  Supply Equations, 1870-1910
Equation
1
Equation
2
Equation
3
Equation
4
Constant -10.16 15.66 -2.12 10.69
0.0% 0.2% 36.7% 2.4%
Price(-1) 0.22 0.20 0.08 0.13
6.6% 2.1% 35.1% 11.8%
Labour Force (-1) 1.55 -0.61 0.37 -0.49
0.0% 11.9% 15.4% 17.7%
Time Trend - 0.07 - 0.04
- 0.0% - 0.3%
Quantity(-I) - - 0.73 0.42
" " 0.0% 0.8%
Adjusted-R2 
Durbin-Watson Stat. 
N. of Observations
0.89
0.58
41
0.95
1.15
41
0.94
n .a .
41
0.96
n .a .
41
Source: elaborated by me based on data presented in the Appendix. Note: P-values below the estimates (in percentage).
Indeed, equation 1 suggests that the price elasticity of supply for Brazilian rubber 
was very inelastic (about +0 .22), whereas production of rubber was very elastic to labour 
(+1.55). The adjusted-R2 was very high but the Durbin-Watson statistic suggested positive 
serial correlation in the residuals.312 In equation 2 a simple time trend was added which 
turned to be statistically significant313. This specification changed only slightly the price 
elasticity (now it is +0 .20) but the rubber supply elasticity to labour became negative 
although statistically significant only at 15% confidence level. In equation 3, a lag of the 
dependent variable is added which turned out to be very significant in statistical terms314 
even though the price and labour elasticity became statistically non-significant. Finally, 
equation 4 presents the result including both a lag of the dependent variable and a time 
trend. Both the time trend and the dependent variable lagged were very significant in
312 The partial correlogram of residuals spikes at lag one whereas autocorrelation shows a 
decaying trend from lag one: these two evidences point out to a Autoregressive Model of lag one. 
This impression is confirmed by running the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test.
313 There is still evidence of positive serial correlation among the residuals.
314 The Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test indeed suggests that there is no more serial 
correlation in the residuals but both the price elasticity and the labour elasticity turned non­
significant in statistical terms. Applying the Koyck-transformation to the variables, the price 
elasticity of Brazilian rubber supply was 0.31 and the labour elasticity 1.37, in line with results of 
equations 1 and 2.
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statistical terms and the labour force once again turned negative although not statistically 
significant. In this specification, the price elasticity is statistically significant only at 15% 
confidence level and, according to the Koyck-transformation, its value is 0.22.
What is problematic in Figure 4.6 is the labour force variable which is not very 
robust with the sign even changing depending on which specification is chosen. This is 
probably a consequence of the way this variable was constructed. First, it was necessary 
to interpolate population data for 1862, 1872, 1890, 1900 and 1910 (see Appendix). Then, 
the percentage of the population between 15 and 59 years old was also interpolated from 
data for 1872, 1900 and 1910 (for the years previous to 1872, the percentage in 1872 was 
applied throughout). Finally, the interpolated percentage of people between 15 and 59 
years old was multiplied to the total interpolated population series to obtain the series for 
the labour force. With so scant data, and given the fact that immigration occurred in waves 
between the data points for population, it is not at all unexpected that the series do not 
capture correctly the effects of labour supply on the Brazilian rubber supply. The price 
elasticity, in turn, turned out to be reasonably robust to specification changes and can be 
taken to lie within the 0.20-0.30 range.315
Therefore, the literature was correct in pointing out that the supply of Brazilian 
rubber was very price inelastic but as it will be shown in Chapter 5, even under low price 
elasticity of supply, Brazilian producers were still able to exercise market power in world 
markets of rubber and indeed the government profited quite a lot through taxation on 
rubber exports.
4.6 -  Final Remarks
The literature on the Brazilian Amazon rubber boom has usually focused on labour 
relations. Debt-peonage was generally regarded as a necessary condition to enforce 
production as labourers arriving at the Amazonian rubber estates had to pay back for their
315 It needs be stressed here that a more reliable estimate of the price elasticity of Brazilian rubber 
supply would have been computed if demand and supply were estimated jointly by instrumental 
variables. The problem was to find a good instrument. Note however that specifications here show 
no problem of contemporaneity as the variables were all lagged one year.
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travel costs plus maintenance until they were able to produce rubber. Economic 
exploitation was thus enforced by the rubber estate owners’ monopoly over the means of 
production (possession of rubber trees). Notwithstanding the fact that the revisionist 
literature tried to discredit this Marxist view, the only two books on the subject did not 
agree on the mechanisms that could have enforced production. If it was not violence or 
punishment, what was then?
This chapter offered a game theoretic model that unveiled the bargain positions of 
labourers and rubber estate owners. Instead of assuming any pre-defined power 
relationship between these transacting agents, the game simplified the motivations of both 
parties into a simple and general framework that is further constrained by the institutions 
existent and created in the Brazilian Amazon. The game suggested that there were 
several possible scenarios in which production could have been enforced according to the 
roles of four main variables: tapper’s horizon of planning, reward from cheating, expected 
income from an alternative employment and the implicit and explicit prices paid for rubber 
produced.
The game is then applied to the analysis of power between the other nodes of the 
rubber chain within the Brazilian Amazon. The rubber chain becomes then very intricate 
and the relations of power does not necessarily follow a vertical one in which every 
forward node is able to exploit the node immediately beneath it, as the GCC approach 
usually assumes. It is possible though that rubber exporters were still better positioned to 
extract monopoly rents due to their knowledge of the rubber market and the degree of 
oligopolisation of their activities. Finally, looking at the whole chain together, it is possible 
to conclude that rubber production is easily self-enforced under a scenario of constant 
production expansion and of high inelasticity of demand, just like the one that prevailed 
from 1870 to 1910. Under this scenario, all factors of production could have been properly 
remunerated.
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5. The Political Economy of Taxation and its Impacts on Amazonian Welfare
5.1 -  Introduction
States create, mould and destroy institutions. Its importance has already been 
emphasised in Chapter 2 when the evolution of the rubber manufacturing industry in the 
USA and Britain was analysed. There, it was shown that the market structure was 
basically shaped by the patent system which defined the amalgamation process on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Chapter 3 stressed the role of the State in an indirect way: even 
though investment and finance in rubber production was taken as dependent on private 
entrepreneurs, the rule of law seemed to have been quite an important factor for 
entrepreneurs as the investment flows usually followed colonial lines. In the Brazilian 
Amazon, it was no different: the State also influenced the development of the rubber 
production chain in several different ways and at several different levels. Therefore, 
whereas the present chapter aims to see how the State (at its several levels) influenced 
the crude rubber production chain, especially through taxation, the next chapter will further 
analyse the role of the government as provider and/or guarantor of supporting activities to 
rubber production.
The departure point for this chapter is the fact that rubber exporters in Brazil faced 
an inelastic demand (see Chapter 2). In theory, this privileged position might have allowed 
them to capture substantial monopoly rents. However, recent literature on the rubber 
boom has advanced that competition was present in all stages of the rubber chain 
(including, among exporters) and then cartelisation was virtually impossible. Chapter 4 
has shown that this claim was not exactly true and that in several contexts there was room 
for extraction of market power. The present chapter thus argues that the role of the 
government has been neglected: inelasticity of demand for Brazilian rubber allowed the 
government to capture monopoly profits even under a perfect competitive market. But how 
much surplus could have been captured and how much was actually generated? 
Moreover, in that case, some explanation must be provided for the question of why the
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government was generating a sub-optimal outcome. Those are the issues dealt with in the 
present chapter.
In order to address these issues, the chapter re-estimates elasticities using the 
same methodology as Chapter 2, but out of a merged US and British database. The idea 
is to generate a single elasticity of demand that will then be applied to evaluate welfare 
effects of taxation. Therefore, once the extension of Brazilian market power is assessed, it 
is possible to ask how much the region (optimally?) profited from it.
The chapter is organised in 6 sections, including this introduction. Section 5.2 
presents a description of the econometric model and the data used in the estimation of the 
elasticity of demand for Brazilian rubber. It also discusses the estimation output under 
different scenarios for the elasticity of substitution and for the elasticity of foreign supply. 
Section 5.3 analyses the economics of taxation, stressing that the actual export tariff 
levied by the government was well below its optimum level. Section 5.4 thus computes the 
welfare effect of the actual export tariff and the counterfactual welfare effect had the 
government set the tariff at the optimum level. The results indicate that the government 
could have doubled the welfare effect. Section 5.5 then provides a simple model that 
gives an explanation of why the government set the tariff at such a low level (16.6% on 
average between 1870 and 1910). It is suggested that it is possible that government 
revenue maximisation does not necessarily implied that the region’s welfare was being 
maximised. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes the chapter.
5.2 -  Estimating Market Power
As explained in the introduction, the underlying idea of the chapter is to analyse 
Brazilian market power on crude rubber and the first step is then to re-compute the 
elasticity of demand facing Brazilian rubber exporters. Chapter 2 showed that there are 
several ways of computing these elasticities though. One possibility would be to estimate 
demand and supply equations for the whole market jointly. However, in order to add up 
crude rubber supplies from several different parts of the world, that procedure would 
require the assumption that rubber was a complete homogenous commodity. In view of
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large quality differentials, this procedure does not seem to be satisfactory; notably 
because quality is an important feature of the story here. Furthermore, by this procedure it 
is possible to obtain an estimate for the elasticity of demand for Brazilian rubber which is 
exactly the objective in this Chapter. Another estimation procedure would be to compute a 
separate demand and supply system for different countries/regions but this procedure 
would treat each rubber source as a totally different commodity, leaving no room for 
complementarity or substitutability among the sources: crude rubber was not a 
homogenous product at all as different grades of crude rubber were substitutes to some 
extent and sometimes they could also be mixed to achieve some desired minimum quality. 
Moreover, this procedure would require information about supply conditions in all rubber 
producing regions, something that does not seem feasible for the exercise here.
As in Chapter 2, the estimation procedure proposed here is thus based on an 
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) for rubber. Besides looking at the properties of the 
estimation, like Adjusted-R2, Durbin-Watson Statistic, Unit Root Tests, etc., the 
parameters will also be examined, providing a measure of how necessary the different 
rubber sources were. The second step will then be to retrieve the elasticity of substitution 
between different rubber sources and the own-price elasticities (through equation 2.3) 
which, in turn, will be corrected by equation 5.1 below for the more reasonable case in 
which rubber supply is not perfectly elastic.
Indeed, the own-price elasticities of demand for rubber given by equation 2.3 
assumes that rubber supply is perfectly elastic and that rubber exporters in countries like 
Brazil would rapidly adapt to any change in price. This is not a reasonable assumption 
here as it is necessary to take into account now the elasticity of supply for other sources 
of rubber. Since the goal is to analyse the Brazilian market power on rubber, it is possible 
to follow Irwin316 and compute the elasticity of export demand facing the Brazilian rubber 
exporters, rjBRZ, which is dependent upon the Brazilian market share, S, the elasticity of
316 Irwin (2003).
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substitution between Brazilian and other varieties of rubber, a , the elasticity of foreign 
export supply, s , and the elasticity of demand for Brazilian rubber, 7 :
S ) c f  + S t ) ]  +  < 7 ? i  (5.1)
^ B R Z  S ( < J ~ J ] ) + ? )  +  £
According to equation 5.1, the elasticity of demand for Brazilian rubber will be 
smaller, (a) the smaller the elasticity of demand for rubber in general; (b) the smaller the 
elasticity of Brazilian rubber supply and; (c) the smaller the elasticity of substitution 
between Brazilian rubber and the other sources of rubber317.
The dataset used in the estimation was constructed by merging British and US 
trade data (discounting off the trade between these two countries) as presented in 
Chapter 2. Since up to 1910 Brazil (BRZ) possessed the largest market share (60.8%) 
and no other single country consistently exceeded the 10% mark, the other countries had 
to be aggregated in groups, notably in view that their territory often changed as 
consequence of colonial policies or simply due to independence or incorporation by 
another. In order to keep our results here comparable with Chapter 2, all British colonies 
(BRC) were aggregated (whose combined market share from 1870 to 1910 reached 
14.0%) into one category.
From this dataset, a set of equations (in the form of equation 2.1) will be jointly 
estimated. In practice, the estimation will then have two equations: one for Brazil and 
another one for the British Colonies. For Brazilian rubber, the Brazilian market share 
(dependent variable) will be estimated against the price of Brazilian rubber, the price of 
British Colonial rubber and a variable that capture overall physical demand of the market 
as it is defined as the total expenditure on crude rubber (total imports of crude rubber) 
divided by an average price of the raw product. Analogously, for British colonial rubber, 
the British Colonial share (dependent variable) will be estimated against the price of 
Brazilian rubber, the price of British Colonial rubber and a variable that capture overall
317 Van Duyne (1975, p. 603).
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physical demand of the market as it is defined as the total expenditure on crude rubber 
(total imports of crude rubber) divided by an average price of the raw product.
The system was then estimated using Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
(SUR) with only symmetry imposed and the results are reported in the Appendix. 
Homotheticity was not imposed since the system here is equivalent to one in which one 
extra equation for “all remaining countries” had been deleted whose (3 coefficient would be 
given by the adding-up restriction.318
The Adjusted-R2 indicates a reasonably good fit for BRZ equation (0.49) and a 
poor fit for BRC (0.11). Durbin Watson statistic suggested positive serial correlation in 
both equations possibly due to omission of price expectations or inflexibility in the short 
run, as a result of long run contracts between buyers and sellers. Even though the 
estimated coefficients remain unbiased and consistent, they are not efficient anymore. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests on residuals in level for BRZ equation (not reported here) 
indicated that the null hypothesis that the residuals follow a unit root is rejected at 11%. 
The null hypothesis of unit root is also rejected in first difference at 0.1% confidence level. 
For the BRC equation, null hypothesis can only be rejected in second differences at 0.1% 
confidence level.
Remember that under AIDS, changes in real expenditure operate through the 
coefficients: it is positive for a luxury good and negative for necessities. According to the 
estimates presented in the Appendix, Brazilian rubber is a luxury good whereas British 
Colonial rubber is a necessity (both statistically significant at 1% confidence level). 
However, since the coefficients are very close to zero, changes in the quantity of crude 
rubber consumed do not cause a significant change in terms of market share: for instance, 
whenever overall consumption of rubber increased (income rose) there was an increase 
of Brazilian market share and a slight decrease in the British Colonies’ market share. This
318 In fact, to be strictly correct, the estimated equation should have included a price variable for “all 
remaining countries”. However, the micro properties do not change and the system is equivalent to 
impose that the coefficients of these prices were equal to zero. All qualitative results are robust to 
specification changes and it was just chosen here the minimal specification required to support the 
hypothesis put forward here, i.e., that Britain could, at least partly, pass-through the price of rubber 
scarcity. Furthermore, it must be stressed that estimates are invariant to the equation deleted. See 
Barten (1969).
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may further indicate that Brazilian supply did not keep up the pace with its demand and/or 
that consumers regarded Brazilian rubber as of a higher quality.
Applying equation 2.3 to the estimated parameters of the AIDS model in the 
Appendix, we can retrieve the own-price and cross-price elasticities of demand. According 
to Figure 5.1 below, the own price-elasticity of rubber for British Colonies was -0.02 (not 
statistically significant though) and for Brazil -1.32 (highly significant: t-stat = -18.85). The 
elasticity of substitution between Brazilian and British Colonial rubber was not significant 
but indicate that it might have been positive (+0.29), i.e., the two rubber sources were 
considered substitutes.
Figure 5.1 -  Implied Elasticites of Demand for Rubber, 1870-1910
Mkt Share Beta BRZ BRC
BRZ 64.14% 0.08 -1.32 0.29
6 24 -18.85 0.57
BRC 10.43% -0.03 -0.02
-3.00 -0.05
Note: t-statistics below each estimate
Source: computed from methodology and data presented in
the Appendix.
It must be stressed again here that own-price elasticies of demand for Brazilian 
rubber computed above should not be confused with the elasticity of export demand that 
Brazilian rubber exporters faced (from this point onwards British Colonial rubber will be 
ignored as it did not register a statistically significant estimate nor is it crucial for the 
analysis here). The own-price elasticity of demand for Brazilian rubber should then be 
corrected by applying equation 5.1 in order to obtain the actual elasticity of demand that 
Brazilian rubber exporters faced. It is possible to infer that the demand for Brazilian rubber 
was somewhat inelastic and more so compared to the demand for US cotton in the 
Antebellum period: -1.1 (assuming elasticity of substitution of 0.8319, elasticity of rubber 
supply from other producers as 1.0 and market share of 64.1%) against -1.7 for US cotton. 
Figure 5.2 below presents the elasticity of demand for Brazilian rubber under different
319 Note that this refers to the elasticity of substitution between rubber from British Colonies and 
Brazil computed for 1885-1910.
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scenarios for the elasticity of supply from other producers (s) and elasticity of substitution 
between Brazilian rubber and another types of rubber (a).
Figure 5.2 -  Implied Elasticity of Export Demand for Brazilian Rubber under 
Different Scenarios
elasticity of 
substitution (a)
Elasticity of Foreign Export Supply (s)
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00
0.50 -0.83 -0.91 -0.94 -0.96 -0.97
0.80 -1.07 -1.09 -1.10 -1.11 -1.11
1.00 -1.18 -1.19 -1.19 -1.20 -1.20
1.50 -1.38 -1.38 -1.38 -1.38 -1.38
1.80 -1.46 -1.47 -1.47 -1.47 -1.48
3.00 -1.65 -1.70 -1.73 -1.75 -1.77
5.00 -1.79 -1.89 -1.97 -2.04 -2.09
oo -2.06 -2.34 -2.61 -2.89 -3.17
Note: table shows the output of equation 5.1, assuming Brazilian market
share (S) = 64.14% and elasticity of demand for Brazilian rubber
(>7brz) = |1.32|.
Source: computed from data presented in the Appendix.
From Figure 5.2, it is possible to infer that, except in the case in which rubber is 
considered a homogeneous commodity (equivalent to having an elasticity of substitution 
equals to infinity), elasticity of demand for Brazilian rubber should have lain somewhere 
between -0.8 and -2.1. Comparing with Irwin’s estimates for cotton during the antebellum 
period, from 1870 to 1910 rubber might have been more inelastic insofar as the elasticity 
of substitution between Brazilian rubber and rubber produced in British Colonies might 
have been as low as 0.8, which, according to Figure 5.2, would suggest an elasticity of 
demand around -1.10.320 For rubber, it is very unlikely that the elasticity of substitution was 
actually higher than 1.8321, which would mean that the elasticity of demand for Brazilian 
rubber would have fallen within the range of 0.8-1.5. Therefore, demand for Brazilian
320 However, using the same parameters as Irwin (2003), i.e., a  -  3 and s -  0.5 , rubber would be 
equally elastic: -1.7 for rubber against -1.7 for cotton.
32 This belief is based on several other different specifications (and different time periods) 
estimated by the author and not reported here. The elasticity of substitution between Brazilian and 
British Colonial rubber was usually below 1.5.
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rubber from 1870 to 1910 seems to have been more inelastic than the demand for US 
cotton during the Antebellum period, especially because in the case of rubber the 
government was intervening in the market quite a lot through an export tariff, implying that 
the demand for Brazilian rubber might have been even more inelastic. This point will be 
further explored later on here.
In addition, it should be highlighted here that the demand for Brazilian rubber was 
becoming more and more inelastic over time. From Figure 5.3 below, it can be seen that 
at the peak of the rubber boom, the elasticity of demand was probably very close to one (- 
1.1). If the elasticity of substitution is assumed to be 0.8, the elasticity of demand for 
Brazilian rubber could have been as low as 10.941 (in absolute terms).
Figure 5.3 -  Elasticity of Demand for Brazilian Rubber (20-year Moving Windows)
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Note: It assumes a constant elasticity of foreign supply (s) at 1.0 and an elasticity of substitution (a) at 1.3.
All estimates are statistically significant at 10% confidence level.
Source: Based on methodology and data presented in the Appendix.
As explained in Chapter 3, crude rubber was not a homogeneous commodity at all, 
registering huge differences in terms of quality and physical properties of the material,
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notably in terms of tensile elasticity. The higher the quality of the crude rubber, the more 
applications it would have and of course, the higher the price: prices indeed reflected 
quality and there were several different grades of rubber in the market whose prices could 
vary by 3.1 times. 322 Note that quality was also influenced with the crude rubber 
production technique. Rubber was produced from the latex of the tree and would generate 
the best quality only if the tree was tapped with care. Depending on the dexterity of the 
rubber tapper the latex could coagulate once in contact with the air (or depending on the 
type of tree as well), and the more care they had, the less impurities the crude rubber 
might have had. As argued in Chapter 3, hevea trees produced the best quality of crude 
rubber. For certain manufactured products, there was a limit to substitution from higher to 
lower grades of rubber, and therefore there were limits to substitute for Brazilian rubber 
and then it is not surprising that Brazilian market share went unchallenged until 1910 and 
that Brazilian rubber always registered a market premium.
Due to the relative inelasticity of demand for Brazilian rubber, it can be said that 
conditions existed for monopoly profits to be generated, had some oligopolistic (or 
monopolistic) structure emerged. This contention was long advanced and was probably 
known at the time of the rubber boom otherwise, how could one explain the article by 
Pearson, published in 1901 in India Rubber World in which the author seemed keen on 
explaining the reasons why rubber would never be monopolised by Brazil?
“No fear need be felt that the supply of rubber will ever be monopolized.
(...) [Rubber] is obtained throughout a wide belt, extending around the 
world, but mostly in regions remote from civilized centers (...); it comes in 
driblets to innumerable initial markets, from millions o f gatherers, whose 
labor practically is beyond control. Moreover, if all the forests now yielding 
rubber, and all the rubber gatherers at work, and all the houses trading in 
rubber in America, Europe, Asia, and Africa, were brought under a single
322 See, for instance, price data presented in the Appendix that shows prices for different grades of 
rubber traded in New York on 29th January 1906.
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control, the possibility would exist of new forests being explored, new 
workers found, and new trading houses opened, every one of which facts 
would tend to the overthrow of the monopoly” 323
What is implicit in Pearson’s argument above is that he believes that 
monopolisation would have never taken place because the elasticity of substitution 
between Brazilian and other types of rubber was very high and that the elasticity of supply 
of other countries was also relatively high. However, Pearson’s assumptions did not find 
support in the data or in contemporary accounts. For instance, Chapter 3 has shown that 
several rubber sources were fastly exhausting due to the method of extraction employed. 
Moreover, the elasticity of substitution between BRZ and BRC was not at all too high.
Barham and Coomes, in turn, argued that despite the fact that rubber was 
exported from Belem by a small number of foreign-owned export houses, this did not 
mean that competition in the rubber market was absent in Brazil. They argued that 
entrance in rubber market was relatively free and then high concentration levels were 
consistent with competition due to contestability: rubber was freely traded in major ports in 
the USA, Europe and the Amazon; there were plenty of information available to 
participants in the market, especially from two trade journals India Rubber Trade 
(published in New York) and India Rubber Journal (published in London); rubber 
production was very decentralized, being spread over a large territory; etc. In order to 
further support their argument, they cite Weinstein’s account of the unsuccessful attempts 
by the Vianni trading house to corner Belem rubber exchange over more than a decade in 
the 1870s and 1880s.324
First, Barham and Coomes accounts of the rubber trade are not accurate. Trade 
was not exactly free inasmuch as some of the transactions were hidden under forward 
contracts and only part of the trade occurred in spot markets (see Chapters 2 and 3). The 
free market they refer to is the marginal market: a) the Brazilian spot market was supplied
323 Pearson (1901, p. 135) also cited by Barham and Coomes (1996, p.34).
324 Barham and Coomes (1996, pp. 32-35) and Weistein (1983, pp. 139-155).
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by the rubber produced in excess of the forward contracts set by the export houses; b) in 
the USA and in Britain, the spot market was fed by the rubber ordered in excess of the 
forward contracts. They might differ quite substantially, as it is not clear that Brazilian 
export houses would only make orders following orders coming from abroad: it is not true 
that all Amazonian export houses were simply agents o f foreign manufacturers (see 
Chapters 3 and 4). It is very likely that they speculated quite a lot. Secondly, information 
was definitely available in the major cities but it is unlikely that it reached the far corners of 
the Amazon basin where production was actually taking place, especially because the 
main trade journals were published in English and a few people spoke English in the 
Amazon between 1870 and 1910. It is unlikely that even the majority of immigrants spoke 
that language, as most of them were Portuguese.325 Thirdly, production was decentralized 
but the decision upon levels of production may not have been as decentralized as claimed 
by Barham and Coomes.
Although the thesis has shown that an oligopolistic structure could have emerged 
in the Brazilian Amazon (see previous chapters), for the purpose of the present Chapter, 
this fact does not even need to be proved as the literature so far missed the role of the 
government and how taxation could have ensured that monopoly profits were generated 
even under perfect competition among exporters of rubber in Brazil. That is exactly the 
subject of the next section and the results here seem to provide further evidence to Frank 
and Musacchio’s rubber chain analysis (‘from trees to tires’). They acknowledge that even 
though competition was present at every link of the rubber chain, Brazil was able to reap 
monopoly profits before about 1900.326 Here, it seems that it would have been possible to 
exploit Brazilian market power on rubber even during the first decade of the twentieth 
century. Once more, the rubber chain seems further and further away from the typical 
GCC chain in which the core node is located at the industrial end of the chain (and, 
additionally, it is this core node that benefits the most from the productive chain).
325 True, information from these articles eventually found their way into the Amazon via local 
newspapers. However, the level of illiteracy was very high and probably only the elite could read 
them. Even if it is believed that information could have spread by ‘word-of-mouth’, it would take 
long to reach the most remote parts of the Amazon forest.
326 Frank and Musacchio (2006, p. 288).
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5.3 -  The Economics of Taxation: Impact on Elasticities
Even if the conditions in the rubber market prevented its oligopolisation and 
Pearson was right in saying that free entry may have precluded collusion agreements, it 
was shown in the previous section that conditions existed for the appropriation of 
monopoly profits and both contemporary and more recent literature neglected the 
possibility that government may have ensured (partial) monopoly profits for the Treasury.
Following Irwin and Abreu and Fernandes, it is possible to understand why an 
entire country can be taken as a sole player in rubber market even when production 
occurs in a decentralised way: government interventions in the market affect all producers 
to the same extent and a certain production can be assured by government control of 
rubber price.327 Indeed, the government possessed several mechanisms to pursue this 
goal: nationalisation of rubber production, licensing scheme, stockpiling, export tariff and 
import tariff over goods that affect the rubber cost structure. First, the government could 
have ensured that the monopoly outcome would have been reached if the government 
had bought out (or simply appropriated) all rubber production units, something similar to 
the case of guano production in Peru.328 Even though this mechanism was not impossible 
to be applied, it would have faced strong opposition from the Amazonian elite which, 
especially after the proclamation of the Republic (1889), had access to the government. 
Secondly, the government could have regulated the amount of rubber produced through a 
licensing scheme similar to what Chile did in saltpetre.329 However, this would have 
depended upon the ability of the government to ensure its directives and to prevent 
smuggling, something very difficult to apply due to the geography of the Amazon basin:
327 Irwin (2003) and Abreu and Fernandes (2005).
328 In 1841, Peru asserted its rights of ownership over guano deposits. In 1849, the Peruvian 
government awarded a single contract for extracting guano to a prominent local entrepreneur, 
Domingo Elias, who was later succeeded by Andres Alvarez Calderon. According to Miller and 
Greenhill (2006, p. 243),
“(...) [a] central feature of these contracts after 1849 was the employment 
of merchants to transport and sell guano overseas on consignment for a 
limited term, in return for a commission and other payments for their 
services. The Peruvian government stipulated both the quantity of guano to 
be exported and the price at which it should be sold.”
329 Abreu and Fernandes (2005) and Miller and Greenhill (2006).
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had the government policy pushed prices to a level high enough to compensate for the 
risk of smuggling, the rubber trade would have probably been shifted to Mato Grosso state 
or to one of the neighbouring countries. Note that after the proclamation of the Republic in 
Brazil in 1889 taxation on rubber became a State prerogative. Thirdly, stockpiling could 
have been used to create some sort of ‘valorisation’ policy, as Sao Paulo and Federal 
governments successfully did for coffee330 in the first four decades of the twentieth century 
and that was unsuccessfully pursued in 1911 and 1912 for rubber. Barham and Coomes 
argue that some unsuccessful attempts of price control through stockpiling by Baron of 
Gondoriz were indicative of the impossibility of controlling the market. This was true for 
1911 onwards, when Brazilian market share on rubber was decreasing very fast and with 
hindsight it is possible to state that these attempts were doomed to fail. However, it does 
not follow from this that Brazilian government would have been incapable of controlling 
the market had it attempted years earlier, especially at the hike of the rubber boom. 
Fourthly, export tariff was constantly used by State governments, notably after the advent 
of the Republic in 1889 (and by the federal government in Acre territory after it was bought 
from Bolivia in 1903) and even though the initial aim was just to generate essential 
revenues for Para and Amazonas states, there were consequences in terms of incentives 
for rubber production: the quantity produced was indeed influenced by government 
interventions. Lastly, import taxes over rubber inputs, directly affects the cost of 
production which would result in less rubber being produced as well. This mechanism was 
largely used by Federal government (sometimes even applied to merchandises from other 
states of Brazil).
As explained above, nationalisation of rubber production did not occur, a licensing 
scheme did not emerge and stockpiling was not successfully pursued from 1870 to 1910. 
And since import taxes were not under the control of state authorities (and because the 
federal government was more concerned with issues relating to coffee rather than rubber) 
and its impact was too indirect to provide an estimate of its cost impact, only the effect of 
the export tax on welfare will be analysed here.
330 Bacha and Greenhill (1992) and Abreu and Fernandes (2005).
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How could the export tax have been used as a way to achieve the maximum level 
of regional welfare? Figure 5.4 shows an export market in partial equilibrium. Point A 
corresponds to equilibrium in a perfectly competitive market: rubber domestic producers 
would sell the quantity Q* where rubber export supply equals rubber export demand at the 
world price P*. The optimal quantity of exports is equivalent to the monopoly outcome, Q2, 
corresponding to the point at which the marginal cost of rubber export supply equals the 
marginal revenue from exports. At this point the country generates the highest producer 
surplus.
In the simpler case where the government intervenes into the market through the 
imposition of an export tax only, its optimal level, t, would simply be the reciprocal of the 
price elasticity of rubber export demand. The marginal revenue of commodity exports can
be expressed as P* , where P* is the world price and rjBRZ is the (positive)
Wb r z  j
elasticity of rubber export demand as defined before. Since the rubber domestic price (i.e. 
the price actually received by rubber exporters) would be given by P = P*(1-t), equating 
marginal revenue to rubber domestic price yields the optimal export tax: t = 1/ t]BRZ.
Figure 5.4 -  Competitive and Monopoly Market Equilibria
P
Supply
Demand
Marginal Revenue
Q
From Figure 5.2, it is then possible to compute the implicit optimal export tariff, 
which is just the reciprocal of the absolute value of the elasticites reported there. First of
202
all, even in the counterfactual scenario in which rubber is considered a homogeneous 
product, optimal export tariff would have been as high as 32% and under more realistic 
assumptions (ct = 0.8-1.5), it could have reached 93% (with 72% as a lower bound).
Figure 5.5 -  Implicit Optimal Export Tariff
elasticity of 
substitution (a)
Elasticity of Foreign Export Supply (e)
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00
0.50 120% 110% 106% 104% 103%
0.80 93% 92% 91% 90% 90%
1.00 84% 84% 84% 84% 84%
1.50 73% 72% 72% 72% 72%
1.80 69% 68% 68% 68% 68%
3.00 61% 59% 58% 57% 56%
5.00 56% 53% 51% 49% 48%
oo 49% 43% 38% 35% 32%
Note: table shows the implicit optimal export tariff which was computed as
the reciprocal of the absolute values of Figure 5.2. Therefore, it is also 
assumed here that Brazilian market share (S) was equal to 64.14%  
and the elasticity of demand for Brazilian rubber ( t/ b r z )  was equal to 
|1.32|.
Source: computed from data presented in the Appendix.
Note that these optimal export tariffs were supposed to be levied in excess of an 
existing one which amounted to 16.6% ad valorem on average from 1870 to 1910 (see 
Figure 5.6 for the evolution of the Export Tariff levied by the government). Thus, if the 
government had not intervened in the market, the optimal tariff could have reached
126.5% (with a lower bound at 96.2%), assuming a would lie between 0.8 and 1.8331. In
turn, under the same assumptions, the elasticity of demand that Brazilian rubber 
producers would face, had the government not levied any export tariff would have fallen 
within the interval -0.78 to -1.03332. Therefore, in the absence of government taxation, the 
demand facing Brazilian rubber exporters might have been quite inelastic implying that 
there were definitely grounds for appropriation of monopoly rents by the government
331 This is just the computation of (1+TRF_EXP)*(1+TRF_EXP_OPT)-1; where TRF_EXP is the 
actual export tax levied by the government and TRF_EXP_OPT is the optimal export tax as of 
Figure 5.5.
332 These elasticities were computed as the (negative) inverse of total optimum export tariff range.
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during the rubber boom. In this context, taxation increased the welfare of the region but 
apparently there was room for even more welfare to have been generated there, 
especially in a context of shortage of labour.
As discussed in Chapter 1, immiserising growth is a theoretical possibility 
especially under an expansionary economy as the Brazilian Amazon from 1870 to 1910. 
Improvements in transportation or increases in the price of rubber increased the actual 
number of trees under production, which is equivalent to an increase in the endownment 
of the abundant factor. This would have two effects: 1) since the Amazonian income rises, 
assuming that goods are normal, the Amazonian demand should increase (excluding 
probably the demand for crude rubber that was hardly consumed domestically); 2) 
domestic production of rubber (the good intensive in the abundant factor) should increase, 
whilst domestic production of all other goods should go down (Rybczynski Theorem). This 
really happened at least in relative terms as the Amazonian economy became more and 
more specialised on rubber over time even though it is not true that the production of all 
other products declined over time in absolute terms333. Therefore, in relative terms 
production of rubber (exported good) increased whereas production of imported goods 
decreased. Increased supply of exports combined with increased demand for imports 
should normally result in less favourable terms of trade and there is no reason to expect a 
priori that the utility loss caused by less favourable trading terms to be smaller then the 
direct utility gain of a more abundant factor endowment. However, the terms of trade did 
not worsen due to shortage of labourers: even though high prices of rubber would have 
induced a high increase in rubber production, this mechanism was hampered due to the 
shortage of labour. No overproduction followed and thus no worsening of terms of trade 
happened. Consequently, there was no immiserising growth in the Brazilian Amazon from 
1870 to 1910.
333 See Anderson (1976, p. 68).
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Figure 5.6 - A d  Valorem Export Tariff Levied by the Government, 1870-1910
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Sources: Data were gathered from several Provincial P residentia l Reports, R elatorio  da F azen d a  do 
A m a zo n as  (1918) and LeCointe (1922). See Appendix for the raw data from which this Figure was computed.
Note: A d  valorem  export taxes were computed as the ratio between the rights of rubber (total revenue 
generated by export tariff on rubber exported) and total value of rubber exported instead of using the actual 
tariff as defined by laws. The procedure adopted here captures the true tariff burden insofar as the 
government always established official prices for rubber which sometimes differed quite substantially from 
market prices. Changes in official prices explain the spikes in Figure 5.6 above. For Acre territory, ad  valorem  
export tariff was computed from 1904 to 1912 (note that Acre was officially part of Brazilian Federation only 
after 1903), resulting in 19.24%  on average. For Amazonas, there were figures for 1870 to 1912 and its ad 
valorem export tariff was on average 19.62% . Finally, in Par£, the most important rubber exporter state, ad  
valorem  export tariff amounted to 17.52%  from 1885 to 1912.
5.4 -  Welfare Analysis
Once having computed the optimal export tariff, it is possible to evaluate the gains 
from the actual export tax and the counterfactual gain had the government increased the 
tariff up to its optimum level. This welfare gain would depend upon the elasticity of 
Brazilian rubber supply, and it is defined as the consumer surplus extracted from foreign 
consumers, (P2-Pi)*Qz. minus the domestic deadweight loss, 1A*(Q1-Q2)(Pi-P2(1-t)). In turn, 
the change in rubber price in international markets is given by:
Ap = '  BRZ A t
(5.2)
£ BRZ VBRZ
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where Ap is P2 -  Pi, sBRZ is the elasticity of Brazilian rubber export supply (see Figure 
4.6), tjb r z  is the elasticity of demand for Brazilian rubber and A t  is the change in export 
tax. Note that when sBRZ approaches infinity Ap A t , i.e., Brazilian rubber producers
could integrally pass through the tax burden to consumers. Analogously, when sBRZ -  0,
Brazilian producers are unable to push prices up and they internalise the whole tax 
burden.
The welfare gains of taxation depend not just upon the elasticity of demand that 
Brazilian rubber producers faced but also upon the elasticity of Brazilian rubber supply. In 
that regard, it should be emphasised that there was no significant change in productivity 
per rubber tapper, inasmuch as there was no change in production methods from 1870 to 
1910. Rubber extraction technique varied according to the type of rubber sought and 
extraction methods were very simple. According to Roberto Santos, each rubber tapper 
would operate 1.33 trails (each trail was comprised of 123 rubber trees on average) and 
would produce around 255kg of rubber per year.334 Productivity would depend then on the 
exhaustion of the tree and the type of tree. Remember that hevea brasiliensis provided 
not only the highest quality of rubber but also registered the highest productivity. Since 
productivity was not under the control of the rubber state owner (it was a given: there was 
no plantation scheme in Brazilian Amazon worth of note), it is fair to say that increase in 
production could occur only extensively: adding more rubber tappers to more rubber trees 
and applying more capital, in the form of advances for the tapping season. The absence 
of any major improvements in techniques might have resulted, as shown in Chapter 4, in a 
high price inelasticity of supply due to a claimed shortage of labour despite the fact that 
during the boom, Amazon population increased fourfold, from 278.3 thousands in 1860 to
334 Santos (1980, pp. 77-86).
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1.2 million in 1910335, as a result of immigration from other parts of Brazil, notably from 
Ceara.336
In sum, Brazilian rubber supply responsiveness would directly depend on the 
availability of workers and it was expected that in periods of high immigration, Brazilian 
rubber supply might have been more elastic whereas in periods of low immigration, the 
opposite might have been true. Indeed, as show in Chapter 4, regressing total Brazilian 
exports of rubber against different combinations of variables such as a constant, lagged 
prices (or current price), population and a time trend, gives an elasticity of supply well 
below 1, probably close to 0.25. Moreover, according to Weinstein,
“contemporary observers frequently commented on the fact that the volume 
of Amazonian production was almost completely unaffected by price 
fluctuations, since the aviador lacked an efficient method of increasing or 
reducing his ‘tapper-client’ output. ”337
Figure 5.7 below shows the real welfare effect of the actual export tariff levied by 
Amazonian governments, assuming an elasticity of foreign export supply of 1.0 and an 
elasticity of substitution of 1.3 (which is the middle point between 0.8 and 1.8 used here 
before). For every 20-year period, the elasticity of demand for Brazilian rubber was 
computed, which was then applied to equation 5.2 to estimate the change in price, had 
the tariff not been levied. This new counterfactual price (P2) was used to compute the 
correspondent new counterfactual quantity of rubber exported from Brazil (Q2). As 
mentioned earlier, the net welfare gain was calculated as the consumer surplus extracted 
from foreign consumers, (P2-Pi)*Q2, minus the domestic deadweight loss, 1A*(Q1-Q2)(P r  
P2(f~t))- This value was finally transformed into 1910 prices using Rousseaux Price
335 In this regard, see Akers (1912, pp. 67-70 and 80-81), Woodroffe (1916, pp. 1-24), Santos 
(1980) and IBGE (1987). See also Appendix for population data.
36 There was also international migration but it was concentrated at the end of our period here and 
the numbers were completely dwarfed by the mass of immigrants coming from other regions of 
Brazil.
337 Weinstein (1983, p. 157).
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Index.338 Assuming that the elasticity of Brazilian rubber supply ( s Br z )  was 0.25, Real Net 
Welfare generated by taxation would increase from £29,769 on (annual) average in 1870- 
1889 to £325,900 on average in 1891-1910. Therefore, the government was generating a 
higher real net welfare over time because: a) the value of rubber trade was increasing 
over time and; b) rubber demand was becoming more inelastic.
Figure 5.7 -  Annual Real Net Welfare of the Export Tariff (in 1910 £)
1870-1910
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Source: See Appendix for data and text for details on how this Figure was constructed.
Santos provides an estimate of the Amazonian GDP from 1870 to 1910 (on a 5 
year basis) which was converted into pounds and then interpolated to provide a full 
Amazonian GDP series between 1870 and 1910 (see Appendix for GDP data). Then GDP 
averages over the same periods as of Figure 5.7 were computed, so that the magnitude of 
the welfare generated by government taxation could be assessed. According to Figure 5.8 
below, the government could have generated a welfare effect as high as 1.8% of the
338 Mitchell (1988, pp. 471-473). Results do not change significantly if the Sauerbeck Price Index 
from Mitchell (1988, 474-475) is applied.
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overall GDP of the region during the last 20 years of the rubber boom (1891-1910), three 
times larger than what the government could have generated at the beginning of the 
period. Furthermore, it can be inferred that the government was increasing the net welfare 
effect generated by the export tariff in a context in which the GDP of the region was also 
increasing.
Figure 5.8 -  Real Net Welfare of the Export Tariff (% of Amazonian GDP), 1870-1910
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It is also possible to compute the welfare effect, had the government increased the 
tariff up to the optimum level. In the best case scenario, the government could have 
generated an extra £341,444 (expressed in 1910£) on average in the period 1891-1910 
as welfare gains for the region had it increased the tariff to the optimum level. This would 
have been equivalent to 1.9% of Amazonian GDP in the same period.
iiiiiiiiiii
Appendix for data and text for details on how this Figure was constructed.
209
Figure 5.9 -  Real Net Welfare of [Additional] Counterfactual Optimum Export Tariff
(% of Amazonian GDP), 1870-1910
Source: See Appendix for data and text for details on how this Figure was constructed.
In sum, had the government set the export tariff at the optimum level, an extra 
welfare gain would have been accrued by the government. Crude rubber consumers, 
located mainly in the USA and in Britain would have borne most of the burden of the 
taxation, as the relative inelasticity of demand for that raw product would have made them 
dependent, to some extent, on Brazilian rubber. This result is again in stark contrast with 
the GCC approach inasmuch as it suggests that the rubber manufacturers were not very 
well positioned vis-a-vis other nodes of the rubber chain, quite the opposite. According to 
Figure 5.10 below, from 1890 to 1909, the government could have generated a total 
welfare gain of 3.3% of the regional GDP per year at the rubber manufacturers and the 
final consumers of rubber products expenses. The question then is why did the 
government set an export tariff that was way below the optimum level? That is exactly 
what the next section addresses.
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Figure 5.10 -  Total Possible Welfare had the Government set the Export Tariff at the
Optimum Level, selected periods
(1910 £) (% GDP)
1870-1889 66,050 1.4%
1880-1899 70,947 2 .0%
1890-1909 72,473 3.3%
Source: See Appendix for data and text for details on how this Table was computed.
5.5 -  The Political Economy of Taxation
In the previous section, it was shown that even under a high inelasticity of supply, 
the government could have captured 3.3% of Amazonian GDP per year as a monopoly 
rent in the last 20 years of the rubber boom (1890-1909) since the burden of taxation 
would mostly be passed through to the consumers in Europe and in the USA. However, 
the government captured it only partially. It is important to understand why this was so.
First, as Irwin highlighted, “this partial equilibrium framework is static and ignores 
several important dynamic issues”339 and thus the optimal export taxes computed here 
should be understood as upper bounds, because the demand elasticity is probably biased 
downwards and then the demand elasticity may have risen when the export tax was 
imposed.340 Moreover, the government ability to tax was in fact constrained in three 
different levels: nationally, regionally and locally. During the Empire, Provinces were 
usually forbidden to levy any export tax, even though they sometimes did levy taxes on 
foreign and interprovincial trade. With the advent of the Republic in 1889, export tariffs 
became a State prerogative whereas the import taxes as well as income taxes stayed in 
the hands of the Federal government. The political economy of taxation on foreign trade 
thus became very intricate as presumably the USA and Britain could have actually 
retaliated against a possible higher export tariff. This retaliation would have probably had 
small effects over the Brazilian Amazon but for the country as a whole the result could 
have been quite significant. Retaliation was certainly a big concern for the Federal 
government as it became clear in the episode involving a surtax that favoured the
339 Irwin, (2003, p. 287).
340 Irwin, (2003, p. 284).
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Companhia Mercantil, a Brazilian rubber export house. The idea was to establish a 20-reis 
surtax on each kilogram of rubber exported from Belem but to exempt the Companhia 
Mercantil from such a surtax. Despite the rapid and fierce objection of the other export 
houses, Governor Justo Chermont (shareholder and former officer of the Companhia 
Mercantil) promptly accepted the plan.341
Only days after issuing the surtax decree, Governor Chermont received a ‘letter of 
inquiry’ from Ruy Barbosa, Minister of Finance enumerating the objections made by the 
foreign exporters. Despite his rhetoric of protection of national interests against foreigner’s 
attempts to monopolise the rubber trade, Governor Chermont had to bend to Federal 
pressure. According to Weinstein,
“In the final analysis, there was no hiding the fact that international 
pressure had allowed the foreign exporters to triumph over regional 
interests. Further, the course of events indicated to Paraenses that the 
Amazon still occupied a subordinate political position, despite all the 
rhetoric about decentralization” 342
If at the national level Para (and even more Amazonas) still occupied a 
subordinate position and were thus forced to put “national” interests before their own, 
these States also lacked coordination. The competition for rubber proceeds led the 
Amazonas State to legislate in 1878 a differential tax on rubber exports. The plan was to 
divert the trade from Belem to Manaus as Amazonense rubber shipped directly from 
Manaus would pay a slightly lower duty than rubber exported from Belem. The gap 
between the two export tariffs was subsequently widened in 1885 to 5 percentage points, 
causing several Paraense export houses to open or expand their businesses in Manaus. 
This plan was supported by the establishment of a direct shipping line connecting Manaus
341 Weinstein (1983, pp. 146-155).
342 Weinstein (1983, p. 152).
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to New York and Liverpool (see Chapter 6 for details on Shipping).343 This competition 
between the two most important rubber producing states limited the ability of them to 
increase their export tariffs. Any marginal increase in either export taxes could have 
triggered even more trade diversion, leading to a suboptimal outcome: due to a lack of 
coordination, both States ended up levying a much lower export tax than they optimally 
could. In a strange way, the Amazon State was pursuing a beggar-thy-neighbour policy.
Finally, at the local level, both states were constrained by pressure groups, 
especially the Associagao Comercial do Para (Para Commercial Association)344. The 
ability of these pressure groups to lobby was due to their access to the government: the 
higher the access to the government, the lower the costs of changing (or devising) 
government policies. As explained in Chapter 3 and 4, it is a long contention in the 
Brazilian rubber historiography that foreign export houses controlled rubber trade from the 
top of the aviamento credit channel. According to Weinstein,
“(...) [export houses’] primary function was to ensure a steady supply of 
rubber, at acceptable prices, for the industrial markets. The aviadores 
[intermediaries], on the other hand, simply sought the highest possible price 
for their merchandise. (...)
During the years before the boom, few aviadores had either the capital or 
the connections to become involved in transatlantic commerce; thus the 
exporter performed a strategic function, and he also assured the 
middleman of a source of additional goods or credit should the need 
arise.”345
343 Weinstein (1983, pp. 195-196).
344 Apart from Associagao Comercial do Para, it is possible to identify several other pressure 
groups: old Amazonian elite whose wealth was based on traditional activities such as agriculture 
and cattle ranching; urban professionals; other layers of the government; religious orders (Catholic 
Church, in general); and etc. No distinction will be made here about the nature of their demands 
and the way they influence the government. It suffices for the analysis here that there existed 
pressure groups that influenced and limited the government’s room for manoeuvre.
i45 Weinstein (1983, p. 138).
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As shown in Chapter 3, it might be true that export houses may have been able to 
profit the most from their position in the credit chain, and from their connections with 
importers of rubber in the industrial countries but there were clear limits to this. Moreover, 
the fact that export houses were usually foreign-owned did not mean that they did not 
have access to the government as can be inferred from their successful petition to the 
Federal Government against the tax exemption given to Baron of Gondoriz by Justo 
Chermont, first governor of Para in the Republican period.346 Also, the distinction between 
foreign and national ownership was not so black and white as some European and 
American export houses were operated and capitalised in part by Brazilians such as 
Henrique de La-Rocque and Jose Armando Mendes347.
Indeed, since government had an incentive to tax exports (because it would 
appropriate monopoly rents, as shown in the previous section), the key thing was access 
to government and not only nationality. Imagine, for instance, that initially export houses 
had no access to government (e.g., they were all foreign-owned with no local connections) 
and were facing Amazonian State governments in a context of inelasticity of demand (as 
computed in previous sections). The government had two options: either levy the tariff or 
do not levy it whereas the export houses had to decide if they would lobby or not against 
the tax. Lobbying here means an expenditure that forces the government to change its tax 
policy or a payment to an intermediary to influence the government as well. Having no 
access to the government in the model here means that the cost of lobbying (X) is 
prohibitively high.
It is then important to understand the incentives of each player and how much 
money they would commit to enforce the best outcome for them. First, the export houses 
would spend money lobbying up to what they would lose were the tax imposed. In other 
words, export houses would pay as much as the producer surplus they would lose, 
equivalent to the grey (shaded) area, L, in the Figure 5.11 below (it is implicitly assumed 
that once the exporters lobby, the government is always forced to lift off the tariff or, at
346 Weinstein (1983, p. 152).
347 Weinstein (1983, p. 143).
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least, compensate the export houses for their losses). Secondly, the government would 
commit up to the total revenues generated by the tax equivalent to the dotted area, 7.
Figure 5.11 -  Lobby Incentives
| | Lobby (L)
J] Tax Revenue (T)
'  Supply
Demand
Marginal Revenue
Q
The interaction between the government and the export houses can be analysed 
with the help of Figure 5.12 which shows the payoff matrix for this game. The government 
has two options: it either levies the tariff at the optimum level or it does not. The export 
houses can lobby against the tariff or simply accept it. As explained before, lobbying 
entails a cost (X) that once incurred ensures that the government will change its tax policy 
(do not levy the tax) or at least compensate for the export houses’ losses (/_). In this 
simple game the government earns nothing if it does not levy the tax and T otherwise. 
However, if the export houses decide to lobby against it, the government needs to 
compensate them with, for simplicity, exactly L. If the export houses do not lobby against 
the tax, it will earn L in case the government do not levy it and -L  otherwise. Moreover, 
whenever it does lobby, its earnings will be equal to L -  A. For the government, unless 7 -  
L < 0, it is always a dominant strategy to levy the tax regardless of the reaction of the 
export houses, especially because the high inelasticity for crude rubber will ensure that 7 
-  L »  0. In turn, from the export houses point of view, it is a dominant strategy to lobby as 
long as L -  A > -  L -> 2L > A. The key parameter is thus A: if the cost of lobbying is low 
enough, the equilibrium would be located in the upper right cell of the Figure 5.12 as the
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government will set the tariff at the optimum level and will compensate the export houses 
with at least L. Since in this game X depends on the access to government, export houses 
need a reasonable access to the government to ensure that the costs of lobbying are 
reasonable, guaranteeing their compensation for the losses incurred. This is only possible 
because the inelasticity of demand for crude rubber will ensure that the total welfare 
appropriated will be larger post-tax, allowing this Pareto efficient outcome.348
Figure 5.12 -  Interaction Between Export Houses and State Government
Government
Levy Export Tax Do not Levy Export Tax
CO Lobby ( L -  A; T - L ) ( L -  A.; 0 )
(D
I Do not
-£
O ( -  L ; T ) ( L ; 0 )
CL
X Lobby
LU
Source: Elaborated by me, based on the interactions specified in the text.
A more interesting case though is the one in which the government can set a tariff 
that is below the optimum level in a context of high (but not prohibitive) cost of lobbying. In 
that case, it is possible that the government may find a tariff level T  (where 0 < T’ < T) 
whose associated loss in producer welfare (/.') is lower than X but whose income is higher 
than T -  L. This means that the income accrued by the government with the lower tariff 
but no lobbying would be higher than the income of the optimum tariff with lobbying. In this 
context, the maximisation of government revenues would not necessarily coincide with the 
maximisation of the total welfare.
This last case may have been prevalent in Amazon, at least during part of the 
period under analysis. It is difficult to quantify the cost of lobbying but some hints are
348 An interesting case would the one in which the export houses have perfect access to the 
government, or even better, the case in which export houses comprise (or are) the government. 
This would be equivalent to a case in which the cost of lobbying is zero (X = 0). In this case, the 
government would still set the tariff at the optimum level so long as it agrees with a rebate to the 
export houses that is equal to the loss in producer welfare generated by the tariff.
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provided. Export houses did not have full access to the State government (which was 
generally more connected with the intermediaries - aviadores). Their local connections 
were sometimes very limited, and there might have been some lobbying/mobilisation cost 
otherwise an agreement between export houses should have arisen and they would have 
been the ones extracting monopoly rents out of the market. Only when government set a 
tariff that harmed enough the whole range of exporters were they willing to collude and 
lobby against government interventions in the rubber market: in this context it was rational 
for the government to set a tariff below the optimum level. Indeed, it is possible to 
compute T’ -  T + L and whenever this was positive it meant that the government was 
maximising revenues in a context of possibly imperfect access to the government.
Figure 5.13 -  Actual Government Revenue minus Government Revenue under 
Optimum Export Tax but Full Rebate to the Export Houses (T’ -  T + L), selected
periods
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Source: See Appendix for data and text for details on how this Figure was constructed.
Therefore, under the assumptions here, until around the turn of the twentieth 
century it is possible that the government may actually have maximised its revenues even 
without having set the tariff at the optimum level. If export houses have imperfect access
217
to the government and if they could have at least enforced full rebate of producer surplus 
at a higher cost, it is possible that the best strategy for the government may have simply 
been to set the tariff at the maximum level that did not trigger lobbying reaction from the 
export houses.349
5.6 -  Final Remarks
In the present Chapter, an Almost Ideal Demand System for rubber was calculated 
using data from the UK and the US Balances of Trade from 1870 to 1910. From its 
estimates, it was possible to compute elasticities of demand for Brazilian rubber as well as 
cross-elasticities between different types of rubber. The results indicate that from 1870 to 
1910 rubber was very inelastic: had the government not set any export tariff, the elasticity 
of demand that Brazilian exporters faced was probably between -0.78 and -1.03.
The Chapter further shows that the literature on Brazilian rubber has neglected the 
fact that the government could have been able to ensure the monopoly outcome even 
under a high degree of competition amongst Brazilian rubber exporters and under a high 
inelasticity of supply. Indeed, the government possessed several mechanisms to pursue 
this goal: nationalisation of rubber production, licensing scheme, stockpiling, export tariff 
and import tariff over goods that affect rubber cost structure. It was argued here that 
export tariff and import tariff were the main instruments actually used by the government 
but the welfare analysis focused mainly on the export tariff.
Under reasonable assumptions, results here suggest that the optimum export tariff 
fell in the 96.2%-126.5% interval but the government levied only 16.6% on average in the 
years for which data were available (1870-1910). Had the government imposed the 
optimum export tariff, welfare could have been increased as much as £341,444 per year 
from 1891-1910, equivalent to 1.89% of Amazonian GDP in the period. This welfare would
349 Another possible explanation for a lower export tariff than the optimum level could be given by 
Grossman and Helpman (1995). It is possible to construct a model with two opposing lobbying 
groups, say export houses and intermediaries. Assume that export houses and intermediaries have 
opposing goals concerning the export tariff. Whereas the former would lobby against the tariff, the 
latter would support it, as they would supposedly be the main beneficiaries of the redistribution of 
rents via public goods. It is possible that export houses lobbying power could partly cancel off 
intermediaries lobbying power, leading to a suboptimal outcome.
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have been generated on top of 1.80% that had already been generated by the 
government when it set the export tariff at 18.9% in the same period (1891-1910).
However, the ability of the government to tax was constrained at national, regional 
and local levels. At the national level due to pressure stemming from the Federal 
government which was more worried about national interests, and probably more with 
consequences on the Brazilian south-east coffee producing region. The disputes over 
rubber proceeds between Para and Amazonas states further constrained the ability of 
these governments to set the tariff at the optimum level, leading to a suboptimal outcome. 
Finally, at the local level, pressure groups were also constraining optimal tax policies. 
Indeed, the political economy of the taxation at the local level further indicated that in fact 
the government may have maximised its revenues, but not the regional welfare, when it 
set an export tariff well below its optimum level. Yet, given the lack of evidence on 
lobbying costs, and the difficulty in assessing access to government, there might have 
been other reasons to explain why the government set an export tariff below the optimum 
level. One obvious reason may have been that the government did not know how high the 
optimum tariff was and it was constrained in some way to test the market to find the right 
level. Another possible caveat of the simple model presented here would be the cost of 
setting up the rebate mechanism as the government would have to know how much 
rubber each exporter was sending abroad and come up with some way of repaying 
everyone back. As the section shows though, this rebate may have been sanctioned 
through the provision or subsidisation of public goods, notably in transport and 
communication.
This chapter stresses the fact that Brazilian Amazon State governments were 
indeed increasing the welfare of the region through taxation, no matter how competitive 
the rubber market was. Moreover, the results further indicate that there was room for the 
government to extract monopoly rents even in a context of high inelasticity of Brazilian 
rubber supply. Here, the high inelasticity of supply plays a double role: at the same time 
that it decreased the welfare effect of taxation, it prevented immiserising growth from 
happening. Therefore, the results indicate the extension of market power Brazil
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possessed in rubber market and suggest that the government could have ensured the 
maximum internal welfare at rubber consumer’s expense. This conclusion seems to 
contribute a great deal for the debate about the rubber boom in the Brazilian Amazon and 
about taxation in general.
First, the Chapter presents an interesting case in which taxation may have been 
very beneficial for the Brazilian Amazon. Through taxation, the region was able to 
increase its welfare, even though the best scenario would have been the one in which the 
government agrees with some sort of rebate or in which it increases its social and 
economic expenditure. This could be regarded as equivalent to an indirect rebate. This is 
patently a case in which the government was not detrimental to welfare as, for instance, in 
Clarence-Smith’s cocoa chain.350 Secondly, the Chapter also contributes with a simple 
model that shows that it is not always clear that the government should set the export tariff 
at the optimum level because depending on the domestic political economy of taxation, 
maximisation of welfare and maximisation of government revenues may differ. Thirdly, the 
elasticities of demand computed here expand our understanding of the developments 
taking place in the industrialising countries, especially in the USA and in Britain which 
were the main rubber consumers. From 1870 to 1910, rubber found more and more uses 
and became an increasingly strategic commodity: with such an inelasticity of demand it is 
possible that developments in the Brazilian Amazon were influencing the development of 
rubber industrial process in the USA and in the UK. These findings are quite different from 
GCC/Wallerstein approach (see further below). Moreover, dependence on rubber pushed 
the Amazon region into such a specialisation of production that the region became 
virtually a monoproducer of rubber importing everything else. Therefore, the region is an 
interesting case study of trade specialisation due to comparative advantage in which, as 
explained before, immiserising growth did not occur.
This trade specialisation changed the pattern of integration of the region into the 
world economy. However, the chapter supports the Frank and Musacchio’s view that there 
was no economic imperialism in the Amazon as the rubber chain does not fit into the
350 Clarence-Smith (2000).
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model of peripherality of raw material and centrality of manufacture.351 This traditional 
formulation is at the heart of the GCC approach and it suggests that production in the 
periphery (Brazil) should have developed in tandem with impulses emanating from the 
industrial core (USA and Europe). That pattern would ensure that profits in the periphery 
would either be held down (so as to maximise profits at the industrial core) or be high in 
order to ensure profitability from investments flowing from the industrial core. It is not 
surprising that for a quite long period, given the high inelasticity of demand for Brazilian 
rubber, manufacturers in the core economies were tied to developments occurring within 
the Brazilian Amazon, diametrically contrary to the traditional assumption of economic 
imperialism.
However, economic imperialism cannot be completely dismissed since the tax 
policy was constrained at three different levels, and especially by the (foreign) export 
houses’ lobby. It is true that not all export houses were foreign-owned or foreign-managed 
but whenever they were not, they might have relied upon a cooperative local elite. In sum, 
government seemed to be maximising its revenues, given the pressure from export sector 
and the latter’s imperfect access to the government, but there should be no doubt that the 
government could have reaped much more monopoly profits than it actually did.
In sum, the chapter contributes not only to the understanding of the effects of 
taxation and its political economy but also to the economic history of the Amazon region. 
In providing the first measure of elasticity of demand for Brazilian rubber and carrying out, 
also for the first time, a welfare analysis, the chapter showed that there was room for 
extraction of monopoly rents from rubber trade even in a context of high degree of 
competition in the market and without harming the economy as whole, that is, there was 
no immiserising growth. The chapter has brought the role of the government to the fore by 
analysing the impact of taxation on the region’s welfare.
351 Frank and Musacchio (2006).
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6. Communication and Shipping: The Integration of the Brazilian Amazon
6.1 -  Introduction
Due to a combination of quantity and quality, the Brazilian Amazon emerged as 
the main crude rubber producer, accounting for 60% of the market from 1870 to 1910. As 
seen in Chapter 2, the demand for crude rubber increased very fast, following the 
application of this raw material into more and more (new) products. The demand took an 
exponential trend especially after rubber tyres began to be applied in the motorcar 
industry. Supply did not follow demand and the ensuing crude rubber famine meant that 
demand for rubber became very price inelastic. Even though capital was channeled from 
the rubber manufacturing industries to the rubber gatherers along the rubber chain (see 
Chapter 3), labour was very scarce throughout the period as shown in Chapter 4. The 
supply of crude rubber was indeed very inelastic to labour, preventing market forces from 
balancing supply and demand despite the massive inflow of immigrants (mostly from other 
parts of the country) to the Brazilian Amazon. Additionally, labour supply might have 
prevented the economy from suffering immiserising growth.
Taxation also took the Amazonian economy out of the immiserising growth path. 
According to Chapter 5, the government was able to extract monopoly/oligopoly profits out 
of the rubber chain even in a context of perfect competition in all nodes of the chain 
located within the Brazilian Amazon. Through taxation, the government changed 
incentives to production pushing the Amazonian economy closer to the monopolistic 
position. Institutions, however, constrained the ability of the government to extract all 
possible rents and the resultant political economy of taxation meant that the economy was 
in a suboptimal outcome. The government accumulated considerable wealth that was 
partly redistributed back to the region in form of investments and subsidies. These funds 
were instrumental to develop two supporting activities: telegraphs and steamships.
The present chapter analyses the role of the government in the communications 
sector and the consequent impact on the rubber chain. It is argued that steam navigation 
and telegraphs gave rise to the rubber boom which, in turn, supported even further the
222
development of the (steam) navigation and the telegraphic system. Government 
investment and support was instrumental to the creation of this virtuous cycle that resulted 
in biased integration of the Brazilian Amazon. Based on entirely new data collected in 
London, Rio de Janeiro and Belem, this subject is explored for the first time within the 
Brazilian Amazon context. Even though data here could allow the computation of social 
savings, the chapter will not carry out such analysis, leaving it for future research.352
The Chapter is organised into 6 sections, including this introduction. Section 6.2 
describes the development of the mail and telegraphic communication in the Brazilian 
Amazon, highlighting their reliability, speed and cost. Section 6.3 analyses the evolution of 
ocean navigation, emphasising the introduction of steamship liners and their later 
domination of the trade with Belem and Manaus. The connection between telegraphic 
communication and steamship navigation is also explained. Section 6.4, in turn, reviews 
the development of river and coastal navigation showing that costs were high due to the 
risk of navigation and market power. Section 6.5 then analyses what impact steamships 
and telegraphic communication had upon integration of the region within the Brazilian 
context. Section 6.6 concludes the chapter.
6.2 -  Communication: Mail and Telegraphs
As explained in the introduction, the present chapter analyses the role of the 
government in the communications sector and the consequent impact on the rubber chain. 
As will be shown, government investment, support and regulation was instrumental to the 
creation of a telegraphic and postal system connecting the Brazilian Amazon with the 
main rubber consumer markets and with the Brazilian capital. This communication 
network partly overcame geographical distances. However, despite geographical 
proximity to the USA, throughout the rubber boom the Brazilian Amazon was more directly 
and reliably connected with Europe and Rio de Janeiro than with the USA. As the next
352 Social savings methodology is based on seminal works of Fogel (1964) and (1979). For Brazil, 
there are two interesting references on the subject of social savings brought about by railways: 
Summerhill (2003) and (2005).
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section will show, this bias against the USA also affected the shipping connections 
between the Brazilian Amazon and the main rubber consumers.
The establishment of an organised national postal system in Brazil dates back to 
1808 when the Portuguese Royal family fled from the Napoleon army and transferred the 
capital of the kingdom to Brazil, more precisely to Rio de Janeiro. During their stay, 
several postal lines were opened connecting the hinterlands and some provinces to Rio 
de Janeiro. As a consequence a Postal Administration (not yet fully centralised though) 
was opened on 22nd November 1808. However, the Amazon region still waited 5 more 
years to see the establishment of its postal system: it was initially centred at Sao Luis 
(Maranhao), from which it reached the backlands. Following the defeat of Napoleon, D. 
Joao VI was proclaimed King of Portugal and the capital of the Portuguese Kingdom was 
re-transferred to Lisbon. In 1822, the son of the Portuguese King, D. Pedro, declares 
Brazilian Independence from Portugal being acclaimed Brazilian Emperor but, despite this 
political shift, the organisation of the postal system remained basically unchanged until 
1828 when all postal lines were unified into a single administration placed in Rio de 
Janeiro. In 1842, already under the Second Empire (1840-1889), the Brazilian postal 
system was again reorganised following the English model (imposing pre-payment of 
letters through postal stamps) and in 1877 the country joined the General Postal Union 
that had been established in 1874 (in 1879, this postal agreement became known as 
Universal Postal Union), enabling the country to exchange mail easily with all member 
countries.353
Postal services are important not only because they represent the exchange of 
information but also because their statistics may be used as proxies for income or 
economic activity.354 Even though the thesis does not include an estimation of regional 
income based on such evidence (not least because GDP estimates were already 
computed based on more solid data, as presented in the Appendix), postal services still
353 There are very few information on the origins of the Brazilian Postal System and basically 
nothing on its economic impact. Information here was obtained from Correios (Brazilian postal 
System) website:
http://www.correios.com.br/institucional/conheca correios/historia correios/historia correios brasil 
cfm
354 See for instance Bairoch (1976) and Good (1994).
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provide evidence of increasing economic activity in the Amazon region during the rubber 
boom. From 1870 to 1910, the postal service handled an increasing amount of letters and 
printed matter. By 1906, the post office in Belem received 12,983 and sent 8,834 mail 
packages, transferring additional 2,947 mail packages. In terms of letters, 6,330,531 
letters were handled in Belem, out of which 300,213 were registered without mention of 
value and 8,668 with mention of value. Apart from mails and telegraphs (see below), the 
Brazilian Postal System also performed financial transactions through postal orders (vales 
postais): in 1906 the postal service took charge of 4,865 money orders amounting to 
£42,392 and received 1,637 money orders of total value of £17,424. This increasing mail 
traffic was more and more handled by steamers, making postal services a more efficient, 
reliable and faster means of communication.355
During the rubber boom, land telegraphs356 were mostly managed by the postal 
service but there were also some private companies.357 Telegraphs were established first 
in the capital of the Brazilian Empire and evolved following government’s demands for 
communication among the ministries and main state facilities located there. On 11th May 
1852, the first telegraph line was inaugurated. Managed by Guilherme Schuch, future 
Viscount of Capanema, the line connected the Quinta Imperial to the Quartel do Campo, 
two military facilities in Rio de Janeiro. 358 Three years later, the first inter-city telegraph 
line connecting Rio de Janeiro to Petropolis, the summer capital, was inaugurated, having 
50,630m of cables, of which 14,970m were under water.359 Fostered by the Paraguayan 
War (1865-1870), the Imperial overland telegraph system initially developed faster
355 Album do Estado do Para (1908, pp. 216-217).
356 The discussion here refers to the electrical telegraph only. Optical telegraphs had long been 
operating in Brazil. Their construction followed the arrival of the Portuguese Royal Family in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1808. The first line was opened in 1809 connecting Rio de Janeiro to Cabo Frio. The 
purpose of the line was the communication between these two ports. See Silva and Moreira (2007, 
p. 48).
Most private land telegraphic lines were operated by railway companies. However, in 1896, they 
were all incorporated into the Federal Land Telegraph system. See Berthold (1922a, pp. 21-22).
358 Berthold (1922a, p. 4), Vasconcellos (2002) and Silva and Moreira (2007, pp. 49-51).
359 Actually, Berthold (1922a, p. 5) states that the Rio-Petropolis line was opened in 1858 but Silva 
and Moreira (2007, p. 54) showed that it was inaugurated in 1857 instead. Berthold’s mistake is 
likely to have been originated from the fact that the information he got was obtained from a 1858 
document that referred to the previous year.
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towards the south region of the country360 and only after the war had ended was it slowly 
but continuously extended along the Brazilian coast northwards. In 1874, the cables 
arrived at Salvador (in Bahia) and in 1881, reached Fortaleza (in Ceara). In 1884, the 
connection with Sao Luis (in Maranhao) was established and two years later Belem was 
finally incorporated into the system. 361 In 1891, government telegraph lines began to 
expand towards the hinterland reaching Cuiaba and Corumba. In the following years, 
more precisely from 1907 to 1915, Marshall Rondon installed a connection between the 
Mato-Grosso and the Amazonas States (today Rondonia).362 Therefore, by the end of the 
rubber boom, in 1911, the government overland telegraph system possessed nearly
61.000 kilometres of cables and connected the main cities in Brazil (see Figure 6.1 below). 
As a consequence, the number of messages exchanged soared from 233 in 1861 to
751.000 in 1890 and 3,700,000 in 1912 (see Figure 6.1 below). Despite its rapid growth, 
the development of the telegraph in Brazil seems much less impressive in an international 
perspective. For instance, Argentina, a much smaller albeit richer country, possessed over
200.000 km of wire in 1912 through which 8.6 million telegrams were exchanged. Indeed, 
as early as 1871, more telegrams flowed over national wires in Argentina than in Brazil.363
360 In 1866, the line connecting Rio de Janeiro to Porto Alegre (located at the South of the Brazilian 
territory) was opened. See Berthold (1922a, p. 7) and Figure 6.2 further below.
361 Berthold (1922a, p. 7-9) and Vasconcellos (2002).
362 Diacon (2004, pp. 19-51). The line connected Cuiaba (and consequently Rio de Janeiro) to 
Madeira River, an important waterway for Acrean and Bolivian rubber production.
363 Berthold (1922b, pp. 7; 37).
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Figure 6.1: Kilometres of Wire and Number of Telegrams Sent, Brazilian 
Government Land System, 1881-1912
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Source: elaborated from Berthold (1922a, pp. 16; 30). Number of telegrams for 1896 and 1897 were estimated based on the 
trend between 1895 and 1898. The decline in number of messages in 1895 seems to be derived from the change in the way 
the tariff was computed with additional cost for messages crossing States. See Berthold (1922a, p. 24).
In parallel to the government overland telegraph system, private enterprises were 
also granted permission from the government to operate in Brazil, giving rise to competing 
lines as well as different routes, especially through submarine cables.364 In January 1873, 
the Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co. was established aiming to connect Brazil with 
Europe. Later that year, the first section of the Atlantic cable (620 miles) was already laid 
from Lisbon (Carcavellos) to Madeira and in the following year, the remaining two sections, 
Madeira-St. Vincent (Cape Verde Islands, measuring 1,260 miles) and St. Vincent-Recife 
(in Pernambuco -  Brazil, measuring 1,830 miles) were completed, opening the traffic 
between Brazil and Europe in June 1874. This system was placed in communication with
364 The Brazilian submarine telegraph expansion should be viewed in the context of worldwide 
expansion of this means of communication. For instance, see Headrick and Griset (2001).
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Great Britain by means of the Eastern Company’s line from Lisbon to Porthcumo.365 
Indeed, an agreement had been signed with Eastern Telegraph Co. that provided full 
access to their lines, putting Brazil already in connection with China, Japan and Australia 
as well.366 Due to increasing traffic, the sections Lisbon-Madeira and Madeira-St. Vincent- 
Recife were duplicated in 1882 and 1884, respectively.367 However, there was initially no 
direct connection to the United States and the flow of messages had to go to England first 
to be then retransmitted to the USA.
The connection from Recife to the rest of Brazil, and especially to Belem (Para), 
was initially set up by the Western and Brazilian Telegraph Co. which was incorporated 
with the purpose of laying cables connecting the main ports of Brazil and worked in unison 
with the Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co.368 The connection between Para and Rio de 
Janeiro, along the Brazilian coast, was initially supposed to have only three sections: Para 
to Pernambuco, Pernambuco to Salvador (Bahia) and Bahia to Rio de Janeiro. However, 
when the cables were laid in 1873, another station was included, Sao Luis in 
Maranhao.369 The cables had a total length of 2,500 nautical miles and did not suit very 
well the topography of the Brazilian coast, especially in the northern section. As the cables 
were laid in shallow waters, they were particularly subject to fish attacks.370 Therefore, 
even though by 1873 Para was already connected to the capital of the Brazilian Empire, 
Rio de Janeiro, the connection was still unreliable.371
In the following year, the submarine cables were extended southwards from Rio de 
Janeiro to Rio Grande do Sul, touching Santos and Florianopolis. In 1875, the cables
365 Baglehole (1970, pp. 6-7) and Ahvenainen (2004, p. 95).
366 Ahvenainen (2004, p. 96) and Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co., Report of the Directors, 1973. 
The agreement with Eastern Telegraph Co. was facilitated by the fact that the same investor was 
behind both companies, John Pender. Therefore, submarine cables in Brazil should be regarded in 
this more comprehensive expansionary plan of the Eastern Telegraph Group around the globe.
367 Baglehole (1970, p. 7). The duplication of the Recife-Lisbon line was probably due to the 
several small interruptions in the flow of messages. After the company decided to lay a new cable, 
two major disruptions occurred: from 22nd September 1883 to 4th December 1883, and from 2nd to 
28th of March 1884. See Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co., Report of the Directors, 27th October 
1882, 4th May 1883, 26th October 1883, 23rd April 1884 and 31st October 1884.
368 Both concessions (Portugal-Brazil and along the Brazilian coast) were owned by the same 
group of investors who had John Pender as the central figure. See Ahvenainen (2004, pp. 65-66).
369 Ahvenainen (2004, pp. 67-68; 79).
370 Bright (1898, 124-125).
371 For instance, in 1884 the Commercial Association of Para complained about the unreliability of 
the submarine telegraphic system as well as about the delays in establishing the connection via 
land through the government overland telegraph system. Commercio do Para (1884, p. 12).
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were extended even further down to Montevideo, via Chui.372 From Montevideo to Buenos 
Aires, there were two competing lines that were both absorbed later by the Western and 
Brazilian Telegraph Co. From Buenos Aires, there was a land connection to Valparaiso 
(on the Chilean coast), which, in turn, was to be soon connected to Chorillos, near Lima, 
Peru, in 1876. In 1882, this connection was extended by the Central and South American 
Telegraph Co., reaching the west coast of the United States, and thence the US land 
telegraph system.
Therefore, as shown in Figure 6.2 below, in 1882 Para and the rest of Brazil was 
connected to the USA only via Europe or Argentina. Therefore, regarding communication, 
the Brazilian Amazon was closer to Europe, notably to Great Britain and Portugal, and Rio 
than to the United States, despite the fact that the (navigating) distance between Belem 
and Rio was nearly the same as between Belem and New York. The distance between 
Belem and Liverpool was almost twice as large.
372 Baglehole (1970, p. 7).
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Figure 6.2: Main Telegraph Connections in 1882
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Source: elaborated by me. The m ap was drawn using modern borders. Moreover, it only shows approximate location of 
main cities and cable nodes. Note that in 1882, Belem was only connected via submarine cables, as the land connection 
was only established in 1886. See text for details.
There had been a connection between Belem and New York (by the Central 
American Telegraph Co.) which was nonetheless discontinued in 1876, following only two 
years of troublesome operation. This line was successfully completed only in 1891 by a 
French company. La Societe Frangaise de Telegraphes Sous-Marins laid out cables 
connecting Para (and by extension the rest of Brazil) to the Central American and North 
American systems. This company connected the French West Indies to Cuba and thence 
to the United States (from where messages could be sent via the inter-Atlantic systems)
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but also laid out cables from French Guyana to Viseu/Salinas (in Para, Brazil) which, in 
turn, was connected to Belem (and the rest of Brazil) via land lines. 373 This new 
connection Para-United States put the region in a doubly-secure position in regard to its 
communication with Europe since in case of problems with the connection through Recife, 
communication with Europe could flow via the United States.
In October 1892, another route between Brazil and Europe was opened as the 
Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co. started to face competition from the South American 
Cable Co. which laid out a competing cable, connecting Recife to Senegal (touching 
Fernando de Noronha Island) and thence to Canary Islands, Gibraltar, Vigo and finally 
Great Britain.374
By the early 1890s Belem was connected to Rio via submarine cables and an 
overland system. Along the way both routes touched Recife which was the hub that 
connected Brazil to Europe. The United States, in turn, could then be finally reached 
directly via the French cables in the Caribbean even though that route was somewhat 
problematic as messages were sent through several different telegraphic systems before 
reaching their final destination.375 Therefore, the connection with the United States was 
still less reliable than the connections with Rio de Janeiro and Europe, not least because 
these latter routes were eventually doubled and/or tripled. Different routes could be used 
to reach one specific destination in case of technical problems: for instance, the United 
States could also be reached through Europe and through Argentina whereas, conversely, 
Europe could be reached through two different companies as well as via the United States. 
However, connection to the Amazonian hinterland still needed to be carried out.
In this regard, in 1895 the Western Brazilian Telegraph Co. through a subsidiary, 
known as the Amazon Telegraph Co., connected Belem to Manaus. The total length of the 
cables was over 1,300 nautical miles and most of this system was placed on the Amazon
373 Bright (1898, pp. 137-140).
374 Ahvenainen (2004, p. 207) and Bright (1898, p. 133).
375 Bright (1898, p. 138). Furthermore, the topography of the Caribbean was not very suited for 
submarine cables, causing constant interruptions too.
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river bed. The line, however, suffered from constant problems376, especially in the upper 
waters as currents and debris scoured out the bottom, leaving the cable unburied in 
places. The solution was to bury the cable even deeper although this usually brought 
difficulties and delays when repairs were taken. The connection to other Amazonian 
outposts was made by wireless stations, established in 1900s.
Figure 6.3 -  The Eastern Telegraph Co. Submarine System in 1901
Z A B 2 1 £ K  T L L M  HATH  €?* S Y S Y i *  AfCD IT S  &BH XSA L C<oWff.C! flO S S .
Source: Eastern Telegraph Com pany System Map from A.B.C. Telegraphic Code 5th Edition. Available at:
http://www.atlantic-cable.com/Maps/index.htm.
During the last 10 years of the rubber boom, 1900-1910, the reliability and the 
speed of the system improved even further. In 1900, in order to speed up the traffic from 
Belem to Europe, a cable was laid connecting Belem straight to Recife.377 Additionally, a
376 For instance, in 1900, the British Consul stated that the telegraph line between Bel6m and 
Manaus had been repaired in the spring of 1889 after two years of interruption. See UK Diplomatic 
and Consular Report, Annual Series, n. 2580, Brazil, Report for the Year 1900 on the Trade of 
ParP and District.
377 As explained earlier, the connection between Recife and Belem was not direct (there was an 
original station in Sao Luis, see Figure 6.2) and a station in Fortaleza was added some time after 
1873. See Lesage (1915, p. 108).
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third cable was laid between Recife and Rio de Janeiro (the second cable had been laid in 
1891-1892). The consequence was that in 1900, some 75,000 telegrams were received or 
sent in Para and 1907 this amount had jumped to more than 80,000 telegrams.378
In sum, by 1913 Para had access to several telegraphic systems: 1) the French 
Cable, Compagnie de Cables Frangais Telegraphiques, from Para to Cayene, connecting 
with Haiti and New York; 2) the Western Telegraph Company 379, from Para to 
Pernambuco, St. Vincent and Lisbon, and also coastwise to Buenos Aires and Valparaiso; 
3) the South American Cable Company Ltd, from Para to Pernambuco by landlines and 
cable, thence to Fernando de Noronha Island, Dakar and thence to Cadiz; 4) the German 
Cable Company (Deutsch-Sudamerikanische Telegraphengesellschaft)380, from Para to 
Pernambuco by cable and land lines, thence to Monrovia, Dakar and Brest; 5) the 
Amazon Telegraph Company, stations at Para, Santarem and Manaus; 6 ) the 
Government overland telegraph system, coastwise from Para to Rio Grande do Sul and 
Salinas (via Rio de Janeiro); 7) Braganga Railway Company, from Para to Braganga; 8) 
Wireless telegraphic communication to Santarem, Manaus, Sena Madureira (in Acre 
Territory), Cruzeiro do Sul (Acre), Tarauaca (Acre), Rio Branco (Acre), Porto Velho and 
Xapury. 381
This development of the overland telegraphic system was initially a government 
driven enterprise following the need of the state to exercise a tighter control over the 
region. Politically, a civil war (1835-1840) in Para had evinced the weakness of the central 
government’s control over the region and the Paraguayan War (1865-1870) did the same 
in regard to the central region of Brazil, especially in the Mato Grosso Province/State. 
Indeed, the telegraph was promptly used by the Brazilian government for political reasons, 
not least as a weapon of war. As mentioned earlier, the telegraph developed faster as a 
consequence of wars (especially the Paraguayan War). During a Revolution in Rio
378 Para (1908, p. 216).
379 This company was the result of the merge of the Western and Brazilian Telegraph Co. and the 
Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co. that took place in 1899. See Baglehole (1978, p. 12).
380 This connection was established only after the rubber boom, in 1911, and then the interest on 
its impacts for the purpose of the paper here is more limited. For a discussion on the German 
telegraphic cables to Brazil, see Lesage (1915).
381 See United Kingdom Diplomatic and Consular Reports, Brazil, Reports for the years 1910-12 
and part of 1913 on the Trade of Para, n. 5262, Annual Series, March 1914.
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Grande do Sul, the most southern State of Brazil, the government censored and 
controlled the flow of messages via the Western Telegraph cables.382 Moreover, with the 
telegraphic system, the central government became more accutely aware of Amazonian 
needs, enabling it to react more promptly. Government directives could arrive at Para 
quicker, limiting the possibility of conflicting policies between the central and the 
Provincial/State governments. The flow of news also became a reality as the region 
became more aware of what was going on in other regions of the country (as well as in 
other countries) . 383 Analogously, other regions became more aware of what was 
happening there, and news of the rubber boom would attract people from other parts of 
the country, notably from Ceara Province/State. In communications as a whole, the 
government acted proactively: the state was at the same time regulator and provider of 
services.
However, the development of the telegraphic system was also supported and 
fostered by domestic and foreign business groups that foresaw the usefulness of the 
communication system to enhance trade activities.384 In this regard, one aspect that has 
been overlooked by the literature is precisely the importance of the telegraphic system in
382 The Revolt known as Revolugao Federalista (Federalist Revolution) lasted from Feb. 1893 to 
Aug 1895. Several letters sent to Western Telegraph Co. by the Directoria Geral dos Telegraphos 
(Brazilian National Telegraph Administration) show that the government enmeshed with the 
Company’s businesses. The government ordered the closure of the telegraph line connecting that 
province and or censured the messages wired. See for instance the letters dated 21st July 1893, 
29th July 1893, 6th September 1893, 19th September 1893 and 30th September 1893.
383 From newspapers, it is possible to see that after the telegraph, the news arrived in Belem with 
fewer lags. Moreover, arrival of ships were constantly cabled to and advertised in Belem and banks 
based their exchange rates on Rio de Janeiro quotes. There must be no doubt about the 
importance of the telegraph for the rubber trade. For instance according to Pearson (1911, p. 42),
“During the crop season in Para the operators are in constant communication with 
their principals in Europe and America, and in semi-constant touch with their houses 
in Manaos.Each company has its own cipher. None of them know each other's 
cipher; whether they know the rest of their numerals, it is hard to say. ”
Pearson makes direct reference to telegraphs and indirectly emphasises the continuing lack of 
communication between Manaus and Belem. For instance, Weinstein (1983, p. 204) quotes 
Augusto de Montenegro, governor of Para, who a little bit earlier, in 1902, claimed
“(...) that Manaus’s lack of proper storage facilities and unreliable telegraphic 
connections had led to a highly damaging accumulation of stocks, and a general 
disequilibrium in the rubber trade -  a view seconded by the Commercial Association 
of Para”
384 See Ridings (1983).
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the development of steam navigation in the same way as it did with railways. This aspect 
is particularly important for the Amazon region because rivers were the main trade routes 
as the geography of the region prevented the development of a large railway system. It is 
important then to understand the relationship between telegraphs and shipping, especially 
in the Amazonian context.
6.3 -  Ocean Navigation
Steamships preceded the telegraphs in most international routes (not so much in 
the rubber trade though) and consequently time savings had sometimes been achieved 
before the spread of transatlantic telegraphic communication from the 1870s onwards.385 
However, telegraphs provided the basis for the further development of steamship 
navigation. Telegraphs meant that the owners of a cargo ship could communicate with a 
captain whenever a ship reached a port, and shippers could keep track of their shipments. 
Since steamships were very costly to build and operate, cable communication would then 
allow profitability as ships could be continuously transporting full loads of cargo. Moreover, 
the idle time at a certain port could be minimised. Without a cable connection in the port, it 
would have been difficult for ship owners to maximise their profitability and hence less 
steamships would have touched that port. Ultimately, telegraphs would cause or 
strengthen a declining trend in freight rates. Even though the relationship between 
telegraphs and freights have not yet been established quantitatively386, freight rates 
declined concomitantly with the development of submarine telegraphy.
For instance, North shows that freights declined from 1870/3 to 1908/9, with the 
trend being particularly important in long haul routes. As will be shown here, this decline 
did not happen in the Brazilian rubber trade as nominal freight rates were slightly higher in 
1910 compared to 1870. Indeed, North did not evaluate the rubber trade as his ocean
385 See, for instance, Kaukiainen (2001).
386 The only quantitative work on this relationship is that of Lew and Cater (2006). The authors 
establish this causality through a gravity model which has the number of telegrams as one of the 
explanatory variables. They found that the telegraph is strongly correlated with trade expansion 
before the First World War. However interesting their results are, they need to be taken with 
caution as they did not use the number of telegrams sent to the trading partner but rather the total 
number of telegrams handled by the country’s network.
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shipping routes were concentrated in a few bulk commodities: coal, wheat, timber and 
sugar. Due to their low value, North’s freight factors (freight rate divided by commodity CIF 
price) were usually very high in stark contrast with rubber freight factor: this commodity 
was so expensive that its freight factor was very low indeed. Whereas the freight factor 
could have been as high as 50% in the case of timber, in rubber it was often below 1%. 
Finally, North states that the ocean freight market was generally very competitive.387 As 
will be shown here, the rubber trade did not show too much competition as one company 
(Booth Line) held a large market share of rubber shipments. Despite contemporary outcry 
against monopolisation of the overseas shipping in the Brazilian Amazon388, there is 
evidence that the company may not have been able to enjoy substantial oligopolistic 
profits due to market contestability.
Several other studies have reached a similar conclusion to North389: they suggest 
that freights were decreasing from 1870 to 1910. For instance, Harley shows that freights 
decreased rapidly after the 1860s due to mechanical and metallurgical advances in 
shipping. Therefore, Harley challenges North’s assumptions that the declining in freights 
was due to organisational changes.390 Shah Mohammed and Williamson confirm a sharp 
fall in freights for the period 1869-1913 whereas Jacks suggests that shipping costs fell 
throughout the nineteenth century.391 Most of these papers rely on the famous Isserlis 
Index for British freight rates that is criticised on the basis of being constructed from ex- 
ante published rates (instead of actual price paid for the service), integrating sail and 
steam, and depending on ad hoc weighting.392
The shipping literature does not provide the basis for explaining shipping in the 
Brazilian Amazon even though the results here will strengthen Harley’s conclusions about
387 North (1958).
388 For instance, the British Consul in Para stated in 1912 that
“There is, therefore, now no competition in the overseas traffic between Manaos and 
Para and Europe and the United States. Return fares and other reductions have been 
abolished, and the regular services made less frequent, as noticed above".
389 North (1958).
390 See Harley (1988). See also Harley (1970) and Harley (1980).
391 Shah Mohammed and Williamson (2004) and Jacks (2005).
392 Isserlis (1938). For criticisms on this index see Armstrong (1994), Kaukiainen (1990), Yasuba 
(1978) and Brautaset and Graffe (2006).
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the transatlantic meat trade: rubber trade was also dominated by liners, ensuring orderly 
distribution and economies of scale.393 As a consequence of the increasing demand for 
raw rubber, the further development of commerce in the Brazilian Amazon required the 
establishment of a reliable overseas transport system. A few steamship liners would come 
to dominate the trade impacting on freight rates and travel time between Belem/Manaus 
and the rest of the world. Hitherto, the region had been historically more connected with 
foreign countries than with the rest of Brazil, due to maritime currents and winds but 
steamships would overcome natural boundaries decreasing travel time for all routes and 
markedly for those routes along the Brazilian coast. 394 Like telegraphs, steamship 
navigation was initially driven by the government, which offered subsidies to shipping 
companies.395 Shipping was developed even further by national and foreign business 
groups.
Around the 1850s, the Amazonian economy was incipient being concentrated 
more and more on the collection of products from the Amazon forest, notably rubber. 
Products that had played an important role in the past, such as sugar and cotton, were 
declining396 and thus the ocean traffic reflected exactly that. The Amazonian trade lacked 
dynamism and then a few small ships per year generated and sustained the poor 
development of the region’s export sector. Figure 6.4 shows that until the 1850s, usually 
less than 100 ocean vessels touched the Port of Belem per year whose average 
registered capacity, albeit increasing, was still very limited. In 1860s, the average size of
^  Harley (2008).
394 It should be mentioned the difficulty imposed by Nature onto sailing vessels exploring the 
Brazilian North coast. Winds usually pushed ships westwards or southwards causing vessels 
coming from East to West (or from Recife towards Amazon River, see Figure 6.2) to speed up their 
voyage or crash into the coast whereas vessels coming from Amazon to Recife would speed up 
their voyage taking their way to Europe and then back to Brazil. Furthermore, even if they 
succeeded in arriving at Recife, winds and maritime currents were favourable to head south only 
from April to July until Cabo Frio (close to Rio de Janeiro, see Figure 6.2).
395 See next section for details on shipping along domestic routes.
396 See, for instance, Baena (1915, pp. 29-31). Anderson (1976, pp. 63-69) further shows that, 
despite the increase in the production of rubber from 1870 to 1910, the region increased the 
production of several other articles even if less than proportionately. More specifically, he shows 
that there is no statistical relashionship between production of rubber and agricultural goods to 
substantiate the thesis that rubber was ruining agriculture. Therefore, it is true that in relative terms 
the production of everything else was basically declining over time but given the spectacular rise in 
rubber production, it cannot be inferred that the production of other articles of trade was declining in 
absolute terms as some contemporaries had claimed. In this regard, see for example the Falla 
(Speech) of Sebastiao do Rego Barros, president of the Province of Para, dated 15th August 1854.
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the ships increased, though the number of vessels entering the port of Belem remained 
relatively the same. However, although it is difficult to draw the order of causation, with the 
arrival of the cable system in Belem, in 1870s the annual traffic of ocean vessels jumped 
to 250-350 ships per year while their registered capacity continued to increase. These two 
factors are clearly connected: the telegraph fostered commerce (and consequently 
shipping) at the same time that commerce had demanded a telegraph system. As a result, 
by 1911, 320 Ocean vessels entered the port of Belem and their average registered 
capacity was 13 times higher than the average registered capacity in 1851. Table 6.4 
highlights the increasing transatlantic traffic brought about by the Amazonian rubber boom 
from 1870 to 1910.
Figure 6.4 -  Return of Ocean Vessels Entering the Port of Belem, selected years
Years Total Number of Vessels
Registered
Tons
Average Size 
of Vessels
N. of Ocean 
Vessels
Registered
Tons
Average Size 
of Ocean 
Vessels
1836-1837 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 13,843 138
1840-1841 n.a. n.a. n.a. 88 13,543 154
1850-1851 n.a. n.a. n.a. 84 14,701 175
1861 n.a. n.a. n.a. 116 72,406 624
1871 380 209,327 551 260 140,472 540
1881 n.a. n.a. n.a. 311 225,484 725
1891 410 472,257 1,152 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1901 649 690,992 1,065 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1902 725 772,612 1,066 252 323,617 1,284
1911 n.a. n.a. n.a. 320 733,862 2,293
1912 933 1,157,766 1,241 269 654,023 2,431
Source: UK Diplomatic and Consular Reports, several issues, n.a. = not available.
Perhaps more important than the number of vessels and their increasing size is 
the fact that the proportion of the trade carried by steamships increased over time and 
sailing boats had virtually disappeared by 1910. In 1875, 213 ships entered the Port of 
Belem, of which 50% were steamers.397 Twenty years later, steamships outnumbered 
sailing boats by 294 units: while 399 Ocean steamers entered the port of Belem, only 105
397 UK Diplomatic and Consular Reports, Report by the Acting-Consul Brocklehurst on the Trade 
and Commerce of Para for the Year 1876.
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Ocean Sailing vessels did in the same year.398 In 1912, 6 sailing boats entered that port 
against 927 steamships.399 Therefore, steamships and sailing vessels competed for the 
Amazonian trade and in view of higher operation costs (notably in a region that lacked 
coal), steamships were in a disadvantageous position especially before the advent of 
telegraphs. Up to around 1900, sailing ships still had a cost advantage vis-a-vis steamers 
and thus whenever speed was not crucial, traders would still prefer sailing ships for bulk, 
low value, cargo. Only with the increasing size of the vessels, steamers were able to 
generate enough economies of scale that shrank freight differentials, displacing sailing 
vessels altogether from the trade. Moreover, at first sailing ships were quite 
complementary to steamship navigation insofar as they were usually bringing coal to the 
region and leaving in ballast for the West Indies to seek homeward cargo. For instance, 
for the Booth Steamship Co.,
“[i]t had been unprofitable to carry coal to Para in 1880s for 20s. a ton, 
but in 1900 this was performed for 15s. 6d. and to Manaus -  900 miles 
upriver -  for 18s. 6d. In 1911, these rates were, respectively, 13s. and 
18s. and to Iquitos, some 6,100 miles from Liverpool, 40s. a ton. In that 
year, coal f.o.b. Cardiff at 15s. 3d. a ton was delivered at Para for 38s.
(including port duties and discharging expenses), Manaus 42s. 11d. and 
Iquitos 68s. a ton.”400
As a result of the introduction of steamships in the overseas trade, the travel time 
between Belem and the major international and national ports significantly decreased: for 
instance, the travel time of 40 to 60 days between Para and Lisbon was reduced to 11
398 UK Diplomatic and Consular Reports n. 2140 (Annual Series), Brazil -  Report for the Year 1897 
on the trade of Para and District.
399 UK Diplomatic and Consular Reports n. 5262 (Annual Series), Brazil -  Report for the Years 
1910-1912 on the trade of Para.
400 John (1959, p. 93).
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days by 1893.401 Steamships would add another feature to the Amazonian trade: 
regularity.
Regularity was ensured by the dominance of the trade by large steam liners. The 
most important company was undoubtedly the Booth Line, later reorganised as the Booth 
Steamship Co. In 1866, the company started operating a line connecting Liverpool to Para 
(Belem), calling at Lisbon, Ceara and Maranhao. Initially the round voyage of 9,500 miles 
took three months, of which sixty days were spent at sea. The cost of the trip was £1,850 
in total (£329 for port charges and £498 for provisions) and subsequent voyage costs 
appear to have been a third higher (with the proportions of the various components 
remaining roughly constant).402
Until the end of the seventies, freight carried by the Booth Line reflected the 
economic conditions of the region: it did not increase greatly and the basis of trade relied 
on cotton and sugar shipments from Ceara and Maranhao, with only occasionally nuts, 
drugs and rubber providing higher revenue than cotton.403 From mid-seventies onwards, 
rubber became the main article of trade: not only was its price increasing fast, so that the 
high freight rates were at least decreasing per value of the merchandise but, as raw 
rubber also experienced important loss of weight during travel, speed was crucial. For 
instance, raw rubber from the Acre region lost 4.1% of its weight from the producing 
region to Belem. From other regions of Para, it lost around 2.5% of its weight in transit to 
Belem 404 Thus, the sooner the product reached the final buyer, the highest the profit from 
the trade that could have been accrued.
Initially, the Booth Line faced competition from two companies: R. Singlehurst & 
Co. (Red Cross Co.) and the Maranhao Steamship Co. However, the company reached 
an agreement with both of them in 1871 by which the Red Cross Line and the Booth Line 
integrated their Liverpool departures and also established a common list of freight and 
passenger rates. The Maranhao Steamship Co., in turn, was given the exclusive rights to
401 Albuquerque (1894, p. 4).
402 John (1959, p. 54).
403 John (1959, p. 56).
404 Coelho (1982, p. 61, Table 7). Data originally from Relatorio da Alfandega do Para ao Ministro 
da Fazenda, em 31 de marco de 1905, referente aos trabalhos desta alfandega durante o ano de 
1904.
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trade with Maranhao Province and, in exchange, its steamers would not extend their 
voyage up to the Amazon region anymore. As a result of the agreement, freight rates 
increased by 25%. The highest freight rates were for rubber which during the seventies 
brought in between 45s. and 47s. per ton measurement.405
In 1880, an even more rigid timetable of ships was enforced, including the cabling 
of departure dates from foreign ports. Additionally, in the early 1880s as another sign of 
the development of the rubber boom in the Amazon, the Booth Company separated the 
Para trade from the other Brazilian routes and added other routes connecting Para to New 
York, Antwerp and Hamburg. These two last destinations were added in order to forestall 
competition from a proposed German company and from the French Lines (Chargeurs 
Reunis and Compagnie Postale Transatlantique) 406
In 1897 two new companies were trying to establish themselves in the Amazonian 
trade: ‘La Ligure Brasiliana’ and ‘Andresen’. The former was an Italian concern that 
operated a line connecting Manaus to Genoa, calling at Santarem, 6 bidos, Belem, 
Madeira, Lisbon, Tangier, Barcelona and Marseille. From 1897 to 1899 the company 
transported 5,666 passengers in its transatlantic line and 1,608 passengers in the route 
Belem-Manaus-Belem. The company also carried 27,412 tons of merchandise in the 
transatlantic trade in the same period.407 The Portuguese Aviador House Andresen, from 
Porto, also opened a steamship line (from 1,500 to 1,700 tons of capacity) connecting 
Oporto to Manaus. The reaction of the Booth line to these two competitors was to wage a 
price war.
Therefore, the Booth Line was maintaining its leading position in the Amazonian 
trade by threatening possible competitors, cartelising the trade and merging with 
competing firms. For instance, when Red Cross Line first opened its service to the 
Brazilian Amazon, the first reaction of the Booth Line was to reduce freights and 
passenger fares to make its threat credible. This would either force the competing 
shipping company out of the trade (as it did with the French Lines) or compel it to enter
405 John (1959, pp. 60-62).
406 John (1959, pp. 65-67; 88-89).
407 Caccavoni (1900, p. 60).
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into an agreement with the Booth Line (as happened with Red Cross, the Maranhao 
Steamship Co. and the German Lines). The Booth Line also resorted to 
amalgamation/merger in order to preserve its leading position especially when the 
Company feared that some competitor could buy out the Singlehurst family’s shares (the 
biggest shareholders) in the Red Cross Line when the senior partners gave signs that 
they wanted to retire. In 1901, an agreement was reached between the two companies by 
which the Booth and the Red Cross Lines would be amalgamated under the new Booth 
Steamship Co. Ltd. with a capital of £550,000 and a total fleet capacity of 65,000 gross 
tons. 408 Shortly afterwards, the interests of the Maranhao Steamship Co. Ltd were 
acquired (but no ships) and so was the Amazon Tug and Lighterage Co.409 The Company 
would keep increasing its shipping capacity as by 1910, at the peak of the rubber boom, 
its overall gross tonnage reached 125,603 tons (excluding the tonnage of the Booth 
Iquitos Line).
In parallel, the Booth Steamship Co. also expanded its interests in the Amazon 
region. First, the Company held from 1897 to 1901 a quarter share in a very profitable 
venture, the Empreza Line, which ran a shipping service along the Brazilian coast. Other 
important moves of the Company were the acquisition of a substantial holding in the 
Amazon River Steam Navigation Co. and the incorporation of the Booth Iquitos Steamship 
Co. Ltd. operating a new line connecting Iquitos (in Peru) to Liverpool.410 Additionally, the 
Booth Steamship Co also held, for a period, a controlling interest in the Manaos Harbour 
Ltd., a company incorporated to improve and manage the Port of Manaus 411
The extent of Booth’s market power can be grasped from its market shares. In 
1907, the company transported to Europe 7,445 tons of rubber and to the United States, 
8,254 tons. This is equivalent to 43% of all rubber exported from Brazil (36,490 tons412) in
4UB John (1959, p. 96).
409 Heaton (1987, p. 24).
410 Heaton (1987, pp. 21-22).
411 John (1959, p. 100).
412 Brasil (1987, p. 309).
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1907 and to 49.3% of the rubber exported from the Amazon region (32,532 tons413) in that 
same year. Its market share in passenger traffic was even larger: in 1907 the company 
transported 4,396 passengers in several lines, equivalent to 71.3% of total regional 
transatlantic passenger traffic. In this very same year, the Company registered £197,319 
profit from steamers and other accounts and a total profit of £211,799 that after charging 
£18,000 Interest on Debenture Stock, debiting the Directors’ and Trustees’ Fees and 
writing off depreciation of the ships and other property resulted in a net profit of 
£70,557.414
As emphasised by Wallerstein and discussed in Chapter 1, monopoly and 
competition are useful concepts to analyse the distribution of profits along the chain. In 
overseas shipping, the Booth Co. might have extracted substantial monopoly/oligopoly 
profits. However, the ability of the company to do so was somewhat limited by 
contestability of the market. This was especially true in the passenger market as the 
elasticity of travel to passenger fare was probably much higher than the elasticity of 
rubber shipments to freight costs.
Through several devices, the Booth Steamship Co. succeeded in maintaining a 
leading position in the overseas trade between Amazonian ports and the industrialised 
countries, notably Britain. Nonetheless, as explained here, this leading position did not 
remain uncontested and several competing companies appeared, implying that the ability 
of the Booth Steamship Co. to manipulate freight rates and passenger fares was limited to 
a certain extent. In order to preserve its market share the company also threatened 
competitors and open new lines, as the one connecting Belem to New York. Even though 
the United States were the main consumer market for crude rubber, there were more 
regular steamships running from Belem to Liverpool than to New York, possibly due to the 
lack of a reliable telegraph system along the second route. As emphasised earlier on here, 
steamships were costly to build and operate and the lack of a reliable cable
413 For Acre: 11.192 tons, see LeCointe (1922, pp. 433-444); for Para: 10.415 tons, see Weinstein 
(1983, p. 271) and; for Amazonas: 10.924 tons, see LeCointe (1922, p. 433). See Appendix for 
further data on the rubber trade.
414 From Booth Stemaship Co. Ltd. 1907 Report of the Directors.
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communication between Belem and New York might explain why most of the trade 
between these two cities was carried out in sailing vessels at first, and by a single 
steamship line later.
In terms of freight rates, by 1910, the Booth Co. was charging 50 shillings per ton 
of rubber transported from Belem to Liverpool415 compared to 46 shillings in the 1870s416. 
Thus even though the nominal freight rate increased over time, as a proportion of the 
price of crude rubber it decreased substantially as the value of that commodity was 
increasing very rapidly during this period: from £267 per ton in 1870 to £801 in 1910 on 
average417. The transport cost from Belem to Liverpool was thus equivalent to 0.9% of the 
CIF price of rubber in 1870 compared to 0.3% in 1910, meaning that the Booth Steamship 
Co. might have been able to extract part of the profits accrued by the rubber sector 
through increasing nominal freight rates (in a context of decreasing operational costs) 
which in consequence were the result of its high market power in shipping and the 
inelasticity of rubber, as computed in Chapter 2. However, probably due to contestability, 
freight rate adjustments were not able to keep up with the pace of the increasing price of 
crude rubber. The same might have happened with passenger fares: the first class trip 
from Manaus to Liverpool was quoted at £24 2s. 9p. in 1884418 and £30 in 1910419. Again 
the Booth Line was able to exercise its oligopoly power to ensure an increasing nominal 
fare in a context of possibly decreasing operational costs.
In sum, it is difficult to establish a causal relationship between telegraphs and 
ocean shipping. However, they were symbiotic: telegraphs decreased freight rates by 
allowing minimisation of travel costs whereas shipping increased the economies of scale 
and profitability of the telegraphic network. In the case of the Brazilian Amazon, 
telegraphs strengthened the dominance of the rubber trade by large steam liners, 
ensuring regularity, speed and economies of scale. The regulatory framework (institutions) 
was instrumental by allowing the exploration of the ocean traffic by foreign business
415 L’Etat du Para a Turin (1911, p. 44).
416 John (1959, p. 62).
417 Brasil (1987, p. 309), prices are CIF. See also Appendix for further data.
418 Loureiro (1989, p. 160) converted into pounds using the exchange rate presented in the
du Para a Turin (1911, p. 42).
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Appendix 
41^  L’Etat
groups which possessed far more capital and knowledge of the business compared to 
domestic business groups. Although this regulatory framework also allowed foreign 
business groups in routes on the Amazon river and its main tributaries, it usually forbade 
their participation in coastal shipping as next section shows.
6.4 -  River and Coastal Navigation
Throughout the rubber boom, the Brazilian central government only allowed 
foreign vessels to carry out coastal shipping for a brief period of time, at the end of the 
Empire and in the very first years of the Republic. The biggest company in this business 
was the Lloyd Brasileiro, a government owned company that ran several services lines 
connecting the main coastal cities in Brazil with the La Plata estuary and the United States. 
The company possessed 62 steamers, totalling 108,000 tons of capacity (as of 1907)420, 
and constantly suffered from financial problems. The internal management, usually 
delegated to political proteges, was certainly to blame.421
The Lloyd Brasileiro had two steamship lines connecting Manaus to Rio de Janeiro. 
The first one was a ‘fast service’ that ran twice, or sometimes three times, a month and 
touched at the ports of Belem, Sao Luis, Fortaleza, Natal, Cabedello, Recife, Maceio, 
Salvador and Vitoria covering some 2,369 miles in about 9 to 10 days. Even though the 
ships were usually in good condition, according to a contemporary, the company was not 
able to cope with the increasing demand in passenger traffic.422 The second line, the ‘slow 
service’, ran in the same route but touched some additional ports along the way, such as 
Tutoya (in Maranhao), Santarem, 6 bidos, Parintins and Itacoatiara. Due to the 
employment of old ships on this line and to the increased loading and unloading times, the 
trip from Rio to Manaus usually took around 18 days. In 1914, a first class ticket in the 
routes Belem-Rio and Manaus-Rio was 259$ (£19) and 363$ (£22 7s. 7d.), respectively 
whereas the first class passenger fare between Belem and Manaus reached 102$ (or £6 
5s. 9d.).
420 Album do Estado do Para (1908, p. 284).
421 LeCointe (1922, pp. 250-255).
422 LeCointe (1922, pp. 251-252).
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Coastal navigation performed a commercially important role, connecting Para to 
other regions in Brazil, especially to Rio de Janeiro. However, more important than the 
coastal navigation was undoubtedly the river navigation which, as seen in the first chapter, 
was at the heart of the transportation system of the region. Because of the denseness and 
extensiveness of the Amazon forest, rivers were the fastest and easiest way to reach the 
hinterland, providing a communication system between Belem (in Para) and Bolivia, Peru, 
Colombia, Venezuela and central Brazil. Rubber production mimicked early 
Portuguese/Brazilian territorial expansion in the region insofar as rubber estates spread 
along the Amazon River and its tributaries, turning them the main rubber trade arteries. 
The geographical position of Belem would also be important to explain the establishment 
of that city as the main rubber hub in the world: rubber production from the entire Amazon 
basin, including neighbouring countries, would be channelled through the city.
Navigation in the region was not an easy task though. Currents and rapids were 
common and the river system was so complex and intricate that boats could easily get lost 
in the region. However important river navigation was, until 1852 the fleet of boats was still 
very small and thus insufficient to provide the basis for a vibrant trade in the region. There 
was no regular steamship service and small sailboats and canoes were responsible for 
channelling the trade that was still very limited. In the early 1850s, the main route -  Belem 
to Barra (later known as Manaus) -  was traversed by 40 to 50 sailboats that usually took 
60 to 90 days of travel (distance of 996 miles). For instance, in 1852 the value of 
merchandises brought from Manaus to Belem reached 27:789$000 of foreign produce 
and 4:509$984 of national produce. In regard to communication and commerce with 
central Brazil and the hinterland of the Amazon region, there were 6,000 people involved 
in the trade employing an armada of more than 2,000 canoes. In 1861, it is estimated that 
the number of canoes had increased to 4,000 but by the end of the 1880s they virtually 
disappeared, not being substantially employed anymore in regular trade.423 Indeed, a
423 Loureiro (1989, pp.147-149). In 1883, the proportion of the four most important articles of trade 
(rubber, cocoa, nuts and fish -  pirarucu) carried by canoes to Belem was only 8.1% (in value). See 
Commercio do Para (1884, Annex 68).
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transportation revolution had already begun, rapidly displacing canoes out of the 
Amazonian trade.
It is possible to date this transportation revolution to 1852, when steamships 
started to be employed in the region, shortening distances and overcoming natural 
impediments to navigation (as discussed in chapter 1). Nonetheless, before foreign 
technology and capital could be combined to integrate the Amazon region, it was 
necessary to change the legal framework that regulated navigation in the Amazon River, 
amid foreign pressure.
The first attempt to introduce steamships in the Amazon was carried out by a US- 
based company called New-York Society in 1826, following suggestion of the Brazilian 
trade envoy to the USA, Jose Silvestre Rebello. However, Para authorities barred the 
steamship “Amazon” at Belem harbour, arguing that the service had to be explored by 
Brazilian nationals or the State only. After that incident, the Provincial Treasury 
unsuccessfully tried to foster incorporation of steam navigation companies in the region.424 
As a result, by 1840s, steamships were not employed yet in any regular river line even 
though the first steamship travel in the Amazon took place in 1843 when the imperial 
government sent the warship “Guapiassu” up to Manaus. The trip from Belem to Manaus 
took 9 days 14 hours and 42 minutes much less than the usual 60 to 90 days for sailing 
boats425, showing how much could be gained from the regular employment of steamships 
in the Amazonian trade. Only in 1852 Irineu Evangelista de Souza, Baron of Maua, 
incorporated the “Companhia de Navegagao do Amazonas” (Amazon Navigation 
Company) after he was given exclusive rights of navigation in the river as well as 
generous subsidies from Provincial and Imperial governments. The company would open 
8 lines within the first 10 years of operation: Belem-Manaus, Manaus-Nauta (Peru), 
Manaus-Tabatinga, Manaus-Santa Isabel, Belem-Bayao (by Tocantins River), Belem- 
Chaves (at Marajo Island), Belem-ltacoa (at Marajo Island) and Belem-Soure (at Marajo
4^ 4 Albuquerque (1894, pp. 10-11).
425 Loureiro (1989, p. 149).
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Island) . 426 The service which the company provided was initially both good and 
extensive 427
In parallel with the establishment of the Amazon Navigation Company, there 
emerged the last defiance of Brazilian sovereignty in the region, concerning the opening 
of navigation in the Amazon River. With the River closed to foreign flags and the region 
disconnected from Brazilian economic and political domain, Britain and especially the 
USA started to defy Brazilian sovereignty. Although British pressure was confined to 
diplomacy and immediately rejected by the Brazilian government, the US press and 
government were more diligent, fulled by Mathew Fontaine Maury’s series of articles. 
Maury first stated the importance of the Amazon for the commerce of the United States in 
an article titled “The Great Commercial Advantages of the Gulf of Mexico” and, some 
months later, he would put forward the argument that the Amazon valley could be used as 
an outlet for the US-South slave population. In his words, the Amazon would be the 
remedy for preserving the Union.428 Seizing the oppportunity and under US pressure, Peru, 
Bolivia, Nueva Granada and Venezuela freed navigation in the river within their borders 
which could only be accessed through Brazil. The Brazilian Central government rushed to 
revoke its neighbours’ dispositions denying in parallel US claim via diplomatic channels.429 
US pressure did not die out until the Civil War but the Brazilian government would still 
postpone the solution of the matter until 1866 when the Empire freed navigation in the 
river. As a result, Baron of Maua lost his exclusive rights and two new navigation 
companies were incorporated, both heavily subsidised by the government: Companhia 
Fluvial Paraense (1867) and Companhia Fluvial do Alto Amazonas (1869). In 1874, the 
three companies merged and a new company was incorporated in London as the Amazon 
Steam Navigation Company. Eighteen years later the company also amalgamated the 
Para and Amazonas Company (‘Companhia Para e Amazonas’). The company definitely 
strengthened its position in the region but also took measures to expand shipping facilities
Albuquerque (1894, pp. 18-19).
427 Melby (1942, p. 453).
428 Bell (1939, p. 495).
429 Ferreira Reis (1957, pp. 70-74).
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according to demand generated by increasing rubber production in the upper reaches of 
the Amazon Forest. For instance, the Amazon Steam Navigation Company carried an 
increasing volume of trade as a proportion of the Regional GDP: from 14.2% in 1855 to 
63.8% in 1870.
As a consequence, the Amazon Steam Navigation Company enjoyed a 
considerable market power in river transportation as it possessed by 1902 nearly 60% of 
total steamship capacity of Para State (see Figure 6.3 below) but there was scope for 
other firms to dispute certain routes or to run others not exploited by the company. Such 
was the case of ‘Empreza de Marajo’ (subsidised) which ran river navigation in the Island 
of Marajo (the service was later transferred to Companhia Lloyd Brasileiro) .430 Other 
examples were the ‘Amazon Tug & Lighterage Co. Ltd.’ which covered the rivers 
Solimoes and Madeira (English concern, not subsidised) and the Tocantins and Araguaya 
Co. (heavily subsidised) which ran services in those two rivers (Tocantins and Araguaya 
rivers). There were also several small companies and private steamboats, usually owned 
by Aviador Houses centred in Belem. For instance, in 1902 there were 117 steamships 
registered at the Belem Harbour Authorities, of which 34 were in possession of the 
Amazon Steam Navigation Company, the remaining vessels being pulverised in the hands 
of several companies (awadores/intermediaries). For comparison, the second largest 
steamship company in 1902 was Mello & Co. which owned 7 boats only, compared to 34 
of the Amazon Steam Navigation Company. Whilst total capacity of Mello & Co.’s boats 
was just under 2,000 tons, total combined capacity of the 34 steamships of the Amazon 
Steam Navigation Company was well over 27,000 tons (see Figure 6.5 below).
430 Albuquerque (1894, pp. 27-30).
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Figure 6.5 -  Steamships Registered at the Belem Harbour Authorities, 1902
Companies Number of steamships
Average 
capacity 
(in tons)
Total
Capacity
Amazon Steamship Navigation Co. 34 811 27,576
Mello & Co. 7 274 1,919
A. Berneau & Co. 4 362 1,447
Martins Ribas & Co. 4 222 886
Oliveira Andrade & Co. 4 213 851
Salheiro Motta & Co. 3 525 1,576
Caetano Monteiro da Silva 3 160 481
Guilherme Augusto de Miranda Filho 3 189 568
Tocantins and Araguaya Co. 2 125 250
Cerqueira Lima & Co. 2 365 730
Montenegro & Co. 2 324 647
Hilario Francisco Alves 2 195 390
Vieira & Irmao 2 80 160
N. N. Maia 2 72 144
Other 43 202 8,705
Total 117 396 46,330
Source: elaborated from Annuario Estatistico do Para (1902, pp. 36-37). The source provides data 
on each individual ship. It shows the number of people employed in each ship, the date and place 
of construction, and the type of boat (wooden, iron or steel).
The main line, Belem-Manaus, was also covered by ocean vessels which, as was 
already discussed, provided the link between the Amazon region and the main consumer 
markets of rubber in Europe and the United States. Therefore, after 1866, there was some 
degree of competition which was not nonetheless enough to ensure a decrease in freight 
rates as the Amazon Steam Navigation Co. retained a considerable degree of market 
power. For instance, in 1855 the freight rate for transporting 14.65kg of rubber from the 
Amazon Province (probably Manaus) to Para Province (Belem) was $500.431 Therefore, 
assuming 996 miles of distance, the freight rate per ton-mile of rubber was equivalent to 
$034 (or 0.94 pence) in 1855. In 1869, the Companhia Fluvial do Alto-Amazonas was 
charging a freight rate equivalent to $088 (amounting to 1.94d.) per ton-mile of rubber. 
Finally, in 1913 the Amazon Steam Navigation Co. was charging $053 (equal to 0.86d.) 
per ton-mile of rubber transported between Belem and Manaus but $178 (equivalent to
431 Relatorio apresentado a Assemblea Legislativa Rovincial [sic], pelo excellentissimo senhor 
doutor Joao Pedro Dias Vieira, dignissimo preside rite desta provincia, no dia 8 de julho de 1856 
por occasiao da primeira sessao ordinaria da terceira legislatura da mesma Assemblea. Barra do 
Rio Negro, Typ. de F.J S. Ramos, 1856, Mappa n. 13.
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2.87d.) per ton-mile from Xapury (in Acre region) -  to where rubber production had 
expanded, located 1,850 miles from Manaus -  to Manaus.
From 1855 to 1870, the freight factor decreased from 3.8% to 2.8% and, at least 
for rubber, this trend seems to have persisted up to 1910, especially because the price of 
rubber was increasing in both national and foreign currency. Like in the overseas trade, 
there is thus indication that, throughout the rubber boom, the river transport system was 
also able to extract monopoly rents from the increasing trade traffic which were probably 
passed through to the final consumer as the demand for rubber was certainly inelastic, as 
shown in Chapter 2.
There was a limit however to lowering transportation costs within the Amazon. 
First, as mentioned earlier, the region had no coal reserves and then the price of coal f.o.b. 
in Belem and Manaus was an important determinant of the cost of travel and depended on 
the freight rates charged in the overseas trade (that, in turn, was not decreasing or at least 
not as fast as the general trend of freight rates elsewhere): according to the Booth 
Steamship Co. the price of coal in Belem was probably over twice as high as in Cardiff.432 
Secondly, because coal was available mainly in Manaus and Belem, steamships had to 
carry coal for the round trip decreasing the available space for other merchandises and 
then increasing the freight rate per ton of merchandise transported. Alternatively, ships 
could use timber in place of coal but this would imply less horse power for the ships and 
more stops along the way to collect timber. Both factors would slow the trip. The scarcity 
of coal thus became increasingly important as trade developed further and further into the 
forest where, additionally, the conditions of navigation were worse. Rivers became 
narrower and the geographic knowledge scarcer, meaning that boats could not be so 
large (otherwise the risk of being sunk or stranded would be even higher) limiting the 
extraction of economies of scale. Therefore, it is not surprising that the freight rate per ton- 
mile was not decreasing in the Amazon region and for longer routes price charges were 
usually higher. There was much less scope for extraction of economies of scale in the 
river navigation compared to ocean navigation.
432 1 5s. in Cardiff against 38s. in Belem and 42s. in Manaus. See John (1959, p. 93).
251
For passenger fares the story is a little different as the flow of people was mainly 
confined to the region between Manaus and Belem. Thus passenger fares measured in 
national currency seem to have remained relatively constant over time, at least 
considering the main passenger line of the region, Belem-Manaus. Measuring it in sterling 
pounds, there was a significant drop from 1855 to 1884, remaining relatively constant 
thereafter.
Figure 6.6 -  Passenger Fares from Belem to Manaus in Selected Years
Year Company Passenger Fares
in milreis in £
1855 Amazon Steam Navigation Co. 100$000 £11 10s.
1884 Red Cross Line 60$000 £ 5  3s.
1910 Booth Steamship Co. 100$000 £ 6  15s.
1915 Amazon Steam Navigation Co. 100$000 £ 5  5s.
Sources: for 1855 Loureiro (1989, p. 152); for 1884, Loureiro (1989, p. 160); for 1910, L'Etat 
du Para a Turin (1911, p. 43) and; for 1915, Braga (1916, p. 73). Note: for 1855 and 1884 the 
fares refer to first class tickets while for 1910 and 1915 the sources did not specify it.
Sources quoted passenger fares in milreis which were converted into £, using exchange rate 
series provided in the Appendix.
In 1853, 691 tickets were sold by the Amazon Steam Navigation Co. resulting in a 
total revenue of 21:350$639 or 30$898 per ticket on average. In 1855, the average price 
of passenger fare had already decreased to 14$867 (with 3,811 tickets being sold). In 
1869, the company sold 13,386 tickets earning 151:918$513, equivalent to just 11 $349 
per passenger. In pounds, this declining trend is even more evident as the average fare 
decreased from £3 13s. in 1853, to £1 14s. in 1855 and finally to 10s. in 1869. There is no 
information for the subsequent period (1870-1910) but it is possible to infer that from 1853 
to 1869 the average cost of travel was probably decreasing in both national and foreign 
currency and, additionally, people were probably changing travel classes: there were 3 
different fares and since the decrease in the average passenger rate from the Amazon 
Steam Co. was decreasing faster than the nominal passenger fare (at least measuring by 
the Belem-Manaus route) the number of people travelling under the lower rate was
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increasing over time. This probably reflects the increasing number of rubber tappers 
travelling longer and longer distances to arrive at rubber estates that were located further 
and further away from Belem. However, judging from the relatively constant passenger 
fares, river shipping companies were increasing their profits by increasing passenger 
traffic rather than by increasing passenger fares. If more economies of scale were 
generated over time (at a lower extent comparing to the overseas trade), they were 
certainly accrued by the shipping companies, not being passed through to local 
passengers.
In sum, freight rates and passenger fares in the Amazon region remained quite 
high. There were certainly some factors that were increasing the economies of scale of 
the shipping sector such as the increasing size of the ships and the improved efficiency of 
new ships. Regularity also helped the shipping industry to minimise their costs as loading 
and unloading required less and less time but here the telegraphs played a lower role 
compared to overseas trade: telegraphs arrived quite late (see section 6 .2) in the 
Amazonian hinterland and the system was quite costly (as will be shown in the next 
section). The risk of very known routes, such as Belem-Manaus, might have decreased 
over time as sailors became more and more experienced and acquainted with the 
specificities of the Amazon river and its tributaries. Nonetheless, there were several other 
factors that limited the capture of significant economies of scale. First, the risk of new 
routes that might be so high that had to be smoothed out along other routes to maintain 
profitability. Secondly, there were certainly limits to increase the size of the ships, 
especially in the new routes in the far reaches of the forest where the rivers were 
invariably narrower. Thirdly, the region did not possess any coal reserve so that its price 
f.o.b. in the region depended on the freight rate charged in the overseas trade. It is true 
that the price of coal was decreasing over time (even though by 1910, it was still at a very 
high level) but since steamships had to carry coal for the round trip, there was limited 
carrying capacity. That was especially true in the new routes where the amount of coal 
required was higher and the ships were usually smaller. Finally, we must take into account 
that the Amazon Steamship Co. might have possessed significant market power that
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prevented freight rates from falling. Therefore, with the expansion of trade within the forest, 
the average cost of transportation might have been increased and not decreased as it 
would be expected. In order to support the existent shipping lines as well as to foster new 
ones, government subsidies were instrumental: they provided the security for 
entrepreneurs to incur the risk of exploring ever new routes. In regard to passenger traffic, 
there was some more room for exploitation of economies of scale as most of the traffic 
was concentrated along the main lines, notably in the Belem-Manaus route.
6.5 -  Communication and Shipping: Measuring Integration
The high levels of freight rates in the Amazon can be best assessed from Figure 
6.7 which shows that at the end of the rubber boom, ocean freight rates charged in the 
region were significantly higher than in the overseas trade. The routes to Europe 
registered the lowest freight rates, 0.10-0.16 pence per ton-mile, meaning that the total 
cost of shipping one ton of rubber from Belem to Liverpool was 600 pennies (or £2 10s.) 
and to Havre, 670 pennies (or £2 16s.). In turn, the freight rate from Belem to New York 
was 0.29 pence per ton-mile, or nearly twice as high as in the Liverpool route, making the 
total cost of shipping one ton of rubber to New York (672 pennies) higher than shipping it 
to Liverpool or Havre, for instance.
It should be noted here that the freight rate for the Belem-Genoa route was 
significantly lower than in other overseas routes, probably because La Ligure Brasiliana 
was fighting their way into the Amazonian trade, competing in prices against the Booth Co. 
Therefore, the freight rate of 0.10 pence per ton-mile along this route should not be 
indicative of the cost of travel to Europe as a whole as it was probably only transient.
The costs for the Brazilian routes were much larger than in the overseas trade. 
Excluding the Madeira-Mamore Railway (whose freight rates were unbelievably high), the 
freight rate charged varied from 0.86 to 1.28 pence per ton-mile, or nearly ten times higher 
than in the Belem-Liverpool route and 4 times higher than in the Belem-NY route. The 
result was that the total cost of shipping one ton of rubber from Manaus to Belem (854 
pennies or £3 11s.) was higher than shipping it to any overseas destination! The total cost
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of shipping one ton of rubber from the confines of the Amazon forest where the frontier of 
rubber production was located (in the Acre region) to Belem was even higher: 3,159 
pennies or £13 3s. The costal shipping was also very expensive as the freight rate 
charged in the Belem-Rio route was the most expensive one, 1.28 pence per ton-mile.
255
Figure 6.7 -  Freight Rates in British Old Pences at the end of the Rubber Boom
Routes Year Company Travel Time Distance Freight Freight Total Freight
in hours in miles pence per ton-mile pence per hour pence per ton
Bel6m-New York 1910 Booth Steamship Co. 214 2,295 0.29 3.13 672
Bel6m-Liverpool 1910 Booth Steamship Co. 420 4,495 0.13 1.43 600
Bel6m-Genoa 1900 La Ligure Brasiliana S/A 421 4,503 0.10 1.02 431
Bel6m-Havre 1910 Booth Steamship Co. 382 4,092 0.16 1.68 642
Bel6m-Hamburg 1913 Hamburg Sudamerikanische 415 4,442 0.16 1.73 720
Bel6m-Rio 1914 Lloyd Brasileiro 228 2,315 1.28 12.98 2,959
Bel6m-Sena Madureira (Acre) 1913 Amazon River Steam Navigation Co. 187 2,580 1.22 16.94 3,159
Bel6m-Manaus 1913 Amazon River Steam Navigation Co. 72 996 0.86 11.86 854
Madeira-Mamore 1913 Madeira-Mamor6 Railway n.a. 220 16.11 n.a. 3,544
Sources: 1) Travel Time - Belem-Liverpool: John (1959, p. 58), computed from Table 1 average for 1908, ships Hilary and Gregory; Belem-Rio and Belem-Manaus: LeCointe (1922); For Belem-New York, 
Belem-Genoa, Belem-Havre and Belem-Hamburg, it was assumed the same speed as for Belem-Liverpool whereas the travel time for Belem-Sena Madureira was computed assuming the same speed as 
for Belem-Manaus. 2) Distance -  Belem-Liverpool, Belem-Havre, Belem-Hamburg and Belem-Rio: Para (1908, pp. 220-224); Belem-Manaus: Albuquerque (1894, p. 13); Bel6m-Sena Madureira and 
Madeira-Mamore: Souza (1914) and; Belem-New York and Belem-Genoa computed from www.datalov.com imposing the same route as stated in these companies prospects. 3) Total Freight per Ton - 
Belem-New York, Belem-Liverpool, Belem-Havre and Belem-Hamburg: L'lztat du Para a Turin (1911); Para-Genoa: Caccavoni (1900, p. 61); Belem-Rio: LeCointe (1922, p. 253) and; other routes: Souza 
(1914).
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Therefore, in terms of shipping cost, Belem was closer to Liverpool than to New 
York despite the fact that the travel distance between Belem and Liverpool was nearly 
twice as high as in the Belem-New York route. Whilst the longer distance partly explains 
why the price per ton-mile was lower in the Liverpool route, the unreliability of telegraphs 
in the New York route might further explain why the total cost of travel was higher in that 
route. However, what is really striking is the fact that Belem was still closer to foreign 
destinations than to neighbouring cities. The cost of shipping rubber from Manaus to 
Belem was higher than in the overseas routes and in regard to Rio, Belem was still far 
away in economic terms. The high cost of shipping goods from Rio to Belem was 
definitely the result of the inefficiency and/or market power of the Lloyd Brasileiro under 
the umbrella of the monopoly of coastal navigation to national flags.
The Lloyd Brasileiro charged freight rates substantially higher compared with 
routes along which companies were also extracting monopoly (oligopoly) rents such as 
the ones in the Amazon (The Amazon Steam Navigation Co.) and overseas (the Booth 
Co.), and where the risk of travel was very high (as in some routes ran by the Amazon 
Steam Navigation Co.). In the international context, the rates were just incredibly high 
(Figure 6 .6): for instance, the freight cost of shipping one ton of rubber to Liverpool was
4.4 times the total cost of shipping coal (3.3 times for grain) along a similar route. The 
Belem-Rio freight rate was equivalent to 28.7 times higher than the price charged for 
shipping coal in a similar route (23.7 times for grain): the company charged then high 
rates despite being heavily subsidised by the Central government: for instance, in 1907 
the company received £187,000 in subsidies out of a total subsidisation of £260,000 to 
navigation companies in Brazil.433
433 British Diplomatic and Consular Report n. 4358, Annual Series, p. 59.
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Figure 6.8 -  Comparison of Amazonian Freight Rates with Equivalent rates for Coal and Grain
Routes Amazonian Trade Kaukiainen Coal Kaukiainen Grain
pence per ton pence per ton-mile pence per ton pence per ton-mile pence per ton pence per ton-mile
Belem-New York 672 0.29 106 0.05 126 0.05
Belem-Liverpool 600 0.13 137 0.03 184 0.04
Belem-Genoa 431 0.10 137 0.03 184 0.04
Belem-Havre 642 0.16 131 0.03 173 0.04
Belem-Hamburg 720 0.16 136 0.03 183 0.04
Belem-Rio 2,959 1.28 106 0.05 126 0.05
Belem-Sena Madureira (Acre) 3,159 1.22 110 0.04 133 0.05
Belem-Manaus 854 0.86 88 0.09 92 0.09
Sources: 1) Amazonian Trade: Figure 6.8; 2) For selected years, Kaukiainen (2003) estimated terminal charges and cost per ton-mile for coal and grain shipments based on Fairplay. To ensure
comparability with Figure 6.8, figures for 1911-1913 were used. Counterfactual shipment costs for coal along the rubber lines were computed by applying the appropriate distances (as reported in Figure 6.8)
to Kaukiainen’s cost per 100m (1.392 pence per 100m) plus his terminal charge (74.172 pence). Analogously, for grain, shipment costs were obtained by applying the same distances to Kaukiainen's cost
per 100m (65.268 pence per 100m) plus his terminal charges for grain (65.268 pence).
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Even though the cost of shipping goods was still lower in the overseas routes, the 
gap between the freight rates in overseas and in national (coastal and along the river 
Amazon) routes might have shrank quite substantially from 1850 to 1910. Before 
steamship navigation, due to maritime currents and winds, the fastest way to travel from 
Belem to Rio de Janeiro was to go to Portugal via the Caribbean and then return to Brazil, 
touching Fernando de Noronha Island and thence coastwise down to Rio de Janeiro. The 
costs might have been very high indeed as they entailed a trip to Europe before returning 
to Brazil. Steamships overcame the natural hurdles to navigation in the north Brazilian 
coast and, especially in terms of travel time, Belem became much closer to the rest of 
Brazil.
The navigation speed was relatively the same for the Booth Steamship Co. 
(Belem-Liverpool), the Amazon River Steam Navigation Co. (Belem-Manaus) and the 
Lloyd Brasileiro (Belem-Rio), making the travel time between Belem and Manaus 
significantly lower than any of the other routes mentioned here before: 72 hours (Figure 
6.5). A vessel of the Lloyd Brasileiro would travel from Belem to Rio de Janeiro in 228 
hours whereas the distance between Belem and Liverpool would be navigated in 420 
hours by the Booth steamers. Applying the same speed in the Belem-New York route, it 
seems that Belem was equidistant from New York and Rio de Janeiro in terms of travel 
time. If some other cities on the Brazilian coast are added, it is possible to see how closer 
Belem became from them as, for instance, the travel time between Belem and Ceara was 
nearly 76 hours about the same travel time between Belem and Manaus: no wonder why 
so many Cearenses (people born in the Ceara Province/State) migrated to the Amazon 
forest during the rubber boom.
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Figure 6.9 -  Passenger Fares (1st Class Tickets) at the end of the Rubber Boom
Routes Year Company Travel Time Distance Passenger Fare Passenger Fare Passenger Fare
in hours in miles pence per mile pence per hour in £
Belem-New York 1910 Booth Steamship Co. 214 2,295 1.70 18.16 16
Belem-New York 1914 Lloyd Brasileiro 214 2,295 2.26 24.15 22
Belem-Liverpool 1910 Booth Steamship Co. 420 4,495 1.39 14.86 26
Belem-Genoa 1900 La Ligure Brasiliana S/A 421 4,503 1.15 12.28 22
Belem-Havre 1910 Booth Steamship Co. 382 4,092 1.58 16.95 27
Belem-Hamburg 1910 Hamburg Sudamerikanische 415 4,442 1.46 15.61 27
Belem-Rio 1914 Lloyd Brasileiro 228 2,315 1.66 16.81 16
Belem-Ceara (Fortaleza) 1915 Lloyd Brasileiro 76 767 1.95 19.78 6
Belem-Salvador 1915 Lloyd Brasileiro 155 1,573 1.91 19.39 13
Belem-Manaus 1914 Lloyd Brasileiro 98 996 1.52 15.39 6
Belem-Manaus 1914 Amazon River Steam Navigation Co. 72 996 1.49 20.55 6
Bel6m-Sena Madureira (Acre) 1914 Amazon River Steam Navigation Co. 254 2,580 2.84 28.83 31
Sources: 1) Travel Time - Belem-Liverpool: John (1959, p. 58), computed from Table 1 average for 1908, ships Hilary and Gregory; Belem-Rio and Belem-Manaus: LeCointe (1922); For Belem-New York, 
Belem-Genoa, Belem-Havre and Belem-Hamburg, it was assumed the same speed as for Belem-Liverpool whereas the travel time for Belem-Sena Madureira was computed assuming the same speed as 
for Belem-Manaus. 2) Distance -  Belem-Liverpool, Bel6m-Havre, Belem-Hamburg and Belem-Rio: Para (1908, pp. 220-224); Belem-Manaus: Albuquerque (1894, p. 13); Bel6m-Sena Madureira and 
Madeira-Mamore: Souza (1914) and; Belem-New York and Belem-Genoa computed from www.datalov.com imposing the same route as stated in these companies prospects. 3) Passenger Fares: for all 
routes of Booth Steamship Co. and Hamburg Sudamerikanische, see L'[=tat du Par6 a Turin (1911, pp. 42-45). For Belem-Salvador and Belem-Cear£ routes, see Braga (1916, pp. 68-69) whilst for all the 
remaining data refer to LeCointe (1922).
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This decrease in ‘distance’ and travel time also reflected in the passenger fares 
charged by the companies. Cearenses would pay £6 to go to Belem whereas someone 
coming from Rio de Janeiro would pay £16 (Figure 6.7). This was the same fare paid by a 
New Yorker but significantly lower than the fare paid by the English to go to the region: 
£22. The traffic of people was probably more competitive and the companies operating in 
the Amazon probably had a lower degree of market power as the prices seemed to be 
much more competitive. The demand for travel was probably much more elastic to the 
passenger fare than the demand of rubber was to the shipping cost, meaning that 
companies could exercise their market power in freight but not in the passenger market.
Figure 6.10 -  Ranking of Proximity to Belem at the end of the Rubber Boom
Rank Distance Travel Time Freight Rate Passenger Fare Telegrams
1 Manaus Manaus Liverpool Manaus Rio de Janeiro
2 New York New York New York New York = Rio de Janeiro
Manaus
3 Rio de Janeiro Rio de Janeiro Manaus Liverpool
4 Liverpool Liverpool Rio de Janeiro Liverpool New York
Source: Elaborated by me based on costs reported in Figures 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9.
Another effect of the decreasing travel time between Belem and the other cities in 
Brazil is that the flow of mail was occurring at a higher speed, especially after the 
introduction of steamers. This communication flow was also enhanced by the telegraphs 
which brought Belem even closer to the rest of Brazil. Looking at the prices of sending 
telegrams to different cities (Figure 6.9) it can be seen that the government overland 
telegraph system provided very low rates. A message from Belem to Rio de Janeiro cost 
nearly 4 pennies per word (it would go through more than 3 States) whereas via the 
Western Telegraph Co. (submarine cables) would cost 13 pennies per word. Messages 
sent to Great Britain would cost some 31 pennies per word and to the United States 
around 40 pennies per word. It is likely though that the actual cost of sending telegrams to 
the United States was much lower (although less reliable) through the French cable but
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unfortunately no data for the traffic on this line was found.434 In terms of mail, at the end of 
the rubber boom Para was also closer to the rest of Brazil than to any foreign destination: 
the price of sending a letter of up to 15g to Brazil amounted to $100 (or 1 % pence) whilst 
the cost of sending a letter to any member country of the Universal Postal Union was 
$200 (equivalent to 2 1/4 pennies).435
This state of affairs enforced ‘social’ and political integration but not so much 
economic integration. Financial markets are usually better integrated than any other 
market so it should be expected that at least exchange rate transactions in Para would be 
relatively in par with the Rio de Janeiro’s market. There is no exchange rate for Para in 
the period before the advent of the rubber boom but I collected some data from two main 
newspapers from Para and also from British Consular Reports for some years after 1876 
(Figure 6.10) in order to compare to the exchange rate quoted in Rio (exchange rate was 
defined as British old pence per Brazilian milreis -  see Figure 6.12). The result is that, 
apart from the period immediately after the Proclamation of the Republic (November 
1889), throughout the period the coefficient of variation was usually around 4% but 
sometimes reached 8% (Figure 6.14 below). This means that during the rubber boom, 
transactions in foreign currency in Para embodied a premium over the Rio de Janeiro 
exchange rate that nonetheless kept confined within certain limits.436 Quotes for the 
exchange rate in Rio usually arrived in the morning and sometimes were cabled again in 
the afternoon, meaning that the spread of information through the telegraph system might 
have been important to prevent huge deviations between Para and Rio de Janeiro foreign 
exchange markets. For some days, it was even stated that banks in Para refused to close
434 According to Bright (1911, p.198), the price of sending messages from Great Britain to Belem 
was lower via the French Cables compared to the route via the Western Telegraph Co.
435 Braga (1916, p. 80). Conversion to pounds were carried out using the 1915 exchange rate 
available at http://www.ipeadata.aov.br.
436 Differences in the exchange rate might also reflect that the quotes refer to different 
computations: for instance, for Para the exchange rate referred to the quote for the 15th day of each 
month (or for the closest date available) whereas the exchange rate for Rio de Janeiro was 
computed as the average over the whole month. However, I also had the Rio de Janeiro rate for 
some of the days coinciding with Para quotes and the comparison between these two more similar 
quotes resulted in very close estimates to Figure 6.15.
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any transaction due to interruptions in telegraphic communication.437 Furthermore, the 
British Vice-Consul for the Amazonas States, Mr. Temple stated in 1900:
“One of the greatest drawbacks under which the State of Amazonas at 
present labours is the lack of telegraphic communication with the rest of 
the world. Business, into which exchange transactions enter, is thereby 
rendered very speculative. Foreign Banks are unable to establish 
themselves, and the general progress of the town very much impeded.
Attempts are being made to remedy this state o f affairs.’438
437 For instance in 1892, the newspaper A Provincia do Para stated about the exchange rate 
market that: “Due to the interruption in the submarine telegraph cable, news from the south arrived 
quite late (...)”. In a previous occasion (on 15th November 1891), the same newspaper mentioned 
that “we received no news about the rates transacted in Rio de Janeiro and thus here [in Para], the 
banks made their payments at the 12d. rate but refused to let people withdraw at that rate”.
438 British Diplomatic and Consular Reports n. 530, Miscellaneous Series, Brazil -  Report on the 
State of the Amazonas, June, 1900, p. 27.
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Figure 6.11 -  Price of Telegrams Sent to Several Destinations through different Companies at the End of the Rubber Boom
(1915)
Telegrams Price per Word
in pence
Telegrapho Nacional
Bel6m to Any city in Para State 1
Crossing 2-3 States 3
Crossing more than 3 States 4
Manaus (wireless) 11
Santarem (wireless) 8
Senna Madureira (wireless) 19
Iquitos - Peru (wireless) 36
Braganga Railway Telegraph
up to 20 words 13
urgent telegram up to 30 words 38
Western Telegraph Co. Ltd.
Belem to Rio de Janeiro 13
Ceara 6
Maranhao 3
Great Britain 31
United States (Lousiana and Texas) 40
United States (others) 42
Portugal 35
France 31
Germany 31
The Amazon Telegraph Co. Ltd.
Belem to Manaus (land & submarine) 33
Santarem (land & submarine) 16
Source: Braga (1915, pp. 82-86).
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Figure 6.12 -  Exchange Rate in Para, 1876-1911
pence per milreis
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Source: Quotes from newspapers: Diario do Para and A Provincia do Para, several issues.
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Figure 6.13 -  Exchange Rate in Rio de Janeiro, 1876-1911
pence per milreis
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Source: http://www.ipeadata.aov.br.
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Figure 6.14 -  Coefficient of Variation of Para Exchange Rate vis-a-vis the Rio de 
Janeiro Exchange Rate, selected periods
n. of 
observations
Coeff. of 
Variation
Apr/76-Jul/76 4 1,03%
Jan/80-Ago/81 20 4,21%
Jan/83-Dec/84 24 4,02%
Jul/86-Dec/88 30 8,02%
Jul/89-Dec/92 41 30,98%
Jan/00-Jun/00 6 7,85%
Apr/11-Jun/11 3 0,52%
Source: newspapers (A Provincia do Para and Diario de Noticias), British Diplomatic and Consular Reports and Ipeadata 
(for Rio).
However, the high cost of freight prevented this financial integration to translate 
into price integration, especially because of the exploitation of market power along the 
several nodes of the rubber chain. For instance, looking at Figure 6.15 it is possible to see 
that the manioc flour (one of the most important foodstuffs in the Amazon region) was 
priced at 4 Brazilian milreis in Rio de Janeiro and cost 3.5 milreis in Para (cheaper, 
probably because it was imported from locations such as Ceara State which was closer to 
Para than to Rio de Janeiro). In the hands of intermediaries (aviadores), the price would 
jump to 6 milreis and including freight rates, tariffs and taxes, the manioc flour would cost 
as much as 20.1 milreis in Acre without including the commission of the rubber estate 
owner. Adding that up, the price would reach some 35 milreis, or 8.75 times higher than 
the price charged in Rio de Janeiro.439
It is indeed difficult to discuss price convergence between Acre and Belem or Acre 
and Rio de Janeiro, since the region was recently populated as a consequence of the 
development of the rubber production. As seen above, however, there were huge 
differences in prices between Acre and Rio de Janeiro not only because of high freight 
rates but also because of market power in several links of the rubber chain. Moreover, it is 
likely that before the establishment of telegraphic connection in the Acre region, prices
439 It is not possible to trace back how the author computed the flat freight rate for all products. It is 
likely that he just diluted the total cost across all products equally.
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differed even more as people in the region lacked information of the prices charged in 
other regions of Brazil.
Figure 6.15 -  Prices of Several Goods at Different Locations, 1913
in Brazilian reis
Price in 
Rio de Janeiro
Official Value 
at Para
Aviador
Price
Freight
Tariffs
and
Taxes
Price in 
Acre
Price in Acre 
(including commission)
Manioc Flour (40 litres) 4.0 3.5 6.0 12.0 0.3 20.1 35.0
Sugar (40 kg) 14.0 27.0 27.2 12.0 1.4 44.6 80.0
Coffee (60 kg) 57.0 60.0 60.0 12.0 3.0 82.5 240.0
Rice (70 kg) 35.0 35.0 43.2 12.0 2.1 63.1 180.0
Fat (30 kg) 30.0 44.0 12.0 2.2 64.0 180.0
Jerked Beef (60kg) 48.0 48.0 69.0 12.0 3.5 92.9 180.0
Tobacco (14.5kg) 21.6 43.5 80.0 12.0 4.0 105.6 240.0
Kerosene (caixa, 10 galoes) 8.0 8.0 12.0 0.4 22.4 60.0
Salt (30 kg) 2.0 3.0 3.0 12.0 0.8 16.7 30.0
Soap (14.5kg) 7.3 8.5 12.0 0.4 23.0 40.0
Cachaga/Alcohol (20 litros) 10.0 15.0 12.0 0.8 30.5 70.0
Matches (1 package) 43.0 48.0 65.0 12.0 3.3 88.3 290.0
Beans (30kg) 7.0 9.0 15.0 12.0 0.8 30.5 60.0
Bacon (15kg) 12.0 16.0 12.0 0.8 31.7 120.0
Butter (50 cans) 100.0 100.0 12.0 5.0 128.7 375.0
Source: Souza (1914, p. 36).
Nonetheless, price integration between Belem and Rio did not occur either as 
products such as sugar and tobacco registered a 100% price differential. Rice and Jerked 
Beef (imported into both cities), in turn, had the same price with the other products 
registering differentials that varied from 5% to 50%. It is difficult to assess if these price 
differentials just represented different regional tastes and/or endowments but the high 
freight rates from Brazilian regions to Belem prevented arbitrage mechanisms to work 
properly.
In regard to “social” integration, since due to the advent of the telegraphic system 
and faster mail communication, news started to spread quicker within Brazil and thus 
more and more became known about the Amazonian rubber cycle in other parts of the 
country. Therefore, the development of the rubber boom attracted many people 
(especially from poorer areas of the country such as Ceara) to work as rubber gatherers 
within the Amazon forest in search for a better life. This influx of people towards the 
Amazon was supported, as was shown here, by cheaper passenger fares and decreasing 
travel time. As seen in Chapter 5, the result was that the Amazonian population increased
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nearly four-fold during the rubber boom, from 322,909 people in 1870 to 1,217,024 people 
in 1910 (see Appendix).
Steam navigation and telegraphs gave rise to the rubber boom which, in turn, 
supported even further the development of the (steam) navigation and the telegraphic 
system. The rubber boom demanded a better communication and transport systems and 
the consequent increased traffic of people and merchandises provided these systems with 
economies of scale that ensured their ulterior development. The combination of rubber 
trade, telegraphs and steamships generated a virtuous cycle that altered the economic 
and social structures of the Brazilian Amazon, as seen along this thesis. Government was 
instrumental by carrying out investments (as in telegraphs and mail), by providing 
subsidies (as in the case of shipping companies) and by its regulatory role.
6.6 -  Final Remarks
The Brazilian Amazon was very disconnected from other regions of Brazil and 
from Rio de Janeiro in particular due to geographical hurdles that hampered the 
navigation along the north coast of Brazil. Therefore, before the 1850s the fastest and 
easiest way to travel from Belem to Rio de Janeiro was to go to Europe via the Caribbean 
and then tackle down the way across the Atlantic touching Fernando de Noronha Island 
and thence coastwise, until Rio de Janeiro.
As in the case of the annexation and unification of the Brazilian Amazon within the 
Rio de Janeiro’s political domain, the central government played a decisive role in the 
integration process by both subsidising and carrying out investments in transport and 
communication. In the case of the steamship navigation, the government gave away huge 
subsidies and did it not only at its inception, as the government continued to subsidise 
several lines throughout the period. For instance, in 1898 the Para government alone 
spent 570:284$000 (or £17,079) with subsidies for steamship navigation companies. 
Indeed, according to the Commercial Association of Para, in 1869, “it is not superfluous to
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repeat that from the establishment of steam navigation dates the extraordinary 
development of public wealth in Para”.440
Steamships shortened distances within the Amazon region, connecting the entire 
basin with Belem and abroad. However, freight rates in the region remained quite high by 
international standards, reflecting a combination of market power and high risk of 
navigation (especially in the domestic routes) and, as shown here, total shipping costs 
resulted to be higher in domestic routes than in overseas ones: in terms of shipping costs 
Belem was closer to Liverpool and New York than to Manaus or Rio de Janeiro. 
Passenger fares, in turn, were relatively cheaper in the domestic routes implying a faster 
and more reliable movement of people and information (mail, which was also carried by 
steamers) within Brazil.
The biggest impact on the speed of the flow of information though was brought 
about by the establishment of telegraphic lines connecting Belem with Rio de Janeiro and 
with the international telegraphic system. Again, the government played an important role 
especially by constructing its own telegraphic land system connecting the main cities of 
Brazil along the coast. Thus by the end of the rubber boom, Belem was indeed connected 
to several different cables whose prices indicated that, in terms of information, the 
Brazilian Amazon became closer to Rio de Janeiro than to New York or Liverpool.
Interestingly, rubber had fostered the development of submarine telegraphs for 
gutta-percha (a kind of low quality rubber, extracted from a tree that grows in Southeast 
Asia) was used to insulate copper cables against the water.441 Furthermore, rubber was 
also important in the improvement of the efficiency of steam engines insofar as this raw 
material was sometimes used as seals.
Steam navigation and telegraphs gave rise to the rubber boom which, in turn, 
supported even further the development of the (steam) navigation and the telegraphic 
system. The rubber boom demanded a better communication and transport systems and 
the consequent increased intensity in the flow of people and merchandises provided these
440 Ridings (1983, p. 246).
441 Headrick and Griset (2001, pp. 545-550).
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systems with economies of scale that ensured their ulterior development. The spread of 
news and the improvement in the transport system also provided the region with the most 
scarce factor of production, labour, and, as shown in Chapter 4, the Brazilian supply of 
rubber was very inelastic to this factor of production. Furthermore, the advent of 
steamship navigation in the Amazon region displaced the canoes, releasing even more 
labourers to work in the rubber industry. Thus communication and (steam) navigation 
generated some integration, and the consequent move of people (and other factors of 
production) and flow of information, created the conditions for further development of the 
rubber boom by supporting a virtuous cycle that, as seen in this thesis, completely 
changed the economic, political and social structures of the Brazilian Amazon. In sum, 
without rubber, steamships might have been even more costly to operate, and the 
submarine telegraphic system may have never developed. Analogously, without 
steamships and telegraphic communication, the rubber boom might have never taken 
place.
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CONCLUSION
As stated in the introduction, the thesis examines how institutions and geography 
explain the development of the rubber chain in the Brazilian Amazon from 1870 to 1910. 
For the analysis, a new theoretical framework was built. The framework is general enough 
to be applied to other commodities as well. The departure point was general trade theory 
that provides two basic explanations for patterns of trade: technology and endowments. 
However, these standard trade models usually consider trade in isolation from investment, 
finance, or other relations between traders. It was thus necessary to combine these 
features as well as institutions and geography in order to generate a more suitable 
framework for the analysis of commodity chains, and of the rubber chain in particular. A 
more quantitative-driven analysis from macroeconomic data gave further support to 
inferences taken from microeconomic behaviour. From this analysis of the rubber chain, 
contributions to Commodity Chain Literature, and World, Brazilian and Amazonian 
Economic History are made.
There are two levels of analysis. The thesis analyses interactions that happened 
within the nodes of the chain as well as interactions between different nodes of the chain. 
In the within-analysis, competition among agents located in the same node is examined. 
In the between-analysis, no pre-defined power structure is imposed ad hoc: indeed, the 
location of the nodes did not imply any power structure along the chain, location being 
merely the result of an historical process that, in turn, was a consequence of technology 
and endowment factors as well as institutions. Power between nodes of the chain was 
understood under a game theoretical framework. This was in fact one of the most 
innovative theoretical concepts developed in the thesis.
The organisation of the thesis followed the stylised chain as presented in Chapter 
1. The thesis began by analysing the rubber manufacturing industry. In a Ricardian 
fashion, at first, the proximity to rubber sources and the dexterity in the manipulation of 
rubber provided comparative advantage to indigenous rubber manufactures. However, the 
discovery of the vulcanisation process undermined the superior quality of indigenous 
production and made possible the centralisation of rubber manufacture in factories:
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vulcanisation shifted comparative advantage in rubber manufacturing towards Britain and 
the USA. From then on, the pattern of trade became mainly understood as a result of 
Hecksher-Ohlin forces: Brazil specialised in the production of crude rubber due to the 
relative abundance of rubber trees in the Brazilian Amazon whereas Britain and the USA 
specialised in the production of rubber manufactures due to the relative abundance of 
capital, that became a requisite for larger rubber concerns. Therefore, from the 1860s 
onwards, Britain and the USA deepened their industrial position in rubber manufacturing 
with a similar technology being used on both sides of the Atlantic.
Even though standard trade models explain the geography of rubber trade (and by 
consequence the first node of the rubber chain, namely, the rubber manufacturing 
industry) there were other forces at play. Institutions were, undoubtedly, very important. 
Formal institutions, notably patent legislation, influenced and shaped the market structure 
of the rubber manufacturing industry. Patents encouraged a process of amalgamations in 
Britain and the USA even though the rubber industry remained quite competitive on both 
sides of the Atlantic. This competition at the manufacturing level resounded along the 
chain, translating into a struggle for securing a steady and reliable source of crude rubber, 
the main input in the industry. The thesis enhances the analysis of the rubber chain by 
acknowledging that trade is not carried out under neoclassical assumptions: the 
relationship between parties to trade and the role of investment and finance was 
instrumental to understand the actual pattern of the rubber trade that emerged. Given its 
scarcity, crude rubber was very expensive and access to resources thus became strategic 
to determine or influence profitability at the manufacturing level, turning the manufacturing 
node of the rubber chain into something very different from the ideal GCC/‘Wallersteinian’ 
core-node type. True, the British rubber industry was better positioned compared to its 
American counterpart: since British traders were importing more crude rubber than the 
British industry needed, they were able to pass through the burden of crude rubber 
scarcity to American buyers since the latter were unable to meet all their demand from 
primary sources. Furthermore, there was also scope for exporters placed in Brazil to 
extract monopoly rents especially from American buyers who registered a more inelastic
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demand for their product when compared to British demand for Brazilian crude rubber (- 
1.11 for the USA against -1.54 for the Britain). Inelasticity of demand for rubber was 
indeed one of the main features of this commodity chain from 1870 to 1910, a feature that 
actually shaped the market structure in several different nodes of the chain, affected the 
bargain position of players located in different nodes and defined the division of profits 
along the chain. Inelasticity of demand was indeed the main determinant of the pattern of 
British and American investments in rubber production and trade. The scarcity of crude 
rubber led to a struggle along the rubber chain for a steady supply of that raw product: the 
rubber manufacturing industry needed to break the dependence upon an unreliable raw 
product which defined its prices and the ultimate level of its own production.
The consequent geography of trade impacted the quality of the raw material the 
industrial countries (especially Britain and the USA) were acquiring. As crude rubber was 
not a homogeneous commodity, the possibilities of production became defined by the 
quality of the crude rubber imported. In a neoclassical market, prices would have cleared 
the market: those in need of the best rubber quality could always pay the market price and 
get the needed amount of the product. However, trade was in fact the result of a 
constellation of institutions: it was usually hidden behind forward long-term contracts and 
followed colonial lines. First, the thesis stressed the fact that the rubber market was far 
from comprised of anonymous and atomised agents transacting with one another. Traders 
and manufacturers usually established long lasting connections that impacted on the way 
they traded: it was not easy to by-pass this informal arrangement and the US buyers early 
understood it. Secondly, traders preferred to establish commercial activities in areas 
under the jurisdiction of their native countries. This happened sometimes because these 
traders were prevented from establishing themselves in another country’s colonies. Even 
when jurisdiction was not an issue, the rubber trade followed their country’s informal areas 
of influence, as it happened in the relationship between Mexico and the USA. Thirdly, 
geographical and economic distances (first and second-nature geographical aspects) 
further influenced and shaped the pattern of the rubber trade.
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In regard to the main rubber producer, the Brazilian Amazon was not a formal or 
informal colony of either the USA or Britain. The ensuing struggle between American and 
British buyers to obtain a competitive edge by securing a more stable and reliable access 
to Brazilian rubber reserves may have prevented concerted action among rubber 
importers, giving some room for manoeuvre to rubber exporters placed in producing 
regions, notably in Brazil. Such seemed to be the case of the Brazilian/Portuguese export 
house, J.H.Andresen. The relationship between this company and its main buyer (a British 
rubber import house) resembled a usual trade relationship in which both companies 
benefited and the thesis further indicated that if any company exercised market power, it 
was probably the Brazilian/Portuguese export house. Export houses in Brazil were not 
free to act as monopolists or oligopolists in the rubber market though. In the Brazilian 
supply chain there was a counteracting force that prevented players from extracting 
monopoly rents fully: the scarcity of labourers. However, the thesis rejects the assumption 
that production was only possible due the creation of an exploitative labour system. It 
does not deny that debt enslavement and coercion were present in the Brazilian Amazon, 
but it rejects the idea that it was a necessary feature of rubber production. In this regard, 
the thesis advances a game theoretic model that unveils the bargain positions of 
labourers and rubber estate owners. Instead of assuming any pre-defined power 
relationship between these transacting agents, the game simplifies the motivations of both 
parties into a general framework that is further constrained by the institutions existent and 
created in the Brazilian Amazon. The game suggests that there were several possible 
scenarios in which production could have been enforced according to the roles of four 
main variables: tapper’s horizon of planning, reward from cheating, expected income from 
an alternative employment and the implicit and explicit prices paid for rubber produced. 
The game was further applied to the analysis of power between the other nodes of the 
rubber chain within the Brazilian Amazon. The rubber chain became then very intricate 
and the relations of power ceased to necessarily follow a vertical one in which every 
forward node is able to exploit the node immediately beneath it, as the GCC approach 
usually assumes. Yet, it was possible that rubber exporters were even better positioned to
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extract monopoly rents due to their knowledge of the rubber market and the degree of 
oligopolisation of their activities but they did not necessarily do so. Not least because it 
was easier to enforce rubber production under a scenario of constant production 
expansion and of high inelasticity of demand, like the one that prevailed from 1870 to
1910. Under this scenario, all factors of production could have been properly remunerated.
If it is not certain that any particular node of the rubber chain was extracting 
monopoly rents in full, the government was certainly profiting from the monopolistic 
position the Amazonian region had in rubber markets. The literature on Brazilian rubber 
has indeed neglected the fact that the government could have been able to ensure the 
monopoly outcome even under a high degree of competition amongst Brazilian rubber 
exporters and under a high inelasticity of supply. The government possessed several 
mechanisms to pursue this goal: nationalisation of rubber production, licensing scheme, 
stockpiling, export tariffs and import tariffs over goods that affect the rubber cost structure. 
It is argued here that export tariff and import tariff were the main instruments actually used 
by the government but the welfare analysis focused on the export tariff. Under reasonable 
assumptions, results here suggest that the optimum export tariff could have ranged 
between 96.2%-126.5%, but the government levied only 16.6% on average in the years 
for which data were available (1870-1910). Had the government imposed the optimum 
export tariff, welfare could have been increased as much as £341,444 per year from 1891- 
1910, equivalent to 1.89% of Amazonian GDP in the period. This welfare would have 
been generated on top of 1.80% that had already been generated by the government 
when it set the export tariff at 18.9% in the same period (1891-1910). But why did the 
government not increase the tariff up to the optimum level? The thesis argues that the 
government was constrained in three levels: 1) Internationally: the Federal government 
may have feared international retaliation (especially from consuming countries) from such 
a tax policy; 2) Regionally: the competition among the three government entities (Para 
and Amazonas States and Acre Territory) for tax revenues generated a sub-optimal 
outcome; 3) Locally: pressure from business groups might have constrained the ability of 
the government to increase the export tax on rubber even more.
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Overall, the thesis supports the view of Frank and Musacchio that there was no 
economic imperialism in the Amazon as the rubber chain does not fit into the model of 
peripherality of raw material and centrality of manufacture. This traditional formulation is at 
the heart of the GCC approach which suggests that production in the periphery (Brazil) 
should have developed in tandem with impulses emanating from the industrial core (USA 
and Europe). That pattern would ensure that profits in the periphery would either be held 
down (so as to maximise profits at the industrial core) or be high in order to ensure 
profitability from investments flowing from the industrial core. It is not surprising that for a 
quite long period, given the high inelasticity of demand for Brazilian rubber, manufacturers 
in the core economies were tied to developments occurring within the Brazilian Amazon, 
diametrically contrary to the traditional assumption of economic imperialism and to that 
embedded in the GCC approach. However, contrary to Frank and Musacchio, the thesis 
shows that imperialism cannot be completely dismissed though as the government (as 
well as all other agents in the rubber chain) was sometimes constrained by foreign 
pressures.
From taxation, the Amazonian State governments accumulated considerable 
wealth that was partly redistributed back to the region in form of investments and 
subsidies. These funds were instrumental to develop two rubber supporting activities, 
telegraphs and steamships, whose impacts on the chain were analysed in this thesis. 
Interestingly, rubber had fostered the development of submarine telegraphs for low rubber 
grades were used to insulate copper. Furthermore, rubber was also important in the 
improvement of the efficiency of steam engines insofar as this raw material was 
sometimes used as seals. Steam navigation and telegraphs gave rise to the rubber boom 
which, in turn, supported yet more the development of the (steam) navigation and the 
telegraphic system. The rubber boom demanded a better communication and transport 
systems and the consequent increased intensity in the flow of people and merchandises 
provided these systems with economies of scale that ensured their ulterior development. 
The spread of news and the improvement in the transport system also provided the region 
with the scarcest factor of production, labour, and, as shown here, the Brazilian rubber
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supply was very inelastic to this factor of production. Furthermore, the advent of 
steamship navigation in the Amazon region displaced canoes, releasing even more 
labourers to work in the rubber industry. Thus communication and (steam) navigation 
generated some integration, and the consequent movement of people (and other factors 
of production) and flow of information, created the conditions for further development of 
the rubber boom by supporting a virtuous cycle. In sum, without rubber, steamships might 
have been even more costly to operate, and the submarine telegraphic system may have 
never developed. Analogously, without steamships and telegraphic communication, the 
rubber boom might have never taken place.
As stated in the first paragraph of this conclusion, the thesis makes several distinct 
contributions. First, the thesis constructs a new theoretical framework that was applied to 
the study of the rubber chain and which can be adapted for other commodity chains too. 
The analysis spans two levels: interactions among agents located within the same node of 
the chain and between agents located in different nodes. Whereas in the within-analysis, 
competition was the predominant topic of discussion, in the between-analysis game 
theory was applied in order to model bargaining power. Such analysis offers the most 
comprehensive study on the rubber chain ever produced, examining the rubber chain from 
tappers to manufacturers. Analytically, the thesis combines trade models with institutions, 
economic geography and econometrics, providing a new view on the organisation and 
evolution of rubber trade from 1870 to 1910. It is argued that institutions shaped the 
development of the rubber boom and permeated each and every node of the rubber chain. 
Although the thesis shows that the framework can be fully applied to commodity chains, a 
word of caution is needed: the framework assumes a partial equilibrium approach and 
sometimes some connections between different markets may be missing. However, the 
thesis retains the basic properties and features of the rubber chain. Its validity is indeed 
corroborated by qualitative and quantitative historical evidences and data.
Secondly, the thesis contributes to Global Economic History. Rubber was an 
important raw material whose industrial applications increased over time. This raw 
material is indeed at the heart of two important technological developments of the
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industrial world, steam engine and motorcars, as rubber provided performance gains for 
both products. Before the advent of large scale plantations, rubber was a very scarce raw 
material for which there were virtually no substitutes available: its natural elasticity 
rendered the product unique. Consequently, scarcity and poor substitutability made 
demand very price inelastic. That is exactly one of the main features of the story here. 
Inelasticity of demand drove production methods to be rubber-saving. The more scarce 
this raw material was the more incentives agents had to innovate: little wonder that the 
USA led the world in reclaimed rubber, first, and in synthetic rubber later. Therefore, the 
thesis explains the development of the rubber manufacturing industry in the USA and 
Britain. The need to secure a steady and reliable source of crude rubber explained how 
competition resounded along the chain, giving rise to a specific pattern of trade. As the 
thesis shows, this pattern of trade was yet shaped by institutions and economic 
geography. Furthermore, the inelasticity of demand for rubber shifted power between 
nodes of the chain. Indeed, the Wallersteinian pre-eminence of manufacturing over 
extractive industries is not valid here. Due to a combination of quantity and quality, rubber 
traders located in the Brazilian Amazon are likely to have possessed the highest degree of 
market power, allowing them to ultimately influence rubber manufacturing and not the 
other way around. Even if it is believed that these agents did not exercise this market 
power, for whatever reasons, the governments of the Amazonian States certainly profited 
substantially from the monopolistic position of the region on the world rubber markets. The 
rubber chain thus shows an interesting case in which taxation was beneficial for the region 
as a whole without generating immiserising growth.
Thirdly, the thesis contributes to Brazilian economic historiography. The rubber 
chain in the Brazilian Amazon is not analysed in vacuum as economic and political 
connections with other parts of the country were taken into account. These interactions 
produced a skewed insertion of the Brazilian Amazon into the world economy. In 
comparative terms, despite geographical proximity, the region strengthened its ties with 
Britain in detriment to the USA. Deeper domestic integration was also a reality during the 
rubber boom. Hence capital, people, goods and information were exchanged between the
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Amazon and the rest of Brazil and between the Brazilian Amazon and the rest of the world. 
Internationally, two places figured prominently: Britain and the USA. Domestically, Ceara 
(and other Northeastern States) from where most of the immigration originated and Rio de 
Janeiro, the political capital during the period, stood out. The relationship with Rio de 
Janeiro was explored in detail. During the empire, the Amazon region lacked autonomy, 
being thus dependent on Rio de Janeiro. After the Proclamation of the Republic, with the 
consequent adoption of the Federalist regime, the region was granted more political and 
economic autonomy. This autonomy was indeed exercised by Amazonian governments 
via taxation on exports.
Lastly, the thesis fills a big gap in the economic historiography of the Brazilian 
Amazon. As it is clear from the thesis, there are very few contributions on the economic 
history of the Brazilian Amazon. Given the importance of rubber, not least due to its 
impacts on trade and foreign exchange, it is surprising that the literature is so 
disproportionately poor compared to the literature produced for coffee in the Brazilian 
South-East. As shown here, one topic of discussion fits prominently: labour relations. The 
thesis provides a game theoretic approach that changes the long established view about 
labour relations in the Brazilian Amazon. It is shown that, contrary to existing the literature, 
violence and coercion were not necessary features of rubber production. Production could 
have been assured via market mechanisms that were shown to have been more prevalent 
than what the literature believed or assumed.
The thesis goes beyond labour relations. Not only does it provide a more 
comprehensive account of the rubber boom (as existing works had also attempted) but it 
also links rubber supply and demand. The thesis thus analyses the impulses of demand, 
especially the motorcar industry. It shows that demand became more price-inelastic over 
time, increasing the room of manoeuvre of agents placed in the Brazilian Amazon. Again, 
inelasticity is the main feature in the story here. Indeed, due to inelasticity there was 
scope for taxation to increase the regional welfare. The thesis thus provides a welfare 
analysis that shows how much the region profited from taxation and how much it could 
have profited had the government set the tariff at the optimum level. Clearly, there were
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winners and losers but, overall, the region profited from rubber taxation as rubber 
consumers paid most of the taxation burden. This gives further support for the absence of 
imperialism in the Brazilian Amazon even though the government ability to tax was limited 
to some extent. Moreover, the thesis provides an interesting case study that unveils the 
behaviour of an important British rubber trader (Schroder) and the connection with its 
main supplier located in the Brazilian Amazon (J.H.Andresen). It is argued that the 
relationship between these two companies resembled a usual trade relationship but if any 
company possessed market power over another, it was probably the Brazilian/Portuguese 
export house. Once more, there is further indication that economic imperialism does not fit 
neatly into the picture here.
In order to support all these claims and findings an extensive dataset was 
collected and organised. New evidence presented in this thesis is based on data 
organised in the Appendix. An entirely new dataset for the rubber trade was compiled 
from British, US and French import data. It contains quantities, values and prices of crude 
rubber imported not only from Brazil but also from all other sources of supply. A more 
detailed price dataset was constructed from contemporary publications reflecting market 
quotations for the main rubber grades. As can be inferred from the Appendix, Brazilian 
official statistics seemed to have underestimated the quantities a great deal, as these 
three countries have imported more rubber from Brazil than total Brazilian official statistics 
suggest. This difference is even more strinking if it is taken into account that rubber would 
probably still lose some weight in transit. The advantage of Brazilian official statistics is 
that it breaks the data down by administrative units: Para, Amazonas and Acre. Trade 
statistics can then be matched with export tax earnings to generate ad valorem export 
taxes at the State/Provincial level. Brazilian official statistics also provided rubber 
production data on a more detailed level, for lower administrative units (by villages or 
rivers). It is possible then to combine this very detailed rubber trade data with information 
on freights. Extensive data on freight rates for rubber are provided, encompassing 
different methods of transportation (for instance canoes) and several different routes. This 
vibrant trade was accompanied and sustained by a communication network for which
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postal and telegraphic communication data were compiled. Moreover, the thesis further 
provides data on rubber manufacturing, wages in the Brazilian Amazon, investments in 
the region, etc.
Therefore, the thesis advances in several fronts the current historiography. Yet, 
there are several improvements that can be made. First, in view of the findings here, the 
business history of tyre companies (and of rubber companies in general) needs to be 
revisited and augmented by including French and German rubber manufacturers too. This 
revision is required in order to explore the rubber famine these companies experienced. 
Their relationship with rubber traders requires further work as well, especially regarding 
the share of the market that was spot and how much was actually channelled, on a yearly 
basis, through forward contracts. More case studies on the rubber trade are needed, so 
that it is possible to make more general statements about the relationship between traders 
located in producing and consuming countries. In particular, it is necessary to know more 
about the behaviour of rubber exporters placed in Brazil. Were they monopolists and 
monopsonists? Were they only monopolists or monopsonists? Or neither of the above? I 
believe they were neither of the above, but more information on their behaviour is needed 
to establish this on more solid basis. In order to fully determine the impact of 
communications networks (notably shipping and telegraphs) on the rubber trade, more 
data is required. It would thus allow a more quantitative assessment of domestic and 
international market integration as well as an analysis of social savings for the Brazilian 
Amazon. Finally, the interactions between the Brazilian Amazon and the rest of Brazil 
need deeper analysis too, notably regarding the relationship with the coffee producing 
areas in South-East Brazil. Here, a computable general equilibrium model could shed 
more light on how these two booming regions interacted during the period 1870-1910. For 
instance, the thesis shows that taxation was certainly beneficial for the Amazonian region, 
but was it good for Brazil as a whole? Furthermore, how did the exchange market clear in 
a context of two separate markets that barely interacted with each other? These are the 
sort of questions that could be addressed by building up such model. For now, it is only
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possible to speculate that Brazil was far from an immense archipelago of separate 
economic islands as portrayed by Celso Furtado.
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Appendix A: Econometric Results
A.01 - Underlying Model: Almost Ideal Demand System442
The aim of Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) is to provide with a framework that is 
general enough to be used as a first-order approximation to any demand system. 
Preferences are assumed to be represented by a PIGLOG preference, a function that 
allows for exact aggregation over consumers: the market outcome can then be 
understood as the result of independent decisions taken by all agents (or, analogously 
here, by a representative consumer). This class of preferences, PIGLOG, are in turn 
represented via an expenditure function:
log e(u, p ) = ( 1 -  u) log a(p ) + u log b{p) (a. 1)
where u lies between 0 (subsistence) and 1 (bliss) so that the positive linearly 
homogeneous functions a(p) and b(p) represent the cost of subsistence and bliss, 
respectively.
The expenditure function defines the minimum expenditure required to attain a specific 
utility level at given prices and it can be shown that this function will exist whenever 
preferences satisfy the assumption of local non-satiation (since in that case indirect utility 
function would be strictly increasing in income). In this context, the problem of utility 
maximisation can be analogously solved by the minimisation of the expenditure function 
for a given utility level, u*:
e ( u ,p )  = min p x  (a.2)
s.t. u ( x )  =  u *
Any expenditure defined in that way would have the following properties provided that p
»  0 and u > u(0) where u is a continuous utility function representing a locally
nonsatiated preference relation defined on the consumption set X  = :
1. e(p,u) will be non-decreasing in pk for any k and strictly increasing in u\
2 . e(p,u) is homogeneous of degree 1 in p ;
3. e(p,u) is concave in p;
4. e(p,u) is continuous in p and u;
5. If h(p,u), the hicksian demand function, is the bundle with the least cost to attain a
these derivatives exist for every p  > 0 .
This last property is particularly interesting insofar as it is known that the hicksian demand 
at utility u is equal to the marshallian demand at income e(p,u). Therefore, it follows that 
the price derivatives of e(u.p) are the quantities demanded. Conveniently defining log a(p) 
and log b(p) so that at any single point the first and second order derivatives of e(u,p) 
exist:
certain level of utility at prices p ,  then h j ( p , u ) de(p,u)
dp,
,V i = Provided that
(a.3.1)
K  Z  K  J
log b{p) = log a(p ) + /?0 Y l  Pk (a.3.2)
K
It will follow that,
442 This section follows Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).
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de(u,p) (a-4)
 = q‘dPi
Multiplying both sides of equation a.4 by——— , it is straightforward to see that:
e(u,p)
a log e(u,p) _ p igi (a.5)
=  w .
5 log pt e(u, p)
Where w, is the budget share of good /. Therefore, substituting a.3.1 and a.3.2 into
equation a.1 and logarithmic differentiating it, it is possible to obtain the budget shares as
a function of prices and utility:
=«,■+Z  ru lo§ Pj+&uPoY\Pkk
j
where y^ = \ { y . .+ y . )j o u j*
As argued earlier, the expenditure minimisation problem is equivalent to the problem of 
maximisation of utility, meaning that the relations below must always hold, provided that 
v(p,m) = max u and e(p,u) = min px, where v(.) is the indirect utility and w, income:
e(p,v(p,w)) = w (a.7.1)
v(p,e(p,u)) = u (a.7.2)
Condition a.7.1 simply states that w is the lowest income from which it is possible to 
achieve utility v(p,w), whereas condition a.7.2 establishes that the maximum utility at 
income e(p,u) is u. Note that it is implicit the assumption that the individual must spend 
their entire income w otherwise they will not satisfy the maximisation axioms. Hence, 
solving equation a .1 for u as a function of p and x and substituting it into a.6 , it follows 
that:
W, = « ,■ + £  r,j log Pj + A  log (a.8 .1)
j  *
where log P = a0 + Z  <*k l°g  Pk + \  Z  Z  ^  lo§ Pj (3'8'2)
k ^  j  k
Provided that the three set of conditions below hold, equation a.8.1 then represents a 
system of demand functions that add up to total expenditure ( Z w/ = * are
homogeneous of degree zero in prices and total expenditure taken together, and satisfy 
Slutsky symmetry.
n n n /g  Q 1)
5 > , = 1 . 5 > , = O a n d £ 0 =O
/ = ]  1 = 1  i = l
Y jYi, =° <a'92)
r,j = Yu <a -9 -3)
Equation a.8.1 will be the specification to be estimated in this paper. As it is explained 
elsewhere before, from the results obtained, it is possible to compute elasticities of 
demand that each rubber supplier faced, notably Brazilian rubber exporters. It is also
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possible to compute cross elasticites between different sources of rubber, providing a 
notion of substitutability and complementarity between different types of rubber. Lastly, it 
is possible to evaluate welfare analysis between different scenarios of government 
intervention in the market, with focus here lying on Brazilian government taxation over 
rubber exports.
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A.02 - AIDS System from British Data, 1870-1910
____________________________________UK Data__________________________
Estimation Method: Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Sample: 1870 1910
Included observations: 41
Total system (balanced) observations 82
Simultaneous weighting matrix & coefficient iteration
Convergence achieved after: 3 weight matrices, 4 total coef iterations
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C(10) -0.68 0.32 -2.15 3.50%
C(20) -0.28 0.07 -3.76 0.03%
C(30) 0.08 0.06 1.49 14.17%
C(100) 0.07 0.02 3.99 0.02%
C(11) 0.79 0.34 2.30 2.39%
C(31) 0.01 0.06 0.14 88.94%
C(102) -0.03 0.02 -1.77 8.00%
Determinant residual covariance 2.05E-06
Equation: BRZ_MKT = C(10) + C(20)*LOG(BRZ_PRC) + C(30)
*LOG(BRC_PRC) + C(100)*(LOG(ALL_VAL)-LN_PRICE)
Observations: 41
R-squared 0.35 Mean dependent var 0.60
Adjusted R-squared 0.30 S.D. dependent var 0.05
S.E. of regression 0.04 Sum squared resid 0.06
Durbin-Watson stat 1.41
Equation: BRC_MKT = C(11) + C(30)*LOG (B RZ_P RC) + C(31)
*LOG(BRC_PRC) + C(102)*(LOG(ALL_VAL)-LN_PRICE)
Observations: 41
R-squared 0.10 Mean dependent var 0.16
Adjusted R-squared 0.02 S.D. dependent var 0.05
S.E. of regression 0.05 Sum squared resid 0.08
Durbin-Watson stat 0.64
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A.03 - AIDS System from US Data, 1870-1910
___________________________________ USA Data_________________________
Estimation Method: Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Sample: 1870 1910
Included observations: 41
Total system (balanced) observations 82
Simultaneous weighting matrix & coefficient iteration
Convergence achieved after: 6 weight matrices, 7 total coef iterations
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C(10) -0.97 0.30 -3.27 0.16%
C(20) -0.02 0.05 -0.32 75.30%
C(30) -0.18 0.04 -5.09 0.00%
C(100) 0.08 0.02 5.06 0.00%
C(11) 0.52 0.22 2.41 1.85%
C(31) 0.23 0.04 5.91 0.00%
C(102) -0.02 0.01 -1.44 15.26%
Determinant residual covariance 2.94E-06
Equation: BRZ_MKT = C(10) + C(20)*LOG(BRZ_PRC) + C(30)
*LOG(BRC_PRC) + C(100)*(LOG(ALL_VAL)-LN_PRICE)
Observations: 41
R-squared 0.44 Mean dependent var 0.58
Adjusted R-squared 0.39 S.D. dependent var 0.07
S.E. of regression 0.05 Sum squared resid 0.11
Durbin-Watson stat 0.85
Equation: BRC_MKT = C(11) + C(30)*LOG(BRZ_PRC) + C(31)
*LOG(BRC_PRC) + C(102)*(LOG(ALL_VAL)-LN_PRICE)
Observations: 41
R-squared 0.30 Mean dependent var 0.17
Adjusted R-squared 0.25 S.D. dependent var 0.04
S.E. of regression 0.04 Sum squared resid 0.05
Durbin-Watson stat 1.05
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A.04 - Symmetry Test for the British System
Wald Test:
Test Statistic Value df Probability
Chi-square 0.23 1 62.92%
Null Hypothesis Summary:
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err.
C(21) - C(30) 0.04 0.08
Restrictions are linear in coefficients.
A.05 - Symmetry Test for the US System
Wald Test: USA (1870-1910)
Test Statistic Value df Probability
Chi-square 7.46 1 0.63%
Null Hypothesis Summary:
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err.
-C(21) + C(30) -0.23 0.09
Restrictions are linear in coefficients.
A.06 -  AIDS System for British and US data combined, 1870-1910
Estimation Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Date: 02/05/08 Time: 17:39
Sample: 1870 1910
Included observations: 41
Total system (balanced) observations 82
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
0(10) -0.90 0.24 -3.76 0.03%
C(11) -0.15 0.04 -3.44 0.10%
0(12) -0.05 0.03 -1.41 16.18%
C(100) 0.08 0.01 6.24 0.00%
C(20) 0.75 0.22 3.48 0.08%
C(22) 0.10 0.04 2.82 0.62%
C(101) -0.03 0.01 -3.00 0.37%
Determinant residual covariance 0.00
Equation: BRZ_MKT = C(10) + C(11)*LOG(BRZ_PRC) + C(12) 
*LOG(BRC_PRC) + C(100)*(LOG(X)-LN_PRICE) 
Observations: 41
R-squared 0.53
Adjusted R-squared 0.49
S.E. of regression 0.04
Durbin-Watson stat 1.17
Mean dependent var 
S.D.dependent var 
Sum squared resid
0.64
0.05
0.05
Equation: BRC_MKT = C(20) + C(12)*LOG(BRZ_PRC) + C(22) 
*LOG(BRC_PRC) + C(101)*(LOG(X)-LN_PRICE) 
Observations: 41
R-squared 0.18
Adjusted R-squared 0.11
S.E. of regression 0.03
Durbin-Watson stat 0.69
Mean dependent var 
S.D.dependent var 
Sum squared resid
0.11
0.03
0.03
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A.07 -  Symmetry Test for British and US data combined, 1870-1910
Wald Test
Test Statistic Value df Probability
Chi-square 6.93 1 0.85%
Null Hypothesis Summary:
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err.
C(12) - C(21) -0.15 0.06
Restrictions are linear in coefficients.
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Appendix B: Macroeconomic Data
B.01: Total Population in the Brazilian Amazon (divided by Provinces/States)
1840-1910
Years
Amazonas
State
Para State
Acre Federal 
Territory
Amazon
Region
Amazon/
Brazil
1 8 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 9 0 ,0 0 0 2.5%
1 8 1 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1 0 8 ,6 3 9 2.6%
1 8 2 0  /a /b 1 8 ,5 0 6 1 1 8 ,4 9 4 n.a. 1 3 7 ,0 0 0 2.9%
1 8 3 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1 2 8 ,8 9 6 2.4%
1 8 4 0 /b 1 9 ,5 7 0 1 0 9 ,9 6 0 n.a. 1 2 9 ,5 3 0 2.2%
1 8 5 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2 0 0 ,3 9 1 2.8%
1 8 6 0 4 6 ,1 8 7 2 3 2 ,0 6 3 n.a. 2 7 8 ,2 5 0 3.3%
1 8 7 0 5 4 ,8 9 5 2 6 8 ,0 1 4 n.a. 3 2 2 ,9 0 9 3.3%
1 8 8 0 1 2 0 ,8 9 9 2 6 9 ,0 9 8 n.a. 3 8 9 ,9 9 7 3.1%
1 8 9 0 1 4 7 ,9 1 5 3 2 8 ,4 5 5 n.a. 4 7 6 ,3 7 0 3.3%
1 9 0 0 2 4 9 ,7 5 6 4 4 5 ,3 5 6 n.a. 6 9 5 ,1 1 2 4 .0 %
1 9 1 0 3 5 8 ,6 9 5 7 8 3 ,8 4 5 7 4 ,4 8 4 1 ,2 1 7 ,0 2 4 5.1%
1 9 2 0 3 6 3 ,1 6 6 9 8 3 ,5 0 7 9 2 ,3 7 9 1 ,4 3 9 ,0 5 2 4 .7 %
Notes: n.a. = not available. Note that Acre Federal State was part of Bolivia until 1903 when through Petropolis Treaty
Brazil bought this Area from Bolivia.
la Breakdown figures by Provinces/States based on 1819 shares.
lb Brazilian population for 1820 and 1840 was obtained by linear interpolation from the nearest years for which 
data was available.
Sources: Elaborated from Santos, Roberto. Historia Economica da Amazonia, 1980 and Giorgio Mortara (Estatisticas 
Historicas do Brasil, p. 31, Tab. 1.5).
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B.02: Population Breakdown (selected years), 1854-1920
Amazonas Para
Free Slaves Free Slaves
Sex Ratio Total Sex Ratio Total Sex Ratio Total Sex Ratio Total
1854 100 41,411 94 1,189 90 173,750 103 33,650
1872 121 56,631 99 979 108 247,779 103 27,463
1890 121 147,915 - - 103 328,455 -
1900 121 249,756 - - 105 445,356 -
1920 118 363,166 - - 105 983,507 -
Note: Sex ratio is defined as males/females.
Sources: a) 1854 and 1872: Botelho, Tarcisio Rodrigues. Populacao e Nacao no Brasil do Seculo XIX, tese de
doutorado, sp, usp, 1999; b) 1890, 1900 and 1920: Brasil. Estatisticas Historicas do Brasil. Series 
Economicas, Demograficas e Sociais de 1550 a 1985. Rio de Janeiro, IBGE, 1987.
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B.03: GDP Estimates for the Brazilian Amazon, 1800-1915
Total GDP 
BRZ mil-reis
Primary Sector 
BRZ mil-reis
Secondary Sector 
BRZ mil-reis
Terciary Sector 
BRZ mil-reis
1800 $698,328 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1805 $718,786 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1810 $376,307 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1815 $491,146 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1820 $503,333 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1825 $554,118 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1830 $748,235 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1835 $611,111 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1838 $945,000 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1840 $1,402,728 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1845 $1,945,554 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1850 $3,641,895 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1855 $8,644,666 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1860 $14,242,303 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1865 $16,161,342 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1870 $24,704,963 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1875 $37,291,930 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1880 $47,077,464 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1885 $85,549,250 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1890 $106,222,192 $53,953,169 $548,222 $51,720,801
1895 $175,697,357 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1900 $371,138,276 $181,039,545 $6,221,963 $183,876,768
1905 $283,938,000 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1910 $485,833,410 $218,286,714 $19,605,371 $247,941,325
1915 $153,568,000 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Elaborated from Santos (1980, pp. 332-8).
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B.04: Rural Wages in the Brazilian Amazon, 1911
Rural Wages in 
1911
Para Amazonas
in BRZ milreis in BRZ milreis
Minimum Average Maximum Minimum Average Maximum
Agricultural Worker 3$000 10$000 3$000 6$500 10$000
Carpenter 5$000 15$000 15$000 25$000 35$000
Stonemason 15$000 25$000 35$000
Note: It does not include payments in kind, especially in form of food. For Amazonas, the total wage with food would be
increased by 1$000 to 1$200 BRZ milreis.
Source: Elaborated from Ministerio da Agricultura, Industria e Comercio - Diretoria do Servigo de Inspecfao e Fomento 
Agricolas: ASPECTOS DA ECONOMIA RURAL BRASILEIRA, 1922.
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B.05: Price Differential in the Brazilian Amazon
Price Differencials
At Solimoes River At Madeira River
Tappers/Rio de Janeiro 4.9 10.2
Tappers/Estate Owner 1.6 3.4
T appers/Intermediary 2.4 5.0
Estate Owner/Intermediary 1.5 1.5
Intermediary/Rio de Janeiro 2.1 2.1
Source: Santos (1980, p. 170). Figure shows the difference in prices of merchandises, 
practised by different nodes along the rubber chain.
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B.06: Exchange Rates, 1870-1912
V S $ / £
(1)
Penc e! milreis
(2)
US$lmilreis
(3)
1870 $5.59 22.06 $0.51
1871 $5.46 24.03 $0.55
1872 $5.45 25.00 $0.57
1873 $5.55 26.09 $0.60
1874 $5.42 25.78 $0.58
1875 $5.59 27.22 $0.63
1876 $5.42 25.34 $0.57
1877 $5.08 24.56 $0.52
1878 $4.89 22.94 $0.47
1879 $4.85 21.38 $0.43
1880 $4.84 22.09 $0.45
1881 $4.83 21.91 $0.44
1882 $4.87 21.16 $0.43
1883 $4.85 21.56 $0.44
1884 $4.85 20.69 $0.42
1885 $4.86 18.59 $0.38
1886 $4.86 18.69 $0.38
1887 $4.85 22.44 $0.45
1888 $4.87 25.25 $0.51
1889 $4.87 26.44 $0.54
1890 $4.86 22.56 $0.46
1891 $4.86 14.91 $0.30
1892 $4.87 12.03 $0.24
1893 $4.86 11.59 $0.23
1894 $4.88 10.09 $0.21
1895 $4.89 9.94 $0.20
1896 $4.87 9.06 $0.18
1897 $4.86 7.72 $0.16
1898 $4.85 7.19 $0.15
1899 $4.86 7.44 $0.15
1900 $4.87 9.50 $0.19
1901 $4.87 11.38 $0.23
1902 $4.87 11.97 $0.24
1903 $4.86 12.00 $0.24
1904 $4.87 12.22 $0.25
1905 $4.87 15.68 $0.32
1906 $4.85 16.19 $0.33
1907 $4.86 15.22 $0.31
1908 $4.87 15.16 $0.31
1909 $4.87 15.16 $0.31
1910 $4.86 16.23 $0.33
1911 $4.86 16.11 $0.33
1912 $4.87 16.16 $0.33
Sources: (1) Lawrence H. Officer, "Dollar-Pound Exchange Rate From 1791," MeasuringWorth, 2008. URL: 
http://www.measurinaworth.orQ/exchanaeDQund/
(2) Taxa de cambio - libra esterlina / mil reis - RJ - Pence - Outras fontes - HIST_ERVL. IPEADATA, 2008 URL: 
http://www.ipeadata.gov.br
(3) = (1)*(2)/240
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Appendix C: Rubber Trade Data
C.01: Notes on Rubber Trade Statistics, 1870-1912
Statistics during the Second Empire (1840-1889) were noticeably better when 
compared with the First Republic (1889-1930). The Second Empire was an exercise of 
State building in which the Emperor tried to extend the central government authority over 
all corners of the country. For this aim, he needed up to date and reliable information 
about the Provinces. Presidents of the Provinces were appointed by the Emperor and 
usually drawn from the central elite. In order to weaken political ties between the 
Presidents and the local elites, Presidents were constantly changing seats. In 1889, a 
peaceful military coup overthrew the Emperor and established a Republican Federation 
but the government was handed to civilians just a few years later. Provinces became 
States and appointed Presidents were replaced by locally elected Governors. Under the 
Federation, States were given rights to tax exports while import taxation stayed in the 
hands of the central government. During the Empire, only the central government had 
right to tax trade even though States sometimes applied export taxes on foreign and inter- 
Provincial commerce.
The first decade of the Republic was marked by political and economic instability 
with high inflation, falling exchange rates and external default. Yet, at the turn of the 
century, economic policy started leaning towards monetary orthodoxy. From 1906 to 1914 
the country formally adopted the gold standard. Sudden changes in the exchange rates 
were particularly damaging for trade statistics. Trade values denominated in foreign 
currency may have varied widely, depending on which parity was used as a benchmark: 
average over the year, end of the year, etc. Sometimes, for taxation purposes, values 
were computed from official prices generating additional problems for the trade statistics. 
Smuggling, double-counting and inaccuracies may have turned trade quantities very 
unreliable too.
There are three sources for exported quantities of rubber: regional, central and 
foreign. Regional data come from the Provinces/States and were reported in regional 
publications such as Fallas (Speeches) of Presidents/Governors and Annual Reports. 
Central statistics were produced by the Empire and later by the Federal governments. 
These national data on rubber exports were later compiled and organised by IBGE 
(National Institute of Geography and Statistics in the Anuario Estatlstico do Brasil, Ano V, 
1939/40) and republished in the volume Estatlsticas Historicas do Brasil. Lastly, foreign 
data were obtained from importing statistics of the main rubber consumers: France, 
United States and Britain. Figure C.02 below shows that these three sources do not agree 
on the amount of rubber exported by either the Brazilian Amazon or Brazil.
Due to changes in the quality of data reporting, it is necessary to break Figure C.02 
into two different periods representing the Empire and the Republic. In the first period 
(until 1889), regional statistics suggest a higher amount of rubber was exported when 
compared to central Statistics. There are at least three possible reasons for this: 1) there 
was systematic error in one of the sources, possibly in the provincial data due to the fact 
that the central series was supposedly corrected backwards by IBGE in the 1940s; 2) 
Different definition of what exported rubber was443 as, for instance, caucho may have not 
been considered as rubber; 3) As exports from inland provinces (and some neighbouring 
countries) had to pass through a coastal province (as was the case of the Mato-Grosso 
and Amazonas), there may have occurred double-counting. However, foreign statistics 
were systematically higher than those reported by the country as a whole, meaning that 
central statistics were undoubtedly under-reported (assuming that foreign statistics are 
correct)444. Yet the foreign statistics do not even include other important markets for 
Brazilian rubber: Portugal, Belgium and Germany. In turn, apart from a few years445,
443 In the statistics, rubber (borracha) was reported under different categories: borracha fina, 
borracha entrefina, borracha sernamby, caucho, mangabeira, manigoba, and massaranduba.
444 It is important to remember that the exports of rubber reported by Brazilian Statistics must be at 
least as large as those reported by importing countries, not least because of shrinkage of rubber in 
transit. It is more likely that smuggling occurred in the Brazilian Amazon than, say, in Liverpool.
445 Some differences in the statistics may arise due to the time of travel: for instance, if rubber was 
shipped in Brazil in December 1900, it may only arrive in Europe or in the USA in January 1901.
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regional statistics were always higher than foreign ones. Therefore, during the Empire, 
regional statistics seem more reliable than central ones. From 1890 to 1912, the opposite 
was true.446 First, central statistics were systematically higher than regional statistics. This 
makes sense and it is expected as there were some other states in Brazil that also 
produced rubber. The difference may come from their exports of rubber. However, looking 
at the original sources of the central statistics (for instance: Importagao e Exportagao, 
Movimento Maritimo, Cambial e do Cafe da Republica dos Estados Unidos do Brazil, 
Servigo de Estatlstica Commercial, Ministerio da Fazenda), it is possible to see that 
figures for the Amazonas and Para States and the Federal Territory of Acre were 
considerably larger than that reported in their regional statistics. Moreover, the difference 
does not stem from different definition of what rubber represented. Comparing regional 
statistics against foreign ones, it is possible to see that regional statistics were under 
reported. Even if rubber exports from other Brazilian states are added, foreign imports of 
rubber are considerably higher in nearly all years after 1889. In this period, central 
statistics of rubber exports are higher than than reported by major importing countries and 
thus are considered more reliable.
In sum, during the Second Empire regional statistics are more likely to be correct 
and, during the First Republic, central statistics seem more reliable. Yet it is impossible to 
know how reliable these two series really are. Therefore, unless otherwise stated, foreign 
statistics, which refer to rubber imports from Brazil as a whole, will be used as 
representative for the Brazilian Amazon. Other States did export rubber but only in 
insignificant quantities. Foreign statistics may have encompassed rubber exports from 
neighbouring countries (such as Peru, Colombia and Bolivia) but this may not be a 
significant problem. For instance, as econometric exercises are interested to assess the 
degree of market power by exporters placed in Brazil, it is possible that these agents did 
have some degree of control of rubber that was being channelled through the Brazilian 
Amazon, even if produced elsewhere.
446 This stroke me as odd though. I was expecting that the administrative unit which was 
responsible for taxing would produce the most reliable series of rubber exports. It seems that the 
opposite happened.
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C.02: Comparing Different Sources of Rubber Trade Statistics, 1870-1912
Regional Data Central Data Foreign Data Central - Regional_________ Foreign - Regional__________Foreign - Central
(1)______________ [2]______________ [3]_____________________ (2 )-(1 )___________________ (3) - (1)___________________ (3) - (2)
6,239 4,912 5,195 -1,327 -1,044 283
6,684 5,369 4,741 -1,315 -1,942 -627
6,991 5,381 5,667 -1,611 -1,324 287
7,754 5,882 6,279 -1,872 -1,476 397
8,004 6,266 6,127 -1,738 -1,877 -139
7,723 5,785 7,108 -1,938 -615 1,323
7,819 5,956 6,797 -1,864 -1,023 841
8,562 6,409 7,393 -2,153 -1,169 984
9,222 6,549 7,583 -2,673 -1,639 1,034
9,678 6,668 7,708 -3,010 -1,970 1,040
8,679 6,802 7,623 -1,878 -1,056 822
8,620 6,782 8,860 -1,839 240 2,078
9,806 7,170 9,030 -2,636 -776 1,860
10,542 8,326 9,667 -2,216 -875 1,341
10,393 8,528 10,537 -1,865 145 2,009
12,316 8,045 11,988 -4,272 -328 3,944
13,164 8,414 12,806 -4,750 -357 4,393
13,711 6,695 14,013 -7,016 302 7,318
15,458 17,062 17,051 1,604 1,593 -11
15,938 15,990 15,623 52 -316 -367
566 
-404 
609 
776 
-963 
-7,099 
-2,899 
-1,684 
2,765 
1,996 
2,255 
-890 
-192 
-2,768 
-3,806 
-2,909 
-4,581 
-716 
-5,085 
-555 
1,909 
-2,979 
 21
(1) = Figure C.19, series 1 + Figure C.20, series 1 + Figure C.21, series 1
(2) = Figure C.05, series 1
(3) = Figure C.05, series 2 + series 3 + series 4.
15,355 15,355 15,921 0 566
16,650 16,650 16,246 0 -404
15,990 18,250 18,859 2,260 2,869
17,965 19,050 19,826 1,085 1,861
16,821 19,710 18,747 2,889 1,926
17,786 27,794 20,695 10,008 2,909
18,008 24,370 21,471 6,362 3,463
19,700 21,621 19,937 1,921 237
19,830 21,218 23,983 1,388 4,153
22,930 20,790 22,786 -2,140 -144
24,427 24,302 26,557 -125 2,130
25,746 30,241 29,351 4,495 3,605
24,212 28,632 28,440 4,420 4,227
26,921 31,717 28,949 4,796 2,027
26,801 31,866 28,060 5,065 1,259
31,342 35,393 32,484 4,051 1,142
31,081 34,960 30,379 3,879 -702
32,532 36,490 35,774 3,958 3,243
32,270 38,206 33,121 5,936 851
32,609 39,027 38,472 6,418 5,863
32,224 38,547 40,456 6,323 8,232
31,303 36,547 33,568 5,244 2,265
33,869 42,286 42,307 8,417 8,438
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C.03: Brazilian Official Statistics of Trade, 1870-1912
Value of Brazilian Total Brazilian % Rubber in Total
Rubber Exported Exports Exports
£1,000 £1,000 %
(1) (2) (1)/(2)
1870 741 15,446 4.80%
1871 988 17,264 5.72%
1872 1,050 20,741 5.06%
1873 1,099 21,506 5.11%
1874 1,126 21,506 5.23%
1875 1,125 21,606 5.20%
1876 1,154 20,697 5.58%
1877 1,181 19,818 5.96%
1878 1,142 19,286 5.92%
1879 1,086 19,649 5.53%
1880 1,091 20,519 5.31%
1881 1,093 20,194 5.41%
1882 1,173 18,258 6.42%
1883 1,050 18,436 5.70%
1884 883 19,499 4.53%
1885 901 17,307 5.21%
1886 941 17,806 5.28%
1887 1,164 21,954 5.30%
1888 4,024 27,566 14.60%
1889 2,788 39,409 7.07%
1890 2,550 40,658 6.27%
1891 2,686 40,327 6.66%
1892 3,012 44,422 6.78%
1893 3,403 47,434 7.17%
1894 3,554 46,495 7.64%
1895 5,055 47,832 10.57%
1896 3,774 44,626 8.46%
1897 4,232 40,050 * 10.57%
1898 5,325 37,961 14.03%
1899 6,126 38,055 16.10%
1900 6,429 45,936 14.00%
1901 8,627 57,204 15.08%
1902 7,294 56,748 12.85%
1903 9,734 55,052 17.68%
1904 11,220 57,847 19.40%
1905 14,416 64,358 22.40%
1906 14,056 75,381 18.65%
1907 13,690 80,707 16.96%
1908 11,785 71,244 16.54%
1909 18,926 85,802 22.06%
1910 24,646 94,954 25.96%
1911 15,057 98,385 15.30%
1912 16,095 108,069 14.89%
Sources: (1) Estatisticas Historicas do Brasil, 1550-1985, Table 6.40, p. 309.
(2) Estatisticas Historicas do Brasil, 1550-1985, Tables 11.1 and 11.2, pp. 523-524. 
Note: Both series were adjusted for calendar year.
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C.04: Value of Brazilian Rubber Traded, 1870-1912
Value of Brazilian 
Rubber Exported
Value of Brazilian Rubber Imported into 
Selected Countries 
France Britain USA
£1,000
(1)
£1,000
(2)
£1,000
(3)
£1,000
(4)
1870 741 34 721 425
1871 988 31 993 208
1872 1,050 10 961 386
1873 1,099 12 949 561
1874 1,126 28 720 600
1875 1,125 28 1,015 451
1876 1,154 64 940 395
1877 1,181 39 928 511
1878 1,142 47 879 503
1879 1,086 44 1,082 680
1880 1,091 52 1,297 1,007
1881 1,093 103 1,267 1,232
1882 1,173 41 1,460 1,683
1883 1,050 70 1,953 1,786
1884 883 128 1,373 1,494
1885 901 125 1,256 1,108
1886 941 64 1,331 1,419
1887 1,164 147 1,605 1,707
1888 4,024 139 1,604 2,220
1889 2,788 131 1,756 1,554
1890 2,550 158 1,908 1,884
1891 2,686 282 1,765 2,532
1892 3,012 228 1,729 2,818
1893 3,403 195 2,030 2,406
1894 3,554 237 2,021 2,266
1895 5,055 291 2,176 2,698
1896 3,774 386 3,018 2,096
1897 4,232 416 2,672 2,346
1898 5,325 447 3,603 3,088
1899 6,126 646 3,089 3,498
1900 6,429 756 4,322 3,671
1901 8,627 705 3,747 3,474
1902 7,294 713 3,621 3,233
1903 9,734 605 4,518 3,543
1904 11,220 687 4,553 4,608
1905 14,416 993 6,009 5,847
1906 14,056 1,660 5,905 4,915
1907 13,690 1,049 6,244 6,779
1908 11,785 1,243 5,332 3,960
1909 18,926 1,777 8,643 7,036
1910 24,646 3,458 14,473 9,737
1911 15,057 1,840 7,940 5,869
1912 16,095 2,598 6,792 6,548
Source: (1) Estatisticas Historicas do Brasil, 1550-1985, Table 6.40, p. 309. Adjustments were made for different
calendar years.
(2) Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1870-1912.
(3) Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom with Foreign Countries and British 
Possessions (Parliamentary Papers), 1870-1912.
(4) Tableau general du commerce et de la navigation: commerce de la france avec ses colones et les 
puissances etrangeres, 1970-1912.
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C.05: Quantity of Brazilian Rubber Traded, 1870-1912
Official Brazilian Imports of Rubber from Brazil
Export of Rubber France Britain USA
tons tons tons tons
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1870 4,912 121 2,700 2,374
1871 5,369 134 3,640 967
1872 5,381 43 3,462 2,162
1873 5,882 54 3,511 2,714
1874 6,266 132 2,874 3,121
1875 5,785 143 4,229 2,736
1876 5,956 329 4,106 2,361
1877 6,409 223 4,311 2,860
1878 6,549 299 4,619 2,665
1879 6,668 180 4,349 3,179
1880 6,802 213 3,885 3,526
1881 6,782 392 3,938 4,530
1882 7,170 145 3,737 5,148
1883 8,326 235 4,733 4,699
1884 8,528 491 4,626 5,421
1885 8,045 519 4,940 6,530
1886 8,414 265 4,620 7,921
1887 6,695 566 5,789 7,658
1888 17,062 536 5,416 11,099
1889 15,990 546 6,231 8,846
1890 15,335 659 5,817 9,444
1891 16,650 1,005 5,561 9,680
1892 18,250 951 6,339 11,570
1893 19,050 814 6,879 12,133
1894 19,710 988 7,151 10,608
1895 27,794 1,212 7,468 12,015
1896 24,370 1,610 9,866 9,995
1897 21,621 1,486 8,537 9,915
1898 21,218 1,596 10,656 11,731
1899 20,790 1,700 8,628 12,458
1900 24,302 2,262 11,583 12,713
1901 30,241 2,109 11,459 15,783
1902 28,632 2,131 12,006 14,303
1903 31,717 1,808 13,025 14,116
1904 31,866 1,773 11,268 15,018
1905 35,793 2,644 13,241 16,599
1906 34,960 4,100 12,900 13,380
1907 36,490 2,981 14,520 18,274
1908 38,206 3,071 15,242 14,808
1909 39,027 2,804 15,712 19,955
1910 38,547 4,466 18,068 17,922
1911 36,547 3,484 16,013 14,071
1912 42,286 5,678 15,418 21,211
Source: (1) Estatisticas Historicas do Brasil, 1550-1985, Table 6.40, p. 309. Adjustments were made for
different calendar years.
(2) Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1870-1912.
(3) Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom with Foreign Countries and British 
Possessions (Parliamentary Papers), 1870-1912.
(4) Tableau general du commerce et de la navigation: commerce de la france avec ses colones et les 
puissances etrangeres, 1970-1912.
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C.06: Price of Brazilian Rubber Traded, 1870-1912
Implicit Price of Implicit Price of Brazilian Rubber Imported into Selected 
Brazilian Rubber Countries
Exported__________   France______ Britain_____________USA_____
£ per ton £ per ton £ per ton £ per ton
 in _________________(2)_____________£)_____________(4)______
151 282 267 179
184 229 273 215
195 229 277 179
187 229 270 207
180 211 251 192
194 194 240 165
194 194 229 167
184 176 215 179
174 158 190 189
163 246 249 214
160 246 334 286
161 264 322 272
164 282 391 327
126 300 413 380
103 260 297 276
112 240 254 170
112 240 288 179
174 260 277 223
236 260 296 200
174 240 282 176
166 240 328 200
161 280 317 262
165 240 273 244
179 240 295 198
180 240 283 214
182 240 291 225
155 240 306 210
196 280 313 237
251 280 338 263
295 380 358 281
265 334 373 289
285 334 327 220
255 334 302 226
307 334 347 251
352 387 404 307
403 375 454 352
402 405 458 367
375 352 430 371
308 405 350 267
485 634 550 353
639 774 801 543
412 528 496 417
381 458 441 309
(1) Estatisticas Historicas do Brasil, 1550-1985, Table 6.40, p. 309. Adjustments were made for 
different calendar years.
(2) Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1870-1912.
(3) Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom with Foreign Countries and British 
Possessions (Parliamentary Papers), 1870-1912.
(4) Tableau general du commerce et de la navigation: commerce de la france avec ses colones et les 
puissances etrangeres, 1970-1912.
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C.07: Value of Rubber Imported into Britain, 1870-1912
Brazil
Value of Rubber Imported into Britain from selected places
. . . .  Mexico & _ _ ... .Rest of the _ , , _, . Re- British 
Central Africa .Amazon . Exporters Possessions America
Others Total
£ £ £ £ £ £ £ £
720,951 107,588 34,460 75,295 281,406 344,417 33,511 1,597,628
992,955 214,265 27,418 81,112 126,222 203,571 38,738 1,684,281
960,602 105,496 40,293 108,744 142,614 369,879 34,631 1,762,259
949,201 117,906 53,818 140,244 170,240 295,398 19,288 1,746,095
720,210 89,100 42,030 122,957 142,850 197,363 12,095 1,326,605
1,015,204 60,256 47,408 113,863 145,192 165,745 22,890 1,570,558
939,886 34,040 44,290 140,007 126,210 199,730 52,497 1,536,660
928,308 20,094 31,536 164,554 111,709 210,987 17,606 1,484,794
879,409 15,060 22,145 144,243 59,318 160,804 32,230 1,313,209
1,082,044 15,003 19,026 195,667 55,345 212,535 46,670 1,626,290
1,297,373 12,165 29,005 406,607 121,112 463,434 58,251 2,387,947
1,267,008 21,849 30,882 314,892 163,774 341,785 114,428 2,254,618
1,460,219 21,014 22,915 471,951 259,033 476,563 42,997 2,754,692
1,953,142 37,893 47,122 513,692 356,390 726,591 17,987 3,652,817
1,372,823 28,590 24,921 233,441 162,851 442,144 7,729 2,272,499
1,255,978 3,946 20,401 206,118 162,922 324,546 7,824 1,981,735
1,330,854 5,045 5,714 262,836 147,007 462,556 8,144 2,222,156
1,605,115 14,823 13,219 263,897 208,830 591,197 7,484 2,704,565
1,604,108 22,402 6,067 233,250 264,099 422,679 2,736 2,555,341
1,755,718 15,500 2,247 256,481 263,001 317,334 7,088 2,617,369
1,908,062 28,349 994 483,999 372,253 465,197 6,234 3,265,088
1,765,450 23,573 4,147 314,519 659,765 574,583 6,943 3,348,980
1,729,366 21,840 - 209,521 465,926 541,877 13,882 2,982,412
2,029,858 36,071 4,545 234,348 356,759 654,089 14,748 3,330,418
2,020,799 51,508 7,835 257,283 301,203 604,719 28,757 3,272,104
2,176,189 24,871 2,976 242,450 393,347 885,959 34,386 3,760,178
3,017,921 59,541 2,302 206,972 592,800 1,034,996 76,590 4,991,122
2,671,569 145,759 548 285,972 338,275 1,077,050 34,243 4,553,416
3,603,198 222,719 1,110 394,419 601,826 1,329,508 62,153 6,214,933
3,089,499 234,884 4,775 476,880 837,606 1,205,135 75,118 5,923,897
4,322,471 111,622 11,620 488,644 1,056,282 879,839 115,655 6,986,133
3,746,909 279,821 1,620 358,136 935,765 419,575 88,398 5,830,224
3,621,211 149,596 10,584 297,859 746,409 272,431 82,172 5,180,262
4,518,101 287,814 2,051 557,157 833,710 449,923 94,210 6,742,966
4,553,497 557,867 1,952 782,157 783,354 899,641 120,242 7,698,710
6,008,967 622,467 1,314 677,235 1,108,381 1,075,033 150,556 9,643,953
5,905,282 419,317 1,608 815,163 1,359,146 1,251,667 214,437 9,966,620
6,244,393 773,128 2,249 849,431 1,168,315 1,577,333 219,910 10,834,759
5,331,842 559,177 378 488,705 698,609 1,135,044 157,150 8,370,905
8,642,829 851,474 34,885 741,703 975,896 2,624,732 266,685 14,138,204
14,472,701 1,278,899 79,988 1,158,374 2,235,532 6,505,759 365,536 26,096,789
7,940,106 907,918 38,825 800,014 1,120,477 7,033,143 492,019 18,332,502
6,791,666 813,101 50,117 777,743 1,106,922 11,417,995 622,709 21,580,253
Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom with Foreign Countries and British Possessions 
(Parliamentary Papers), 1870-1912.
(1) Rest of the Amazon = Ecuador, ‘Nueva Granada’, Colombia, Venezuela and Peru.
(2) Central America & Mexico = ‘Central America’, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Haiti and Mexico
(3) Africa = ‘Western Coast Africa’, ‘German West Africa’, ‘German East Africa’, ‘British West Coast 
Africa’, ‘British East Coast Africa’, ‘East Coast Africa’, Madagascar, China, ‘British South Africa’, Natal, 
Mauritius, ‘Zanzibar & Pemba’, ‘Gold Coast (ind. Lagos)’, Nigeria, ‘Sierra Leone’, Gambia, ‘Niger 
Protectorate’, ‘French West Africa’, ‘French Somaliland’, ‘Portuguese West Africa’ and ‘Fernando Po’.
(4) Re-Exporters = Hanse Towns, Russia, Holland, Belgium, Turkey, United States, France, Portugal, 
Spain, Italy, Hamburg, Bremen and Germany.
(5) British Possessions = 'Channel Islands’, ‘New South Wales’, ‘British West Indies’, ‘British East 
Indies’, ‘British India’, ‘Madras’, ‘Bombay & Scinde’, ‘India Singapore & Ceylon’, Singapore & Eastern 
Straits’, ‘Ceylon’, ‘Federated Malay States’, ‘Borneo’, ‘Mauritius’, ‘Aden’, ‘Australasia’, ‘British West 
Coast Africa’, 'British East Coast Africa’, ‘British South Africa’, ‘Natal’, ‘Zanzibar & Pemba’, ‘Gold Coast’, 
‘Lagos’, ‘Nigeria’, ‘Sierra Leone’, ‘Gambia’, ‘Niger Protectorate’ and finally ‘Other British Possessions’.
(6) Others = all other countries not included in the categories above.
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C.08: Quantity of Rubber Imported into Britain, 1870-1912
Brazil
Quantity of Rubber Imported into Britain from selected places
_ * , Mexico & „  .Rest of the „ . , . . .  _ . British Central Africa Re-Exporters „
Amazon . Possessions America
Others Total
tons tons tons tons tons tons tons tons
1870 2,700 641 205 651 1,018 2,282 232 7,728
1871 3,640 1,327 242 693 532 1,439 311 8,183
1872 3,462 563 270 718 771 2,011 187 7,982
1873 3,511 660 341 860 820 1,680 127 7,998
1874 2,874 514 266 869 720 1,270 49 6,562
1875 4,229 373 300 816 739 1,194 151 7,801
1876 4,106 199 276 1,051 706 1,397 327 8,062
1877 4,311 127 200 1,158 662 1,538 118 8,114
1878 4,619 105 141 970 358 1,184 230 7,606
1879 4,349 85 106 1,159 314 1,383 255 7,651
1880 3,885 52 124 1,641 470 2,134 310 8,615
1881 3,938 110 132 1,474 717 1,756 616 8,742
1882 3,737 84 81 1,916 936 2,250 228 9,232
1883 4,733 139 159 2,010 1,324 3,190 85 11,639
1884 4,626 136 108 1,319 1,442 2,428 42 10,102
1885 4,940 22 108 1,195 945 1,904 38 9,152
1886 4,620 27 25 1,440 1,021 2,724 36 9,894
1887 5,789 64 56 1,506 1,272 3,336 43 12,066
1888 5,416 93 26 1,560 1,521 2,549 28 11,194
1889 6,231 60 10 1,744 1,881 2,007 72 12,005
1890 5,817 115 5 2,635 2,151 2,623 67 13,412
1891 5,561 88 17 1,791 3,132 3,524 53 14,166
1892 6,339 78 - 1,292 2,756 3,260 101 13,827
1893 6,879 151 17 1,484 2,309 3,956 107 14,904
1894 7,151 210 34 1,636 2,422 3,780 132 15,365
1895 7,468 103 15 1,510 2,851 5,263 142 17,352
1896 9,866 241 10 1,263 4,014 6,191 318 21,903
1897 8,537 579 3 1,608 3,011 6,302 125 20,165
1898 10,656 732 5 2,101 4,334 6,828 215 24,872
1899 8,628 693 18 2,256 5,399 5,593 256 22,843
1900 11,583 361 39 2,418 7,292 3,925 457 26,076
1901 11,459 961 5 1,890 6,995 2,041 346 23,698
1902 12,006 551 46 1,634 5,289 1,428 348 21,303
1903 13,025 919 8 2,235 6,015 2,081 411 24,695
1904 11,268 1,521 7 2,807 5,317 3,886 394 25,200
1905 13,241 1,536 5 2,259 8,360 4,229 519 30,148
1906 12,900 1,047 5 2,621 9,007 4,595 666 30,841
1907 14,520 1,796 6 2,881 8,566 5,323 809 33,900
1908 15,242 1,658 2 2,044 5,735 3,819 714 29,215
1909 15,712 1,957 93 2,371 8,445 5,998 990 35,565
1910 18,068 2,032 167 2,510 10,591 10,275 909 44,552
1911 16,013 2,149 118 2,211 9,709 14,389 1,435 46,024
1912 15,418 1,924 128 2,432 10,145 24,192 1,667 55,906
Source : Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom with Foreign Countries and British Possessions
(Parliamentary Papers), 1870-1912.
Notes: (1) Rest of the Amazon = Ecuador, ‘Nueva Granada’, Colombia, Venezuela and Peru.
(2) Central America & Mexico = ‘Central America’, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Haiti and Mexico
(3) Africa = ‘Western Coast Africa’, ‘German West Africa’, ‘German East Africa’, ‘British West Coast 
Africa’, ‘British East Coast Africa’, ‘East Coast Africa’, Madagascar, China, ‘British South Africa’, Natal, 
Mauritius, ‘Zanzibar & Pemba’, ‘Gold Coast (incl. Lagos)’, Nigeria, ‘Sierra Leone’, Gambia, ‘Niger 
Protectorate’, ‘French West Africa’, ‘French Somaliland’, ‘Portuguese West Africa’ and ‘Fernando Po’.
(4) Re-Exporters = Hanse Towns, Russia, Holland, Belgium, Turkey, United States, France, Portugal, 
Spain, Italy, Hamburg, Bremen and Germany.
(5) British Possessions = ‘Channel Islands’, ‘New South W ales’, ‘British West Indies’, ‘British East 
Indies’, ‘British India’, ‘Madras’, ‘Bombay & Scinde’, ‘India Singapore & Ceylon’, Singapore & Eastern 
Straits’, ‘Ceylon’, ‘Federated Malay States’, ‘Borneo’, ‘Mauritius’, ‘Aden’, ‘Australasia’, 'British West 
Coast Africa’, ‘British East Coast Africa’, ‘British South Africa’, ‘Natal’, ‘Zanzibar & Pemba’, ‘Gold Coast’, 
‘Lagos’, ‘Nigeria’, ‘Sierra Leone’, ‘Gambia’, ‘Niger Protectorate’ and finally ‘Other British Possessions’.
(6) Others = all other countries not included in the categories above.
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C.09: Implicit Price of Rubber Imported into Britain, 1870-1912
Implicit Price of Rubber Imported into Britain from selected places
_ . ,  Mexico & _ „  . *. ,.. Rest of the _ . , . . .  Re- Bntish 4 .Brazil . Central Afnca  ^ Others TotalAmazon . Exporters PossessionsAmerica
ton £ per ton £ per ton £ per ton £ per ton £ per ton £ per ton £ per ton
267 168 168 116 276 151 145 207
273 161 114 117 237 141 125 206
277 187 149 151 185 184 185 221
270 179 158 163 208 176 152 218
251 173 158 142 198 155 248 202
240 162 158 140 196 139 151 201
229 171 161 133 179 143 161 191
215 158 157 142 169 137 149 183
190 144 158 149 166 136 140 173
249 176 180 169 176 154 183 213
334 234 234 248 258 217 188 277
322 198 234 214 228 195 186 258
391 249 281 246 277 212 189 298
413 273 297 256 269 228 211 314
297 210 231 177 113 182 182 225
254 181 189 172 172 170 206 217
288 188 226 183 144 170 228 225
277 233 235 175 164 177 174 224
296 241 229 149 174 166 99 228
282 260 216 147 140 158 99 218
328 247 208 184 173 177 93 243
317 267 241 176 211 163 130 236
273 280 n.a. 162 169 166 137 216
295 239 270 158 154 165 138 223
283 245 227 157 124 160 218 213
291 243 197 161 138 168 242 217
306 247 230 164 148 167 241 228
313 252 204 178 112 171 273 226
338 304 228 188 139 195 289 250
358 339 268 211 155 215 293 259
373 309 297 202 145 224 253 268
327 291 295 190 134 206 255 246
302 271 232 182 141 191 236 243
347 313 254 249 139 216 229 273
404 367 291 279 147 232 305 306
454 405 287 300 133 254 290 320
458 400 330 311 151 272 322 323
430 431 349 295 136 296 272 320
350 337 240 239 122 297 220 287
550 435 375 313 116 438 269 398
801 629 480 461 211 633 402 586
496 422 329 362 115 489 343 398
441 423 390 320 109 472 373 386
Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom with Foreign Countries and British Possessions 
(Parliamentary Papers), 1870-1912.
(1) Rest of the Amazon = Ecuador, ‘Nueva Granada’, Colombia, Venezuela and Peru.
(2) Central America & Mexico = ‘Central America’, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Haiti and Mexico.
(3) Africa = ‘Western Coast Africa’, ‘German West Africa’, ‘German East Africa’, ‘British West Coast 
Africa’, ‘British East Coast Africa’, ‘East Coast Africa’, Madagascar, China, ‘British South Africa’, Natal, 
Mauritius, ‘Zanzibar & Pemba’, ‘Gold Coast (incl. Lagos)’, Nigeria, ‘Sierra Leone’, Gambia, ‘Niger 
Protectorate’, ‘French West Africa’, ‘French Somaliland’, ‘Portuguese West Africa’ and ‘Fernando Po’.
(4) Re-Exporters = Hanse Towns, Russia, Holland, Belgium, Turkey, United States, France, Portugal, 
Spain, Italy, Hamburg, Bremen and Germany.
(5) British Possessions = ‘Channel Islands’, ‘New South W ales’, ‘British West Indies’, ‘British East 
Indies’, ‘British India’, ‘Madras’, ‘Bombay & Scinde’, ‘India Singapore & Ceylon’, Singapore & Eastern 
Straits’, ‘Ceylon’, ‘Federated Malay States’, ‘Borneo’, ‘Mauritius’, ‘Aden’, ‘Australasia’, ‘British West 
Coast Africa’, 'British East Coast Africa’, ‘British South Africa’, ‘Natal’, ‘Zanzibar & Pemba’, ‘Gold Coast’, 
‘Lagos’, ‘Nigeria’, ‘Sierra Leone’, ‘Gambia’, ‘Niger Protectorate’ and finally ‘Other British Possessions’.
(6) Others = all other countries not included in the categories above.
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C.10: Value of Rubber Imported into the USA, 1870-1912
Value of Rubber Imported into the USA from selected places
Rest of the _ . , . . .  Asia & _ _ . .Brazil . Central Africa _ Europe Others TotalAmazon . OceaniaAmerica
£ £ £ £ £ £ £ £
425,135 113,342 23,449 855 21,087 34,738 297 618,903
208,335 109,813 5,287 57 7,945 50,132 32 381,601
386,308 375,628 25,634 9 29,061 52,063 10,121 878,824
561,268 486,462 31,008 8,130 56,321 95,165 4,990 1,243,342
600,470 365,388 39,108 10,090 55,281 71,656 1,315 1,143,308
450,704 259,804 39,143 6,133 39,908 40,636 75 836,403
395,122 242,991 34,918 7,486 18,854 50,366 16 749,753
511,486 311,798 26,804 4,782 12,670 213,797 9,641 1,090,978
502,535 207,641 38,249 19,760 20,654 174,548 28 963,416
679,746 220,797 37,794 22,993 8,768 281,055 - 1,251,152
1,007,073 397,256 90,550 16,363 8,921 464,597 - 1,984,760
1,231,833 397,689 182,398 17,496 12,535 393,798 53,062 2,288,809
1,682,521 168,172 261,888 38,781 26,360 557,716 193,701 2,929,138
1,786,178 220,968 324,655 35,142 64,267 534,257 232,690 3,198,157
1,494,191 181,441 319,071 49,505 37,145 605,337 145,475 2,832,166
1,108,449 78,796 190,007 20,998 41,406 364,549 67,248 1,871,452
1,418,660 74,690 211,684 48,788 45,395 577,259 69,667 2,446,142
1,707,050 188,469 267,635 60,218 55,663 556,043 1,372 2,836,450
2,220,113 152,215 256,833 40,244 80,562 548,695 569 3,299,232
1,554,210 112,553 211,306 33,773 68,120 563,597 - 2,543,559
1,884,207 96,483 155,929 16,387 58,992 843,315 1,171 3,056,484
2,531,735 168,403 181,464 20,558 52,412 752,852 561 3,707,984
2,818,002 128,584 125,105 25,514 32,923 942,375 - 4,072,503
2,405,752 130,868 120,291 21,960 31,108 954,473 - 3,664,452
2,266,149 103,614 102,659 23,181 24,774 569,377 - 3,089,753
2,698,416 107,412 110,418 11,034 23,386 802,529 - 3,753,194
2,095,553 118,075 106,853 1,400 24,349 1,063,014 - 3,409,244
2,345,891 95,138 102,424 312 27,835 1,020,577 - 3,592,176
3,088,224 127,579 103,590 790 29,017 1,884,875 154 5,234,229
3,497,808 195,951 211,781 470 70,534 2,547,241 419 6,524,204
3,670,661 196,091 209,870 - 58,597 2,306,348 1,322 6,442,889
3,474,272 121,320 175,291 - 50,932 2,021,179 - 5,842,994
3,232,747 109,208 144,576 - 32,347 1,593,849 51 5,112,778
3,542,905 120,485 133,081 - 25,670 2,439,432 1,124 6,262,698
4,608,265 194,625 175,368 - 80,566 3,245,578 372 8,304,774
5,847,280 255,445 211,984 2,299 164,380 3,758,952 1,625 10,241,964
4,914,966 246,917 342,386 627 186,247 3,598,496 12,310 9,301,948
6,778,558 277,526 757,823 1,568 226,592 4,081,000 385 12,123,453
3,959,929 208,970 921,377 503 137,164 2,286,080 4,085 7,518,108
7,036,100 259,055 1,223,845 - 131,652 4,020,066 683 12,671,401
9,736,869 462,716 2,457,573 1,124 496,095 7,642,025 1,711 20,798,112
5,868,697 429,939 373,480 6,341 1,144,160 7,862,052 3,522 15,688,190
6,547,931 426,642 533,482 927 1,405,167 10,166,969 18,113 19,099,231
Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1870-1912. All values were converted into pounds 
sterling using exchange rate provided earlier in this Appendix.
(1) Rest of the Amazon = ‘New Granada’, Colombia, Ecuador, ‘British Guiana’, ‘Dutch Guiana’, ‘French 
Guiana’, Peru and Venezuela.
(2) Mexico & Central America = ‘British Honduras’, ‘Costa Rica’, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Salvador, Mexico, ‘British West Indies’, Cuba, ‘Puerto Rico’, ‘Dutch West Indies’, Haiti, ‘Santo 
Domingo’, ‘Central American States’, ‘Spanish West Indies’, and ‘French West Indies’.
(3) Africa = ‘British Africa’, ‘Portuguese Africa’, ‘French Africa’, Liberia, Madagascar and ‘All Other 
Africa’.
(4) Asia & Oceania = China, 'British East Indies’, ‘Dutch East Indies’, Hong Kong, Japan, Siam, 
Philippines, ‘All Other Asia’ and 'British Australasia’.
(5) Europe = Austria-Hungary, Spain, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Russia, Turkey and Britain.
(6) Others = all other countries not included in the categories above.
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C.11: Quantity of Rubber Imported into the USA, 1870-1912
Quantity of Rubber Imported into the USA from selected places
Brazil Rest of the Amazon
Mexico & 
Central 
America
Africa Asia & Oceania Europe Others Total
tons tons tons tons tons tons tons tons
2,374 1,179 232 15 263 296 7 4,365
967 849 45 1 85 264 2 2,212
2,162 2,439 170 0 203 301 79 5,354
2,714 2,605 207 52 450 534 32 6,594
3,121 2,056 275 72 437 436 41 6,437
2,736 1,725 290 47 343 318 1 5,459
2,361 1,603 267 61 175 337 0 4,803
2,860 1,805 183 36 110 1,208 68 6,269
2,665 1,336 253 141 173 1,107 0 5,675
3,179 1,521 256 167 56 1,571 - 6,749
3,526 1,768 418 96 47 1,777 - 7,632
4,530 1,707 823 87 69 1,626 236 9,079
5,148 710 1,244 194 137 2,124 746 10,302
4,699 808 1,319 145 294 1,753 800 9,819
5,421 795 1,430 233 184 2,364 722 11,147
6,530 420 1,086 135 275 2,127 407 10,981
7,921 393 1,136 291 302 2,796 435 13,274
7,658 911 1,163 288 343 2,627 6 12,995
11,099 828 1,162 180 573 2,770 3 16,614
8,846 757 1,104 177 533 3,252 - 14,669
9,444 592 834 91 423 3,961 7 15,351
9,680 869 863 85 598 3,595 37 15,727
11,570 788 710 137 196 4,872 - 18,273
12,133 758 670 134 272 4,879 - 18,846
10,608 664 627 132 191 3,089 - 15,312
12,015 786 689 51 285 4,201 - 18,026
9,995 720 595 7 282 5,082 - 16,681
9,915 560 565 2 223 4,872 - 16,136
11,731 699 539 5 208 7,708 1 20,890
12,458 899 853 3 454 8,494 2 23,162
12,713 810 867 - 292 7,711 4 22,397
15,783 572 756 - 255 7,706 - 25,073
14,303 583 673 - 255 7,052 1 22,867
14,116 619 613 - 206 9,394 5 24,952
15,018 814 748 - 493 9,695 1 26,769
16,599 960 811 11 967 11,145 4 30,497
13,380 824 1,361 3 951 9,661 59 26,238
18,274 924 3,800 8 1,014 10,890 1 34,910
14,808 698 4,655 1 561 7,491 15 28,228
19,955 891 7,411 - 513 11,307 2 40,079
17,922 1,136 11,301 2 1,098 14,371 4 45,833
14,071 1,136 997 15 2,103 14,347 11 32,680
21,211 1,296 1,643 3 2,876 22,927 34 49,990
Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1870-1912. Ail values were converted into pounds 
sterling using exchange rate provided earlier in this Appendix.
(1) Rest of the Amazon = ‘New Granada’, Colombia, Ecuador, ‘British Guiana’, ‘Dutch Guiana’, ‘French 
Guiana’, Peru and Venezuela.
(2) Mexico & Central America = ‘British Honduras’, ‘Costa Rica’, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Salvador, Mexico, ‘British West Indies’, Cuba, ‘Puerto Rico’, ‘Dutch West Indies’, Haiti, ‘Santo 
Domingo’, ‘Central American States’, ‘Spanish West Indies’, and ‘French West Indies’.
(3) Africa = ‘British Africa’, ‘Portuguese Africa’, ‘French Africa’, Liberia, Madagascar and ‘All Other 
Africa’.
(4) Asia & Oceania = China, ‘British East Indies’, ‘Dutch East Indies’, Hong Kong, Japan, Siam, 
Philippines, ‘All Other Asia’ and ‘British Australasia’.
(5) Europe = Austria-Hungary, Spain, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Russia, Turkey and Britain.
(6) Others = all other countries not included in the categories above.
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C.12: Implicit Price of Rubber Imported into the USA, 1870-1912
Implicit Prices of Rubber Imported into the USA from selected places
_  ^ Mexico & . . „Rest of the Asia &Brazil . Central Africa _ Europe Others TotalAmazon . OceaniaAmerica
ton £ per ton £ per ton £ per ton £ per ton £ per ton £ per ton £ per ton
179 96 101 56 80 118 44 142
215 129 117 106 94 190 21 173
179 154 151 65 143 173 127 164
207 187 150 158 125 178 156 189
192 178 142 141 126 164 32 178
165 151 135 130 116 128 82 153
167 152 131 123 108 150 210 156
179 173 146 134 116 177 143 174
189 155 151 140 119 158 185 170
214 145 148 138 158 179 n.a. 185
286 225 216 170 191 261 n.a. 260
272 233 222 202 181 242 225 252
327 237 211 200 192 263 260 284
380 274 246 242 219 305 291 326
276 228 223 213 202 256 202 254
170 188 175 156 150 171 165 170
179 190 186 168 150 206 160 184
223 207 230 209 162 212 230 218
200 184 221 224 141 198 176 199
176 149 191 191 128 173 n.a. 173
200 163 187 181 140 213 171 199
262 194 210 242 88 209 15 236
244 163 176 187 168 193 n.a. 223
198 173 180 164 115 196 n.a. 194
214 156 164 175 130 184 n.a. 202
225 137 160 216 82 191 n.a. 208
210 164 180 194 86 209 n.a. 204
237 170 181 144 125 209 n.a. 223
263 183 192 148 140 245 205 251
281 218 248 181 156 300 252 282
289 242 242 n.a. 201 299 299 288
220 212 232 n.a. 200 262 n.a. 233
226 187 215 n.a. 127 226 42 224
251 195 217 n.a. 124 260 217 251
307 239 235 n.a. 163 335 357 310
352 266 261 210 170 337 382 336
367 300 252 233 196 372 210 355
371 300 199 208 224 375 302 347
267 300 198 360 244 305 274 266
353 291 165 n.a. 256 356 349 316
543 407 217 659 452 532 474 454
417 378 375 431 544 548 309 480
309 329 325 274 489 443 533 382
Commerce and Navigation of the United States, 1870-1912. All values were converted into pounds 
sterling using exchange rate provided earlier in this Appendix.
(1) Rest of the Amazon = ‘New Granada’, Colombia, Ecuador, ‘British Guiana’, ‘Dutch Guiana’, ‘French 
Guiana’, Peru and Venezuela.
(2) Mexico & Central America = ‘British Honduras’, ‘Costa Rica’, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Salvador, Mexico, ‘British West Indies’, Cuba, ‘Puerto Rico’, ‘Dutch West Indies’, Haiti, ‘Santo 
Domingo’, ‘Central American States’, ‘Spanish West Indies’, and ‘French West Indies’.
(3) Africa = ‘British Africa’, ‘Portuguese Africa’, ‘French Africa’, Liberia, Madagascar and ‘All Other 
Africa’.
(4) Asia & Oceania = China, ‘British East Indies’, ‘Dutch East Indies’, Hong Kong, Japan, Siam, 
Philippines, ‘All Other Asia’ and ‘British Australasia’.
(5) Europe = Austria-Hungary, Spain, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Russia, Turkey and Britain.
(6) Others = all other countries not included in the categories above.
(7) n.a. = not available.
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C.13: Quarterly Price of Brazilian Rubber Traded in New York, 1870-1894
Note:
Source:
Para Rubber Price
Date US cents per pound Date US cents per pound
1870.01 100.00 1882.07 106.00
1870.04 95.00 1882.10 115.00
1870.07 105.00 1883.01 107.00
1870.10 95.00 1883.04 106.00
1871.01 100.00 1883.07 110.00
1871.04 75.00 1883.10 101.00
1871.07 81.00 1884.01 96.00
1871.10 78.00 1884.04 69.00
1872.01 72.50 1884.07 59.00
1872.04 86.00 1884.10 53.00
1872.07 84.00 1885.01 56.00
1872.10 70.00 1885.04 61.00
1873.01 74.00 1885.07 66.00
1873.04 74.00 1885.10 55.00
1873.07 76.00 1886.01 61.00
1873.10 67.00 1886.04 67.00
1874.01 75.00 1886.07 81.00
1874.04 68.00 1886.10 81.00
1874.07 63.00 1887.01 76.00
1874.10 60.00 1887.04 83.00
1875.01 58.50 1887.07 85.00
1875.04 69.00 1887.10 71.00
1875.07 67.50 1888.01 76.00
1875.10 62.50 1888.04 78.50
1876.01 64.00 1888.07 74.50
1876.04 61.00 1888.10 70.50
1876.07 63.00 1889.01 74.00
1876.10 58.50 1889.04 68.50
1877.01 58.00 1889.07 71.00
1877.04 57.00 1889.10 73.00
1877.07 55.00 1890.01 80.00
1877.10 52.00 1890.04 92.00
1878.01 49.00 1890.07 102.00
1878.04 43.00 1890.10 93.00
1878.07 49.00 1891.01 78.00
1878.10 50.00 1891.04 92.00
1879.01 51.00 1891.07 86.00
1879.04 50.00 1891.10 66.00
1879.07 69.00 1892.01 67.00
1879.10 73.00 1892.04 70.50
1880.01 81.00 1892.07 68.50
1880.04 92.00 1892.10 67.00
1880.07 90.00 1893.01 68.00
1880.10 77.00 1893.04 78.00
1881.01 76.00 1893.07 67.00
1881.04 76.00 1893.10 67.50
1881.07 87.00 1894.01 68.00
1881.10 80.00 1894.04 65.50
1882.01 87.00 1894.07 66.00
1882.04 108.00 1894.10 69.00
From 1892 onwards, prices refer to 'Upriver Para'. 
Baker, Rubber Statistics 1900-1937,1938, p. 42.
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C.14: Monthly Prices of Different Grades of Brazilian Rubber Traded in New York
1894-1900
nt Monthly Prices of Different Grades of Brazilian Rubber in New YorkUpriver Island Cametd
pound min
Fine
max
Coarse 
min max
Fine
min max
Coarse 
min max
i
min
Coarse
max
1894.11 71 73 55.5 57 68.5 70 47 48 52 53
1894.12 72 76 56.5 58 69.5 73 48 51 51.5 55.5
1895.01 74 75.5 55 58 71.5 74 50 52 54 56
1895.02 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1895.03 73.5 74.5 52 54.5 71.5 72.5 47 48 51.5 53
1895.04 73 74 53 55 71 72 46.5 47.5 51.5 53
1895.05 73 76 55 57 72 74 47 49 52.5 55
1895.06 75 76 56 57 72 74 47.5 50 53 55
1895.07 72 74 55 56 70 72 46 47.5 50 51
1895.08 72 74 56 58 70 73 45.5 48 50 51.5
1895.09 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1895.10 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1895.11 77 83 57 61 74 81 44 51 48 53
1895.12 77 78 57 58 75 76 45 46.5 48 49
1896.01 74 77 53 56 71 75 43 45 46.5 48.5
1896.02 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1896.03 75 76 53 55 73 74.5 42.5 45.5 47.5 48
1896.04 76 82 54 57 73.5 81 44 47 50 54
1896.05 82.5 89 57 60 80 85 46.5 49 50.5 53
1896.06 86 89 56 59 80 85 44 48.5 50 52.5
1896.07 86 88 56 58 81 85 43 47 50 52
1896.08 82 86 54 57 77 81 41.5 44 51 52
1896.09 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1896.10 81 84 54 56 80 82 47 48.5 51 52
1896.11 83 84.5 56 57 81 83 47 48 51 52.5
1896.12 82 85 53 58 79 83 44 48 51 53
1897.01 82 83 52 54 78.5 80 44.5 46 50.5 51.5
1897.02 82 84 52 5 55 80 82 44.5 46 51 52
1897.03 82 83.5 52 54 80 82 44.5 45 51 54
1897.04 84 88 54 58 82 84 45 48 55.5 57
1897.05 85.5 88 55.5 57.5 83 84 45.5 48 59 60
1897.06 84 86 54.5 56 82 83 45.5 47 58 59
1897.07 84 86 55 56 82 84 46.5 48 56 58
1897.08 86.5 88 57 60 84 86.5 49 50 56 58
1897.09 87 88 59 61 85 86 50 51 55 56.5
1897.10 87.5 88 60 65 5 85 86 52.5 55 55.5 61
1897.11 86 88 62 66 83 86 52.5 55 60 61.5
1897.12 83 87 59 63 80 84 49 52.5 57 59
1898.01 84 90 62 70 82 87.5 53 60 57 61.5
1898.02 89.5 95 71 75 88 93 60 65 61.5 70
1898.03 94 95 73.5 75 92.5 93 62.5 64 69 71
1898.04 92.5 95 74 75 91.5 93 62.5 64 68 70
1898.05 94 95 73.5 75.5 92 93 63 65 68.5 69.5
1898.06 95 97 75 80 92.5 96 64 65 69 71
1898.07 98 105 80 88 95.5 102 64.5 68 71 75
1898.08 103 106 86 89 100 103 68 72 74 75
1898.09 96 103 82 87 93 99 63 68 68 74
1898.10 89 96 79 85 85 94 58 65 59 67
1898.11 95 99 83 87 89 95 62 67 66 68
1898.12 96 98 85.5 88 90 94 65 69 66.5 70
1899.01 96 104 86 93 93 101 67 72 69 75
1899.02 100 104 86 92 99 101 69 73 71 74
1899.03 102 107 88 90 101 105 71 75 72 77
1899.04 100 103 85 88 100 103 96 73 72 74
1899.05 99 102 82 86 99 101.5 67 71 69 72
1899.06 97 101 77 83 95 98 63 66 65 68
1899.07 99 102 78 80 95 98 64 66 64 68
1899.08 100 103 77 79 95 97 62 66 62.5 66
1899.09 101 104.5 77 83 96 99 61 63 62 64
1899.10 103 105 81 84 97 99 61.5 64 63 65
1899.11 105 111 84 90 99 108 64 70 64.5 70
1899.12 108 110 86 90 105.5 108 65 69 66 70
1900.01 108 110 84 87 105 108 64 66 65 69
1900.02 104 109 80 86 103.5 108 61.5 66 64 68
1900.03 99 105 75 80 98 104 59 64 62.5 65
1900.04 98 102 73 76 96.5 99 57.5 60 63 65
1900.05 89 102 65 75 87 99 47 61 56 65
1900.06 89 97 65 72 87 95 47 55 55 60
1900.07 93 97 67 71 87 93.5 51 54 54.5 59
1900.08 93 99 68 71 88 97 55 58 55 59
1900.09 99.5 103 70 72 95.5 99 55 58 56 57.5
1900.10 93 100 69 74 92 100 52 57 56 58
1900.11 84 87 63.5 66 76.5 80 46.5 50 48 51
1900.12 92 95 68 69 86 89 53 55 54 56
Source: India Rubber World, several issues. Note: n.a. = not available.
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C.15: Monthly Prices of Different Grades of Brazilian Rubber Traded in New York
1901-1905
Monthly Prices of Different Grades of Brazilian Rubber in New York
Upriver__________________   Island___________________   Cameta
pound min
Fine
max min
Coarse
max min
Fine
max min
Coarse
max min
Coarse
max
1901.01 87 92 65 69 84 88 48 52 54 55
1901.02 86 88 63 66 83 85 46 48 53 54
1901.03 83 86 59 60 83 84 45 50 53.5 54
1901.04 85 94 59 68 84 93 52 60 54 63
1901.05 89 93 62 65 85 90 51 60 58 63
1901.06 87 90 62 64 84 87 47 53 54 58
1901.07 84 87.5 61 63 82 85 46.5 48.5 50 55
1901.08 85 92 61 68 81 88 46 50 50 51
1901.09 87 91 65 66 84 88 48 50 50 51
1901.10 84.5 90 63.5 66 78 85 46.5 48 48 49
1901.11 93 97 68 70 89 94 52 57 55 56
1901.12 85 87 65 66 79 81 48 51 50 51
1902.01 77 86 62 65 75 81 47 52 50 53
1902.02 72 79 60 63 69 76 45 48 48 50
1902.03 72 76 58 61 70 73 46 48 48 53
1902.04 73 74.5 59 60 71 73 47 49 53 53.5
1902.05 71 74.5 56 60 70 73.5 45 49 51.5 53
1902.06 70 72 55 56.5 68 70 45 46 48 52
1902.07 70 72 55 56.5 67 69 44 46 46 48
1902.08 70 76 56 61 67 73 45 48 46 48.5
1902.09 74.5 78 59 62 71 75 46 48 47 50
1902.10 74.5 79 60 64 72 74 46 49 47 49
1902.11 78.5 82 63 68 73 76 48 51.5 48.5 52.5
1902.12 80 91 65 73 74 88 49 60 54 61
1903.01 86 92 71 76 84 89 53 62 55 64
1903.02 84 90 70 73 82 87 50 54 52 57
1903.03 90 93 72 74 86 90 55 58 57 61
1903.04 90 93 72 74 87 91 56 60 61 63
1903.05 91 94 71 73 87 91 56 60 60 64
1903.06 89 93 70 74 85 89 54 57 56 60
1903.07 94 96 74 76 89 92 56 58 58 60
1903.08 95 100 75 79 90 97 59 61 58 61
1903.09 100 110 79 91 97 108 60 70 61 68
1903.10 100 109 83 91 96 106 56 68 56 67
1903.11 92 102 78 83 90 98 54 58 53 58
1903.12 93 98 76 81 88 94 54 57 54 57
1904.01 94 105 77 83 90 102 56 65 55 64
1904.02 101 107 82 86 99 104 64 67 64 67
1904.03 106 112 84 87 103 108 66 70 66 70
1904.04 107 112 84 88 105 109 64 69 64 69
1904.05 111 115 86 90 108 112 65 69 66 70
1904.06 111 114 87 90 108 111 64 68 64 68
1904.07 112 119 87 91 109 115 63 66 64 66
1904.08 118 121 90 91 114 116 65 67 65 66
1904.09 109 121 85 91 107 116 59 67 60 66
1904.10 112 117 86 90 109 114 61 65 61 65
1904.11 116 131 89 98 112 126 62 73 63 72
1904.12 118 130 89 97 114 126 65 72 65 71
1905.01 118 125 90 94 114 122 65 71 64 71
1905.02 125 129 93 96 122 126 70 75 70 76
1905.03 128 134 94 100 125 131 75 80 77 82
1905.04 131 134 96 99 127 130 73 77 76 80
1905.05 131 135 95 97 129 132 73 76 78 81
1905.06 130 135 94 97 128 133 72 76 74 80
1905.07 128 131 90 95 125 128 68 71 71 76
1905.08 127 129 90 92 125 127 68 70 71 73
1905.09 129 132 91 94 126 129 69 72 71 74
1905.10 122 130 89 93 119 127 69 71 70 72
1905.11 121 124 89 91 118 121 68 72 69 72
1905.12 123 129 90 97 120 126 71 77 72 78
Source: India Rubber World, several issues.
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C.16: Monthly Prices of Different Grades of Brazilian Rubber Traded in New York
1906-1912
Monthly Prices of Different Grades of Brazilian Rubber in New Yorkcen
Upriver Island Cametd
pound Fine Coarse Fine Coarse Coarsemin max min max min max min max min max
1906.01 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1906.02 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1906.03 125 129 93 96 123 125 73 75 74 77
1906.04 125 128 92 95 122 125 70 74 72 76
1906.05 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1906.06 123 125 90 92 119 122 65 66 70 72
1906.07 122 124 89 91 118 120 64 65 69 71
1906.08 122 124 90 92 118 120 65 67 68 70
1906.09 122 124 92 94 118 120 66 69 68 70
1906.10 122 124 93 96 119 121 68 73 69 72
1906.11 122 124 95 97 118 120 71 73 70 71
1906.12 122 124 96 98 118 120 71 73 72 74
1907.01 121 124 96 98 117 120 71 73 72 74
1907.02 119 123 95 98 117 119 69 72 71 73
1907.03 116 121 92 96 114 119 66 70 71 73
1907.04 115 118 91 94 114 116 66 68 71 72
1907.05 112 116 88 92 110 115 62 67 70 72
1907.06 108 112 86 88 104 110 61 63 70 71
1907.07 108 115 86 90 104 108 61 64 70 71
1907.08 108 115 89 92 104 109 60 62 66 69
1907.09 106 110 88 90 99 105 58 60 62 66
1907.10 98 106 84 88 91 99 56 59 55 62
1907.11 83 99 68 85 72 92 44 56 42 56
1907.12 82 86 66 72 72 79 44 50 43 48
1908.01 74 82 56 65 71 76 45 50 45 50
1908.02 66 76 48 56 65 74 41 46 42 46
1908.03 70 83 48 59 68 80 41 43 41 48
1908.04 78 84 55 58 75 80 42 44 44 48
1908.05 83 94 58 65 80 90 43 48 48 57
1908.06 88 94 62 65 84 89 43 46 53 56
1908.07 91 96 64 67 83 88 42 46 52 55
1908.08 89 96 65 69 83 90 43 46 51 53
1908.09 96 103 69 73 90 96 44 48 51 53
1908.10 103 113 72 82 95 104 47 54 53 56
1908.11 112 130 82 100 104 124 54 70 56 72
1908.12 115 123 89 94 112 116 52 61 57 64
1909.01 120 122 90 92 113 116 55 59 62 64
1909.02 120 126 91 96 115 120 57 60 62 65
1909.03 122 126 93 97 118 121 55 61 63 67
1909.04 121 126 92 96 118 123 56 59 63 69
1909.05 126 135 96 98 123 131 59 67 69 78
1909.06 135 151 98 105 131 142 67 70 78 82
1909.07 150 195 105 120 141 184 70 75 80 92
1909.08 179 195 110 120 165 184 62 75 80 92
1909.09 190 215 112 132 172 202 65 82 83 96
1909.10 202 215 120 132 183 202 72 82 83 96
1909.11 193 203 117 121 172 184 69 72 80 84
1909.12 175 193 111 121 164 172 69 72 79 82
1910.01 178 187 111 115 167 181 71 75 79 85
1910.02 187 210 115 128 181 204 75 89 85 98
1910.03 209 258 130 170 203 245 90 107 95 128
1910.04 258 292 170 187 245 278 107 115 128 135
1910.05 235 280 160 182 226 272 93 109 110 127
1910.06 223 245 150 163 213 230 93 105 110 125
1910.07 216 240 148 155 208 225 98 103 110 123
1910.08 187 220 140 148 178 210 94 98 96 110
1910.09 155 190 122 142 150 182 90 92 90 98
1910.10 137 150 102 120 120 146 73 90 75 89
1910.11 136 152 102 107 120 128 73 75 75 78
1910.12 136 150 100 105 119 125 70 73 72 76
1911.01 115 130 90 98 100 115 62 69 64 73
1911.02 128 168 98 120 115 156 65 90 68 95
1911.03 145 166 108 118 130 156 62 90 79 92
1911.04 118 145 88 110 112 135 60 63 75 80
1911.05 93 128 82 89 92 122 58 67 67 76
1911.06 95 103 81 85 91 98 58 63 67 71
1911.07 99 107 82 96 92 110 58 63 70 75
1911.08 109 117 95 99 102 109 61 63 66 68
1911.09 113 120 94 99 106 112 62 64 66 68
1911.10 100 112 90 96 96 107 56 63 60 66
1911.11 99 106 87 91 93 100 57 60 60 62
1911.12 104 107 90 93 95 101 60 64 60 65
1912.01 103 111 90 94 97 107 62 64 63 66
1912.02 107 111 92 94 105 108 62 65 65 67
1912.03 111 123 93 99 108 118 63 67 66 72
1912.04 112 118 92 96 110 114 63 66 66 70
1912.05 109 112 89 92 105 110 58 63 65 67
1912.06 108 112 86 91 101 106 55 59 63 65
1912.07 110 119 85 91 100 108 54 57 62 65
1912.09 110 122 87 95 107 113 55 59 61 67
1912.10 104 111 81 86 99 106 53 56 56 61
1912.11 102 108 80 84 94 100 53 58 55 58
1912.12 106 112 82 85 96 102 54 58 56 60
Source: India Rubber World, several issues.
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C.17: Prices for Different Grades of Rubber in New York on 29th January 1906
(cents per pound)
Min Max Med
Para
Islands Fine, new 118.0 119.0 118.5
Islands Fine, old n.a. n.a. n.a.
Upriver Fine, new 123.0 124.0 123.5
Upriver Fine, old 127.0 128.0 127.5
Islands Coarse, new 72.0 72.5 72.3
Islands Coarse, old n.a. n.a. n.a.
Upriver Coarse, new 97.5 98.0 97.8
Upriver Coarse, old n.a. n.a. n.a.
Caucho (Peruvian) sheet 78.0 79.0 78.5
Caucho (Peruvian) ball 96.0 97.0 96.5
Ceylon (Plantation) fine sheet 137.0 138.0 137.5
African
Sierra Leone 1st quality 108.0 108.5 108.3
Massai, red 108.0 108.5 108.3
Benguella 78.0 79.0 78.5
Cameroon ball 77.0 78.0 77.5
Accra flake 22.0 23.0 22.5
Lopori ball, prime 116.5 117.0 116.8
Lopori strip, prime 107.0 108.0 107.5
Madagascar, pinky 90.0 91.0 90.5
Ikelemba 117.5 118.0 117.8
Soudan niggers 93.0 94.0 93.5
Centrals
Esmeralda, sausage 94.0 95.0 94.5
Guayaquil, strip 76.0 77.0 76.5
Nicaragua, scrap 92.0 93.0 92.5
Panama, slab 70.0 71.0 70.5
Mexican, scrap 93.0 94.0 93.5
Mexican, slab 71.0 72.0 71.5
Magabeira, sheet 67.0 71.0 69.0
Guayule 44.0 45.0 44.5
East Indian
Assam 94.0 95.0 94.5
Borneo 40.0 50.0 45.0
Source: The India Rubber World, 1st February 1907, p. 165.
Note: n.a. = not available.
C.18: Rubber Stocks, selected dates
30/6/1900 30/6/1901
Dates
30/6/1902 30/6/1903 30/6/1904
in tons
Para Rubber at
Liverpool 2,137 1,467 2,448 1,601 905
Havre 95 70 30 65 25
New York 601 875 392 383 102
Para 195 28 60 129 174
in transit 1,099 995 900 1,185 878
Total Para Rubber in Stock 4,127 3,435 3,830 3,363 2,084
Average Rubber from other sources at
Liverpool 1,082 946 585 456 715
London 646 742 560 224 306
Antwerp 726 954 681 488 689
Lisbon 717 544 505 220 290
Rotterdam 80 56 66
New York 571 320 575 246 238
Total Average Rubber in Stock 3,742 3,506 2,986 1,690 2,304
Total Rubber in Stock 7,869 6,941 6,816 5,053 4,388
Source: Miguel Calmon du Pin e Almeida. Producgao e Commercio de Borracha: Parecer da Comissao de Agricultura e 
Industria da Camara dos Deputados sobre o projeto de monopolizagao do commercio de borracha, 1906, p. 52.
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C.19: Proceeds from Exported Rubber from Para State, 1870-1912
Quantity of Rubber 
Exported from Pari
Value of Rubber 
Exported from Pari
Rights on Rubber 
Exported from Par i
Export Tariff on 
Rubber
Rights on Total 
Exports from Pari Export Tariff
tons BRZ mil-reis per ton BRZ mil-reis per ton % BRZ mil-reis per ton %
(1) (2) (3) (3)/(2) (5) (5)/(2)
1870 5,010 $8,720,596,743 $1,145,512,031 13.14%
1871 5,318 $10,210,249,214 $1,163,538,842 11.40%
1872 5,300 $10,147,206,752 $1,118,734,191 11.03%
1873 5,796 $10,328,882,247 $1,235,795,866 11.96%
1874 5,954 $9,932,375,517 $1,029,073,842 10.36%
1875 5,544 $9,760,863,908 $941,947,626 9.65%
1876 5,870 $10,419,540,159 $782,017,137 7.51%
1877 6,409 $11,390,095,777 $1,136,509,478 9.98%
1878 6,548 $11,527,152,315 $1,542,274,211 13.38%
1879 6,668 $11,775,475,134 $1,948,038,943 16.54%
1880 5,317 $9,418,706,337 $1,738,681,176 18.46%
1881 5,431 $9,554,998,913 $3,238,102,310 33.89%
1882 5,780 $10,536,946,256 $3,021,952,232 28.68%
1883 5,714 $8,356,600,688 $2,549,855,152 30.51%
1884 5,362 $6,374,347,814 $1,534,441,174 24.07%
1885 6,808 $9,328,881,991 $726,877,350 7,79% $1,792,315,813 19.21%
1886 6,987 $10,053,253,120 $822,628,532 8.18% $2,332,953,321 23.21%
1887 6,967 $12,958,509,958 $957,224,381 7.39% $2,237,167,179 17.26%
1888 7,447 $16,697,953,998 $688,568,737 4.12% $2,023,002,679 12.12%
1889 8,120 $12,844,899,079 $548,107,876 4.27% $2,134,878,776 16.62%
1890 7,556 $13,365,469,299 $2,148,693,000 16.08% $2,246,754,873 16.81%
1891 7,640 $19,941,358,674 $3,384,741,000 16.97% $3,058,896,959 15.34%
1892 8,062 $26,667,628,784 $6,139,164,000 23.02% $6,677,155,431 25.04%
1893 8,374 $31,163,184,944 $7,137,097,000 22.90% $7,887,096,711 25.31%
1894 8,181 $35,295,885,186 $7,667,424,000 21.72% $8,126,832,692 23.02%
1895 8,615 $38,030,865,288 $8,992,956,000 23.65% $8,984,228,102 23.62%
1896 8,895 $36,732,897,957 $10,819,111,000 29.45% $10,855,707,132 29.55%
1897 9,235 $57,569,617,623 $14,019,674,000 24.35% $14,016,333,807 24.35%
1898 9,342 $78,945,023,435 $16,211,787,000 20.54% $17,004,884,898 21.54%
1899 9,549 $91,644,013,831 $18,593,903,000 20.29% $18,715,834,082 20.42%
1900 9,720 $66,645,607,224 $14,123,255,000 21.19% $14,169,501,981 21.26%
1901 10,052 $60,681,863,134 $9,826,156,000 16.19% $10,132,753,114 16.70%
1902 10,501 $54,179,301,907 $8,681,186,000 16.02% $9,111,588,491 16.82%
1903 11,135 $68,883,735,742 $11,180,222,000 16.23% $11,679,684,098 16.96%
1904 11,429 $79,299,128,541 $12,844,082,000 16.20% $13,259,965,572 16.72%
1905 11,325 $71,562,779,315 $11,648,959,000 16.28% $11,947,793,786 16.70%
1906 11,747 $70,656,626,162 $11,529,338,000 16.32% $11,696,757,155 16.55%
1907 10,415 $62,081,095,592 $9,704,188,000 15.63% $10,141,976,721 16,34%
1908 11,016 $54,307,852,240 $8,579,396,000 15.80% $8,974,113,972 16.52%
1909 11,586 $89,638,192,827 $14,603,063,000 16.29% $14,941,494,027 16.67%
1910 10,257 $100,312,261,913 $14,702,091,000 14.66% $15,088,501,895 15.04%
1911 10,341 $64,060,815,181 $9,518,716,000 14.86% $9,919,778,018 15.48%
1912 11,632 $66,410,259,063 $9,538,638,000 14.36% $9,897,616,876 14.90%
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Sources for Figure A.16: Weinstein, Barbara. The Amazon Rubber Boom 1850-1920. Stanford, S. UP, 1983. Tabela A.1, pg. 271.
Le Cointe, Paul. L'Amazonie Bresilienne. Paris: Challamel, 1922, pag. 433.
Mensagem presidencial do para, 1916, p. A-139.
Mensagem da provincia do para, 1889.
Falla com que o exm. sr. conselheiro Francisco Jose Cardoso Junior, primeiro vice-presidente da provincia do Para, abrio a 1.a sessao da 26.a legislatura da Assemblea 
Provincial no dia 4 de margo de 1888. Para, Typ. do "Diario de Noticias," 1888.
Falla com que o exm. sr. conselheiro Francisco Jose Cardoso Junior, 1.o vice-presidente da provincia do Para, abrio a 2.a sessao da 25.a legislatura da Assemblea Provincial
em 20 de outubro de 1887. Para, Typ. do Diario de Noticias, 1887.
Falla com que o exm. sr. general barao de Maracaju abriu a 2.a sessao da 23.a legislatura da Assemblea Legislativa da provincia do Para em 15 de fevereiro de 1883. Para, 
Typ. do Jornal da Tarde, 1883.
Falla com que o exm.o snr. dr. Joao Jose Pedrosa abrio a 1.a sessao da 23.a legislatura da Assemblea Legislativa da provincia do Para em 23 de abril de 1882. Para, Typ. 
de Francisco da Costa Junior, 1882.
Relatorio apresentado a Assemblea Legislativa Provincial na 2.a sessao da 22.a legislatura em 15 de fevereiro de 1881 pelo exm. sr. dr. Jose Coelho da Gama e Abreu. Para, 
Typ. do Diario de Noticias de Costa & Campbell, 1881.
Relatorio apresentado pelo excellentissimo senhor doutor Jose Coelho da Gama e Abreu, presidente da provincia, a Assemblea Legislativa Provincial do Para, na sua 1.a 
sessao da 22.a legislatura, em 15 de fevereiro de 1880. Para, 1880.
Falla com que o exm. sr. dr. Joao Capistrano Bandeira de Mello Filho abrio a 2.a sessao da 20.a legislatura da Assemblea Legislativa da provincia do Para em 15 de
fevereiro de 1877. Para, Typ. do Livro do Commercio, 1877.
Relatorio apresentado ao exm. senr. dr. Francisco Maria Correa de Sa e Benevides pelo exm. senr, dr. Pedro Vicente de Azevedo, por occasiao de passar-lhe a 
administragao da provincia do Para, por ocasiao de passar-lhe a administragao da Provincia, 1875.
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C.20: Proceeds from Exported Rubber from Amazonas State, 1870-1912
Quantity of Rubber 
Exported from
Value of Rubber 
Exported from
Rights on Rubber 
Exported from Export Tariff on Rubber
Amazonas Amazonas Amazonas
tons BRZ mil-reis per ton BRZ mil-reis per ton %
(1) (2) (3) (3)/(2)
1870 1,228 $2,172,063,231 $464,623,317 21.39%
1871 1,366 $2,621,741,109 $558,099,905 21.29%
1872 1,691 $3,260,103,815 $676,548,324 20.75%
1873 1,959 $3,501,732,761 $679,201,540 19.40%
1874 2,050 $3,432,703,618 $600,032,226 17.48%
1875 2,179 $3,836,097,470 $590,519,250 15.39%
1876 1,949 $3,456,372,764 $651,027,342 18.84%
1877 2,153 $3,822,972,278 $691,377,592 18.08%
1878 2,674 $4,705,672,768 $869,163,006 18.47%
1879 3,010 $5,319,730,044 $1,135,206,530 21.34%
1880 3,362 $5,929,580,095 $1,342,301,530 22.64%
1881 3,189 $5,597,067,982 $1,704,195,146 30.45%
1882 4,027 $7,615,370,688 $2,068,702,155 27.16%
1883 4,827 $4,989,356,879 $2,157,685,013 43.25%
1884 5,030 $6,760,862,122 $2,022,474,564 29.91%
1885 5,509 $7,694,125,680 $2,080,037,025 27.03%
1886 6,177 $9,149,071,789 $2,167,221,925 23.69%
1887 6,744 $12,544,354,241 $2,057,805,230 16.40%
1888 8,011 $17,963,506,859 $2,556,079,480 14.23%
1889 7,819 $12,368,606,410 $2,916,308,140 23.58%
1890 7,799 $13,795,908,594 $3,563,837,440 25.83%
1891 9,010 $23,518,641,326 $7,064,550,420 30.04%
1892 7,928 $26,226,620,145 $5,268,347,240 20.09%
1893 9,591 $35,691,050,794 $7,249,548,320 20.31%
1894 8,640 $37,273,979,588 $7,583,983,418 20.35%
1895 9,171 $40,485,396,833 $14,450,837,819 35.69%
1896 9,114 $37,635,787,838 $13,935,828,669 37.03%
1897 10,465 $65,233,518,218 $13,420,819,518 20.57%
1898 10,488 $88,623,056,026 $25,893,418,982 29.22%
1899 13,381 $128,424,427,727 $22,368,630,830 17.42%
1900 14,708 $100,847,362,120 $20,188,204,101 20.02%
1901 15,694 $94,745,487,557 $15,130,950,153 15.97%
1902 13,711 $70,738,482,113 $12,115,619,076 17.13%
1903 15,787 $97,665,095,484 $16,666,608,784 17.07%
1904 13,123 $91,054,010,103 $16,760,980,543 18.41%
1905 11,751 $74,250,820,623 $12,746,288,711 17.17%
1906 10,782 $64,851,063,928 $11,397,574,223 17.57%
1907 10,924 $65,115,970,807 $11,374,726,475 17.47%
1908 9,984 $49,222,255,261 $8,358,040,572 16.98%
1909 10,193 $78,860,899,174 $13,316,487,569 16.89%
1910 10,454 $102,231,927,303 $14,629,452,543 14.31%
1911 10,386 $64,334,722,964 $9,999,031,526 15.54%
1912 10,484 $59,854,593,446 $9,824,010,705 16.41%
Sources: Le Cointe, Paul. L'Amazonie Bresilienne. Paris: Challamel, 1922, pag. 433.
Relatorio da Fazenda do Amazonas, 1918.
Souza, Eloi. A Crise da Borracha e o Esquecimento da amazonia, colegao mossoroense, serie c, volume dlxxii, 
1990 (original written in 1914), table 14.
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C.21: Proceeds from Rubber Exported from Acre Territory, 1904-1912
Quantity of Rubber 
Exported from Acre
Value of Rubber 
Exported from Acre
Rights on Total 
Exports from Acre Export Tariff
tons BRZ mil-reis per ton BRZ mil-reis per ton %
(1) (2) (3) (3)/(2)
1904 2,249 $15,441,988,000 $2,376,932,377 15.39%
1905 8,266 $43,350,036,000 $8,688,284,140 20.04%
1906 8,553 $44,945,604,000 $9,167,776,000 20.40%
1907 11,192 $57,440,859,000 $13,545,117,000 23.58%
1908 11,270 $48,088,589,000 $9,467,295,725 19.69%
1909 10,830 $74,076,902,000 $14,073,496,372 19.00%
1910 11,513 $107,706,504,000 $19,866,541,559 18.45%
1911 10,576 $63,159,130,000 $9,671,715,000 15.31%
1912 11,753 $61,561,393,000 $12,389,612,000 20.13%
Sources: Le Cointe, Paul. L'Amazonie Bresilienne. Paris: Challamel, 1922, pp. 413; 433-4 and 446.
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C.23: American Rubber Concerns Incorporated in London and still active in March 1911
Firm type Incorporation Date area claimed  
(in Acres)
Authorised Capital 
(in £)
Issued Capital 
( in f )
R eglonl Region2 Reg!on3
British Honduras Rubber, Ltd plantations fev /1910 18,513 95,000 70,000 Central America British Honduras n.a.
Posoltega Rubber Estates, Ltd plantations set/1907 700 30,000 22,507 Central America Nicaragua n.a.
Castilla Rubber Plantations, Ltd plantations abr/1910 13,400 115,000 115,000 Central America Panama Veraguas
Henriquez Estates, Ltd both nov/1908 over 40,000 acres 36,000 31,000 Central America Panama n.a.
Henriquez South Rubber Estates, Ltd both fev /1910 10,330 50,000 40,500 Central America Panama n.a.
Amistad Rubber Plantations and Estates, Ltd plantations ago/1910 27,961 120,000 103,500 North America Mexico Chiapas
Anglo Mexican Rubber Estates, Ltd n.a. m ai/1910 160,540 895,000 895,000 North America Mexico Coahuila
El Palmar Rubber Estates, Ltd wild m ar/1910 4,680 145,000 145,000 North America Mexico Vera Cruz
Filisola Rubber and Produce Estates plantations abr/1910 24,000 120,000 92,000 North America Mexico Tehuantepec
Guayule Rubber Co, Ltd wild abr/1910 n.a. 400,000 400,000 North America Mexico n.a.
M ano Marquez (Mexico) Rubber and Tobacco Estates plantations n.a. 20,000 100,000 91,918 North America Mexico Oaxaca
San Cristobal (Mexico) Rubber, Tobacco and Estates Co., Ltd plantations nov/1909 17,000 60,000 60,000 North America Mexico Oaxaca
Soconusco Rubber Plantations, Ltd n.a. abr/1910 5,600 200,000 173,400 North America Mexico Chiapas
Standard Rubber Corporation of Mexico n.a. m ar/1910 980,000 300,000 200,000 North America Mexico n.a.
Anglo-Bolivian Rubber Estates, Ltd wild abr/1910 900,000 125,000 115,000 South America Bolivia Velasco
Galvez Rubber Estates, Ltd wild m ar/1907 n.a. 150,000 130,688 South America Bolivia Caupolican
La M artona Rubber Estates, Ltd wild fev /1910 1,280,000 250,000 66,619 South America Bolivia Santa Cruz
Zongo Rubber Estate, Ltd wild fev /1910 110,000 120,000 100,000 South America Bolivia La Paz
Alves Braga Rubber Estates and Trading Co., Ltd wild jan /1909 215,000 440,000 276,357 South America Brazil ParS
British and Brazilian Rubber Planters and M anufacturers, Ltd plantations fev /1910 375,000 250,000 119,952 South America Brazil Bahia
Ceara Rubber Estates, Ltd plantations fev /1910 4,000 50,000 30,000 South America Brazil Ceari
Diamantino Rubber Plantations, Ltd plantations m ar/1910 16,000 100,000 97,490 South America Brazil Pari
Island (Para) Rubber Estates, Ltd wild ju l/1910 3,400 70,000 57,000 South America Brazil Pari,  M arajd  Island
Jequie Rubber Syndicate, Ltd plantations ago/1908 80,000 40,000 40,000 South America Brazil Bahia
Lagoa Rubber Plantations, Ltd n.a. m ai/1910 988 50,000 21,500 South America Brazil Pari
Par i (M arajo) Islands Rubber Estates, Ltd wild abr/1910 150,000 125,000 100,000 South America Brazil Pari, M arajo  Island
Rubber Corporation of Brazil, Ltd plantations abr/1910 1,235,000 250,000 191,666 South America Brazil Bahia
Serinha Rubber Estate, Ltd n.a. m ar/1910 5,000 50,000 40,000 South America Brazil Ceara
St. Antonio (Para) Rubber Estates, Ltd wild abr/1910 15,840 75,000 75,000 South America Brazil Para
W est Jequi6 Rubber Estates, Ltd both jan /1910 5,000 50,000 50,000 South America Brazil Bahia
British Guiana Balata Co. mainly wild m ai/1910 448,000 60,000 38,700 South America British Guiana Essequibo River
Consolidated Rubber and Balata Estates, Ltd n.a. set/1909 n.a. 250,000 246,466 South America British Guiana n.a.
Coverden Rubber & Produce Co., Ltd n.a. Jun/1910 1,525 50,000 40,000 South America British Guiana Dem erara River
David Young Rubber Estates (British Guiana), Ltd plantations jun /1910 3,841,000 85,000 51,000 South America British Guiana Aruka River
Demerara Rubber Co., Ltd both abr/1910 2,561,210 90,000 80,000 South America British Guiana n.a.
Essequibo Rubber and Tobacco Estates, Ltd wild abr/1910 128,000 100,000 97,373 South America British Guiana n.a.
H. & U. Rubber and Coffee Estates, Ltd wild abr/1910 400,000 195,000 180,000 South America Colombia Magdalena River
La Libertad Rubber and Cocoa Estate Co., Ltd plantations ju l/1910 12,500 60,000 60,000 South America Colombia Magdalena River
Dutch Guiana Balata and Rubber Concessions, Ltd n.a. m ai/1910 n.a. 100,000 South America Dutch Guiana n.a.
Paramaribo Rubber and Tim ber Estates, Ltd plantations fev /1909 25,000 60,000 10,315 South America Dutch Guiana Surinam
Pacaya Rubber and Produce Co., Ltd wild m ar/1910 187,000 175,000 155,000 South America Peru Pacaya River
Peruvian Amazon Co., Ltd wild set/1907 7,680,000 1,000,000 850,732 South America Peru n.a.
Castara Estates, Ltd plantations fev /1908 over 1,000 acres 100,000 100,000 South America Trinidad and Tobago n.a.
Total 21,003,187 7,186,000 5,860,682
Source: Rubber Producing Companies, Capitalised in Sterling, March 1911. Note: n.a. = not available.
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Appendix D: Productivity in Rubber Manufacturing
362
D.01 Notes on Productivity in the Rubber Manufacturing Industry
A standard measure of productivity in rubber manufacturing is only available for 
the period after the First World War. For earlier years, productivity is usually measured as 
consumption of crude rubber, the main input in the industry, over the number of wage 
earners in that very same industry. As Figure D.02 shows, in the current measure of 
productivity there is no persistent productivity gap in favour of either Britain or the United 
States. According to Woodruff447, also cited by Broadberry448, labour productivity gap 
(measured as consumption of crude rubber per wage earner) only opened up after WW1.
Although this measure of productivity provides an idea of how much crude rubber 
a worker was able to process, it is probably more a technological than a productivity 
measure per se. In order to understand how misleading this measure of productivity may 
be, consider the extreme example. Imagine that to produce one tyre, Industry A consumes 
5kg of crude rubber and employs 1 worker whereas Industry B consumes 40kg of rubber 
and employs 4 workers. According to the current measure of productivity based on 
consumption of crude rubber per wage earner, we would have a productivity gap of 2:1 
favouring Industry B. However, both industries are producing only one tyre and whereas 
technology in Industry A allows it to employ only one worker, Industry B requires 4 
workers, implying an actual productivity gap of 4:1 in favour of Industry A (see Figure 
D.03).
In the absence of any measure of prices and physical production of rubber 
manufactures, and in view that the rubber industry comprises several different products, 
productivity in the US rubber industry can only be computed from 1849 onwards as gross 
production of rubber goods per wage earner, deflated by the price of crude rubber. True, 
the best measure of productivity would be based on a composite index of rubber 
manufactures but in the absence of such index, crude rubber price will be used as unit 
value instead. As the thesis shows, this unit value measure discounts off quality 
differentials to some extent.
Figure D.05 shows the results for the period under analysis here. From 1869 to 
1909, the current value of production increased 13.6-fold and in real terms 6.2-fold. The 
implicit price of crude rubber from US import statistics was used as deflator and, as can 
be inferred from column 2 , crude rubber price increased 2 .2-fold in the same period. 
Based on the number of wage earners in the industry, it is possible to compute the gross 
production per worker at 1910 US dollars and the results are shown in the last column. 
Apart from 1869, when a wage earner produced US$7,541 worth of rubber goods, the 
other years seem to indicate that between 1879 and 1909, a rubber worker would have 
produced on average US$5,177 worth of rubber goods (this is just the average of the last 
column). Note that productivity decreased quite drastically in 1899 reaching US$4,400 
and only with the further development of the tyre production at the turn of the century did it 
increase again.
Unfortunately, there is no equivalent dataset for Britain that would allow us 
compare productivity in the nineteenth century as the first UK Census of Production was 
only taken in 1907. Figure D.06 below then compares productivity in rubber manufacturing 
between the United States and Britain in the nearest years possible: 1904 and 1909 for 
the United States against 1907 and 1912 for Britain. The difference here is that implicit 
rubber prices from imports registered different values in these two countries and we are 
faced with two possible deflators: the British rubber price and the US rubber price. 
However, regardless of which deflator we choose, productivity in the British rubber 
industry (converted into US dollars) in 1907 and 1912 is much smaller than the values 
computed for the USA.
Once converting all productivity estimates into US dollars, it is possible to compute 
the productivity gap across the Atlantic. Using US crude rubber prices as deflator, the 
productivity gap ranged from 2.1:1.0 to 2.5:1.0 favouring the United States whereas under 
UK crude rubber prices, the productivity gap stood around 2:1. These estimates are in line
447 Woodruff (1955, p. 380).
448 Broadberry (1997, p. 208).
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with Broadberry’s figures for the whole manufacturing sector449 despite the fact that they 
do not take into account specialisation of production or quality differentials (as our unit 
value measure is crude rubber and not an index of the price of rubber manufactures). 
Indeed, the production mix of rubber goods was quite different: whereas rubber tyres 
accounted for only 32% and 38% of overall rubber manufacture gross production in the 
UK in 1907 and 1912, respectively, rubber tyres accounted for 74% of overall US rubber 
production in 1914. Conversely, footwear and waterproofing clothes remained relatively 
more important in Britain compared to the USA. However, product structure might be 
disregarded as an explanation of the productivity gap insofar as after 1930s the product 
mix in the two countries was basically the same but the productivity gap remained.450 
Quality differentials, in turn, are more difficult to assess, but it might be the case that the 
United States were buying low quality rubber (at least at the margin) which could have 
limited and influenced the quality of their rubber manufacture products.
In sum, there is evidence that the productivity gap between the United States and 
Britain in rubber manufacturing was very substantial already in the first decade of the 
twentieth century, probably in line with the rest of the manufacturing sector. However, 
given the high estimates of productivity in the US rubber industry in the nineteenth century, 
it is possible that the British rubber industry might have always been a laggard, a result 
that would be in stark contrast with the current measure of productivity.
449 Broadberry (1997).
450 Broadberry (1997, p. 285).
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D.02: Productivity as Consumption of Crude Rubber per Wage Earner, 1870-1910
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Sources: a) US consumption of rubber in long tons and number of wage earners in the US Rubber industry were both obtained by interpolation of data for 1869, 1879, 1889, 1899, 1904, 1909 and 1914: all 
data from several issues of the US Census of Manufactures; b) UK rubber consumption in long tons computed as Net Imports of crude rubber into the UK from (Barker, p. 14); c) Number of rubber workers 
were obtained by interpolation of data from Woodruff (1855, p. 71), Census of England and W ales (1871, 1881, 1891, 1901 and 1911) and UK Census of Production (1907 and 1912).
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D.03: Computation of Rubber Productivity
A
Industry
B
(1) Production (in tyres) 1 1
(2) Rubber Consumption (in kg) 5 10
(3) Employment (in number of people) 1 4
Current Measure of Productivity: (2)/(3) 5 / 1 : 4 0 / 4 1 : 2
Standard Measure of Productivity: (1)/(3) 1/1:1/4 4:1
Source: Elaborated by me, based on a hypothetical example explained in the text.
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D.04: Growth of US Rubber Manufacturing Industry, 1849-1909
Establishments Average number of Earners Annual Wages Value of Products
Rubber 
Consumption 
(long tons)
Rubber Consumption 
per Wage Earner
Production Value 
per Wage Earner Average Wage
1849 36 2,602 544,236 3,039,735 1,000 0.38 1,168.23 209.16
1859 37 3,047 858,062 5,945,710 1,500 0.49 1,951.33 281.61
1869 56 6,025 2,559,877 14,566,374 3,756 0.62 2,417.66 424.88
1879 104 11,789 4,051,431 25,309,648 7,500 0.64 2,146.89 343.66
1889 167 20,152 9,526,909 42,853,817 14,960 0.74 2,126.53 472.75
1899 301 36,566 15,426,573 99,880,693 20,308 0.56 2,731.52 421.88
1904 265 43,873 20,084,166 148,015,391 26,089 0.59 3,373.72 457.78
1909 267 49,264 25,136,976 197,394,638 39,789 0.81 4,006.87 510.25
Source: Elaborated from Barker, PT. Rubber Industry of the United States, 1839-1939, US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Trade Promotion Series n.
197, 1939, p. 13.
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D.05: Productivity in the US Rubber Industry, 1869-1909
Gross Value of Production 
(current US$) US Price (US$) per kg of Rubber
Value of Production 
(1910 US$)
Gross Production per 
Worker (1910 US$)
1869 14,566,374 0.71 45,436,636 7,541
1879 25,309,648 0.90 62,078,693 5,266
1889 42,853,817 0.84 111,917,719 5,554
1899 99,880,693 1.37 160,905,682 4,400
1904 148,015,391 1.51 216,054,484 4,925
1909 197,394,638 1.54 282,737,669 5,739
Source: Elaborated from Census of Manufactures, US Trade and Navigation Reports and Barker (1939). 
Note: Values were deflated using the US Price per kg of rubber as the unit value.
D.06: Rubber Manufacturing Productivity, 1904-1912
USA 1904 UK 1907 USA 1909 UK 1912
Production Levels
Current Price (US$) 148,015,391 43,292,880 197,394,638 62,336,000
at 1910 US Rubber Price (US$) 216,054,484 56,570,149 282,737,669 73,886,059
at 1910 UK Rubber Price (US$) 283,210,432 79,344,672 290,260,706 94,399,922
Number of Wage Earners 43,873 24,039 49,264 31,900
Unit Value (in US$)
Current Rubber Prices in the USA 1.51 - 1.54 -
Rubber Price in 1910 in the USA 2.21 - 2.21 -
Current Rubber Prices in the UK - 1.55 - 1.88
Rubber Price in 1910 in the UK - 2.85 - 2.85
Productivity (in US$)
at 1910 US Rubber Prices 4,925 2,353 5,739 2,316
at 1910 UK Rubber Prices 6,455 3,301 5,892 2,959
Productivity Gap US Prices UK Prices
USA1904/UK1907 2.1 2.0
USA1909/UK1907 2.4 1.8
USA1909/UK1912 2.5 2.0
Sources: US Census of Manufactures (1904 and 1909) and UK Census of Production (1907 and 1912). Rubber prices were used to estimate Unit Value and were computed as the implicit price from crude 
rubber imports: total value of crude rubber imports over total quantity of crude rubber imported. Crude rubber import data were obtained from US Trade and Navigation Reports and from UK Parliamentary 
Papers. UK values were converted into US dollars using exchange data presented in Appendix B.
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